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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
During the first decade of its existence, the Irish Free State was governed by the 
largest political party in the Dáil, Cumann na nGaedheal. Translated to English, 
Cumann na nGaedheal literally meant the organisation or society of the Irish and, as 
noted by Ciara Meehan, the name ‘strongly echoed’1 Cumann Lúthcleas Gael, the Irish 
term for the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). During the formative years of Irish 
statehood, Cumann na nGaedheal in government grappled with the enormous 
challenges facing the newly independent Irish state. Perhaps the greatest legacy of its 
decade in power was the successful establishment of a fully functioning liberal 
democracy in a country that had become accustomed to sending its elected 
representatives to the Imperial Parliament in Westminster since the 1801 Act of Union. 
During its decade in government, Cumann na nGaedheal succeeded in legitimising the 
authority of the Irish Free State across the twenty-six counties. Moreover, in peacefully 
ceding power to Eamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil party, usually translated as the soldiers 
of destiny, in 1932, Cumann na nGaedheal showed that the new state was built on firm 
democratic foundations.  
In spite of its apparent successes in Irish state-building, by 1933 Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s identity had been submerged within a new political organisation to be 
called the United Ireland Party. Within a few years of its formation this party was known 
more commonly by its Irish title, Fine Gael, the tribe or family of the Irish. Coakley 
suggests Fine Gael provided a neater balance to the name Fianna Fáil and that its 
popularisation coincided with the Treatyite party’s electoral and psychological eclipse 
by its main rival.
2
 In addition, the ‘Fine Gael’ label bore connotations of its parent party 
lending credence to suggestions the new party was ‘Cumann na nGaedheal writ small’.3 
Having dominated Irish politics for ten years, Cumann na nGaedheal was relegated to 
                                                          
1
 Ciara Meehan, The Cosgrave party: a history of Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923-33 (Dublin, 2010), p. 8. 
2
 John Coakley, ‘The significance of names: the evolution of Irish party labels’ in Études Irlandaises, 5 
(1980), pp 174-8. 
3
  Meehan, Cosgrave party, p. xiv. 
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second place behind the new party of its old adversary, de Valera.  In the year of its 
second electoral defeat to Fianna Fáil, Cumann na nGaedheal’s unique identity was 
jettisoned as party leader W.T. Cosgrave and his colleagues joined forces with Frank 
MacDermott’s National Centre Party and Eoin O’Duffy’s National Guard (Blueshirts). 
However, the merger failed to transform the opposition’s fortunes for the better. Fine 
Gael remained second to Fianna Fáil at every general election from 1937 until 2007, 
emerging as the largest party for the first time in March 2011. In the intervening 
seventy-eight years Fine Gael only ever served in government in sporadic coalitions that 
have always included the Labour party. As such, the elections of 1932 and 1933 effected 
lasting political realignment in Ireland, with the party that had prided itself on having 
‘founded the state’ bequeathing a largely fruitless inheritance to Fine Gael. 
In 1923 the Cumann na nGaedheal party seemed to have held all the electoral cards 
worth playing. With the Civil War over, the Free State’s authority ran through the 
twenty-six counties where most people desired peace and stability after years of 
bloodshed and chaos. In that year, the party’s main opponents were demoralised, lacked 
public sympathy and had nowhere to turn at the end of a political cul-de-sac. Moreover, 
the pro-Treaty party had inherited from Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith the majority 
section of the revolutionary Sinn Féin coalition (1917-21)
4
 and was better placed than its 
anti-Treaty rival to expand into the wider, non-revolutionary constituency. This included 
old Irish party constitutionalists, commercial farmers and the professional and business 
classes. Yet by 1933, Cumann na nGaedheal had ceded serious ground to de Valera’s 
revamped anti-Treaty party which may have lost the war of 1922/23 but was proving it 
could win the peacetime longue durée. Having lost two general elections in an eleven 
month period, the self-proclaimed ‘National Party’, Cumann na nGaedheal, found itself 
forced to merge, as an equal partner, with MacDermott’s Centre Party and O’Duffy’s 
Blueshirts. It is indicative of the perilous position of the former ‘government party’ by 
1933 that it should accept merger on these terms with a minor party of independents and 
farmers and another non-parliamentary political group led by a man whom they knew 
could be volatile and difficult to work with.
5
 
                                                          
4
 Michael Laffan, ‘The unification of Sinn Féin in 1917’ in IHS, xvii, no. 67 (March1971), pp 353-79. 
5
 Fearghal McGarry, Eoin O’Duffy: a self-made hero (Oxford, 2005), p. 174. 
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 This thesis endeavours to tease out the reasons for Cumann na nGaedheal’s loss of 
support and the consequent political realignment of 1932-33. Political parties often 
rebuild from the opposition benches and the merger to form Fine Gael could be 
interpreted simply as a pro-Treaty rebranding exercise. However, the question of Fine 
Gael’s origins in 1933 is a more complex one that requires scrutiny. On its foundation, 
the Fine Gael leaders were keen to stress the discontinuity with the old Cumann na 
nGaedheal organisation as was reflected in the new party’s leadership structure.6 Initially 
at least, the Fine Gael project was an attempt to move away from the Cumann na 
nGaedheal (and Civil War) legacy by creating a new force in Irish politics. In particular, 
the Centre Party leaders James Dillon and MacDermott stressed the need to move on 
from the bitter controversy of the Civil War and seemed to genuinely regard Fine Gael 
as a fresh start. It also represented a new beginning for elements within Cumann na 
nGaedheal who had been growing disillusioned with the excessively moderate and 
cautious approach of the party’s leadership. What were the underlying causes of this 
political transformation in 1933? Can an explanation be found by examining an assumed 
dearth of pro-Treaty grass-root organisation during the time of Cumann na nGaedheal or 
do we need to cast our net further by looking at the rapidly changing world of the early 
1930s in understanding Cumann na nGaedheal’s disappearance as an independent party 
in 1933? 
Broad outline of Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923-33 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s performance in government could be described as solid if 
at times unspectacular and has been looked at in detail by historians such as Alvin 
Jackson, Ronan Fanning, and Dermot Keogh, among others. The party quickly adopted a 
cautious, fiscally conservative approach to governance based on a commitment to what 
Patricia Clavin describes as ‘gold standard orthodoxy’,7 that is, balanced budgets, 
controlled expenditure and minimum government interference. This was the prevailing 
financial policy of the period after the First World War. Arguably, the cost of 
reconstruction following the destruction wrought by the Civil War, and the wider 
economic problems facing post-war Europe, necessitated an economic policy such as 
that pursued by Cosgrave’s administration. In other areas of policy, Cumann na 
                                                          
6
 Maurice Manning, The Blueshirts (Dublin, 2006), pp 89-91. 
7
 Patricia Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939 (London, 2000), p. 46. 
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nGaedheal claimed it governed in the interests of the nation as a whole and at times 
acted as though it alone could divine precisely what was in the national interest. Cumann 
na nGaedheal’s steadfast commitment to balanced budgets, regardless of the political 
consequences, is best illustrated in Ernest Blythe’s reduction of the old age pension from 
ten shillings to nine shillings per week in the budget of 1924. Keeping the state’s 
finances in the black was seemingly more important to Blythe and his department of 
Finance officials than the welfare of some of the poorer sections of the community.
8
 
Through most of its decade in power, Cumann na nGaedheal had as its priority the day-
to-day survival of the administrative machine of the Irish Free State. Indeed, Tom 
Garvin argues that the most successful Dáil departments were headed by ministers who 
took a pro-Treaty line following the split in the Sinn Féin movement.
9
 
 Historians have, however, identified some rare examples of innovation from the 
Cumann na nGaedheal administration during its period in office. On 13 August 1925 a 
contract was signed with the German firm Siemens for the construction of the 
Ardnacrusha power station as part of Industry and Commerce minister Patrick 
McGilligan’s Shannon Hydro-Electric Scheme. The Electricity Supply Board (ESB) was 
established in 1927 as an integral part of the government’s ambitious electrification 
programme.
10
 McGilligan’s proposal was a colossal undertaking for the newly 
independent state and it was achieved in spite of the hostility of the department of 
Finance and the political opposition of Labour and the anti-Treatyites. The establishment 
of the Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) in 1927, the first Banking Commission 
and the Currency Commission are cited as enterprising initiatives while the setting up of 
a national radio station, 2RN, in January 1926, has been described as the final 
modernising action of the 1920s.
11
  
 Given the bloody nature of the Free State’s inception, the new government faced 
an enormous challenge in establishing a respected native police force in Ireland. Under 
the guidance of Kevin O’Higgins, the Minister for Home Affairs, and his police 
commissioner Eoin O’Duffy, a new, unarmed police force was gradually extended 
                                                          
8
 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland: revolution and state building (Dublin, 2005), p. 38. 
9
 Tom Garvin, 1922: the birth of Irish democracy (Dublin, 1996), p. 56. 
10
 Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland, p. 37. 
11
 Ibid., p. 37. 
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throughout the Free State in 1923.
12
 The new police force would play a significant role 
in restoring law-and-order in independent Ireland and was quickly accepted and 
respected by Free Staters and Republicans alike. The re-establishment of law-and-order 
fed into Cumann na nGaedheal’s identity as the party that would prove Ireland was 
capable of self-government. As noted by Alvin Jackson, Cumann na nGaedheal 
succeeded in winning loyalty to the state without securing partisan party political 
support for itself.
13
 
Cumann na nGaedheal government offered voters who favoured a return to bread-
and-butter politics the best prospect of stability and security in the years following 
independence. That was an electoral card grasped by the Treatyites during the Dáil 
Treaty debates and the subsequent Civil War. As will be seen throughout this study, the 
Treaty settlement, as a basis for national progress, had widespread support among the 
general population of the twenty-six counties. It must be remembered that a decade 
earlier, most nationalists had framed their aspirations within the confines of a Home 
Rule settlement. Outside Sinn Féin, the 1921 Treaty was broadly welcomed by the 
sectional interest parties who fared well in the 1922 and 1923 elections. Delivering on 
promised peace and stability was Cumann na nGaedheal’s trump card until Fianna Fáil 
entered the Dáil in 1927, thereby accepting the legitimacy of the Free State. On taking 
their seats, de Valera’s party provided the first credible alternative to Cosgrave’s 
administration. Labour never attained the electoral support required to offer anything 
more than a nominal opposition to the Cumann na nGaedheal government.  
By 1932 the country was willing to embrace change as most European countries 
turned to alternative policies. The onset of the Great Depression had discredited the 
liberal economic order, largely adhered to by Cumann na nGaedheal. Throughout the 
1920s, the Free State endured a harsh economic climate, and this was exacerbated 
following the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The onset of the Great Depression placed 
further pressure on the Free State’s economy, while governments all around Europe 
began to fall under the strain of unpopular decisions that failed to satisfy disgruntled 
voters. In some cases, democracy itself collapsed under the weight of the dire economic 
problems facing Europe, as weak parliamentary majorities crumbled under the weight of 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., p. 19. 
13
 Alvin Jackson, Ireland, 1798-1998: politics and war (Oxford, 1999), p. 282. 
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what seemed insurmountable problems. Ireland’s democracy, established on strong 
foundations by Cumann na nGaedheal, survived the Depression, but its fiscally 
conservative government did not. Cumann na nGaedheal endured longer than many 
governments across Europe but nonetheless suffered its first electoral reverse in 
February 1932. The election had been called prematurely so as to avoid the politicisation 
of a Eucharistic Congress, due to take place in June. Although it only dropped 3,000 
votes nationally, Cumann na nGaedheal was supplanted as the largest party in the state 
by Fianna Fáil which seems to have mobilised electors who had previously not voted in 
Free State elections.
14
 However, the death knell tolled for Cumann na nGaedheal a year 
later when a snap general election was called. Unprepared for the contest, Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s parliamentary strength slumped by a further nine seats and it now faced a 
prolonged spell on the opposition benches.  
Many historians and political scientists are quick to attribute Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s demise on its failure to build a strong party machine,15 or to give rank-and-
file branch members a greater say in policy or the running of the party. Undoubtedly, 
Fianna Fáil was much better organised and spent its years in opposition meticulously 
building up a party machine that could sweep it to power. Nonetheless, Cumann na 
nGaedheal too had a loyal following across the country (it secured a plurality of votes 
and seats in three successive general elections) and there is no reason to suggest 
Cosgrave’s party had not the potential to at least match the organisational capacity of its 
main rival. Addressing this point raises a number of important questions. Was Cumann 
na nGaedheal, as has been suggested,
16
 a nineteenth-century style ‘cadre party’17 cut 
adrift in an era of mass politics? If so, why would two parties with common origins in 
the revolutionary Sinn Féin movement adopt such contrasting approaches to party 
organisation? More critically, was the disparity in organisational strength between 
Cumann na nGaedheal and the anti-Treatyites as wide as has been perceived? Is it 
possible that Cumann na nGaedheal branches were active in the constituencies in spite 
                                                          
14
 Richard English, Irish freedom: the history of nationalism in Ireland (London, 2006), p. 328. 
15
 Liam Weeks, ‘Parties and the party system’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the 
Republic of Ireland (London, 2010), pp 137-67. 
16
 David M. Farrell, ‘Ireland: centralisation, professionalization and competitive pressures’ in Richard S. 
Kratz and Peter Mair (eds), How parties organize: change and adaptation in party organizations in western 
democracies (London, 1994), pp 216-41. 
17
 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: their organization and activity in the modern state (London, 1969), 
pp 62-79.  
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of the perceived indifference of government ministers? These questions will be tackled 
in the first five chapters of this work. 
This thesis is divided into two parts in recognition of the twin objectives at the 
heart of the project. Testing the actual strength of the Cumann na nGaedheal party 
organisation on the ground in three constituencies will form the first part of this research 
project (chapters one to five). In the second part of the thesis (chapters six to eight), a 
second issue will be addressed: to what extent did international factors impact on 
Ireland’s domestic politics? Were the domestic policy choices on offer in 1932 part of 
wider trends then discernable on the European continent? As such, the second part of 
this thesis will go on to place the experience of the Irish Free State during this period in 
a wider, European context so as to properly analyse its response to the worldwide 
economic problems of the 1920s and early 1930s. Being mindful that Ireland did not 
exist in a vacuum, chapters six to eight will chart the fortunes of governments across 
Europe as they grappled with problems not dissimilar to those facing Cosgrave and his 
ministerial colleagues.  
Existing Literature 
Until recently, little scholarly attention has been given to Fine Gael’s parent party, 
Cumann na nGaedheal. While a plethora of works have charted the revolutionary period 
1916-23, and in particular the iconic figures Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera, 
much less has been written of the Free State period under Cumann na nGaedheal. 
Michael Laffan, both in numerous articles and in his book The resurrection of Ireland: 
the Sinn Féin party, 1916-23 (Cambridge, 1999), expertly discusses the unification of 
disparate nationalist forces under the Sinn Féin label in 1917. His work describes the 
coalition nature of revolutionary Sinn Féin and the compromises made to achieve party 
unity. Laffan’s book also examines the organisational structures of the revolutionary 
movement, an understanding of which is a pre-requisite in trying to comprehend the 
structures adopted by Cumann na nGaedheal. 
To a considerable extent, Cumann na nGaedheal’s historiography tends to focus on 
the party’s shortcomings and the near inevitability of de Valera’s rise to power. The 
legacy of the Civil War meant that it was some time before the more controversial 
aspects of the state’s early years could be given scholarly attention while the outbreak of 
xiv 
 
the northern ‘Troubles’ in 1969 further influenced the shape of the historiography of the 
Free State period. In 1971 the pro-Treaty tradition was first examined in depth through 
the lens of Eoin O’Duffy’s Blueshirts. At that time Maurice Manning told the story of 
the Treatyite shirted movement in his landmark study simply called The Blueshirts. In 
his work, Manning discussed the Blueshirts’ origins, subsequent development and also 
examined their relationship to European Fascism in the 1930s. Manning concluded that 
the movement lacked all the elements of hardcore Fascism while having some of its 
overt trappings. In 1997 another study of the Blueshirts appeared. Mike Cronin’s 
treatment of the subject, The Blueshirts and Irish politics, is thematic in nature and, in 
contrast to Manning’s work, dealt in detail with the organisational structures of the 
Blueshirt organisation and the motivations of grass-root activists. Cronin argues that the 
Blueshirts played a key role in realigning the political opposition to Fianna Fáil,
18
 and in 
the tense political climate of the early 1930s, provided more potent opposition to de 
Valera than the constitutional force of Cumann na nGaedheal could muster.
19
 Fearghal 
McGarry’s 2005 biography, Eoin O’Duffy: a self-made hero, informs our knowledge of 
O’Duffy’s youth, his experience of the revolutionary war and cultural motivations while 
also dealing with the General’s fraught relationships with his political masters in the 
1920s and early 1930s. Moreover, the biography sheds further light on the vacuum at the 
heart of Treatyite politics that enabled O’Duffy become President of Fine Gael in 
September 1933.
20
  
As regards to studies dealing exclusively with the party that preceded Fine Gael, 
little appeared until 1988. Maryann Gialanella Valiulis’s article: ‘After the revolution: 
The formative years of Cumann na nGaedheal’ focuses on the tumultuous events of 
1924, namely the army mutiny and the secession of nine Cumann na nGaedheal 
deputies. Valiulis hones in on the release by the party’s Standing Committee of a 
document in October 1924 entitled ‘Statement of Views’. Valiulis terms this document 
the ‘October Manifesto’,21 and describes it as an attempt by the ‘dissident wing’ to move 
beyond the confines of the Treaty in an effort to create a post-independence national 
                                                          
18
 Mike Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish politics (Dublin, 1997), p. 14. 
19
 Ibid., p. 21. 
20
 McGarry, Eoin O’Duffy, p. 242. 
21
 Maryann Gialenella Valiulis, ‘After the revolution: the formative years of Cumann na nGaedheal’ in 
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movement. The dissidents, she argues, were disillusioned with the cautious approach of 
the ‘conservative wing’ dominant within the government from 1924. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s internal mechanics were not dealt with in monograph 
form until 1999 in John M. Regan’s The Irish counter revolution, 1921-1936: Treatyite 
politics and settlement in independent Ireland. This was the first work to examine, in 
detail, Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation and the divisions within the party and 
government. This work showed a party, itself born of revolution, struggle with the 
reality of having to consolidate the gains of the Treaty while simultaneously countering 
the new revolutionary forces unleashed during the Irish Civil War. Regan’s book also 
suggests that the deaths of Collins and Griffith left a somewhat enigmatic legacy and 
identity to Cumann na nGaedheal which could be open to conflicting interpretations 
within the overall Treatyite movement. In Regan’s view, Griffithite Sinn Féiners, 
militarist republicans, parsimonious free-traders and economic protectionists came 
together under the new party banner to put down a war waged by the anti-Treaty forces 
against the fledgling Free State and to develop a national policy on the basis of the 
settlement. Regan’s book portrays Cumann na nGaedheal as a badly organised party that 
lacked cohesion and vision. The work also deals with Fine Gael and the Blueshirts up to 
1936 arguing that a broad nationalist consensus had emerged in the twenty-six counties 
by then.  
While having a different focus to the Counter revolution thesis, here it is hoped to 
address some of Regan’s questions about the party organisation by analysing Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s constituency structures. In fact, the first book to deal with Cumann na 
nGaedheal exclusively appeared in 2010, three years into this research project. Ciara 
Meehan’s The Cosgrave party: a history of Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923-33 is a 
welcome addition to the party’s historiography. Meehan’s work breaks with the 
perception that Cumann na nGaedheal lacked innovation in its electioneering techniques 
while providing a more positive treatment of the party’s achievements in government. 
While correctly reappraising the cliché of a ‘Cosgrave party’ in decline from 1927, the 
perception of a weak Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in the constituencies remains 
untested in Meehan’s work. In contrast, testing Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisational 
strength is of fundamental importance to this research project. Furthermore, this thesis 
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sets out to understand the reasons for the party’s demise in 1933 and will analyse the 
impact of global economic Depression in Ireland’s domestic politics. 
Cumann na nGaedheal has elsewhere been the focus of historians, writers and 
political scientists. Brian Maye’s general history of the Fine Gael party, Fine Gael, 
1923-1987, published in 1993, deals briefly with the Cumann na nGaedheal period. 
However, this work’s general focus and lack of primary research makes its historical 
value questionable. That said, the biographical details provided of key party figures are 
extensive and of use. In like manner, Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh’s Days of 
blue loyalty: the politics of the membership of the Fine Gael party, published in 2002 to 
convey the results of a 1999 survey of the Fine Gael membership’s politics, deals briefly 
with the Cumann na nGaedheal period. Chapter two of this book explores Fine Gael’s 
traditions and how the modern party’s sense of identity dates to foundation ‘myths’ 
firmly anchored in the Cumann na nGaedheal period. The authors explain that the term 
‘myths’ is not intended to imply that these collective beliefs are untrue, but rather refers 
to shared stories about the past that, regardless of their veracity, help to shape the 
political identity of party members today. As such, these shared memories and traditions 
bestow on party activists a sense of continuity with an unfolding history of political 
commitment to a party cause. Moreover it is argued that members’ perceptions of Fine 
Gael (in 1999 at least) are rooted in Cumann na nGaedheal’s apparent eschewing of 
populist policies, its commitment to law-and-order and adherence to a moderate and 
accommodating nationalism.
22
 Also important is Kevin Rafter’s 2009 work, Fine Gael: 
party at the crossroads. However, this book was primarily concerned with Enda 
Kenny’s Fine Gael, devoting some space to Cumann na nGaedheal only in its second 
chapter. 
Treatyite politics and organisation have been dealt with in general histories of 
Ireland in this period too. Alvin Jackson, Ronan Fanning, Terence Dooley, J.J. Lee, 
Dermot Keogh, David Fitzpatrick and Diarmaid Ferriter have all examined the politics, 
society and economy of Ireland in the twentieth century and have written on the period 
of Cumann na nGaedheal administration. Terence Dooley’s ‘The land for the people’: 
the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004) is particularly important in that 
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it shows the central importance of the land within the politics of the independent state. 
After 1922 the land question remained a core issue in local and national politics, and in 
particular during the Civil War.
23
 Dooley argues that the 1923 Land Act was connected 
to the Free State government’s attempt to cut the anti-Treatyites off from a potential 
resurgence of radical agrarianism. He also argues that grass-root political movements 
had the potential to bring considerable pressure to bear on politicians and Land 
Commission officials.
24
 
In a number of thought-provoking works, Tom Garvin has examined cleavages that 
he identifies within Irish nationalist politics in both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. His The evolution of Irish nationalist politics (Dublin, 1981), and 1922: the 
birth of Irish democracy (Dublin, 1996) in particular are useful tools that help us tp 
understand the origins of pan-nationalist politics in Ireland and the subsequent division 
that emerged between Treatyites and anti-Treatyites. In addition to historical studies, this 
thesis draws on the work of geographers and political scientists who have written in 
Journals such as Irish Geography, Irish Political Studies and World Politics. This thesis 
owes much to political science in its use of terminology such as ‘cadre party’ and ‘mass 
party’. Maurice Duverger’s classic, Political Parties: their organization and activity in 
the modern state proved particularly useful in this regard. In addition, Susan E. 
Scarrow’s Parties and their members: organizing for victory in Britain and Germany 
(New York, 1996) offers an excellent synthesis of some of the seminal work of political 
scientists in the realm of party organisation.  
This thesis also relies on a number of biographies of key figures from the period 
under review. These include Terence de Vere White’s classic biography Kevin 
O’Higgins (London, 1948) and John P. McCarthy’s Kevin O’Higgins: builder of the 
Irish state (Dublin, 2006). Biographies of W.T. Cosgrave by Stephen Collins (Dublin, 
1996) and Anthony Jordan (Dublin, 2006) proved useful as did life stories of Richard 
Mulcahy by Maryann Gialanella Valiulis (Dublin, 1992) and by the general’s son 
Risteárd in 1999 and 2009. 
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Numerous histories with a local focus have also proved invaluable in the chapters 
that deal with Cumann na nGaedheal’s constituency structures, in particular chapters 
three and four. For example, Michael Wheatley’s Nationalism and the Irish party: 
Provincial Ireland 1910-1916 (New York, 2005) looks at the Irish party’s grass-root 
support structures in the five counties of ‘middle Ireland’ Sligo, Roscommon, Leitrim, 
Longford and Westmeath. Wheatley’s work focuses on constitutional nationalism at a 
local level in the years before the Great War and is of particular interest here due to its 
inclusion of Longford and Westmeath (examined in chapter four). His work sheds light 
on the Irish party’s grass-root strength on the eve of the Great War. David Fitzpatrick’s 
Politics and Irish life, 1913-21: provincial experiences of war and revolution (Dublin, 
1977) hones in on County Clare (examined in chapter three of this thesis) to chart the 
fortunes of the Irish party supporting organisations between 1913 and 1921. This book 
also discusses the consequent rise in support for the advanced nationalist policy of Sinn 
Féin in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising. In like manner, Marie Coleman has written of 
County Longford in her County Longford and the Irish revolution, 1910-1923 (Dublin, 
2003). This work charts the decline of the J.P. Farrell-dominated Home Rule movement 
in the county and the rise of Sinn Féin from 1917 after its victory in the South Longford 
by-election. In particular, Coleman’s book focuses on the role played by the North 
Longford Flying Column during the War of Independence. Unlike this thesis, all of these 
works stop short of examining post-Treaty politics in the counties they are concerned 
with. 
This thesis also makes use of a number of studies by historians of other parties such 
as Fianna Fáil and the Irish Labour party. Brian Reynolds’s unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, ‘The formation and development of Fianna Fáil, 1926-32’ (Trinity College 
Dublin, 1976) and Richard Dunphy’s The making of Fianna Fáil power in Ireland, 
1923-1948 (New York, 1995) both inform understanding of the grass-root machine of de 
Valera’s anti-Treaty party. These works also explain the context of de Valera’s rise to 
power. Kevin Rafter’s Sinn Féin, 1905-2005: in the shadow of gunmen (Dublin, 2005) 
covers the party in its various guises, including its third incarnation as the main anti-
Treaty party until 1926.
25
 Also consulted was Niamh Puirséil’s The Irish Labour party, 
1922-73 (Dublin, 2007). This work explains Labour’s failure to build a strong opposition 
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to Cumann na nGaedheal in the 1920s while highlighting the party’s organisational 
weakness across the Free State. 
 Of particular importance to the second part of the thesis were works that charted 
Ireland’s economic and social history. Ronan Fanning’s The Irish Department of 
Finance, 1922-58 (Dublin, 1978) provides the cornerstone to understanding the power of 
that department within the independent Irish state. In addition, Mary E. Daly’s Social 
and economic history of Ireland since 1800 (Dublin, 1981) and Cormac Ó Gráda’s 
Ireland: a new economic history, 1780-1939 (New York, 1994) proved particularly 
helpful in understanding the policies pursued in the Free State during the 1920s and 
1930s. Further insights are gleaned from Mel Cousins’s The birth of social welfare in 
Ireland, 1922-52 (Dublin, 2003) and Brian Girvin’s Between two worlds: politics and 
economy in independent Ireland (Dublin, 1989). 
Aware that Ireland in the 1920s and early 1930s did not exist in a vacuum, this 
thesis also draws on the work of a number of European historians to broadly chart the 
ways in which the Free State corresponds to or diverges from continental trends, 
particularly those affected by global economic conditions. Academics writing during the 
period have proved particularly useful. Warner Moss, in Political parties in the Irish 
Free State (New York, 1933), captures the general expectation that the liberal, 
parliamentary state was about to be replaced by the party state. Mass parties were 
becoming more powerful in 1933 as the world convulsed from the effects of the 
Depression and many new political movements proposed a complete take-over of the 
state arguing that party politics had had their day. Moss cited the Dáil government of 
Sinn Féin, Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as examples of party-
controlled governments.
26
 At the time of writing, the trend seemed inexorable.  José 
Ortega y Gasset’s The revolt of the masses (1930) correctly diagnosed the decadence of 
European parliamentary systems and was attuned to the reaction against liberal political 
values on the Continent. Europeans, according to Gasset, had moved from a period of 
plenitude before the Great War to one of uncertainty and decay in its aftermath with a 
previously all-pervasive optimistic faith in progress shattered by the destruction and 
bloodletting of 1914-18. The Spanish philosopher regarded Communists and Fascists as 
anti-Liberal. Gasset feared that mass parties, of the left and right, threatened to undo all 
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the progress made since the French Revolution and risked plunging Europe into another 
dark age. Pessimism prevailed as Europe lurched to the extremes in a new epoch of 
economic hardship and political convulsions. 
Contemporary understanding of inter-war Europe is further enhanced by the work 
of historians such as Martin Kitchen, David Stevenson, Mark Mazower, Alan Kramer, 
Stanley G. Payne and Patricia Clavin. R.A.C. Parker (London, 1969) provides a firm 
foundation in the history of inter-war Europe in his Europe 1919-45. Kitchen’s Europe 
between the wars (London, 1988) helps to synthesise the complex trends of the period 
into one thematic book, as does Mark Mazower’s excellent Dark continent: Europe’s 
twentieth century (Bath, 1998). It would be foolhardy to write about Europe in the 
aftermath of the Great War without first having a reasonable understanding of the war 
itself and here David Stevenson’s exhaustively researched 1914-1918: The history of the 
First World War (London, 2004) filled the breach. Stevenson’s work also delves into the 
problems that faced the continent in the aftermath of the war. 
More specific works by historians such as Richard J. Evans, Filipe Ribeiro de 
Meneses and Alejandro Quiroga among others were used as they document those 
challenges as they revealed themselves in individual countries such as Germany, 
Portugal and Spain. Frustrated national expectations in the aftermath of the Great War, 
chronic economic problems seemingly unsolved by either liberal institutions or ‘gold 
standard financial orthodoxy’ and political experiments in democracy, Fascism and 
Communism contributed to a generally tense age as Europe emerged from the shadow of 
one war only to begin a journey towards an even more destructive second world war. 
Some of the economic, political and social tensions that characterised Europe between 
the world wars are also discernable in the Irish Free State during the 1920s and 1930s as 
it searched for legitimacy in the first decades of independence. 
Primary Sources 
While making extensive use of the existing literature, this thesis aims to address a 
lacuna in the historiography of Cumann na nGaedheal and so is heavily dependent on 
original research. Having identified a gap in scholarly attention to Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s constituency structures and the wider European context to its policies, this 
thesis aims to bridge the void by using sources held at various repositories. Extensive 
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use was made of personal papers held in the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), the 
National Library of Ireland (NLI), the University College Dublin Archives Department 
(UCDA) and the Cork City and County Archives (CCCA). Sources held in the Killaloe 
Diocesan Archive (KDA) and the Longford County Archive (LCA) were also useful, 
particularly with regard to chapters three and four. Debates of the houses of the 
Oireachtas and local, national and international newspapers were also consulted. 
Interviews conducted with Professor Risteárd Mulcahy and Dr. Garret FitzGerald proved 
illuminating. 
Local newspapers proved invaluable in researching chapters three, four and five. A 
rich source,
27
 these newspapers covered local issues in extensive detail and meetings of 
active organisations were usually reported on. These newspapers also proved useful in 
providing additional background information on some of the local Cumann na 
nGaedheal activists.  National newspapers such as the Irish Independent and the Irish 
Times sometimes covered local party activity but proved most useful in their reporting of 
national events, government policy and party conferences. International publications 
such as The Times, the Manchester Guardian and The Economist proved particularly 
useful in chapters one, six, seven and eight, not just for their coverage of international 
news, but also for their take on events in Ireland. Various Free State, Cumann na 
nGaedheal, Blueshirt and Fine Gael newspapers held in the National Library were also 
scrutinised. These usually were geared towards party supporters and so are more useful 
as indicators of the party’s ethos and the prejudices of supporters than as reliable factual 
guides. In addition, these party organs often carried organisational notes on the activities 
of branches around the country which were utilised in chapters three, four and five. 
The Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books and the Richard Mulcahy papers in 
the UCD Archives proved the best sources on the party’s organisation. The Seán 
MacEoin, Eoin MacNeill, Hugh Kennedy and Martin Conlon papers held there also 
yielded important material. The Liam de Róiste papers, and particularly his diaries, offer 
an intriguing insight into the mind of a leading Cumann na nGaedheal activist in Cork 
and extensive use is made of this source throughout the thesis. In gaining a picture of 
Free State policy, the papers of Ernest Blythe, Kevin O’Higgins and Patrick McGilligan 
(also in the UCD Archives) are used extensively. Sources in the National Archives 
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including the Department of the Taoiseach papers (these included Executive Council 
minutes), and the Frank MacDermott papers illustrated aspects of the party’s approach. 
Also consulted were the Sinn Féin and Cumann na Poblachta papers held in the National 
Archives of Ireland. Given that the party was in government for most of its existence, 
there was little state surveillance of its grass-root activity. With the transfer of power in 
1932 this changed, although most of the reporting in the Department of Justice papers 
from this time centred on the activity of the Blueshirt movement. The Seán Milroy and 
George A. Lyons papers in the National Library provide additional sources on the 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisation while the Celia Shaw diary captures the horrors of 
civil war from the point of view of a leading pro-Treaty activist.  
Structure of the thesis 
As stated, this thesis is organised in two parts. Part I comprises the first five 
chapters, part II the latter four. Chapter one is an introductory chapter that examines the 
origins of the Cumann na nGaedheal party, founded in December 1922 and launched in 
April 1923. It looks at the new cultural nationalism emerging at the turn of the twentieth 
century and the eclipse of the Irish party after 1916. This chapter draws on the work of 
Laffan and Garvin in helping to understand that Sinn Féin was united for four years and 
that the different sides in 1922 represented, to a certain extent, different factions of the 
superficially united revolutionary party. Chapter two outlines Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
national structures and its performance in general elections during the period 1923-33. 
As such, the chapter paves the way for the following three which chart the party 
organisation’s fortunes in three representative constituencies. 
Chapters three, four and five focus exclusively on party life in the three 
constituencies of Clare, Longford/Westmeath and Dublin North. Clare was chosen 
because the western county was the bailiwick of Eamon de Valera and Cumann na 
nGaedheal struggled for support there, only ever winning one of the five seats available. 
Longford/Westmeath was chosen because it lies in the midlands, was a two-county 
constituency and represented something of a middle ground in terms of Cumann na 
nGaedheal support.
28
 In three of the five elections between 1923 and 1933, the party 
won one seat in Longford/Westmeath before gaining a second in September 1927, which 
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was successfully defended as the party lost power in 1932. The third constituency, 
Dublin North was selected because it was an urban constituency representing the 
northern portion of the capital. Moreover, it was something of a Cumann na nGaedheal 
stronghold for much of the period, returning four Cumann na nGaedheal deputies to the 
Dáil in 1923 and September 1927 and three in the elections of June 1927, February 1932 
and January 1933. In addition, Dublin North and Longford/Westmeath witnessed by-
elections in this period while the locations of the three constituencies provide the study 
with something of an even geographical balance.  
Chapter six provides an overview of political, social and economic change in 
Europe from 1918 to 1933. This chapter draws heavily on secondary sources (mentioned 
above) and is designed to set a wider, international context to Irish policy choices that 
are described in chapters seven and eight. Parallels between events in Ireland and Europe 
are noted as are various points of contrast. Chapter seven documents the first period of 
Cumann na nGaedheal government, 1923 to 1928, stopping short of the generally 
accepted date for the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.
29
 The chapter charts the 
government’s attempts to place the new state’s finances on a firm footing arguing that its 
policy preferences largely corresponded with the dominant ‘gold standard orthodoxy’ of 
the period. Chapter eight looks at Free State government policy between 1929 and 1933. 
As such the chapter scrutinises the last years of Cumann na nGaedheal administration 
and the first year of de Valera’s government. The chapter charts the downturn in the 
Irish economy from about 1930 as trade collapsed and recognises that the Cumann na 
nGaedheal cabinet, like most European governments, were slow to realise their mistake 
in simply continuing to pursue deflationary policies. New approaches were needed and 
governments across Europe fell to more radical or extremist alternatives usually 
encompassing some form of economic nationalism as international cooperation all but 
came to an end in the early 1930s. The chapter argues that Fianna Fáil, as the Irish 
advocate of protectionism and economic nationalism, found itself coming to power in 
1932 at a time when its policy was beginning to carry weight internationally.  
In the thesis that follows, it will be seen that there was more to the Cumann na 
nGaedheal party’s organisation and policy than has been depicted to date. The party took 
the reins of government at a very difficult time as the country emerged from a 
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destructive civil war into statehood as the international economy creaked. On losing 
their two leaders, Collins and Griffith in 1922, Cosgrave and his colleagues were 
charged with leading the country through those turbulent years. Having taken the less 
glamorous side in the Treaty division, the political initiative for change would rest 
ultimately with their opponents and recruitment of a mass party membership was neither 
a priority, nor an easy task, for a government facing such gargantuan difficulties. 
However, in the pages that follow it is hoped that the reader will gain some fascinating 
new insights into pro-Treaty mobilisation in the years 1923-33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
 2 
1  
 
 
The Origins of Cumann na nGaedheal 
 
 
 
Although officially launched as a political party on 27 April 1923 at a Conference 
held in the Mansion House on Dublin‟s Dawson Street, Cumann na nGaedheal had roots 
stretching deep into Irish political history. Indeed, even the name Cumann na nGaedheal 
existed as early as September 1900 as an umbrella title devised by Arthur Griffith to link 
a number of small nationalist groupings.
1
 Ireland, long dominated by England, had 
become an integral part of the United Kingdom 100 years earlier through the Act of 
Union in 1801. Throughout the nineteenth century, Ireland was no longer merely an 
English colony but was considered a part of the United Kingdom in much the same way 
as England, Scotland and Wales were. However, that century also saw national 
consciousness rise on the continent bringing about German and Italian unification and 
threatening the continued existence of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire. Ireland, 
never at ease under London‟s control, was not immune. Increasingly influential middle-
class Catholics and progressive-minded Protestants such as Charles Stewart Parnell 
underpinned „the Irish party‟ which believed Ireland could have its own „home rule‟ 
parliament in Dublin while remaining part of the United Kingdom. After the fall of 
Parnell, „the party‟ remained the dominant voice of nationalist Ireland. However, an 
avant-garde of cultural nationalists sought to promote a distinct Irish national culture 
through the formation of the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Celtic Literary Society and 
the Gaelic League. At this time too, a small band of advanced nationalists opposed the 
official policy of nationalist Ireland as espoused by the Irish party, believing that Home 
Rule did not go far enough. 
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 About 1900 advanced, nationalist intellectuals would attend meetings of the original 
„de-anglicizing‟2 Cumann na nGaedheal in promotion of their cultural and political 
activities. Committed to emphasising Ireland‟s status as a nation in its own right, members 
demonstrated their patriotic zeal by giving up their smoking habits so as to deny the 
British treasury extra revenue from the tax on tobacco. In the early days, the 
organisation‟s only policies were support of Irish industry and the „Hungarian policy‟, first 
advocated as a model for Irish independence by Arthur Griffith at the 1902 Cumann na 
nGaedheal convention. Liam de Róiste was a member of Cumann na nGaedheal and the 
Celtic Literary Society in Cork in 1902. His diaries reflect the antagonisms that existed 
between members of the various organisations, the difficulties of keeping the various 
clubs running and the extent to which de Róiste‟s generation were disillusioned with the 
politics of „the party‟.3 Retrospectively, de Róiste noted that he was 
 
Very intolerant in those days of anything that was not truly Irish. Even in the C.L.S we used to 
have arguments over the songs, music, dances, plays [and] entertainments [.] [S]ome who 
regarded themselves as more “extreme” than I was in political ideas, were not with me as to the 
great importance of the Irish language. Music, drama, literature, to them, were things apart from 
our other dreams or ideals.
4
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal evolved with the National Council and other groups 
associated with Griffith to become Sinn Féin in 1905. „Sinn Féin‟ was the title of a 
Conference in the Rotunda concert hall on 28 November 1905 and only became the 
recognisable name of the new organisation in 1907.
5
 This new party advocated the 
abstention of Irish M.P.s from Westminster and Griffith‟s policy of establishing a dual 
British-Irish monarchy, along Austro-Hungarian lines, through passive resistance to the 
British authorities in Ireland.
6
 W.T. Cosgrave was a founding member of Sinn Féin and 
long-term political disciple of Arthur Griffith who established a Sinn Féin branch in 
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 4 
Dublin in those early days. Sinn Féin made little impact during its first decade, and it 
certainly lacked a strong following though some branches did exist in various parts of the 
country from its inception. Cosgrave and six party colleagues were successful in elections 
to the eighty-seat Dublin Corporation in 1909.
7
 In spite of this rather modest success in 
local politics, nationalist Ireland remained dominated by the Irish party.
8
 Indeed, it seems 
that just a few years into its life, the original Sinn Féin was in decay, its sole purpose 
apparently to antagonise Home Rulers. By 1909 what existed of its grass-root structure 
lost vitality and, according to Michael Laffan, seemed to be in terminal decline by 1914.
9
 
However, Griffith‟s journalism, if not the detail of his policy, had a far-reaching effect 
and, having been wrongly arrested after the 1916 Rising, he was greeted by some of his 
fellow inmates as the man whose writing had incited them to rebellion.
10
 Despite Sinn 
Féin‟s having stalled, the new nationalist and cultural organisations such as the GAA and 
the Gaelic League continued their campaigns of Irish cultural revival and the personal 
relationships that developed in these societies would be utilised in the changing political 
landscape up to and after 1916. Advanced nationalism‟s appropriation of the new cultural 
bodies was often resented by Irish party adherents.
11
 
 Monarchical Sinn Féin became a potent force in Irish politics only through its 
accidental association with the 1916 Rebellion. Ardent Treaty supporter P. S. O‟Hegarty 
was adamant in his 1924 polemic The Victory of Sinn Féin that British and Irish party 
propaganda labelled the 1916 Rising as the „Sinn Féin rebellion‟ in an effort to discredit 
the rebellion, such was the weakness of the abstentionist party at that time.
12
 Sinn Féin 
under Griffith had committed itself to passive resistance and a monarchical settlement in 
Ireland, all of which flew in the face of what the leaders of the 1916 rising sought to 
achieve. Following the execution of fifteen republican leaders in the immediate aftermath 
of the rebellion, the mood of the country changed to one of sympathy for the rebels. Sinn 
Féin became a rallying point for this new wave of nationalist fervour which swept the 
country. As O‟Hegarty noted, many people began to identify with Sinn Féin without fully 
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understanding what exactly it stood for or even partially imbibing its dual-monarchy 
proposals. Now registering on the wider public‟s consciousness, Sinn Féin provided the 
diverse elements of Irish separatism with a label around which they could unite and build 
a platform for the future.
13
 Veterans of 1916 did not hesitate to exploit, to their own ends, 
the newfound notoriety of Arthur Griffith‟s Sinn Féin. 
In 1917 Sinn Fein was reconstituted at its Ard Fheis (annual convention) along much 
broader lines than before.
14
 Crucially, Arthur Griffith agreed to step aside as President in 
favour of the most senior survivor of the rebellion, Eamon de Valera. This changeover 
represented not just a broadening of the party‟s brand of nationalism but also the 
inauguration of a new chapter in Irish political development. Sinn Féin in its new 
incarnation was in reality a rather diverse coalition containing many varied shades of 
nationalist opinion, as was evident in the most significant constitutional amendment 
passed by the 1917 convention. In a delicate compromise designed to appease all within 
its ranks, the Ard Fheis voted to amend the party constitution to state that a republic was 
the declared aim of the organisation but that once independence had been achieved a 
referendum should decide what form of government would be adopted by the new state.
15
 
Griffith‟s original dual-monarchists, and the Republicans who had flocked to its ranks 
following the rebellion, were thereby accommodated. Moreover, in adopting such a broad 
policy, the reconstituted party could hope to attract disillusioned followers of John 
Redmond‟s party and possibly supplant it as the voice of nationalist Ireland. However, the 
unity of the newly constituted Sinn Féin party, generally termed revolutionary Sinn Féin, 
was but a superficial one. Already more militant newcomers had come to distrust those 
identified with Griffith‟s original party.16 When it was finally put to the test in December 
1921 over the complex question of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the underlying divisions 
quickly surfaced as the uneasy coalition created in 1917 disintegrated. 
By the beginning of 1919 Sinn Féin had displaced the Irish party and had firmly 
established itself as the voice of mainstream Irish nationalism. It built on historic by-
election victories in 1917 and 1918 by winning 73 of the 106 Irish seats available in the 
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December 1918 British general election. Following the election, Sinn Féin carried out its 
one consistent policy: abstention from Westminster. Instead, its successful candidates set 
up a parliament in Dublin, Dáil Eireann. This assembly reaffirmed the Irish Republic 
proclaimed in Easter 1916 by declaring Irish independence and announcing a Democratic 
Programme. The Dáil in turn elected, as the Republic‟s executive arm, a government 
under de Valera‟s leadership. While the Dáil ministries evolved slowly, and some proved 
more successful than others, their very establishment, along with Sinn Féin‟s impressive 
mandate, represented a direct challenge to continued British rule in Ireland. Sinn Féin 
hoped to capitalise on the post-war move towards self-determination. However, Britain 
had been a victor in the Great War and the United States its ally. Opinion in America was 
divided. While many supported Sinn Féin‟s attempts to secure a hearing at the Paris peace 
conference,
17
 others believed the 1916 Rising had been a stab in the back and that the 
„Irish problem‟ was a domestic issue to be settled by the British government.18 
On the same day as the first Dáil met, the first shooting in what became known as the 
War of Independence occurred in Soloheadbeg in south Tipperary. Acting on their own 
initiative, a group of Volunteers led by Dan Breen ambushed an RIC patrol killing two 
officers. Evidently the gun was still very much part of Irish politics, and would remain 
central in the years that followed. Sinn Féin clubs had sprung up around the country as 
nationalists of various hues abandoned the Irish party to join the new and dynamic 
nationalist movement that seemed to embody their aspirations. Home Rule having been 
obliterated, the one-party hegemony of the Irish party was replaced by that of the new 
Sinn Féin. Advanced nationalism was now ascendant in Ireland with even the Labour 
party declining to contest elections until the „National question‟ had been settled. Social 
concerns were subordinated to nationalism and the Sinn Féin leadership, like their Irish 
party predecessors, successfully maintained its „brilliant but artificial alliance‟.19 Had Irish 
Labour just missed a trick? Possibly, though as the First World War had shown, it was not 
unusual for parties of the left to compromise with nationalism when major constitutional 
or territorial issues were at stake. Moreover, it appears that a great myth of Irish history - 
that Labour „must wait‟- actually originated in northern nationalist Joe Devlin‟s analysis 
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of the 1918 election. However, there remained the potential for a split in Sinn Féin at a 
later date as constitutional, class and economic differences were put aside in the pursuit of 
the common nationalist goal.
20
 Irish nationalism was accustomed to unity in broad based 
parties and Sinn Féin‟s leaders were determined to maintain the united party they had 
inaugurated in 1917. What use were partisan party politics when the pursuit of national 
aspirations bound Irish people of all classes together? The absence of an opposition inside 
the revolutionary Dáil further weakened the perception of some within Sinn Féin of the 
wider constituency outside the assembly. In the post-revolutionary climate after 1922, the 
realisation that Sinn Féin had been just one of many Irish parties is critical in 
understanding attitudes to the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the efforts of the pro-Treaty party to 
expand into that territory. 
A major threat to the unity of Sinn Féin was the inevitability of compromise once it 
became apparent that the revolutionary war could not result in the outright defeat of the 
British government in Ireland. As we have already discussed, Sinn Féin in 1917 was a 
broad nationalist coalition which housed a wide spectrum of opinions. Some within Sinn 
Fein‟s ranks believed that the achievement of a thirty-two county Irish Republic was the 
objective of the organisation and anything less was unacceptably short of Irish national 
aspirations and a betrayal of those who had died in the years since 1916.
21
 For others, even 
de Valera, and most of the party leadership, Irish self-determination was the primary aim 
of the organisation; forms of government could be worked out once that goal had been 
attained. De Valera, as party leader, needed to keep the movement united by holding a line 
acceptable to both the moderates and the die-hard Republicans. Sinn Féin was 
unquestionably committed to self-government if deliberately ambiguous on the question 
of a republic.
22
 This approach also extended into the realm of social and economic policy. 
Sinn Féin leaders knew that a clear statement of economic or social policy could 
destabilise the united front forged in 1917.
23
 It was the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations of 
autumn and winter 1921 that would bring these underlying divisions in the national 
movement to the forefront. The compromise negotiated with the British team by the Sinn 
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 8 
Féin delegation of plenipotentiaries would prise apart the nationalist coalition formed in 
1917. 
 
The Treaty 
 
 In London, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith proved that they were pragmatists 
determined to secure the best terms that they could from the negotiations with the British 
before concluding an agreement. John Regan has provided a stimulating account of the 
various strategies adopted by the Sinn Féin leaders at the time of the negotiations,
24
 and to 
delve into them here would be a distraction. Regan is correct to state that the 
commencement of negotiations on 11 October 1921 „marked the beginning of the end of 
the Irish revolutionary movement as a united nationalist front‟25 as an ambiguous position 
could no longer keep the party together now that harsh realities had to be faced.
26
 The War 
of Independence ended in stalemate, the British lacking the stomach and political cover 
for an all-out war against the IRA and the rebels not having the resources to drive the 
British forces out. Britain sought talks for mainly political reasons, principal among them 
the need to save face on the international stage. Britain had not been militarily defeated 
and the difference for Sinn Féin between moral and military victory was an inevitable 
compromise. However, Britain‟s resolve to fight would have been strengthened had the 
peace talks with Sinn Féin‟s leaders failed. After all, Sinn Féin faced the same cabinet that 
had led Britain through the Great War, in the process taking responsibility for more 
casualties than any group of men in British history.
27
 
The negotiations offered an opportunity to reconcile Sinn Féin‟s demands for Irish 
independence with the aspirations of the British Empire. Irish failure to inflict outright 
military defeat ensured that the Crown‟s terms would prevail in some form in Ireland. This 
was recognised by the party‟s leaders even if both Collins and de Valera maintained a 
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hard-line public stance in the months before the truce.
28
 Suffice to say that de Valera‟s 
preferred solution of a middle road between empire and Irish Republic, external 
association, was pressed on five occasions by the delegation in London but to no avail. 
External association as a potential solution to the „Irish problem‟ broke with British 
precedent in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa in that de Valera proposed 
to recognise the King as head of an empire Ireland would voluntarily associate itself with 
„for matters of common concern such as defence and external relations‟.29  
De Valera‟s strategy for party unity depended on a number of imponderables. Firstly 
it would depend on „Sinn Féin accepting it and secondly on the British conceding it as a 
basis for settlement not alone of Anglo-Irish but also imperial relations‟.30  From the 
outset it was unlikely the British would reconfigure the legal and constitutional framework 
of their empire for the sake of accommodating die-hard Irish republicans on the United 
Kingdom‟s Celtic fringe. But who was it that de Valera trying to bring with him? If 
agreement was reached in London, it would have to have had the support of ministers 
Robert Barton, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, by virtue of their membership of the 
Irish negotiating team. Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack indicated their difficulties with 
recognising the British Crown in any form, even externally, and thus were unlikely to 
accept compromise. That left Cosgrave. De Valera, seems to have reasoned that Cosgrave 
would follow whatever line he took. Up to that point, Cosgrave had been one of de 
Valera‟s closest confidants and was identified as a key ally.31 De Valera‟s strategy was 
based on the preservation of a cabinet majority for his policy. It seems Regan is again 
correct to deduct that de Valera‟s strategy depended on Collins and Griffith collapsing the 
London talks leaving the President to redeem the situation by negotiating his own 
settlement with the support of the cabinet. After all, on 21 December de Valera wrote that 
he had gathered during his talks with Lloyd George that some form of Dominion Home 
Rule, save Ulster and naval defence would be achieved. Moreover, the President was 
aware that such an offer would be enough to carry the country even if Sinn Féin would be 
divided. „With such an offer...I felt certain that the majority of the people could be weaned 
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from us.
32
 Arguably, de Valera‟s efforts to maintain a united Sinn Féin actually made the 
eventual fissure worse than it might otherwise have been. The cabinet‟s centre of gravity 
lay decidedly with the moderates and de Valera‟s miscalculation left him floundering 
throughout 1922. Had he cast the hardliners adrift under Stack and Brugha‟s leadership (as 
happened in 1926 when he founded Fianna Fáil) he may have retained control of national 
policy. As stated elsewhere, the deft political skill de Valera was to show throughout his 
career deserted him in 1921 and 1922.
33
 
On 3 December 1921 the Dáil cabinet met with the negotiating team in what would 
prove a heated encounter. Griffith, Collins and Duggan believed the draft Treaty, as it then 
stood, was „England‟s last word‟ and the document that would either be accepted or 
rejected by Sinn Féin‟s representatives.34  De Valera could not recommend the Treaty in 
its then form and continued to take his stand on external association with the crown.  The 
report of a cabinet meeting later that day shows that external association did not enthuse 
Brugha.
35
 Griffith intimated he would push for some more concessions from the British 
before submitting the document to the Dáil for approval while Collins had earlier 
indicated his willingness to see how the settlement would work for a year. Collins also 
reminded the cabinet that non-acceptance was risky given that the British were in a much 
stronger position than before should hostilities resume. Despite this, the delegates were 
sent back to London with counter proposals and a form of words for the oath of allegiance 
that would be acceptable to the cabinet. De Valera later recalled of the 3 December 
meeting that he had „begged them to risk it. A win meant triumph, definite and final. If we 
lost, the loss, would not be as big as it seemed‟.36 On the following day, the British 
negotiators were unimpressed with what they saw as Irish intransigence, reminding their 
opposite numbers that the proposals brought back from Dublin had „already been 
discussed and rejected‟.37 That day, the talks actually broke down when George Gavan 
Duffy rather clumsily said Sinn Féin‟s difficulty was coming into the empire after weeks 
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of holding out accommodation with the crown as a means of making Irish unity the 
decisive issue.  
Collins met Lloyd George the next morning at 9.30 a.m. in Downing Street and the 
olive branch was grasped with the two making progress on the various points of 
disagreement, particularly trade and coastal defence.
38
 Lloyd George met his cabinet at 
midday before two further sub conferences with the Irish delegation. The latter conference 
ended at 2.20 a.m., on the morning of 6 December, with the two sides lining up to „shake 
hands and say good-bye‟ having put their signatures to what became known as the Anglo-
Irish Treaty.
39
 
While marking the first tangible advance in the position of Irish nationalism, the 
Treaty augured ill for the continued unity of the Sinn Féin movement. It was a 
compromise, but crucially it was not de Valera‟s compromise and on his support depended 
efforts to gain wider acceptance from Sinn Féin. De Valera‟s policy fell some way short of 
Republican aspirations, and in turn the Treaty signed by Collins and Griffith fell some 
way short of the external association formula worked on by the President. It gave the 
twenty-six southern counties the same Dominion status that had been granted to Australia 
and Canada while the six North Eastern counties, which had been granted their own 
Parliament under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, were given just one month to 
decide whether to opt in or opt out of the new arrangement. Despite the face-saving 
trappings of imperialism insisted upon by the British, the Treaty essentially allowed for a 
constitution in Ireland that, according to Tom Garvin, was in essence democratic and 
republican.
40
 Collins believed he had got substance from the Treaty negotiations, as he had 
informed his cabinet colleagues on 3 December. Persuading hardliners outside the party 
leadership of that fact, and securing the support of his political rivals in Dublin would 
prove a much more difficult task.  
The first political reaction to the Anglo-Irish Treaty occurred at a cabinet meeting 
held in Dublin before Collins, Griffith and Barton had returned home from the 
negotiations. The meeting took place on 7 December 1921 and was attended by de Valera, 
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Brugha, Stack and Cosgrave with Kevin O‟Higgins in a non-voting capacity. De Valera 
took issue with the Treaty believing the delegates had flouted his authority by settling for 
less than external association and by signing without first referring back to Dublin. They 
had not brought the talks to the brink of collapse by pressing one last time for external 
association. In fact, as we have seen, they rescued the talks after Gavan Duffy‟s gaffe 
allowed the British break on the Crown and empire scuppering the strategy of making 
Ulster the fulcrum of any settlement. De Valera summoned the cabinet meeting as he 
wanted to have the Treaty rejected at cabinet before the three delegates had returned home 
to explain themselves. De Valera knew that he could count on the support of the two 
republican hardliners, Brugha and Stack, against Collins, Griffith and Barton. He 
continued to assume Cosgrave would follow his lead thereby giving him a majority of one 
in cabinet. However, Cosgrave interceded on behalf of the three delegates insisting that 
they should be given a fair hearing before a cabinet decision was reached. De Valera 
agreed to his proposal, still anticipating that he could count on Cosgrave‟s vote.41 When 
the signatories returned home, they in fact had the support of Cosgrave, giving the Treaty 
a majority of one in cabinet when it met on 8 December. As such, the cabinet voted to 
recommend the Treaty to the Dáil for ratification with the President in the minority 
section. The cabinet split was replicated in the Dáil party. 
 Clear divisions had emerged in the party leadership as underlying differences of 
approach came to the surface. Tom Garvin argues that the parting between the two wings 
of Sinn Féin represented a deep cultural division within Irish society. In 1921 the 
separation was represented as between republican moralists, who viewed themselves as a 
virtuous minority defending sacred principles, and legalistic, nationalist pragmatists who 
would engage in the counting of heads to arrive at a decision.
42
 Garvin goes on to argue 
that these divisions, concealed by the unity of the Sinn Féin party in the period 1917-21, 
were in fact two deep-rooted political cultures existing within Irish nationalism and 
predating the formation of Sinn Féin.
43
 Elsewhere Garvin describes this „far too tidy‟ 
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description of the divisions of 1921/22 as a „useful heuristic device‟44 as it is also used 
here. Garvin links Republican moralism with austere Catholicism and the conservative, 
conformist culture that he believes ensues in societies where owner-occupier free farmers 
form the dominant social group. He links it too with a „communalism‟ hostile to 
materialism and individualism. Nationalist pragmatism or civic nationalism for Garvin 
was rooted in Irish versions of political ideas derived from the „English and French 
Enlightenments and their Scottish and American offshoots‟.45  This Garvin argues was the 
political culture of the citizen, the bourgeois, and those with an economic interest in 
stability and peace. Observers at the time saw the division similarly but used different 
terminology. For Francis Hackett, the difference was between the scientific and romantic 
spirits, while for ardent anti-Treatyite Mary MacSwiney the division in nationalist ranks 
was between spirituality and materialism. Indeed, as subsequent chapters will illustrate, 
opposition to individualism and materialism continued to be the hallmark of anti-Treatyite 
politics for some time as evidenced particularly in Fianna Fáil‟s adherence to economic 
nationalism, self sufficiency. De Valera once observed that „if a man makes up his mind to 
go out into a cottage, ... he has to make up his mind to put up with the frugal fare of that 
cottage‟.46 In the early decades of independence, however, frugal fare was the hallmark of 
both Treatyite and anti-Treatyite governments. 
In accepting the Treaty as a basis on which to form an independent Irish State, 
Collins, Griffith and Cosgrave embarked on a pragmatic path where politics would 
become a means of settling differences non-violently and where progress towards greater 
independence for Ireland could be achieved in gradual, constitutional steps. The moralistic 
tone of anti-Treatyite thinking was discernable in the pronouncements of de Valera. For de 
Valera, the people had „no right to do wrong‟ while in June 1922 the anti-Treaty IRA 
prepared to protect, with arms, the Republic from the people‟s mandate in favour of the 
Provisional Government. Collins on the other hand referred to the people as the „masters‟ 
during the Treaty debates (though the ambiguous nature of his northern policy showed he 
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remained an arch conspirator
47
) and his Provisional Government forces were resolute in 
their commitment to safeguarding the Treaty‟s mandate. That the divide was slim at its 
centre is borne out by political developments in the subsequent decades. Both Fianna Fáil 
and Cumann na nGaedheal would contain disgruntled factions. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
protectionist wing led by J.J. Walsh had more in common with the anti-Treatyites than 
party colleagues, while a group in Fianna Fáil led by Lemass, MacEntee and O‟Kelly „saw 
the merits of large-scale commercial farming inimical to the aims‟ of their party.48 This 
would indicate that while, in broad terms, the split manifested itself in contrasting political 
styles and cultures, the circumstances of the fissure was an imperfect basis for the two 
party system that emerged. As such dissenting voices would be found within both of Sinn 
Féin‟s daughter parties. Cumann na nGaedheal, for its part, was shaped by the events of 
1921/22. It was developed by the leaders who had taken what was described by the Bishop 
of Kerry as the „less romantic‟ interpretation of the Treaty and the ministers who had 
ruthlessly defended it during the Civil War.
49
 As noted by Ciara Meehan, the Treaty came 
to represent the party‟s raison d’être.50 
 
The disintegration of Sinn Féin 
 
Long accustomed to hearing that they were incapable of self-government, Irish 
leaders had an opportunity in 1922 to show exactly how they would cope with the 
responsibility through the establishment of the Free State. The year of Irish statehood was 
also the year of the „cardinal sin of Irish politics‟ as civil war engulfed the country. In that 
tumultuous year Ireland‟s first democratic constitution was enacted and the institutions of 
state began to be laid down. The traumatic events of 1922 are important in understanding 
the country‟s subsequent political, social and economic development. 
On 7 January 1922 the Anglo-Irish Treaty was approved in the Dáil by sixty-four 
votes to fifty-seven, a slender majority of seven. Following the vote in favour of the 
Treaty, de Valera resigned as President of the Dáil so that a separate vote on the 
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presidency would be taken. Griffith was elected to replace de Valera by an even slimmer 
margin of sixty votes to fifty-eight.
51
 Treaty supporters maintained for many years that 
had de Valera supported the Treaty, the split in Sinn Féin would have been on a smaller 
scale as the President would have carried the support of some wavering deputies who 
remained loyal to his judgement.
52
  
After the vote on the presidency, anti-Treaty deputies departed the Dáil. In order to 
ensure that the Treaty would be passed, Griffith and Collins had laboured to secure the 
confidence of deputies covering a wide spectrum of views within Sinn Féin. As evidenced 
by the vote taken on the presidency, some deputies who had voted for the Treaty still 
retained respect for de Valera and as such their loyalty to the settlement was fragile. 
Collins and Griffith had just about secured enough concessions from the British to enable 
them secure a slim majority of Sinn Féin deputies, though the rump of the party they were 
left with would itself come to resemble a coalition of diverse elements and interpretations 
of what the Treaty could achieve. Some deputies who sided with Collins and Griffith 
viewed the Treaty as a reasonable settlement to the conflict. Others viewed it as a 
temporary agreement that would lead to greater independence for Ireland at some point in 
the future. As such, militant republicans who followed Collins joined with Griffithite 
moderates in accepting the Treaty „on the promise that one day they would advance 
together toward the republic‟.53  Like its pre-truce predecessor, pro-Treaty Sinn Féin was 
an odd mixture united only in support of the Treaty as deputies, who had been as 
republican as anybody in the ranks of the anti-Treatyites, joined with the moderate 
political wing overshadowed since the outbreak of violence in 1919. 
Under the terms of the Treaty, a Provisional Government was established on 14 
January 1922. This, rather than the Dáil government, had „real responsibility for launching 
the new state on a safe course‟.54 Eoin MacNeill proposed Collins as chairman at the 
inaugural meeting of the Provisional Government on 16 January. It came as something of 
a surprise internationally that the youthful Collins was chosen over Griffith.
55
 Griffith was 
to remain head of the revolutionary Dáil during the transition period with Collins taking 
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charge of the official changeover. Having chosen Collins as chairman, the Provisional 
Government adjourned until 4pm so that ministers could visit Dublin Castle for the 
handover of the various departments from the British.
56
 The Dáil government remained in 
existence under Griffith, but under the terms of the Treaty could not legitimately accept 
the formal handover of power. Until September 1922, the two governments existed 
simultaneously though from April, it was more usual for Dáil ministers not serving on the 
Provisional Government to simply sit in on its meetings. 
 
Emergence of ‘sub parties’ 
 
 Despite the extent of the Treaty division, each wing of Sinn Féin was determined to 
maintain some semblance of unity and from the ratification of the Treaty until the so 
called „pact election‟ of 16 June 1922 the party tried to exist as a united entity. This was in 
spite of the fact that de Valera‟s followers were openly denouncing the Provisional 
Government. Efforts were taken by both sides to avoid a formal vote on the Treaty with 
the February Sinn Féin Ard Fheis deferring its decision. The Collins/de Valera pact agreed 
in May 1922 was designed to buy Collins much needed time, as he busied himself trying 
to establish an army to defend the fledgling state while at the same time assuring the 
British he was determined to secure the Treaty position. The campaign leading up to the 
June 1922 election proved the last time many of Sinn Féin‟s leading politicians shared the 
same political platform. In reality the party was split down the middle right across the 
country with each side clinging to the Sinn Féin label in the futile hope that somehow a 
formal split could be avoided, or that they could portray themselves as the true inheritors 
of the revolution. From the end of the pact in June 1922, onetime comrades became bitter 
opponents. 
While in public Sinn Féin was attempting to avoid the divisive issue of the Treaty, 
privately each side was preparing for the inevitable and mobilising support for its own 
candidates. The Sinn Féin Ard Fheis of February 1922 was dominated by a pro-Treaty 
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leadership,
57
 but it was believed at the time that the anti-Treatyites held a majority on the 
floor. Certainly there was speculation that the Republican camp had at least attempted to 
swamp the conference with anti-Treaty delegates, as they had for local meetings around 
the country.
58
 The decision not to push a vote on the issue of the Treaty means there is no 
conclusive proof one way or the other.
59
 Various branches around the country were 
declaring for or against the Treaty while some officers were ejected from their positions 
based on their support or opposition to de Valera or Collins. There is partial evidence 
suggesting that many members of the party who supported the Treaty began to leave Sinn 
Féin around this time, either through disillusionment, a belief that their work in politics 
was completed with the establishment of the Free State or through continued intimidation 
from anti-Treatyites. Certainly there is evidence to suggest that grass-root Treatyites in 
Sinn Féin were subjected to some level of coercion by the anti-Treaty IRA, and even 
Cumann na mBan, particularly in Mayo where letters addressed to pro-Treaty members 
were undelivered.
60
 There is similar evidence in other rural centres and in Cork and 
Dublin. As the split became more permanent, pro-Treaty members of the north Dublin 
Michael O‟Hanrahan Sinn Féin club magnanimously shook hands with the remaining anti-
Treatyites and departed, while Treaty supporters simply stopped attending meetings of the 
south city Thomas Davis and Éamonn Ceannt clubs.
61
 Those experiences may well have 
been a factor in the perceived lack of activism of Treatyites from 1922 through the next 
decade. What is more probable is that the perceived manipulation of the Sinn Féin 
organisation by the anti-Treatyites influenced Treatyite leaders‟ reluctance to be dictated 
to by rigged convention halls. The leadership of each faction, while still clinging to the 
Sinn Féin party label, privately prepared to contest the election as separate entities. That 
so much energy was spent on trying to force a united front demonstrates the continued 
national sentiments of each side and their reluctance to see the national interest challenged 
by a descent into fractious party politics. 
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In early 1922 each wing of Sinn Féin had set up rival election committees to oversee 
their election machineries for a crucial election necessary under the terms of the Treaty. 
Characteristically, even when it was the underdog, the anti-Treaty faction of Sinn Féin 
demonstrated the greater prowess in developing its political strategy and grass-root 
organisation. While their stance on the Treaty went against the general mood of the 
country, anti-Treatyites displayed a keener desire to mobilise support. In addition, the 
evidence suggests they devoted much more time than their pro-Treaty contemporaries to 
discussing the possible permutations that could occur if the split in Sinn Féin proved 
permanent, hence showing a shrewder political nous. While their opponents in the 
Provisional Government were busy laying the foundations of the fledgling state, de 
Valera‟s followers on his organising committee were considering all available options for 
maintaining a position of political strength given the circumstances. In this period, the 
anti-Treatyites discussed the best ways of organising their supporters and the need for 
contingency plans in the event of their pro-Treaty opponents wresting control of Sinn 
Féin. Anti-Treaty organising committee documents from early 1922 reveal an emphasis on 
the need for an active party machine at grass-roots level to campaign against the Treaty 
and the Provisional Government. From an early stage the anti-Treatyites had employed 
organisers to marshal their supporters around the country. One such example of anti-
Treaty organisational skill during this time can be found in instructions issued to each 
republican organiser in March 1922. Each organiser was told to send the director of 
organisation a copy of his area‟s local newspapers each week.62 In correspondence with 
his organising committee, de Valera adopted a hands-on approach to party organisation, 
instructing that each branch be sent a definite programme of organisational work to be 
completed as soon as possible.  
There was little discussion of this nature in the minute books of the pro-Treaty 
election committees in early 1922. The difficult task of gaining support for the Treaty 
remained its main concern in early 1922. De Valera was also a step ahead in another way. 
He was aware of the potent symbolism that was attached to the Sinn Féin label and from 
an early stage he was keen that his faction would retain control of the party in spite of the 
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fact that many of his Treatyite opponents had been its founding members in 1905. Again, 
in letters to his organising committee, de Valera was frank about his fears that Treatyites 
may try to gain control of the old Sinn Féin organisation, leaving his own followers 
stranded. In March 1922, in what could be interpreted as a contingency plan, de Valera 
founded a new Republican party to be called Cumann na Poblachta, the Society of the 
Republic. De Valera asked his followers in Sinn Féin to meet him on the day of the 
February Ard Fheis and it seems Cumann na Poblachta was formed as a result of that 
meeting.
63
 Cumann na Poblachta imitated the structures of Sinn Féin and foreshadowed 
many of Fianna Fáil‟s objectives.64  A year on from its launch, and after deciding instead 
to pursue his aims through a broadly based Sinn Féin, de Valera stated Cumann na 
Poblachta‟s mission had been to house the extremist or „left wing of Sinn Féin‟.65 By 
March 1922 revolutionary Sinn Féin was on a downward spiral of disintegration with both 
sides operating independently of it. During the Civil War, Treatyites closed its central 
office and allowed the organisation to lapse.
66
 While the Treatyites had retained its best 
administrators,
67
 as evidenced by the activity of de Valera‟s election committees, the more 
talented political strategists of revolutionary Sinn Féin had clearly ended up in the anti-
Treaty faction. Cumann na Poblachta only ever really existed on paper and as a label for 
anti-Treaty deputies, but as we can see it was most probably established as a contingency 
whereby anti-Treaty Sinn Féin supporters would find a political home should Sinn Féin 
have ended up in pro-Treaty hands. As we shall see, there was little by way of forward 
planning in pro-Treaty ranks at this time; the day-to-day survival of the Provisional 
Government, and a successful outcome to the June election, occupied much of their time. 
The split following the Dáil vote on the Treaty was not confined to Sinn Féin or even 
the IRA, it also applied to Cumann na mBan, the women‟s movement. A majority of 
Cumann na mBan members went against the Treaty with the smaller faction, under Jennie 
Wyse Power, forming a new women‟s Treatyite organisation. When it was established in 
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March 1922 Cumann na Saoirse became the first pro-Treaty political organisation.
68
 
Cumann na Saoirse immediately set about building up support for the Treaty among 
voters, producing a substantial body of literature to that end. Cumann na Saoirse, and 
particularly Jennie Wyse Power, would play a significant part in pro-Treaty politics up 
until the formal launch of Cumann na nGaedheal in April 1923. Ultimately, the women‟s 
organisation was merged into the new party. 
Following the Dáil vote on the Treaty, its supporters faced the immediate task of 
implementing the agreement and gaining public support for it. Collins led the case for the 
Treaty side publishing pamphlets and speaking at enormous public meetings throughout 
the country.
69
 A collection of his various speeches in favour of the agreement was 
published in advance of the June election and could be purchased for six pence. Treatyites 
also published de Valera‟s alternative of external association, labelled „Document Number 
Two‟ by Collins, to demonstrate how much trouble he was causing for an alternative 
which came very close to the actual constitutional position envisaged in the Treaty. 
Clearly the Provisional Government wanted the electorate to grasp that an isolated, thirty-
two county Republic was not being offered by either side. Anti-Treatyite literature in the 
summer of 1922 referred to the „English King‟s provisional government‟, to the Black and 
Tans having been „outdone‟ by Collins and Griffith and frequently termed the Free State 
the „Slave State‟.70 Treatyite propaganda on the other hand termed the anti-Treatyites 
„Irregulars‟ and urged voters to choose the Treaty over the „alphabet of miseries‟ 
(Auxiliaries, Black and Tans, Commandeering‟s etc).71 
 Collins continued to grow in stature and influence during the first half of 1922 while 
his charismatic personality, and the strong reputation he had built up in the years since 
1916, helped to convince many sceptics that Ireland‟s future in fact lay within the 
framework set out in the Treaty.
72
 At this time, Collins‟s talents as an administrator were 
utilised as he set about asserting the primacy of the department of Finance within the 
administration and he was prepared to accept able „castle personnel‟ such as the 
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conservative Joseph Brennan into his fledgling department.
73
 The Free State side was keen 
to show that having men of a militarist republican background like Collins, Mulcahy, 
MacEoin and O‟Duffy supporting the settlement proved that it was not a betrayal of all 
those who had fought for a Republic since 1916. Loyalty to individual leaders at both 
national and local level often determined the opinion many people at the grass-roots level 
formed of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. On balance, this was probably more of a factor within 
the IRA than Sinn Féin. 
Like their Republican opponents, pro-Treatyites had established organising 
committees in early 1922 to oversee their preparations for the June election. Before the 
foundation of Cumann na Saoirse, from January 1922, the pro-Treaty General and 
Election committee had been the only Treatyite political group in existence and it was 
charged with securing the Treaty position in the summer election. Minutes of an election 
subcommittee meeting of 30 March 1922 reveal that the Treatyites too were behaving as a 
distinct party long before the pact between de Valera and Collins was agreed in May. The 
30 March meeting discussed the situation in Sinn Féin clubs with the Republican faction 
in its ranks referred to as the „anti-treaty party‟ showing the levels to which the split had 
percolated from leadership level down to the ordinary rank-and-file member.
74
 In anti-
Treaty correspondence, Sinn Féin clubs were routinely labelled „Republican‟ or „Free 
State‟. At this time, Treatyite organisers were working in each province with P.J. Ryan 
responsible for Leinster. There was no real discussion of long-term organising strategy at 
the pro-Treaty election meeting with nothing of note being said about the future of Sinn 
Féin or its pro-Treaty faction. It was also clear that Collins was in demand, both at home 
and abroad. Correspondence was received from Glasgow asking that Collins address a 
meeting in the city to outline the benefits of the Treaty. This request was dismissed on the 
grounds that Collins was needed in Ireland to carry out the same function in advance of 
the June election.
75
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The pro-Treaty campaign was organised from offices in 3 and 4 College Street. 
Newspaper and propaganda subcommittees were established by the General and Election 
Committee. A report of the latter subcommittee alleged that some of its members „hardly 
knew‟76 they were on a committee which cannot have augured well for its success. 
Minutes from the propaganda and newspaper subcommittees reveal that an attempt was 
made at this time to compile lists of Sinn Féin clubs where Free Staters were in the 
majority and that Cumann na Saoirse were given posters and literature to distribute.
77
 A 
meeting of 13 April decided that Collins and Seán MacEoin, another hero of the War of 
Independence from Longford, would address a meeting in Ennis County Clare on 30 
April, in the bailiwick of Eamon de Valera.
78
 This is further evidence of the pro-Treaty 
organisers understanding the need to show that the Treaty was not a betrayal of those who 
had fought and died for a republic, and that they were in fact proud to showcase their own 
revolutionary wears by pushing men with strong military reputations, like MacEoin, to the 
forefront of their campaign. Furthermore, organiser reports discussed at this meeting 
revealed that IRA intimidation of Treaty supporters and raids on the party‟s election 
rooms remained widespread.  
Treatyite minute books leading up to the general election indicate that the day-to-day 
business of articulating the Treaty‟s benefits, and therefore gaining it more public support, 
was the primary concern. Public meetings were organised around the country with the 
intention of articulating the benefits of the Treaty. However, there was little strategic 
planning in evidence and scarcely any attempt was made to recruit people to Treatyite 
ranks. Tellingly, the committee meeting of 13 April 1922 received correspondence from 
the recently established Cumann na Saoirse asking if there was any more organisational 
work that they could be given to complete.
79
 While Republicans assigned work to grass-
roots activists, Treaty supporters sought out such work.  
 In spite of the Collins/de Valera pact of 16 May, which was repudiated by Collins in 
the days before polling,
80
 the election was always going to be a de-facto referendum on 
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the Treaty in spite of the participation of other parties and candidates. Many observers 
were critical of Collins for agreeing a pact with de Valera. The pact would exaggerate 
anti-Treaty support according to the New York Times who put it down to Collins‟s 
patriotism and lack of experience.
81
 Sinn Féin had already split on the question of the 
Treaty, the pact merely delayed the inevitable. Moreover, Sinn Féin was not the only party 
contesting the election. Labour, the Farmers‟ Party and ex Unionists were also competing. 
Newspapers published the stance of each candidate on the Treaty while all non Sinn Féin 
parties supported the settlement. As such, pact or no pact, the only way to register 
opposition to the agreement was to vote for candidates from the anti-Treaty wing of Sinn 
Féin. The election results showed that the position of Collins and Griffith had been 
endorsed by the Irish electorate. Fifty-eight pro-Treaty Sinn Féin candidates were elected 
as opposed to thirty-six anti-Treatyites. The remaining thirty-four seats went to other pro-
Treaty parties and candidates. In many ways, the performance of non-Sinn Féin parties 
was the most significant factor of the election. A considerable section of the voting public 
stood aloof from the Sinn Féin divide as Labour, the Farmers‟ Party and independents 
secured the remaining seats. This was a lesson quickly heeded by the pro-Treaty party as it 
sought to expand into the wider non Sinn Féin constituency. The threat of civil war, 
ominously hanging in the air since the signing of the Treaty, became more potent with the 
decisive vote for peace and stability in June 1922. 
 
Civil War breaks out, 28 June 1922. 
 
Following the June election and the public‟s endorsement of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
military matters came to the forefront once again. As was the case during the War of 
Independence, politics became sidelined as the storm clouds long brewing on the horizon 
finally unleashed their might in a hail of bullets, shrapnel and shells. The Civil War 
erupted in Dublin at 4.00am on 28 June 1922.  It was tragic that the united front achieved 
at the 1917 Ard Fheis should end with Irish nationalists fighting each other over the 
minutiae of the document that had resulted from their best efforts. On 12 July Michael 
Collins informed his colleagues on the Provisional Government that he „would not be able 
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to act in his ministerial capacity until further notice‟.82 He resigned temporarily from his 
position at the head of government to take charge of the military campaign as commander-
in-chief of the new national army which was being established virtually in a time of war.
83
 
Despite his absence from the cabinet table, Collins continued to dominate his more jittery 
ministerial colleagues in the summer of 1922 in the sheer bulk of memoranda that 
represented his position in government. W.T. Cosgrave took on Collins‟s role and his 
rebuttal of criticism from a Treaty supporter shows the difficulties faced by the 
Provisional Government at that time: 
 
No doubt the arrangements for relief of distress were not perfect, but the urgency of the matter 
left no time for thinking out a well-organised plan of distribution of relief. At all events, we 
achieved our main object, namely, the immediate relief of distress, and reports from all quarters 
show that no necessitous person went away empty-handed. In the circumstances “queues” were 
unavoidable.
84
 
 
Collins would never again occupy high political office although he made a real 
difference to the government‟s military effort in the short length of time that he was 
commander of the army. The plan to land troops in Cork by sea took the anti-Treaty forces 
there by surprise and forced them out into the hills of the county, which in itself would 
have serious ramifications for the National army as the anti-Treaty military strategy came 
to rely increasingly on guerrilla tactics. On 22 August 1922 while on a tour of inspection 
in his native Cork, the convoy protecting the commander-in-chief was ambushed by such 
a group of anti-Treaty guerrilla fighters under the command of Tom Hales. A short 
skirmish followed before Collins was shot dead. He was the only casualty in what was an 
opportunistic ambush and his untimely death denied him the opportunity of shaping the 
state he had given so much of his young life to building. Collins‟s death was a devastating 
blow for the Provisional Government. Days earlier he had led the military at the funeral of 
Arthur Griffith. In the early hours of 23 August, senior Treatyites were woken by the 
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military and summoned to an emergency meeting in Merrion Street. A crisis conference 
lasting until 7.30 a.m. chose W.T. Cosgrave as leader.
85
 
A meeting of the General and Election committee on 21 July offers an insight into 
the feelings of Treatyites in the weeks before Collins‟ death. The cataclysm of Civil War 
deeply affected the mindset of the pro-Treaty party who instinctively responded as though 
the issue at stake was now more important than the Treaty itself. It was now a question of 
whether the majority would have a right to govern in the new state that was being created. 
The committee was much more concerned with the civil strife sweeping the country than 
with party politics. Séamus Hughes outlined to the 21 July meeting a scheme whereby 
Treaty supporters could be used as a voluntary arm of the state to assist in restoring order 
and public safety.
86
 Rather than direct the energy of its supporters to party political work, 
the committee seemed keen to utilise that potential in the national interest. Administration 
and the defeat of the IRA was more important than the work of party organisation as 
Treatyites watched the country tear itself apart in the Civil War. J.J. Lee has argued that 
the Treaty was the occasion rather than the cause of the Civil War: that it was fought over 
the issue of majority right or divine right. The issue was whether the Irish people could 
choose their own government at any time according to their own judgement.
87
 Similar 
arguments have been put forward by Tom Garvin and Ronan Fanning. Such points of view 
may oversimplify what were complex political choices in 1922 and probably overstate the 
democratic tendencies of the pro-Treatyites and the undemocratic tendencies of anti-
Treatyites. However, the evidence suggests that from the autumn of 1922, victory in the 
Civil War became a matter of principle for the leaders of the Provisional Government. It 
was about more than the Treaty, it was a war to continue the project of self-government. It 
would appear that with the outbreak of the Irish Civil War came an unflinching 
determination among Treatyite leaders to defend the fledgling state at all costs and to 
defeat their opponents militarily, thereby consolidating the legitimacy of the settlement.
88
 
Alternatively, some trace authoritarian tendencies that later emerged within elements of 
the Treatyite movement to the Civil War. John Regan has labelled as a „bunker mentality‟ 
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the Treatyite government‟s attitude during the Civil War. This was a straight-jacket from 
which the party struggled to escape from after the conflict ended.   
Liam de Róiste‟s diary illustrates the extent to which ideas were in flux during 1922 
and 1923. Civil war destroyed the optimism of the revolutionary generation of which de 
Róiste was a part of. A sense of despair and an awareness of the wrongs committed by 
both sides is evident in his diary entries during the fratricidal conflict. On 19 November 
1922 de Róiste expressed doubts about the government‟s conduct during the Civil War,89 
and on 16 March 1923 wrote that he could see fault with both sides.
90
 However, in 
between these entries, de Róiste expressed his opposition to the anti-Treatyite campaign in 
explicit terms. In February and March 1923 he criticised what he termed the „new 
Republicanism‟ of the Treaty‟s opponents. For him, the Provisional Government‟s 
opponents believed the majority had no right to form a government. Such a government, 
„when Eamon De[sic] Valera and his armed minority object‟ was a „usurpation‟.91 De 
Róiste further claimed that the „new‟ Republicans regarded as traitors anybody who did 
not share their point of view. 
92
 Yet by May the disillusioned de Róiste could criticise the 
final executions as „indefensible‟ and express his „disgust and abhorrence‟ at the excesses 
of both sides during the Civil War.
93
 Such were the depths of demoralisation of the 
revolutionary generation as they watched their efforts culminate in green against green. 
 
A new ‘National Party’ emerges. 
 
From August 1922 onwards the Treatyite General and Election Committee began to 
take steps towards the establishment of a distinctive pro-Treaty national organisation. The 
first outright discussion of this nature occurred at a meeting held on 29 August where the 
possibility of setting up a new political organisation in support of the Treaty was discussed 
and agreed to by those present. It is symbolic that the meeting took place just seven days 
after Michael Collins had been killed in West Cork and seventeen days following Arthur 
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Griffith‟s death. With the death of the two leaders of the Treaty cause, the document they 
had signed in London had been sanctified in the eyes of those who had looked to them for 
leadership in 1921/22. The Treaty could no longer be dismissed as an imperfect means to 
an end now that people had died in its defence.
94
  
At the 29 August meeting, the General and Election Committee expressed its desire 
to continue on as a distinct party that would uphold the Treaty position.
95
 It realised that a 
nationwide political organisation was now necessary to ensure the Provisional 
Government would remain in power beyond the formal establishment of the Irish Free 
State on 6 December 1922. Seán Milroy, the committee chairperson and veteran 
Griffithite Sinn Féiner, agreed to report the views that had been expressed at the meeting 
to pro-Treaty Sinn Féin deputies. Milroy moved swiftly. On 7 September a special 
meeting of the General and Election committee took place with pro-Treaty deputies Ernest 
Blythe, Séamus Dolan, Padraic O‟Maille and Walter Cole in attendance.96 Blythe was 
forceful in articulating the type of party he hoped would evolve from their work. He urged 
the need for a party in parliament that would seek to carry the „national cause to 
completion under the Free State‟ and suggested the name „National Party‟, showing that 
the new organisation would continue to champion the cause of a broadly based Irish 
nationalism as opposed to any specific social policy programme.
97
 Revolutionary Sinn 
Féin had, with all its ambiguities, left a mark which would manifest itself at various stages 
in the life of the new party that would emerge. Given its state of decay, it was unfortunate 
for the embryonic party that Blythe used the Liberal party of Britain as an example of 
what kind of relationship the new organisation could expect to develop with the Free State 
government it would support. This was especially true given that 1922 proved to be the 
last time the Liberals ever served in a British government (until the Liberal Democrats, 
formed from a merger of the Liberal party and the Social Democrats in 1988, entered 
coalition with the Conservatives in 2010). 
 It was clear from this meeting that Blythe, and most of his cabinet colleagues, did 
not desire the creation of a party machine that could potentially challenge or influence 
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decisions made by the government. After all, the Treatyites were already secure in power 
without a party machine supporting them, and they did not want that position threatened 
by rigged conference halls as had been the case in the days of Sinn Féin. Blythe‟s vision 
was of an executive and parliamentary party that could rely on an obedient and pliable 
constituency organisation to support it. Various names were suggested for the new party, 
most of which carried national connotations.
98
 Given that the anti-Treaty side had 
appropriated the Republic, the pro-Treatyites adopted „national‟ as part of their political 
identity.
99
 Proposed names included: An Cumann Náisiúnta, United Irishmen, Páirtí 
Náisiúnta and Cumann Sonais Eireann, among others. While no decision was taken on a 
party name, the meeting resolved „that a Political Organisation be formed to safeguard the 
National position which would work through the Treaty towards a united and distinctively 
Gaelic Ireland, and that the Executive of the Free State Party be utilised to launch the 
Party‟.100 Moreover, two sub-committees were established to oversee the new party‟s 
development. Long term Griffithites Seán Milroy, Diarmuid Fawsitt, Walter Cole, and 
Séamus O‟Dwyer joined a sub-committee to draft the objectives of the new party, while a 
further sub-committee of O‟Dwyer, Cole and Montgomery was established to seek out 
suitable premises for the organisation. By 21 September O‟Dwyer was able to announce to 
a General and Election committee meeting the acquisition of new premises at 5 Parnell 
square, an old safe house of Collins formerly owned by Oliver St. John Gogarty, a 
prominent Dubliner and long term associate of Arthur Griffith.
101
 Having found a 
headquarters, the work of defining the party‟s objects, drafting a party constitution and 
settling on a party name could begin.  
In October and November of 1922 the effort to establish the new political 
organisation gathered momentum. However, there was no unanimity within the pro-Treaty 
party as to the right time to launch the organisation. On 18 October Mulcahy wrote to Dan 
MacCarthy outlining his opposition. Mulcahy, as commander-in-chief and Minister for 
Defence, believed the new party‟s name would be sullied by association with the Civil 
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War if it was launched during the conflict. 
102
 By contrast, Blythe and the members of the 
Treatyite General and Election committee were anxious to launch the party at the earliest 
opportunity even though a distinct policy programme had not yet been agreed and 
fratricidal conflict continued to claim Irish lives. At a meeting on 3 October Blythe was 
non-committal on policy, recommending that the new party‟s objectives ought to 
emphasise the carrying on of the national tradition under the Treaty and that the finer 
details of policy could be enunciatiated at public meetings at a later date.
103
 This meeting 
also resolved that the new party, unlike Sinn Féin and Cumann na Poblachta, would not 
establish branches in Britain. At this point, no consideration was given to the possibility of 
Treatyites regrouping under the Sinn Féin banner. The pro-Treaty wing of Sinn Féin were 
not involved in the type of strategic planning that de Valera was engaging in with his anti-
Treaty organising committee. Sinn Féin was dormant and the Treatyites made little effort 
to recapture it. It is reasonable to suggest that the pro-Treatyites may have desired a break 
away from the Sinn Féin label now that they were running a fledgling state that was being 
challenged by an armed minority. After all there was a certain contradiction in the manner 
in which the state had been brought into being and the way its first leaders now faced the 
same type of threat as the British administration had during the War of Independence. 
Alternatively, Treatyite leaders may have wanted a new beginning away from the 
Republican identity assumed by Sinn Féin in 1917 and the decision to found a distinct 
party may have been in reality a conscious attempt to revert to a more moderate strain of 
Irish nationalism, palatable to old Sinn Féiners such as Cosgrave or Milroy and that part of 
the electorate which had stood outside the revolutionary party‟s support base. Such voters 
would need a new home too. As discussed earlier, many Treaty supporters had left Sinn 
Féin in 1922 either through disillusionment or intimidation and it is reasonable to assume 
that this also contributed to the desire to make a clean break. 
 On 3 November the General and Election committee decided that the convention 
should take place on 7 December 1922. MacCarthy compiled a list of potential delegates 
who ought to be invited.
104
 Suggested delegates were discussed as were the objects and 
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programme of the new party. Nothing was agreed until the next meeting on 10 November 
when the first draft of the party‟s constitution emerged. The „Objects and Programme‟ of 
the new party were presented on headed notepaper bearing the Treatyite leadership‟s 
preferred name for the new party, An Cumann Náisiúnta.
105
 However, the final text would 
not be agreed until April 1923. Names of suggested delegates were again discussed while 
it was agreed that Jennie Wyse Power and the historian Alice Stopford Green would 
represent Cumann na Saoirse at the convention. In the event, five Cumann na Saoirse 
members were represented at the convention as Celia Shaw, Mrs. Gavan Duffy and Wyse 
Power attended in a separate capacity.
106
 Letters to Treaty supporters throughout the 
country (presumably those on the pro-Treaty list compiled earlier in the summer) 
informed them of the Conference. Symbolically the Conference was scheduled to take 
place on the day after the Irish Free State would formally come into being and a year on 
from the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.  
Nothing captures more aptly the Civil War birthmark that would always be borne by 
Cumann na nGaedheal than the events of 7 December 1922. Following the morning 
session of the preliminary conference summoned to inaugurate the new political party, 
deputies Seán Hales and Padraic O‟Maille travelled from Parnell Square to the Ormond 
Hotel on the quays for their lunch. On their way to lunch, the two deputies were set upon 
by gunmen. Upon returning for the evening session of the conference, delegates were 
horrified as news spread that O‟Maille had been wounded and Hales shot dead in an 
opportunistic shooting by Republicans at lunch time. Feelings were running high against 
the assassins as the news began to sink in among those present. Fearing further 
assassinations, and the desertion of Free State supporters, the following day senior Free 
State army officers requested permission to execute four IRA prisoners as a reprisal and 
deterrent against further assassinations. Despite the misgivings of O‟Higgins and McGrath 
the government consented and without any pretence to legality Joe McKelvey, Liam 
Mellowes, Rory O‟Connor and Dick Barrett were executed.107  The events of 7/ 8 
December 1922 count among the darkest days in Irish history, and are a stain on the Free 
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State government‟s otherwise commendable record in establishing Irish democracy.108 
Unsurprisingly, news of the Conference was suppressed with the official launch deferred 
until the following spring so as not to associate the name of the new party with those 
bloody events that marked the birth of the Irish Free State and its party of government. 
Celia Shaw, who attended the preliminary conference as a Cumann na Saoirse 
representative, noted in her diary: 
 
When we came back for the evening session we heard the horrifying news that Sean [sic] Hales 
had been killed [and] Padraig O‟Maille [sic] seriously injured. Everyone was dumbfounded [and] 
feeling was very high against the assassins. The next morning the 8
th
 of December was a 
dreary[,] wet day, a stop press came out announcing the execution of Liam Mellowes, Rory 
O‟Connor [and] two others as a reprisal for the killing of the deputy.109 
 
 
One important function carried out by the 7 December conference was the final and 
definitive severing of Treatyite ties with the Sinn Féin organisation. When it came to 
deciding the party‟s name, an amendment was proposed by the two Clare delegates Canon 
William O‟Kennedy and Commandant Paddy Brennan that Treaty supporters should 
attempt to recapture the old Sinn Féin organisation and name. This suggests there was a 
substantial body of Treatyite support that was keen to maintain the old machinery as a pro-
Treaty national movement. When the issue was put to a vote the amendment to reorganise 
as Sinn Féin was defeated by „a large majority‟ according to the official conference 
minutes.
110
 However, delegates would leave their mark on the new party. An Cumann 
Náisiúnta, the leadership‟s preferred name, was not endorsed by the conference either. 
Instead delegates settled on a compromise motion, proposed by Alderman Monahan who 
had earlier supported the Clare delegates‟ suggestion to continue as Sinn Féin. Monahan 
found a compromise by proposing the name Cumann na nGaedheal, thereby creating a 
link Arthur Griffith‟s organisation of 1900. The amendment proved popular with delegates 
embodying as it did continuity and change. Cumann na nGaedheal was adopted by 19 
votes to 16. As John Reagan has pointed out, at one and the same time, Treatyites 
reconciled a break with the revolutionary movement that emerged in 1917 while 
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maintaining a link with their separatist past by choosing the name Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
111
 Additionally, the name Cumann na nGaedheal „may also be seen as a 
counterpoint to the name Cumann na Poblachta [original emphasis]‟.112  
Reflecting on the preliminary conference, Mulcahy noted in his diary that Blythe had 
opposed Brennan and O‟Kennedy‟s motion on the grounds that Sinn Féin‟s work was 
done and that its programmes would be carried out by an Irish government.
113
 As such, the 
Free State was conceived as a new beginning by Blythe and power would rest with the 
legislature and its executive arm rather than with a political party. The preliminary 
conference also discussed the party programme and draft constitution in some detail with 
amendments being made to some paragraphs based on suggestions from the floor. A 
provisional executive of twenty-five was appointed to develop an organisation in advance 
of a formal Cumann na nGaedheal convention to take place in the new year. Additionally, 
the preliminary conference narrowly endorsed by twenty votes to nineteen an age limit of 
18, as opposed to 21, for perspective members while loyalty to the Free State and support 
of majority rule were added as pre-requisites for anybody interested in joining Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
114
 With the draft constitution as yet uncompleted, Cumann na nGaedheal 
would remain a work in progress for some months. Celia Shaw recorded in her diary that 
the preliminary conference had been „a very thrilling meeting‟. 
De Valera‟s reaction to the foundation of Cumann na nGaedheal was swift. Days 
after the Cumann na nGaedheal preliminary conference, anti-Treatyites were 
endeavouring to organise Sinn Féin. A concerted effort was to be made to re-establish the 
party under anti-Treaty auspices and from the outset the IRA was to help with 
organisational work.
115
 The existing structures of Sinn Féin would be retained while 
efforts would be made to establish clubs in each parish. By May 1923 de Valera was 
preparing, like his opponents, to build a broad-based party. His energy was thrown into 
reorganising „nationalist‟ or „independence‟ opinion through Sinn Féin with Cumann na 
Poblachta  remaining on only as a „rallying centre for strict Republicans‟. In reality 
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Cumann na Poblachta was dead. By vacating Sinn Féin, the Treatyites had given de 
Valera his opportunity.  De Valera had previously feared the pro-Treaty side would retain 
control of Sinn Féin. However, that prospect „has been since removed practically by the 
formation of Cumann na nGaedheal which leaves Sinn Fein[sic] to us‟.116 
 
Organising Cumann na nGaedheal 
 
Following the deliberately low-key preliminary conference, Cumann na nGaedheal 
evolved slowly. On 14 December 1922
117
 the General and Election Committee decided to 
circulate a report of the Parnell Square convention to those who had been in attendance 
and to urge that they take action to form branches in their localities as soon as possible.
118
  
Efforts to establish branches of Cumann na nGaedheal were discussed in detail by the 
provisional executive, chaired by Fred Allen. It was around this time that bad financial 
habits began to set in. On 26 January 1923 Allen outlined the details of a meeting he had 
held with Cosgrave and Blythe. In spite of an earlier decision to rely on their own 
followers for direct subscriptions, Cosgrave and Blythe urged Allen to appoint staff and 
organisers promising that the necessary funds would be forthcoming without indicating its 
source.
119
 Deputies were encouraged to help in the organisational drive in their 
constituencies so that a fully representative convention could be organised to launch the 
new party in March 1923.
120
 From the outset Cumann na nGaedheal‟s finances were not 
adequately administered, which is unusual given the party‟s commitment to balanced 
budgets in government. There was a constant trickle of what could be described as 
unnecessary spending. Much of the party‟s expenditure could have been avoided if a 
thorough voluntary service ethic was developed at an early stage in the party‟s life as was 
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initially indicated by the provisional committee set up following the 7 December 
convention.
121
 However, it must be remembered that the army, police and state 
administrative machine absorbed much Treatyite organisational talent in 1922/23 and the 
cherry was well eaten by the time the party came looking.
122
 
 Allen‟s committee hired its first organiser, R.J. Purcell in January 1923. Purcell 
previously worked for the Irish Self Determination League of Great Britain and was also 
involved in the June 1922 election campaign on the recommendation of Collins. Purcell 
was awarded the handsome salary of £6 per week, only slightly less than the wage of a 
Dáil deputy, and would play a significant role in organising Cumann na nGaedheal in 
subsequent years. Purcell immediately set about organising the party in Dublin with 
branches emerging in most wards by the end of March. Another organiser, J.J. Egan, was 
appointed and dispatched southwards towards the old John Redmond strongholds of 
Waterford and Wexford. The Home Rule influence of Redmond remained strong in the 
South East and the new party was greeted with some hostility as a successor to the Sinn 
Féin party that had unceremoniously obliterated the Irish Parliamentary Party tradition in 
the 1918 general election.
123
  Purcell requested advice on the point of admitting former 
Unionists to the party. In response, the committee emphasised that the new organisation 
was open to all who agreed to its programme.
124
 Was this a tacit realisation that in the 
future the party would have to embrace people from outside the Sinn Féin fold? As 
discussed above, there were other deep rooted political traditions in the Free State and a 
party that truly aspired to be all embracing and national in outlook would eventually have 
to practice what it preached, especially if the state over which it presided was to have any 
symbolic meaning to the wider community. Cumann na nGaedheal was quickly adapting 
to the realities of Irish statehood, and sought to follow in the tradition of the Irish party 
and Sinn Féin in establishing itself on a wide platform. 
Though branches of Cumann na nGaedheal were being established around the 
country from early 1923, three high profile launches in Tuam, Kilkenny and Cavan on 8 
April garnered a great deal of media attention in advance of the official launch, planned 
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originally for 20 March, but  now scheduled for 27 April. On 9 April the Freeman’s 
Journal was able to exclaim that „Cumann na nGaedheal has been decisively launched‟ 
following the three meetings held on the previous day.
125
 Likewise the Irish Independent 
carried extensive coverage of the three meetings, recognising that the Tuam launch was 
attended by Bishop Gilmartin and that the meeting had called for public support of the 
forces of law-and-order and free elections.
126
 With the Civil War petering out, the 8 April 
meetings showed that the new organisation was coming into the open after months of 
quiet organising work in the wake of the preliminary conference. It is clear that in advance 
of its official launch, Cumann na nGaedheal was eagerly anticipated around the country 
and was one of the main political talking points during April. Addressing a Farmers‟ 
Union meeting in Longford on 19 April, Kilkenny T.D. Dennis Gorey commented that the 
government was forming a new political organisation to be called Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
127
 Criticising the government‟s policy on partition deputy Gorey stated to 
some applause that: „They are also calling their party, I understand, the “National Party”. 
Where is the Nationality about the party who have thrown over the Catholic Nationalists 
of Ulster?‟ The deputy went on to say that he did not believe de Valera had an answer to 
the Northern question either, showing that the farmers‟ organisation was trying to carve 
out a niche by distancing itself from both Cosgrave and de Valera.  
As April 1923 progressed, an end to the Civil War was in sight. On 12 April the Irish 
Times predicted that the death of Liam Lynch two days earlier would have an adverse 
affect on the anti-government military campaign.
128
 Indeed, the death of Lynch removed a 
substantial obstacle to peace between the government and the Irregulars. Lynch‟s 
successor as IRA chief-of-staff, Frank Aiken, favoured making some sort of peace 
agreement with the government and took steps to that end immediately upon his 
appointment. Although moves were afoot to end the war, the conflict continued to inhibit 
the enforcement of civil administration, as evidenced by an attack on two gardaí in 
Roscommon on 27 April.
129
 However, with railways back up and running and a 
demoralised anti-Treaty army in retreat, the country was beginning to return to conditions 
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resembling normality. Having cost the country £50m, in real terms the equivalent of a 
quarter of a year‟s GNP, the Civil War ended with the defeat of the anti-Treaty IRA on 24 
May 1923.
130
 The country was now securely in the hands of the Free State forces. 
The provisional executive of Cumann na nGaedheal, elected at the preliminary 
conference in December, took charge of the party‟s preparations for the Mansion House 
convention. The convention was to be split between a private and public session with 
decisions on the new party‟s programme and constitution to be made by delegates in 
secrecy. However, the public session was to be a more boisterous affair with ten tickets 
sent to every branch secretary, fifty to the organisation throughout Dublin while a further 
100 tickets were allocated to members of Cumann na Saoirse.
131
 Invitations to the public 
session were also circulated to members of the press. Delegates to the conference 
unanimously adopted Cumann na nGaedheal‟s objectives and programme, which had 
evolved since December to take on a more conservative tone. The party‟s constitution 
proved a slightly more contentious issue. Indeed, Cosgrave wrote to the provisional 
executive inviting its members to meet with his cabinet to discuss the Cumann na 
nGaedheal programme. Cosgrave, Mulcahy, Hayes and Blythe met with the provisional 
executive on 18 April where the objects and programme were discussed and ministers 
agreed to address the convention.
132
 On 25 April Dolan and MacCarthy met with 
Cosgrave, O‟Higgins, MacNeill, FitzGerald, Blythe, Mulcahy, Hugh Kennedy, Duggan, 
Hogan, Walsh and Lynch. Modifications were made to the programme that would be 
presented to the delegates attending the convention and a clause was added to fix the 
minimum membership of each branch at twelve.
133
   
On 27 April Cumann na nGaedheal was officially launched. Mulcahy noted that 
„anybody could have got in‟ to the private session, indicating that the gathering was not so 
exclusive after-all. Mulcahy also criticised the chair‟s control of the meeting and 
considered that the majority of delegates favoured protection demonstrating the continued 
                                                 
130
 Garvin, Birth of democracy, p. 164. 
131
 Provisional general council, minutes of meeting, 13 Apr. 1922 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party 
minute books, P39/min/1). 
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in government buildings, 25 Apr. 1923 (UCDA, Richard Mulcahy papers, 
P7/b/ 325). 
 37 
adherence of rank-and-file Treatyites to Griffithite Sinn Féin policies.
134
 Various changes 
to the objects and programme were proposed from the floor though the final decision on 
the constitution was left to the national executive newly elected by the convention.
135
 In 
another break with what had been the tradition in Sinn Féin, the leader of government did 
not seek the presidency of his party. In refusing to seek the presidency of Cumann na 
nGaedheal, Cosgrave demonstrated his belief that he was leader of the nation first and that 
he did not want to compromise that by taking on the lead role in the party organisation.  
The nomination of Eoin Mac Neill as party president had only been agreed at the last 
minute by the provisional executive on 26 April.
136
 MacNeill was held in high regard in 
1923 as the founder of the Irish Volunteers and as a leading scholar and cultural 
nationalist. He was unanimously endorsed as president by the convention the following 
day. However, that the party of government would be led outside the Dáil by the Minister 
for Education reflected the strange relationship that would develop between Cumann na 
nGaedheal and the government it supported. Indeed, the unusual leadership structure of 
the new pro-Treaty party illustrates the high-brow attitude of many in Cumann na 
nGaedheal to party politics and the organisation at times seemed to resemble more closely 
the loosely tied political machines of the nineteenth century than the new mass parties 
emerging across Europe in the 1920s with numerous writers noting a „dislocation‟137 
between the grass-roots and the Dáil party (these questions will be addressed in more 
detail in subsequent chapters). Cosgrave in particular did not have any great affection for 
partisan party politics and his government was unprepared to cede too much ground to the 
machine that would keep it in power.
138
 Cosgrave saw class and party divisions as 
fractious and damaging to the national interest and his speeches often emphasised the need 
to hold the scales even between the various interest groups. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s formal launch passed without much fanfare. The Irish 
Independent commented that it was „gratifying to see the deplorable conflict transfer to the 
platform‟, a clear reference to the Civil War. The same reporter described the day‟s 
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proceedings as „practical and businesslike‟.139  In like manner, the Southern Star reported 
that there „was no undue exaltation in the speeches at the gathering. On the other hand, 
there was no shirking of burdens‟.140 In contrast, the Manchester Guardian noted that the 
convention had conveyed an unrealistic and aspirational tone and that the new party was 
best place to bridge the various differences between Irish people.
141
 Much like its 
ministers approach to administration, Cumann na nGaedheal would prove practical and 
somewhat dour as a political organisation and it lacked the dynamism of both its 
revolutionary progenitor and anti-Treatyite „half sister‟. However, there was no guarantee 
that an electorate accustomed to the rhetoric of Home Rulers and strident nationalism of 
Sinn Féin‟s leaders during the revolution would warm to a new party forced to deal with 
the realities of self-government and the politics of administration as opposed to that of 
protest.
142
  
1923 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Ireland. The British 
departed the twenty-six southern counties and the nascent Free State government had 
succeeded in crushing the military campaign of an armed minority determined to fight 
against the new settlement. Following the August 1923 election Cumann na nGaedheal 
had a mandate to continue the work begun by the provisional government in bedding 
down the new state on a firm footing. Remarkably, given their intense opposition to 
deValera and their fierce prosecution of the Civil War, the Free State government did 
much in the years to re-integrate rather than exclude the anti-Treatyites from the state‟s 
political apparatus. There was a dogged determination among the government to establish 
a functioning democracy in Ireland, regardless of the consequences for its own electoral 
prospects, a point picked up on elsewhere. By 1927 with de Valera‟s entry to the Dáil his 
revolution was finally over just as Collins‟s revolution had ended with the shelling of the 
Four Courts in June 1922. The chapters that follow look into the Cumann na nGaedheal 
grass-root organisation in greater detail, its performance in elections, the activism levels in 
the constituencies and the reasons behind a perceived electoral fatalism. However, before 
we proceed it is important to acknowledge that the year of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
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foundation was a watershed in Irish history. It marked the beginning of what has been a 
remarkably stable period of democratic government in Ireland and for that achievement, 
Cumann na nGaedheal can take a great deal of credit. 
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The Cumann na nGaedheal organisation: an overview 
 
 
 
Having established Cumann na nGaedheal’s origins, this chapter goes on to detail 
the workings of the party’s national organisational structures over the period 1923-33. 
This chapter is divided into sections to sketch out various aspects of the party organisation. 
Three distinct phases in the party’s life are identified and discussed. The first phase covers 
the initial two years from the party’s official launch in April 1923 through to the 
establishment of a new organising committee, under the chairmanship of J.J. Walsh. This 
committee was created in November 1924 to oversee the campaign for the March 1925 
by-elections caused by a split in the party in the previous year. This period was marked by 
initial organisational growth over the summer of 1923, followed by stagnation in the 
aftermath of the August general election.  
In early 1925 Cumann na nGaedheal began an organisational renewal that saw it 
grow substantially in the constituencies. This new phase of organisational growth was 
short-lived and corresponded with J.J. Walsh’s accession to the lead role in the 
organisation. During this time of growth, the cumainn were given more direct 
representation at the annual party conference.  Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation was 
at its strongest in the mid-1920s with the number of cumainn nationwide growing to their 
highest number. However, the party struggled to maintain its new strength and vitality 
beyond the September 1927 election, though it would be wrong to suggest an irretrievable 
decline had set in. As subsequent chapters will show, while the party machine did lose 
some momentum in 1927, it remained quite robust despite setbacks such as Walsh’s 
decision to leave Cumann na nGaedheal in the summer of 1927 and the global economic 
crash from 1929 onwards. After 1927 the impetus towards a more significant role for 
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rank-and-file members stalled, although some innovation continued to be shown by the 
various constituency organisations in this period (see chapter five). 
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s difficulties were compounded by the failed Boundary 
Commission in 1925 and by political developments in 1926.  William Redmond’s new 
National League threatened Cumann na nGaedheal’s right flank and weakened its capacity 
to attract the wider non Sinn Féin constituency. More significantly, Fianna Fáil’s 
foundation the same year, and subsequent decision to take its Dáil seats, finally presented 
the electorate with a viable alternative to W.T. Cosgrave’s government. A further split in 
Cumann na nGaedheal in 1926, this time over the Boundary Agreement, led to the 
foundation of Clann Éireann. While this party never made an electoral breakthrough, its 
leaders embraced the policies of Fianna Fáil in 1927. Facing an increasingly emboldened 
opposition from 1927 and in having to deal with the consequences of global economic 
collapse from 1929, Cumann na nGaedheal’s prospects in the 1932 election were bleak. 
The February 1932 poll proved to be a ‘critical’ election as the Free State electorate 
returned a Fianna Fáil government supported by the votes of the Labour party. A snap 
election eleven months later gave de Valera his first overall majority. He was to remain in 
power, uninterrupted, until 1948. However, it would be wrong to interpret Cumann na 
nGaedheal as a party in terminal decline from 1927. As this and subsequent chapters will 
show, the cumainn were robust at election time and in the three elections of September 
1927, February 1932 and January 1933 its vote never again fell as low as the June 1927 
figure of 27%. Moreover, facing a prolonged spell in opposition, Cumann na nGaedheal 
was forced to rethink its strategy and to re-evaluate the question of party organisation and 
competing in local elections. In its last months as a distinct party, Cumann na nGaedheal 
made a concerted effort to reorganise. The party engaged in root and branch reform of its 
structures and belatedly decided to contest local elections. In September 1933 the newly 
formed Fine Gael would inherit from its parent party a grass-root machine already 
undergoing a process of renewal. As such, this and subsequent chapters will show that 
Treatyite political reorganisation pre-dated the foundation of Fine Gael in September 1933. 
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Cumann na nGaedheal’s first election 
 
 Cumann na nGaedheal faced its first electoral test just four months on from its public 
launch in April 1923. Irish society was left deeply divided by a Civil War which claimed 
the lives of more Irishmen in eleven months than total Irish Volunteer deaths in the period 
1916-21.
1
 Civil war bequeathed a poisonous legacy to the Irish political system that would 
take many years to heal. Its position secured with the end of the conflict in May, the 
government called a general election for 27 August 1923.
2
 The ballot was the first since the 
Irish Free State officially came into being on 6 December 1922 and a strong performance 
by the government party was needed to bed down the new state’s institutions and to show 
the world, and potential investors,
3
 that the government still had the support of the people. 
Although the fighting had stopped, the country remained deeply unsettled. Over 10,000 
Republican internees remained in government hands while estimates put the material and 
financial damage of the conflict at close to £50m, a vast sum for the period.
4
  
The political landscape in Ireland had been utterly transformed in the time since the 
‘pact’ election of June 1922. Having campaigned on the same platform in June 1922, the 
Sinn Féin ‘sub parties’ had since definitively evolved into their separate entities. After the 
Civil War, anti-Treatyites regrouped and inaugurated themselves as the third incarnation of 
Sinn Féin at a meeting in the Mansion House in June 1923. De Valera jettisoned the 
Cumann na Poblachta project as he sought to broaden the anti-Treaty support base by 
building on the potent symbolism of the old party. Reorganised Sinn Féin in 1923 had a 
much stronger Republican ethos than before, given that most moderates had vacated it upon 
the foundation of Cumann na nGaedheal.
5
 Many Treatyites regretted that the anti-Treatyites 
had regrouped under the Sinn Féin banner. Both sides claimed to be the natural inheritors to 
the Sinn Féin legacy.
6
 Moreover, key military and political figures from each side had been 
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casualties of the Civil War, with the Free State side having to face the electorate without 
the charismatic leadership that Michael Collins had provided in 1922. While W.T. 
Cosgrave did not provide the same level of charismatic leadership, and assumed the role of 
chairman rather than chief in cabinet, he could nevertheless be relied upon as a steady pair 
of hands to guide the country through its darkest hours.
7
  
Cumann na nGaedheal had been established to keep in power those who had steered 
the Provisional Government through the unsteady waters of autumn and winter 1922 and to 
safeguard the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Although its main opponent was demoralised, with many 
of its active supporters interned, Cumann na nGaedheal remained a work in progress as the 
election drew nearer. In the months before its first electoral test Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
organisation lacked the vigour of its parent party. In the early days, Cumann na nGaedheal 
was disadvantaged in that much Treatyite organisational ability was in the service of the 
state rather than the party.
8
 Sinn Féin had at least inherited the party structures of the 
original movement, and experienced something of an explosion of growth after its June 
meeting from just sixteen branches to several hundred.  Conversely, outside the capital 
Cumann na nGaedheal branches were slow to take root and with a crucial general election 
on the horizon the race to get Cumann na nGaedheal organised across the Free State began 
in earnest.  
After the 27 April meeting, Séamus Dolan issued a circular to supporters on 3 May. 
In the circular, Dolan pointed to the successful convention and the formation of cumainn as 
tentative signs for optimism. Dolan called on supporters to volunteer their time to building 
up the party as it was not yet possible to appoint organisers pending the raising of funds for 
the organisation. For its part, the Standing Committee would assist these efforts by 
supplying copies of the party’s constitution, membership cards and literature.9 However, 
Cumann na nGaedheal quickly became preoccupied with the approaching electoral contest, 
the government’s international prestige resting on a strong showing at the polls. As such, 
electoral work soon came to overshadow that of organisation building. In its urgency to win 
with a new and untested party machine, Cumann na nGaedheal made the mistake of 
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throwing money raised from organisation and electoral appeal funds at any organisational 
problem it encountered. Cumann na nGaedheal set out its stall as a non-class party and 
advertised as ‘the national party’. Organising in Naas, speakers said the organisation was 
launched to ‘raise it above all party [and class] interests’.10 Cumann na nGaedheal members 
could also belong to farmer and labour organisations so long as they ‘put their country 
before their immediate class interests’. The Southern Star was unimpressed, preferring if 
Cumann na nGaedheal would admit that it too was a political party like the Farmers’ Union 
or the Labour party. Cumann na nGaedheal organisers, usually men from a military 
background, were appointed and despatched to the constituencies throughout the summer of 
1923. In their instructions, these paid organisers were asked to enlist the support of 
influential people in towns and cities to help organise new cumainn. Once paid organisers 
had worked the provincial towns, the new local party leaders were expected to establish the 
machine in the ‘outlying parish areas’ where they had influence. What was expected of 
organisers was clearly set out in the instructions each was issued with: 
 
Instructions to Organisers 
 
1. Organiser to work the towns in his district, enlist the support of influential people and ask 
them to organise cumainn in outlying parish areas. 
2. Affiliate cumainn immediately. 
3. Will be judged on the number he can affiliate. 
4. To send chief organiser weekly report with a programme of work for the coming week.
11
 
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s rapidly growing network of paid organisers was led by its 
energetic chief organiser P.J. Ryan.
12
 In advance of the 1923 election Ryan oversaw the 
appointment of new organisers, issued them with their instructions, and furnished the 
Standing Committee with weekly reports of the progress. These reports brought mixed 
news for the committee. The positive reaction to organisers in the capital and provincial 
towns was balanced out by the disappointing reception the party was receiving in 
predominantly rural areas. Ryan’s report of 29 June provides a taste of the frantic efforts to 
manufacture an electoral machine in the time available before the election. In it Ryan 
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informed the Standing Committee of the recent appointment of organisers Seán Scanlon in 
Clare, William Breen in County Dublin, Michael O’Hara in Longford/Westmeath and 
Michael McGrath in Wexford.
13
 Every constituency was assigned an organiser and some of 
the bigger ones ended up with two. A total of forty paid organisers were working for 
Cumann na nGaedheal by August. In the same report Ryan elaborated on the difficulties his 
organisers faced in rural areas. To combat the apathy facing the party in the provinces, 
Ryan instructed his organisers to arrange as many parish meetings as possible and sent on 
posters and such materials as might help attract people into Cumann na nGaedheal 
meetings. However, the party structures of Cumann na nGaedheal did little to make life 
easy for the organisers or influential townsfolk to organise cumainn. Ryan’s report of 6 July 
reveals an important problem in the mechanics of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. 
While admitting that the people in rural areas were slow to take an interest, Ryan stated that 
some recent meetings called to start new cumainn had been abandoned by organisers on the 
grounds that only eight or nine people were present.
14
 Party rules stated that twelve people 
were needed to inaugurate a Cumann na nGaedheal branch. Ryan suggested that election 
committees be established in areas where it had not been possible to form branches. Might 
it be that the party had set the bar too high? It would probably have proved more beneficial 
in the long term to proceed in setting up a branch with eight or nine prospective members 
present than to abandon the exercise altogether. It is unclear from Ryan’s report of 6 July if 
people who had turned up for the abandoned meetings were instructed to join nearby 
branches or if they were assured a cumann would be formed at a later date.  
 In order for the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation to manoeuvre its way out from 5 
Parnell Square and reach into every street and every parish in the country, it would have to 
demonstrate greater flexibility than that shown in June and July. Branches continued to 
appear in July and August, although many of these became inactive on the passing of the 
election.
15
 Cumann na nGaedheal was launched in Cork at a public meeting on 8 July. Liam 
de Róiste commented that Cork Treatyites were ‘not a perfectly united body’ and that some 
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supporters believed Cumann na nGaedheal was ‘too broad’ in composition reflecting the 
diverse nature of the party. By the end of July committees were being formed in those 
places where branches could not be formed.
16
 While this action was beneficial to the party 
in the short term, it was a quick fix that would do little to set down firm roots for Cumann 
na nGaedheal in the longer term. In some remote areas it would have been more 
advantageous to proceed with setting up cumainn even if few members were present. 
Perhaps Cumann na nGaedheal’s desire to establish strong branches stemmed from the 
experience of pre-independence political movements. Sinn Féin and the United Irish 
League before it had been national movements with branches in every parish.
17
 Cumann na 
nGaedheal and its anti-Treaty rival operated in a changed environment. Political 
fragmentation, particularly on the pro-Treaty side, replaced the unity of pre-independence 
nationalist politics. Cumann na nGaedheal it seems, continued to see itself as the 
quintessential ‘national’ organisation and adopted the rigid structures that had worked in 
the past. However, Fianna Fáil from 1926 onwards set its minimum branch membership at 
nine and managed to lay the foundations of a strong, dynamic party machine by organising 
itself in small, tight-knit units in every parish. Unlike Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil 
was an opposition party when it was founded so could devote much energy to developing a 
strong grass-root machine and quickly adapted to the changed political landscape.  
In an attempt to stamp the authority of headquarters over the entire organisation, the 
Standing Committee asked that every branch send reports of their meetings to headquarters 
and the local press.
18
 With the election fast approaching the committee wanted to keep a 
watchful eye on the grass-roots. There is evidence to suggest that around this time the 
cumainn themselves, particularly those in Dublin North, were also trying to put their mark 
on the new party. As we shall see in chapter five, the Dublin North constituency was well 
organised by the summer of 1923. Party members in that constituency, particularly from 
Drumcondra and Glasnevin, showed a keen interest in shaping the new party. 
Correspondence to the Standing Committee from the Glasnevin cumann in early July urged 
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that only Gaelic type should be used in all printing matters connected with Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
19
 In September the Standing Committee and National Executive discussed 
resolutions from the Glasnevin branch and Dublin North constituency committee,
20
 this 
time advocating the advisability of holding a national convention to consider the position of 
the organisation. Drumcondra cumann voiced its support for this in October. 
21
 In July a 
meeting of the National Executive advocated the breaking up of larger cumainn, (Dún 
Laoghaire was cited as an example) into smaller ones and reaffirmed the party’s desire to 
have one branch per ward or parish.
22
 Clearly the party’s machinery was still developing 
and unlike their anti-Treaty counterparts, Cumann na nGaedheal organisers did not have the 
benefit of working within the framework of an existing entity. 
Throughout July and August, Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters in 5 Parnell Square 
bristled with activity as the party’s election apparatus was in creation. Simultaneously, a 
new party organisation was being established around the country while having to 
immediately throw itself into a campaign critical to the survival of Cosgrave’s 
administration. Psychologically, the objectives of fighting the election and building the 
organisation remained separate. As in 1922, a Treaty election fund was established though 
a separate organisational fundraising drive met with a meagre response as was typical of the 
party in this period.
23
 Treaty supporters were more willing to donate to the election 
campaign than to the building up of a party organisation. The two funds were merged into 
one at the 9 July National Executive meeting. At this meeting, headquarters made itself 
liable for nomination fees and expenses for each constituency less ten per cent. Ryan’s 
report of 20 July stated that thirty one new Cumann na nGaedheal branches had been 
affiliated in the previous week.
24
 The policy of recruiting paid organisers was working 
while the upcoming election gave an added impetus for Treaty supporters not already 
swallowed up in the army, police or administrative service to get actively involved in the 
new party. 
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 In constituencies where it had become established, the party organisation set about 
selecting candidates. The well organised Dublin North constituency selected its team to 
contest the election under the Cumann na nGaedheal banner at a convention on 1 August,
25
 
with a convention in Cork taking place on 5 August.
26
 In an indication of things to come, 
Treatyites in Cork had been urged to broaden their appeal by cooperating with the city’s 
business interests as represented by the Cork Progressives.
27
 For veteran Sinn Féiners this 
was a bitter pill to swallow, given the Irish party and Unionist tendencies of the 
Progressives in the past. Conversely, in more rural constituencies, party structures were 
patchy and candidate selection more problematic. This was acknowledged by the Standing 
Committee. At first, the committee suggested that affiliated cumainn in such constituencies 
should ‘invite representatives from areas as yet unorganised, to a meeting for the selection 
of candidates’. 28  This proved impractical in some areas and so practice varied from 
constituency to constituency. For instance, the Clare organisation, and various non-party 
guests (see chapter three), selected five candidates to contest what was a five-seat 
constituency. As the election drew closer, party structures continued to evolve. In addition, 
three provincial organisers were appointed to link workers on the ground with Ryan. 
As a final flourish before the general election, 100,000 copies of an address by 
Cosgrave were ordered in large poster form while the same text was to appear in 
advertisements in the Irish Independent, the Irish Times and the Freeman’s Journal.29 A 
prevailing sense of pessimism characterised the 1923 election. The Civil War had killed off 
much of the optimism characteristic of the revolutionary period. Even meetings organised 
by the opposition failed to generate enthusiasm.
30
 1923 was a difficult year for Irish farmers, 
as the war-time boom in agricultural prices came to an end.
31
 It is quite possible that the 
vote for the government party, which had inherited a natural commercial farming base from 
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its advocacy of the Treaty and stability, was affected by the economic depression.
32
 
Cumann na nGaedheal won 39% of the vote and sixty-three seats, a gain of five on the 
number won by pro-Treaty Sinn Féin in 1922. Given that the Dáil had just been increased 
from 128 to 153 seats, Cumann na nGaedheal’s seat total was something of a 
disappointment.
33
 Nevertheless Richard Sinnott makes the point, that Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s share of the vote in 1923 must be considered against the emergence of a multi-
party system in Ireland that year. For the first time every constituency was contested by a 
multiplicity of candidates. Moreover, much of the political re-alignment of 1923 occurred 
on the pro-Treaty side. Sectional interest parties could offer voters greater choice while 
agreeing to work within the framework of the Treaty.
34
 
 Cumann na nGaedheal had performed particularly well in the west and in Dublin. In 
Dublin North, General Richard Mulcahy received an unprecedented 22,205 first-preference 
votes.
35
 Sinn Féin managed to win forty-four seats in spite of the fact that many of its 
activists, and indeed candidates, were in prison. Sinn Féin was the sole beneficiary of anti-
Treaty sentiment with no Republican pretender to its left or right. The Farmers’ Party, 
controlled by the Farmers’ Union, founded in 1920, and strong in most rural constituencies, 
won fifteen seats. Meanwhile, the Labour party won fourteen seats, as yet failing to stir the 
Irish electorate to the social cause. Although short of an overall majority, the abstention of 
the anti-Treaty Sinn Féin deputies gave Cumann na nGaedheal a comfortable majority 
inside the Dáil allowing the government continue in office. In the absence of de Valera and 
his deputies, Cosgrave faced Tom Johnson of the Labour party, who provided a nominal 
leadership of the opposition. While the opposition represented a diverse range of interests, 
from ex-unionists and farmers to Johnson’s Labour party, it was no threat to the 
government. So long as Sinn Féin continued to abstain Cosgrave was safe in power. 
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The legacy of the 1923 election 
 
 With Cosgrave returned as head of government, and with Cumann na nGaedheal 
holding more seats in parliament than the anti-Treatyites in abstention, the summer’s frantic 
organisational efforts had paid off, even if the party had won slightly less than two-fifths of 
the votes cast. With the passing of the election, efforts to organise Cumann na nGaedheal 
across the country slackened. The Standing Committee immediately set about reducing 
spending as it tried to grapple with the financial legacy of the contest. All but two paid 
organisers were told that their services were no longer required.
36
 Even the minutes of 
Standing Committee meetings from the end of August reflect a more sedate atmosphere as 
party work eased. Correspondence from the grass-roots urged that the party immediately 
begin preparations for the local elections due the following year, but as we shall see the 
party never formally contested local government, instead unofficially fielding candidates 
where there was no other pro-Treaty person in contention.
37
  
Throughout the autumn of 1923 the Standing Committee grappled with the debts left 
in the wake of the lavish excesses of the August general election. In addressing the poor 
state of the party’s finances, various options were considered by the National Executive. J.J. 
Walsh was prepared to ask constituency committees to pay their own liabilities while other 
ministers in attendance suggested that outstanding nomination fees dating from 1917 to 
1921, now controlled by Cumann na nGaedheal members, should be obtained.
38
 Leaving it 
to the various constituency committees to pay monies owed would have been unfair, given 
that headquarters had indicated its own liability for these before the election. Such a move 
would have done little to encourage activism grass-root activism. At this time, the Standing 
Committee decided to let out rooms at party headquarters. Cumann na Saoirse had been 
using a room at 5 Parnell Square but they were vacating by 12 October. Cumann Sugradh 
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an Airm, a committee set up to provide recreational facilities for soldiers,
39
 began renting 
Cumann na Saoirse’s old room for a yearly rent of £52.40 Also, the party’s newly formed 
central branch, or Ard Chumann (Chapter five) contributed by paying a small fee for the 
use of rooms three and four at headquarters for its meetings and functions. 
As the autumn progressed, Cumann na nGaedheal’s election hangover worsened. 
Two subcommittees were formed in October, one for finance and one for organisation.
41
 
On 26 October the Standing Committee discussed correspondence from the Clare 
constituency committee indicating that it was £630 in arrears from the election.  Clare 
requested funds from the party’s cash-strapped headquarters to help it clear debts owed to 
local businesses. Despite the decision to forward £150 to the Clare constituency committee 
with an explanation of headquarters’ own financial difficulties (see next chapter), acrimony 
rumbled on in the county for a further two years. By 7 December the situation was so bad 
that further redundancies and salary cuts for staff were considered. Indeed, even the chief 
organiser’s salary was reduced as Cumann na nGaedheal desperately tried to make 
savings.
42
 If the nascent organisation had benefited from the excesses in party spending 
during the election, it was now suffering disproportionately from its after-effects. 
 
Strain, mutiny and by-elections 
 
Ultimate responsibility for the organisation lay with Eoin MacNeill, Cumann na 
nGaedheal president and Minister for Education. By November 1923, with the party’s 
finances in a dire position and with the Fiscal Inquiry Committee having blunted the 
protectionist argument (chapter seven), MacNeill was urging closer cooperation between 
the organisation and the government. He also stressed the need to formulate an attractive 
economic policy to draw people into the cumainn.
43
 As a member of the cabinet, and the 
highest officer in Cumann na nGaedheal, MacNeill was in an ideal position to mediate 
between the organisation, the parliamentary party, and the government, and should have 
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been able to represent the views of the deputies and the organisation in cabinet. On 3 
December MacNeill summoned a conference of the Standing Committee and the Executive 
Council in government buildings. Séamus Hughes, the party’s newly appointed general 
secretary,
44
 also attended. MacNeill understood the importance of giving the organisation a 
function between elections and urged his cabinet colleagues to heed the lessons learned 
from the demise of the Irish party in 1918. MacNeill’s conference discussed the lack of 
contact between grass-roots, party and government. An exchange of views ensued as to 
how best to improve coordination between these. 
 The question of a distinctive policy was also discussed, with some suggesting an 
inducement for joining Cumann na nGaedheal ought to be the opportunity to influence 
legislation. FitzGerald believed the cumainn should welcome all elements, ‘old and new’, a 
reference to the constitutional nationalists of the Irish party, while Blythe saw party 
organisation as a ‘conduit pipe’ for testing public opinion. O’Higgins stated that a 
distinctive Cumann na nGaedheal policy would simply ‘crystallise around government 
legislation’. 45  For O’Higgins and like-minded ministers, the government would shape 
Cumann na nGaedheal and not vice versa. There was, however, a fault line in the 
government. McGrath, Mulcahy and Walsh, all Irish-Irelanders (cultural nationalists), were 
party men who enjoyed uneasy relationships with more ‘cosmopolitan’ colleagues such as 
FitzGerald, O’Higgins and Hogan with Cosgrave holding the centre ground.46 The party 
machine would have little scope to influence ministers or to flex its muscle in the pursuit of 
patronage (although some organisers did attempt the latter in 1924). In spite of his efforts to 
mediate between government and its political machine, MacNeill demonstrated an inability 
to develop the organisation more forcefully. However, MacNeill’s selection as president 
itself was an afterthought. One minister who did demonstrate a knowledge and interest in 
party organisation was Mulcahy and it seems that Cumann na nGaedheal suffered for his 
role as Commander-in-Chief in late 1922 and early 1923 as the new party was evolving. 
After the Civil War Mulcahy took a genuine interest in the party organisation, was critical 
of some of his ministerial colleagues’ neglect of it and regretted the failure of the Treatyites 
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to retain the Sinn Féin label.
47
 In retrospect, Mulcahy’s enforced absence during the party’s 
formative days was detrimental for the organisation. 
Scarcely six months on from its first election, Cumann na nGaedheal faced a crisis 
which potentially threatened the survival of both the state and party. The complex issues 
surrounding the army mutiny, the resignation of two ministers and the secession of nine 
deputies from the Cumann na nGaedheal party have been examined adequately by other 
historians.
48
 What is examined here is the impact of these traumatic events on the wider 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisation and the party’s identity. The mutiny brought to a head 
tensions in the government, the army and the Cumann na nGaedheal party and ultimately 
cost Mulcahy his place in cabinet as he resigned his position before being forced out. 
O’Higgins, acting on behalf of an ill Cosgrave, moved against rival old IRA and IRB 
factions organising themselves in the national army. As such, the episode brought out into 
the open three factions in the overall Treatyite movement, all of whom claimed to be 
following in Collins’s footsteps: the old IRA men, Collins’s former subordinates in the 
clandestine IRB, and, of course, the civilian ministers. 
 Disgruntled army officers were unhappy with the extent of demobilisation after the 
Civil War and the slow pace of progress towards a Republic. They presented Cosgrave with 
an ultimatum on 6 March 1924. The mutineers had little sympathy, the Manchester 
Guardian arguing they simply wanted the public service purged of those with whom they 
‘did not see eye to eye’.49  A move against the mutineers on 18 March, ordered by Gearóid 
O’Sullivan and Richard Mulcahy, created a new crisis as the Executive Council deemed 
that particular action to have cut across government authority. In the end O’Higgins, under 
the direction of Cosgrave from his sick bed, moved against both factions to bring the armed 
forces under true civilian control.
50
 However, the reasons behind Mulcahy’s demise require 
further teasing out. Mulcahy as Minister for Defence in the wake of the Civil War was 
faced with the task of reforming and demobilising a swollen army. Mulcahy remained a 
soldier and some of the more murky civil war atrocities such as that at Ballyseedy had left 
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his ministerial colleagues unimpressed with his army.
51
 The army’s arrest of the mutineers, 
seemingly without government authority, gave the civilian ministers an opportunity to 
install a non-military Defence Minister.  McGrath, on the other hand, had resigned from 
cabinet in sympathy with the original Old IRA mutineers. Eight of McGrath’s supporters 
on the Cumann na nGaedheal backbenches joined with him in seceding from the party to 
form the National Group opposition. 
 For the most part, Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation fell into line behind the 
Executive Council, passing a resolution affirming its belief in the authority of the 
government and appealing to the parliamentary party to remember that ‘the National 
interest is paramount’.52 An attempt was made by the Dublin North constituency committee 
to use the crisis to discuss the aims and policy of Cumann na nGaedheal and to again have 
clarified the relations between the organisation, party and government (see chapter five). 
McGrath’s new group hoped to use the offer of reunion with the party as a ruse to prize 
substantial concessions on policy from the government and to secure the reinstatement of 
the mutinous officers.
53
 The National Group were invited by the Standing Committee to a 
meeting of the National Executive on 13 May where the Dublin North committee’s 
resolution would be debated. Only one member, Seán Milroy, attended and he walked out 
at the beginning of the meeting on the grounds that the wording of the Dublin North motion 
was not as it had been circulated.
54
  McGrath was then invited to a meeting of the Standing 
Committee but declined.  Cosgrave was also keen to maintain party unity and adopted a 
conciliatory position with McGrath and the National Group.
55
 With five by-elections due in 
November 1924, it was unsurprising that Cosgrave should have gone out on a limb to try to 
preserve the party’s unity and reintegrate the National Group. The possibility of the 
Treatyite vote being split even further by National Group candidates must have played on 
the minds of party officials and the President alike. In correspondence with his friend, and 
ardent Treatyite, Bishop Michael Fogarty of Killaloe, Cosgrave described efforts to unite as 
honest on behalf of both McGrath and himself. Fogarty reassured Cosgrave that the split 
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might be for the best.
56
 The government chose to face down the McGrathites rather than 
concede ground on administrative probity or economic policy. On 29 October McGrath 
resigned from the Dáil followed by the rest of the National Group two days later. With five 
by-elections due in November, the resignation of the nine National Group deputies further 
contributed to an air of crisis. Cosgrave and his colleagues knew their position was 
precarious and so turned their attention to grass-root revival. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal was in turmoil when it faced the electorate in five 
constituencies during November 1924. Sinn Féin sought to capitalise on the government’s 
difficulties, claiming that the resignation of the McGrathites was the beginning of the end 
for the Free State.
57
 By-elections in Donegal and Cork Borough were caused by the 
resignations of Cumann na nGaedheal deputies P.J. Ward and Alfred O’Rahilly. A seat in 
Mayo North became vacant due to its forfeiture by the Cumann na nGaedheal candidate, 
the government party deputy for Cork East died while a vacancy arose in Dublin South on 
the appointment of Hugh Kennedy as the state’s first Chief Justice.58 In Cork Borough, 
Michael Egan was selected by a Cumann na nGaedheal convention which was attended by 
former Hibernians and United Irish Leaguers, people who in Sinn Féin days had ‘been the 
enemy’.59 In subsequent months old Sinn Féiners within the Cork city organisation made a 
clandestine effort to wrest control from those with past Irish party affiliations.
60
 The two 
Cork seats were held as was Donegal. However, Cumann na nGaedheal failed to defend its 
seats in Mayo North and Dublin South. Séamus Hughes’s defeat to Seán Lemass in the 
supposedly safe Dublin South constituency came as a surprise at all levels within Cumann 
na nGaedheal.
61
 
The loss of two seats in November, coupled with the National Group secession, 
added to Cumann na nGaedheal’s difficulties. A wounded party now faced new-year by-
elections for nine seats it formerly held. These by-elections in particular would prove a 
crucial test of Cumann na nGaedheal’s strength and ability to preserve its identity. 
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November’s results, and the paltry return from a national appeal for funds,62 augured ill for 
its ability to succeed in the task ahead.  Yet again, a costly election campaign was foisted 
upon a party that was in need of convalescence. A crisis meeting of the Standing 
Committee took place on 27 November 1924 and was attended by O’Higgins, Blythe and 
Walsh. O’Higgins outlined the serious challenge that faced Cumann na nGaedheal: there 
were nine by-elections pending and the organisation had no finance with which to meet 
them. The government and the parliamentary party had considered the matter and decided 
that: 
 
[There were] three months available in which to remedy the existing lack of organisation and it 
had been decided, with the substantial agreement of the Party, that the way out was to appoint a 
vigorous Organising Committee consisting of a selection from the present Coiste Gnoth 
[Standing Committee], from the Ministers and to co-opt a number of other people who were not 
at present connected with the Party or the Organisation.
63
 
 
The new committee would be chaired by J.J Walsh. The minutes of the meeting recorded 
that he: 
 
faced this responsibility from a sense of duty, in order to tide [us] over a position of serious 
difficulty. There must be radical change or we would go under. We were confronted with a 
hostile section of the population, well organised, and [with] a large section standing on the ditch, 
and only a small number of definite supporters of the Government with practically no 
Organisation behind them. It was a herculean task and he was not too hopeful. After 3 months 
there would be an Organisation and then a Convention could be held and a new Executive 
elected.
64
 
 
Essentially, the new committee operated outside the structures of the party. It 
supplanted the Standing Committee and the National Executive and in mid December 
changed its name to the ‘Executive Organising Committee’ betraying what Regan claims 
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was an attempt to subvert the extra-parliamentary Cumann na nGaedheal organisation.
65
 
Alternatively, the establishment of Walsh’s organising committee could be interpreted as a 
party and government taking action to arrest a decline in their fortunes at a time of national 
crisis. In 1924, Cumann na nGaedheal had come through an army mutiny which threatened 
the state from within, the resignation and dismissal of two cabinet ministers, and the 
secession of nine deputies who constituted themselves as an opposition party. When the 
National Group resigned their seats, the party knew it would face nine further by-elections, 
having already lost two supposedly safe seats in November. This was a situation that 
demanded a strong response if the government was to continue in office. The establishment 
of Walsh’s organising committee actually renewed the party’s grass-roots organisation. It 
had not neutered it. Meanwhile the secessionists received little sympathy within their own 
constituency organisations.  
Cosgrave called all nine by-elections for March 1925 and Walsh’s committee 
immediately took charge of the campaign. Cumann na nGaedheal heeded the lessons of 
November and a substantial effort to raise funds was launched. The party’s guarantors 
agreed to put up £2,000 for the March by-elections, while efforts were made to solicit funds 
from business.
66
 Coupled with this was an attempt to find a suitable business candidate to 
run for the party in Dublin North as Cumann na nGaedheal courted middle class votes in 
the capital. Organisational renewal began immediately under the direction of the committee. 
Liam Burke was appointed chief organiser and chief executive officer as Hughes was 
sidelined. Mulcahy and O’Higgins seem to have reflected a general disquiet with the way 
headquarters was run by Hughes and the appointment of Burke was indicative of a move 
towards the appointment of ‘good personnel and staff’. 67  Hughes remained as general 
secretary but it was clear Burke was his superior in headquarters. Walsh’s committee 
decided to spend £5 weekly on Saturday advertisements in the three daily newspapers. It 
also deemed that any profit from the sale of the recently purchased premises on Dawson St., 
                                                 
65
 Regan, Counter revolution, p. 223. Hughes as general secretary wrote to each member of the national 
executive, each constituency secretary and each cumann informing them of the establishment of the new 
committee under Walsh’s chairmanship. Hughes circular, 6 Dec. 1924 (NLI, Seán Milroy papers, MS 46,846). 
66
 Executive Organising Committee, minutes of meeting, 11 Dec.1924 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party 
minute books, P39/min/1). 
67
 Regan, Counter revolution, p. 229; Organising Committee, minutes of meeting 16 Dec. 1924 (ibid.).  
58 
 
initially envisaged as a new headquarters, should be spent on Ford cars for the party 
organisers selected to work the seven constituencies. 
68
  
Remarkably, the secessionists scarcely inflicted any damage on the party organisation 
as evidenced by the attendance at selection conventions in the vacated constituencies. 
Controversially, a Cumann na nGaedheal convention in Cavan selected Milroy as a 
candidate. A welcome discrepancy between the delegates entitled to vote and the number of 
votes cast rendered Milroy’s selection null and void.69 A reconvened convention seventeen 
days later on 21 January selected John O’Reilly, a candidate acceptable to the organising 
committee. The Cavan constituency committee was caught between its divided loyalties to 
headquarters and Milroy, placing its secretary P.J. O’Rourke in a ‘difficult’ position.70 In 
Kilkenny, another member of the National Group, Seán Gibbons, could muster a paltry 
nineteen of the 117 votes cast at the Cumann na nGaedheal convention. In the end Milroy 
contested Dublin North as an independent, the only National Group member to go forward, 
the McGrathites playing no further part in the by-elections.
71
  
Cumann na nGaedheal officially opened its campaign on 1 February with high-profile 
government speakers allocated to each by-election constituency. Walsh’s committee 
directed the campaign making decisions on publicity and literature and indicated that grass-
roots’ initiative would comprise a crucial element of the party’s efforts. 72  Numerous 
organisers were hired for the by-elections. When the votes were counted, it was clear that 
the Organising Committee had succeeded, as the party won seven of the nine seats on offer. 
Given that the nine vacancies were spread across seven constituencies, it would have been 
almost impossible for Cumann na nGaedheal to win all nine seats.  Milroy came last in 
Dublin North showing that the splitters had little sympathy and that Cumann na nGaedheal 
remained intact (the two losses were offset by the decision of two business deputies to take 
the party whip). The March by-elections reaffirmed Cumann na nGaedheal’s position as the 
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largest party and demonstrated that the split in the parliamentary party had not resonated 
with either the rank-and-file or the wider pro-Treaty electorate. Walsh’s committee was 
acknowledged by the Manchester Guardian which put Cumann na nGaedheal’s success 
down to the ‘drastic overhauling of its party machinery’.73  While the secession of the 
National Group undoubtedly chiselled off part of Cumann na nGaedheal’s broad base and 
weakened the republican, advanced nationalist and protectionist lobbies in the party,
74
 it 
remained the ‘government party’. In fact, by 1925, the party was probably more cohesive 
than ever. Now the Organising Committee turned its attention to building up the party 
organisation in other parts of the country. 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisational apex? 
 
 A meeting on 13 January 1925 decided that organisers hired for the by-elections, 
‘would be sent to areas that were unorganised’ when that hurdle had been successfully 
navigated.
75
 At the same meeting Cosgrave praised Walsh and his committee, asserting that 
Cumann na nGaedheal would ‘make good as a result of its work’.76 In the chapters that 
follow, the efforts from the spring of 1925 to build a stronger party organisation can be 
seen from the perspective of the constituencies themselves. In his diary, de Róiste, a fellow 
constituent of Walsh, referred to his ‘reorganising committee’,77 indicating that the exercise 
was as much to do with organisational renewal as the March by-elections. Organisational 
problems had dated from the August 1923 election, were compounded by the tumultuous 
events of 1924 and reached their nadir with the lacklustre performance in the November 
1924 by-elections. However, this low-point proved to be the catalyst for change and with 
MacNeill serving as the Free State representative on the Boundary Commission, Walsh, as 
chair of the Organising Committee, became de-facto head of the organisation.  
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Again, rigid party rules seemed to stifle enthusiasm by stipulating that the number of 
Dáil deputies in a constituency was the basis by which it would be represented at the 
party’s annual convention or Ard Fheis. For instance, the two-day 1924 convention was 
attended by a mere 123 delegates. Delegates in 1924 debated resolutions, some of which 
called for a wider basis of representation at the annual convention.
78
  However, things 
began to change in 1925. As well as reorganising the constituencies, Walsh’s committee 
had suggested various changes to Cumann na nGaedheal’s rules and these were to be 
enacted by the May 1925 annual convention, which had been postponed to facilitate 
electioneering in the lead-up to the March elections.
79
 The new rules gave each cumann 
direct delegate representation at the annual convention. Addressing delegates, Walsh 
criticised the indirect manner in which branches were represented heretofore, noting that 
conventions were ‘summoned in a peculiar way’. 80  The switch to direct cumann 
representation more than doubled the attendance at subsequent annual conventions, 
ensuring that they were not just more representative of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
membership, but were more energetic affairs in general.  
In his address, Cosgrave outlined some proposals introduced in that year’s budget, 
including cuts in income tax, reduced duties on tea and sugar (known at the time as the poor 
man’s luxuries, see chapter seven) and improved agricultural grants. In keeping with the 
ethos of a ‘National’ party, he claimed the budget was ‘calculated to encourage rich and 
poor alike’. Echoing his speeches of 1922 and 1923, Cosgrave claimed that the party’s 
‘policy has been, and will be, to hold the scales even between all interests, to assist each 
without injury to the others’.81  Cosgrave also devoted sections of his speech to party 
organisation. He claimed that, as a party of government, Cumann na nGaedheal did not 
have the luxury of devoting as much time as its political opponents to building up its 
machinery. He added that strong organisation was necessary if the party was to continue 
implementing its policies and suggested it could become a co-ordinating force between the 
various sectors of society by appealing to national rather than class interests. 
                                                 
78
 Minutes of Annual Convention, Jan. 1924 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1). 
79
 National Executive, minutes of meeting, 21 Apr. 1925 (ibid.). 
80
 Cumann na nGaedheal Annual Convention, Mansion House Dublin (Athlone, 1925) copy in the Richard 
Mulcahy papers (UCDA, Richard Mulcahy papers, P7b/60/28). 
81
 The grassroots agreed. Flyers in the de Róiste papers referred to Cumann na nGaedheal as the ‘National 
Organisation’, as a party that was ‘not Anti-Farmer, is not Anti-Labour, it is National’, Various flyers, 
undated (CCCA, Liam de Róiste papers, U271/K/ Dáil material). 
61 
 
Acknowledging the organisational progress made since December 1924, an enthusiastic 
Cosgrave stressed, to prolonged applause, that the push must continue ‘until in every 
district of every constituency there is a live, active branch of the party’ that was ‘watchful 
of the national interests in the district’.82 Clearly the party was still wedded to the idea that 
it could reconcile the diverse interests of the country by bringing them under an all 
embracing nationalist banner. 
Throughout the summer of 1925, efforts were made to build on the organisational 
progress that had been made. As Cumann na nGaedheal renewed its organisation, Sinn Féin 
seemed to be in decline. In March 1925 its Ard Comhairle heard that it had 375 branches, 
eighteen of which were in Britain. The report went on to state the position would not 
improve until members understood that ‘Sinn Fein [sic] should be not merely an election 
machine, but rather the organised spirit of Republicanism’.83 Clearly, republicans had their 
own organisational problems. 
 Following the 1925 convention Liam Burke wrote to each Cumann na nGaedheal 
T.D. asking that they use the summer recess to maintain and improve the organisation in 
their constituencies. Deputies were sent the contact details of each cumann secretary in 
their constituency on the understanding that regular contact would be maintained. 
According to Burke, ‘more remains to be done before we can afford to rest on our oars’.84 
The reorganising effort continued over the summer as is evident in subsequent chapters. 
Burke was able to tell the National Executive on 30 June that the party now had 520 
cumainn nationwide, five paid organisers, nine constituencies with paid secretaries and six 
constituencies with active, voluntary secretaries. Additionally, Burke indicated that 
cumainn would be supplied with materials to encourage political discussion and debate, a 
pamphlet on the Shannon Scheme and a verbatim report of the 1925 annual convention’s 
proceedings.
85
 Burke’s report also outlined that inaccuracies existed in the electoral register 
and that securing adequate funds remained a problem for the party. Burke emphasised his 
desire that each deputy would stay in close touch with their constituency organisation over 
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the summer break and informed the committee that public meetings were organised in nine 
constituencies where Cumann na nGaedheal remained weak.  
Over 300 delegates attended the 1926 Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention in 
the Rotunda, where J.J. Walsh was re-elected as party chairman and deputy Margaret 
Collins-O’Driscoll, a teacher and sister of Collins, replaced Jennie Wyse Power as vice 
chair.
86
 Addressing the convention, Walsh put the total number of Cumann na nGaedheal 
branches at 797. However, Burke contradicted Walsh when he spoke, putting the figure of 
affiliated cumainn for the year ending 4 May 1926 at 430.
87
 As such, Treatyites and anti-
Treatyites seem to have been pretty evenly matched in the mid-1920s. Burke’s report 
continued: 
 
immediately after these bye-elections [sic], upwards of 20 organisers were dispatched to those 
areas where no elections had been held, with a view to re-organising and extending Cumann na 
nGaedheal there and making the position secure for the Local Elections. These have been 
working for the past six weeks and the result has been in every way encouraging. Our total of 
affiliations has risen in those six weeks by 275 to 430 Branches and, on all sides, serious interest 
[is shown] in their political affairs. The irregulars’ weapon of intimidation is definitely blunted, if 
not broken, once [and] for all, and our supporters now come forward freely and openly to 
identify themselves with the Organisation. 
 
It is difficult to gauge the precise strength of the organisation at any given time due to 
the absence of surviving membership records. However, it is likely the actual number of 
branches lay somewhere between 797 and 430, given that the number of affiliated branches 
quoted in June 1925 was 520 and that cumainn were notoriously slow when it came to re-
affiliating.
88
 Walsh may have exaggerated organisational strength for propaganda purposes, 
though he may have been including branches that had not yet affiliated while a figure of 
800 has been cited elsewhere.
89
 Walsh instructed delegates to ‘exert their influence in the 
localities as an organisation representing the government’ before introducing Cosgrave as 
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the man who had come to the rescue in 1922, to fill ‘the shoes of Arthur Griffith and 
Michael Collins, and nobody could say that he had not acquitted himself with great 
ability’.90 Cosgrave called on members to prepare for the next general election, asking 
delegates to extend and strengthen their local organisation so that Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
machinery would be as perfect as possible in time for the contest.  Cosgrave used his 
speech to outline the benefits of the London Agreement of 1925. Cosgrave’s administration 
has taken a lot of criticism over its handling of the Boundary Commission which 
culminated in Cosgrave going to London to sign an agreement that eventually left the 
border between the Free State and Northern Ireland as it was, with the South preferring to 
leave the border as it was than exchange east Donegal for south Armagh. MacNeill’s 
honourable conduct on the commission probably cost him his political career.
91
 Many 
Cumann na nGaedheal supporters would have expected the Free State to gain northern 
territory, especially those adherents of Collins’s ‘stepping stones to freedom’ interpretation 
of the Treaty.
92
 Addressing party members, Cosgrave robustly defended his government’s 
handling of the affair, stating that once the government realised the commission intended to 
remove ‘people who had enjoyed the liberty of the Free State’ in exchange for limited 
northern territory they sought a deal with the British to maintain intact the integrity of the 
territory ‘we have administered since 1922’. Cumann na nGaedheal was keen to avoid a 
repeat of the disunity of 1922. In December 1925, each cumann secretary was asked in 
writing to call a meeting where the merits of the deal, including cancellation of the state’s 
liability for a share of the British war debt, could be discussed by members.
93
  
Resolutions debated at all levels within Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation (see 
subsequent chapters) dealt with a wide spectrum of problems that touched on various 
government departments. Others concerned the internal mechanisms of the party. For 
instance, Fr. Malachy Brennan and Martin Conlon of Roscommon called for the 
establishment of a weekly party newspaper while another member wanted ministers to use 
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cinema to promote ‘national ideals’.94 Clearly the extra-parliamentary party contained a 
rich reservoir of energy and ideas. For the most part, this resource remained untapped. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s new organisational strength was offset by political 
developments in 1926. More damaging to it in the long-term than the National League’s 
attempt to mobilise old constitutionalists was the formation of Fianna Fáil. A small 
majority of the 500 Sinn Féin delegates attending the March 1926 Ard Fheis changed Irish 
political history by voting to defeat a motion put down by Eamon de Valera.
95
 De Valera’s 
delicately worded motion asked that the party treat abstention from Dáil Éireann as a 
political tactic rather than an immovable principle. The pragmatist in de Valera saw that 
one day he would have to take his opposition to Cosgrave inside the Dáil. De Valera’s 
motion, not for the first time, placed him in a minority within his own party. Following his 
defeat, de Valera and fellow moderates split from the Republican die-hards in Sinn Féin. 
Cumann na nGaedheal did not benefit from the split as de Valera founded a new party that 
would confound expectations by broadening anti-Treatyite appeal, in the process tempting 
discontented voters to the polls.
96
 De Valera and his supporters moved quickly and 
decisively. Announced as a new political organisation on 13 April, its objectives outlined 
on 17 April, Fianna Fáil held its inaugural meeting in the La Scala theatre Dublin on 16 
May. Unlike Cumann na nGaedheal in 1923, Fianna Fáil had a deliberate organising 
strategy that involved its political leaders travelling the country establishing branches. 
Fianna Fáil’s first Ard Fheis in November 1926 was attended by 467 delegates with 435 
cumainn nationwide.
97
 Fianna Fáil continued to build its organisation and within a year of 
its foundation could boast 1,337 branches,
98
 easily outstripping the number Cumann na 
nGaedheal had mustered during its best period of organisation.
99
 By 1933, and having held 
the reigns of power for the first time, Fianna Fáil could boast almost 1,700 branches.
100
 
Like Cumann na nGaedheal, the party made contact with community leaders such as priests, 
teachers and businessmen to help in the organisational drive. Reynolds suggests that 
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Cumann na nGaedheal’s support was particularly strong in towns and cities, and with 
Labour too focussing on urban centres, de Valera was free to appeal to rural voters.
101
 
 
 
Attitude to local elections 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal adopted a decidedly casual approach to local elections. In 
spite of repeated urgings from the rank-and-file, the party never officially contested local 
elections. Repeatedly, the National Executive, the Standing Committee and Walsh’s 
Organising Committee concluded that Cumann na nGaedheal should not attempt to control 
local government and that politicians were not equipped to deliver effective local 
representation and management. Instead, Cumann na nGaedheal favoured reaching 
agreement in local politics with parties who were opposed to Sinn Féin or ‘those working 
for the destruction of the government’.102 In 1924, the party’s governing executive vaguely 
stated that it would only support local election candidates who were ‘for construction’ and 
who promised to co-operate with the existing government.
103
 For the National Executive, 
party politics should be confined to the national parliament.
104
  In 1925, Walsh’s committee 
reiterated the position. There it was argued Cumann na nGaedheal would not be damaged 
by withdrawing from local electoral tussles. Once again it was suggested that the weight of 
the organisation could be thrown behind candidates broadly supportive of the Free State. It 
was also argued that Cumann na nGaedheal did mot need to field local election candidates 
as the by-election results had shown that the government still had popular support so the 
party did not need to again test its standing with the people. 
105
  
There were, of course, numerous instances of Cumann na nGaedhealers standing for 
election to local authorities. In some areas, Cumann na nGaedheal stood local election 
candidates where no other pro-Treaty candidate was in the field,
106
 while members 
sometimes sought election under independent or business banners. Cosgrave himself had 
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suggested that prospective local candidates could be interviewed with a view to 
determining whether or not they would have the party’s support.107 In 1925 a prominent 
businessman and Cumann na nGaedheal supporter stood for election to Longford county 
council. In a letter to voters in south Longford, P.J. McCrann, stated that he was not going 
forward as the nominee of any political party ‘believing as I do, that politics should have no 
connection with the functions of local administrative bodies’. He further claimed to have 
sought election on ‘the invitation of a number of influential ratepayers’.108 McCrann had 
addressed a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Lanesboro in July 1923 and was later a 
candidate in the June 1927 general election (see Chapter four). 
 In not contesting local councils, Cumann na nGaedheal passed a wonderful 
opportunity to build up local support and to give the cumainn a purpose between general 
elections. This deprived it of local influence and the opportunity to stay in close contact 
with the concerns of ordinary voters. Political organisations thrive on elections and 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s doctrinal opposition to national parties involving themselves in 
local politics helped give it a reputation for being aloof. By 1933, with the party having lost 
two general elections in a row, it was finally decided to officially contest the local elections 
due in June of that year. Deep opposition within Cumann na nGaedheal to the politicisation 
of local politics was still evident as the official line from speakers throughout the country 
insisted that they were reluctantly entering the fray because of the Fianna Fáil 
government’s continued insistence on contesting local councils. A statement released by 
headquarters in April 1933 read that Cumann na nGaedheal felt compelled ‘in this time of 
national crisis to accept the challenge thrown down by the Fianna Fáil party, which has 
announced its intention of capturing public boards’.109 As will emerge, the party’s new role 
in opposition forced it to rethink strategy. 
 
Two contrasting elections  
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s preparations for the June 1927 election began in the autumn 
of 1926. Although it now had a more extensive branch structure across the country, 
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preparations for the election mirrored those of 1923 with the appointment of yet more paid 
organisers. By 4 February 1927 the party had twenty-four organisers in the field.
110
 These 
organisers were paid from headquarters but the Standing Committee emphasised that in this 
election, each constituency should bear the brunt of election expenses, a view that was later 
reiterated by the National Executive.
111
 Organisers were busy in the months before the 
election and their job was to stir existing branches into action and to form new ones where 
there was no organisation.
112
 A Cumann na nGaedheal election handbook was produced, 
outlining the role the ordinary branch would play in the campaign. It asked constituency 
committees to meet regularly to consider the views of the paid organiser who was to be 
referred to as the ‘director of elections’. A faultless scheme of organisation was outlined in 
the handbook that placed a cumann in each parish or ward of every constituency. In rural 
areas it was advised that the cumann ought to be representative of every town-land in its 
area.
113
 Branches were to form committees of four or five to examine the voting register. 
Cumainn were to ensure every voter was canvassed twice, and to arrange transport for 
supporters who needed it. The booklet advised that after-Mass meetings with ‘able 
speakers’ be organised in districts where Cumann na nGaedheal support was known to be 
weak.
114
 All this would work very well in constituencies where the local Cumann na 
nGaedheal organisation was strong. However, in spite of all the progress that had been 
made, Cumann na nGaedheal remained badly organised in some constituencies.
115
   
Cumann na nGaedheal’s election handbook contained a section entitled ‘Points For 
Canvassers’. Aware that their party represented a state and administration which still faced 
considerable opposition from a vocal minority outside Dáil Éireann, the booklet asked 
Cumann na nGaedheal workers to remember that ‘courtesy often disarms opposition’ and to 
emphasise that ‘Cumann na nGaedheal candidates desire to promote goodwill amongst all 
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Irishmen’.116 Cumann na nGaedheal believed that a grateful electorate would recognise the 
progress that had been achieved since the dark days of the Civil War. Canvassers were 
asked to outline the government’s establishment of the national army and the garda and its 
role in reconstruction, house building, industrial development, agriculture and trade. An 
attempt was also made to link the party to the lost pro-Treaty leaders. As such activists 
were urged to impress the following message on voters: 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal is the national organisation formed to carry out the policy adopted by 
Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins and continued by the Government of President Cosgrave. At 
this General Election it is putting forward candidates with a view to securing for that policy a 
great majority of seats in Dail Eireann [sic]. The present Dail [sic] and Government have been 
engaged in establishing peace and order. They have provided a National Army and a National 
Civic Guard. They have laid [the] foundations of National progress in the Constitution and a 
number of essential laws and measures of administrative organisation. It has dealt with the 
problems of reconstruction, house building, industrial development, industrial disputes, domestic 
and foreign trade and commerce, agriculture, fisheries, manufacturers, transport system etc.
117
 
 
Cosgrave’s address to the 325 delegates attending the 1927 annual convention was 
published as election literature. Whereas in the previous two years he had indicated a 
positive theme, Cosgrave’s address of 1927 reiterated the government’s achievements with 
a little flourish at the end elucidating the purpose of the party. Accordingly, Cosgrave stated 
that Cumann na nGaedheal believed in an ordered society, hard work, constant endeavour 
and a definite settled policy of recruitment to the public service on merit alone adding that 
‘performance, not promise should be the touchstone’ by which the party should be 
judged.
118
 It was clear from Cosgrave’s speech that his government’s policy would remain 
unchanged. 
Although the strength of its organisation had improved, Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
prospects for the June 1927 election were mixed. The Boundary Commission episode 
provided opposition parties such as the National League and Fianna Fáil with ammunition 
with which to attack the government. In addition, the overall pro-Treaty vote was now more 
fragmented than it had been in 1923. The formation of the National League in 1926 posed a 
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real threat to Cumann na nGaedheal. Redmond’s party outflanked Cumann na nGaedheal 
on the right, appealing to constitutionalists and disgruntled interests which had previously 
backed Cumann na nGaedheal. Old Irish party elements on which the National League had 
mobilised continued to regard Cosgrave’s party as an offshoot of its old Sinn Féin enemy. 
Cumann na nGaedheal was dealt another blow in April 1927 when negotiations for a 
possible merger with the Farmers’ Party broke down. Their leader, Dennis Gorey, joined 
Cumann na nGaedheal, but his organisation opposed fusion. Failure to reach agreement 
with natural allies left Cumann na nGaedheal vulnerable. Moreover, the government had 
antagonised a number of interest groups, vintners and old age pensioners among them, 
while Fianna Fáil could use the language of an irredentist Irish nationalism as part of its 
identity now that the Boundary Commission had left the border with Northern Ireland 
untouched. Redmond’s National League skilfully opposed O’Higgins’s intoxicating liquor 
legislation while, like Fianna Fáil, also deployed the green card to attack the government.
119
  
Cumann na nGaedheal’s preparations for the 1927 election followed a similar pattern 
to those of 1923. However, the party was more careful with its money this time. Sub 
committees were formed for the purpose of fund raising while overdrafts were secured 
from a number of banks, bringing the total election fund to over £10,000.
120
 Memories of 
the painful cutbacks left in the wake of the 1923 election, and the acrimony created by 
party incompetence in the constituencies, helped ensure party funds were managed in a 
more prudent fashion than before. 
In spite of solid preparations, Cumann na nGaedheal was vulnerable on every flank 
and had not done enough to retain its existing support. It had not offered a constructive 
policy for the future and the various sectional interest parties were able to both benefit from 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s lack of an edge and capitalise on its unpopularity with the various 
aggrieved sections of the electorate. Even Cumann na nGaedheal supporters felt the party 
had failed to offer a constructive policy during the campaign and had simply reiterated its 
achievements since 1922.
121
 Cumann na nGaedheal lost sixteen seats in the election, 
slumping to forty-seven, only three more than Fianna Fáil which was the success story of 
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the election.
122
 Fianna Fáil was jubilant and believed Cumann na nGaedheal was finished. 
A letter to its cumainn stated ‘We have broken the back of Cumann na nGaedheal[original 
emphasis]. They will never again be even as strong as they are now’.123 However, Fianna 
Fáil’s refusal to take the oath and hence their seats in the Dáil allowed Cumann na 
nGaedheal to form a government with the support of the Farmers’ Party and independents. 
All would change within a few weeks as Irish politics would once again be rocked to its 
foundations in a way that would have serious consequences for the two main political 
parties. 
There had been talk within Treatyite circles for some time as to how best to deal with 
the continued abstention of the anti-Treaty party. Various proposals were put forward, some 
from grass-root activists, which would compel Dáil candidates to take their seats once 
elected. The tragic events of 10 July 1927 would provide the catalyst for action.
124
 The 
assassination of Kevin O’Higgins on Booterstown Avenue as he walked to Mass removed 
from cabinet the minister who had restored law-and-order in the years since independence. 
While he had shown less interest in the party machine than colleagues such as Mulcahy or 
Walsh, O’Higgins was nonetheless a crucial figure within Cumann na nGaedheal. He was 
the intellectual driving force within cabinet and had played a starring role on the 
international stage and in particular at the 1926 Imperial Conference. O’Higgins’s ability 
was recognised by his colleagues and just before his death he had been assigned an extra 
portfolio, External Affairs, in addition to his role as Justice Minister and Vice President. 
125
 
O’Higgins was probably the natural successor to Cosgrave and his death was a blow that 
both party and state could ill afford. De Róiste noted that while he had been politically 
opposed to O’Higgins on certain issues, he could still admire his ability. For de Róiste, 
‘Griffith was a teacher: Collins a leader: O’Higgins a state-builder’.126  De Valera’s strong 
condemnation of the assassination revealed that his revolution had ended and that Fianna 
Fáil was ready to join with Cosgrave in framing their differences in a parliamentary context. 
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 The government responded to the assassination by introducing public safety 
legislation, aimed at the gunmen, and the Electoral Amendment Bill, aimed at Fianna Fáil. 
The latter required that in future all Dáil candidates would have to take the oath as laid 
down in the Treaty, otherwise their candidature would be ineligible. Cumann na nGaedheal 
spurned an offer from the Labour party to serve in a national coalition between the two 
parties that would represent ‘employers, investors and workers’. 127  However, Labour’s 
opposition to the public safety legislation poisoned relations between Johnson’s party and 
the government. Numerous Cumann na nGaedheal speakers accused Labour of seeking to 
capitalise politically from O’Higgins’s assassination. Aware that Fianna Fáil was 
considering taking its seats in the Dáil, Johnson looked at how the numbers were stacking 
up for an alternative government. On 12 August 1927 de Valera led his party into the Dáil, 
taking the oath as an ‘empty formula’ and leaving Cosgrave short of a clear majority inside 
the chamber. Cosgrave’s administration was in an impossible position. Johnson put down 
his party’s motion of no confidence in the government. Johnson hoped to lead a 
Labour/National League coalition which would be supported by Fianna Fáil. However, 
against all the odds, Cosgrave survived the vote of no confidence on the casting cote of the 
Ceann Comhairle and the famed disappearance of John Jinks of the National League. 
Following two by-election victories in August, Cosgrave dissolved the Dáil and called a 
snap general election for September. 
Days after the party’s disastrous electoral showing in June, which had stunned 
members at all levels of the party,
128
 the Standing Committee met to review Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s poor electoral performance. Its efforts to take immediate corrective action 
were made easier in that, in stark contrast to the 1923 general election, £967 of the election 
fund remained unspent. Anticipating an early general election, the committee retained the 
services of seven organisers to be dispatched to constituencies where Cumann na 
nGaedheal performed particularly badly in the election. One of these organisers was former 
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Wexford Gaelic football captain Seán O’Kennedy. 129 Additionally, a series of public 
meetings, to be addressed by prominent ministers and deputies, were arranged around the 
country.
130
 A committee of O’Higgins, Mulcahy and Tierney was appointed to examine 
first preferences and transfers in each constituency as the party looked to recover the lost 
ground. On 9 July the Standing Committee went further, calling for as many constituency 
conferences as possible to be held before 1 August to ‘assess the party’s position and make 
plans for the future’.131 Keen to develop its organisational structures, the parliamentary 
party called a special meeting to improve the organisation in the constituencies while the 
possibility of establishing a weekly party newspaper was also explored at the 9 July 
meeting. O’Higgins’s assassination interrupted these plans and the next meeting was 
adjourned in sympathy with the deceased minister’s family.132 Nonetheless, the corrective 
measures made an impact and the party machine was in a more healthy state by the time the 
September election came about. Even The Times commented on the improvement of the 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisation since the June election.
133
 
With Fianna Fáil’s entrance to the Dáil, there was finally a viable alternative 
government on offer which would not involve a coalition of parties of the right and left. 
Only three seats separated the two main parties going into the September 1927 contest and 
the polarisation of the state’s politics benefitted Cumann na nGaedheal at the expense of 
smaller pro-Treaty parties and independents. On the eve of the general election, J.J. Walsh 
delivered a devastating blow by resigning from the government and party.
134
 Walsh was 
disgruntled with Cumann na nGaedheal’s informal alliance with the Farmers’ Party and 
argued that followers of ‘Arthur Griffith’s economic teachings will now be forced, if they 
still desire to adhere to Cumann Na Ngaedheal [sic], to subordinate their life-long 
convictions’.135 From the letter, it is clear that Walsh had become exasperated with his 
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colleagues’ refusal to adopt an avowedly protectionist programme. However, the letter also 
reveals that Walsh retained much respect for senior figures in the party: 
 
Apart from these matters which are honest differences of opinion, and the privilege of every 
individual, I must conclude by saying that I have never met a more honest or fearless body of 
men in any walk of life than the men I have worked with over these trying years, and my only 
regret is that which I conceive to be [the] national duty compels me to take the action I have now 
taken. 
 
Drafts prepared by Cosgrave in response reveal his disappointment with Walsh’s 
decision. The tetchy tone of the reply he finally settled on shows that Walsh’s 
announcement came as a surprise. Cosgrave had ‘not the honour of seeing your letter to me 
until 48 hours after reading it in the Press’.136 Margaret Collins-O’Driscoll filled in as head 
of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation until the election of a successor to Walsh at the 
1928 party convention. Walsh’s resignation significantly weakened the protectionist lobby 
within the government party still further but more importantly deprived Cumann na 
nGaedheal of the services of one of its best organisers. However, public life never sat easy 
on Walsh’s shoulders,137 and writing in 1944 he recalled that he had resented depending on 
the public for a livelihood.
138
 
 In the second election of 1927, Free State supporters rallied to the government as 
Cumann na nGaedheal clawed back much of the support lost in June. The party won 38% 
of the vote, regaining fifteen of the seats lost earlier that year to bring its total to sixty-two. 
Cumann na nGaedheal hired the O’Kennedy-Brindley advertising agency to arrange a 
dynamic press campaign. A brochure containing twenty of the 300 advertisements used was 
produced by the agency.
139
 Ciara Meehan cites the party’s use of the advertising agency as 
evidence of an innovative style of electioneering not previously highlighted by 
historians.
140
 Fianna Fáil also performed well in the election, increasing its seat total by 
thirteen to fifty seven. Just five seats separated the two main parties. With an emboldened 
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Fianna Fáil snapping at its heals, and a global economic collapse just around the corner, 
Cumann na nGaedheal faced what proved its most difficult period in government. 
 
Organisational growth halts  
 
In opposition, Fianna Fáil gained the experience necessary to portray itself as a viable 
alternative government. 
141
 Inside the Dáil Fianna Fáil served its apprenticeship and availed 
of the opportunity to develop its organisation further while concentrating on the 
development of a distinctive policy to set it apart from the government party. Fianna Fáil’s 
fundraising efforts utilised its strong grassroots machine from 1927 onwards. That year’s 
Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis decided to organise an annual Church gate collection. In addition to 
raising funds, the collection gave Fianna Fáil branches an annual event for which to prepare 
and keep itself oiled. 
142
 Returns from the collections had the additional bonus of providing 
the Fianna Fáil leadership with a good indication of the party’s strength or weakness in any 
given part of a constituency. Cumann na nGaedheal continued to carry out its fundraising in 
a quite chaotic manner, writing letters to supporters and organising collections in some 
constituencies.  
Cumann na nGaedheal stalled somewhat after the September 1927 victory. By 1928 
the vibrancy of earlier Standing Committee meetings had abated (although there is a 
paucity of surviving records from 1927 onwards). At one such meeting Gearóid O’Sullivan 
pointed out that a number of committee members were absent and that something should be 
done to address the problem.
143
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s annual convention of 1928 was the 
first to take place since the resignation of party chairman J.J. Walsh. As Walsh’s deputy, 
Margaret Collins-O’Driscoll presided as acting chair in 1928. Addressing delegates, 
Collins-O’Driscoll said that they all appreciated Walsh’s work for the party and wished him 
well in the future. Canon Masterson of Mohill proposed the Minister for Education J.M. 
O’Sullivan for the now vacant position of chairman. O’Sullivan’s proposer believed the 
post should be filled by ‘a person of ministerial rank and that he should belong to a 
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department that did not excite anything like controversy or deep feeling’.144 Quite clearly 
the position of Cumann na nGaedheal chairman was to become a largely ceremonial one 
once more, much like it had been under Eoin MacNeill. O’Sullivan discharged his duty in 
an understated fashion, chairing committee meetings and party conferences and attending 
constituency meetings around the country. O’Sullivan lacked Walsh’s energetic 
organisational style. In his address to delegates, Cosgrave reported on the satisfactory 
results of the two general elections and four by-elections since the previous conference. 
Cosgrave also noted with satisfaction that the Dáil was fully representative of the country 
now that Fianna Fáil had taken their seats.  
 
Party newspapers and social functions 
 
In 1922 newspaper propaganda was all important. Most national, provincial and local 
newspapers were supportive of the Treaty and tended to endorse the Provisional 
Government. For a time, The Free State and United Irishman were organs of the pro-Treaty 
party. However, after 1923 with the government enjoying the support of most national 
newspapers, there was little need to continue with distinct Cumann na nGaedheal party 
publications. At various intervals, the grass-roots called for the establishment of a dedicated 
party newspaper. These appeals were largely unheeded. As general secretary, Liam Burke 
was enthusiastic about the use of newspapers (as revealed by him to US political scientist 
Warner Moss) to convey party propaganda. In December 1926 he asked each minister to 
prepare a new year’s message for the provincial press. Burke required fifty lines from each 
minister and was at pains to point out ‘the very great importance to the government of 
starting the new-year with such a flourish of publicity trumpets’.145 As part of the Standing 
Committee’s efforts to instigate reform within Cumann na nGaedheal after the disastrous 
general election of June 1927, it was finally decided to establish a regular party newspaper. 
Within a month of this decision The Freeman, clearly drawing on the title of the 
sympathetic Freeman’s Journal which was closed down in 1924, emerged as the Cumann 
na nGaedheal organ in August 1927. The Freeman made little effort to appeal to a non 
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Cumann na nGaedheal audience and was dominated by articles praising the government, 
lauding Collins and Griffith and carrying news of party activities around the country. 
 In a further innovation, the Cumann na nGaedheal constituency organisations began 
to place a much greater emphasis on the need to provide social entertainment for party 
members. This type of activity corresponds with the efforts of mass-organised parties to 
create ancillary bodies to reinforce the political identity of grass-root members and 
supporters.
146
 Such efforts aimed at maintaining existing members and attracting new ones. 
As pointed out by Duverger, ‘a man who is bored at the branch meetings of the party will 
enjoy its sports club’. 147  We shall discover in chapter five, that within Cumann na 
nGaedheal, this effort was spearheaded by the Dublin North constituency organisation. 
Established in November 1927, the Dublin North constituency social club drew the praise 
of the Cumann na nGaedheal newspaper. Indeed, The Freeman encouraged the organisation 
in other constituencies to emulate the success of the Dublin North social club. Cumainn 
were also encouraged to ensure the party newspaper was circulated to branch members and 
to retain activists in the winter months by arranging social events under the auspices of 
Cumann na nGaedheal.  
The Freeman struggled to achieve the levels of circulation necessary and went from a 
weekly to a monthly publication before being wound up. In 1929 The Freeman was 
replaced as an official organ by The Star. A more highbrow publication, The Star tried to 
appeal to a wider audience and was less partisan than its predecessor. However, the 
intellectual nature of this publication made it difficult to achieve mass circulation and it too 
became a monthly publication in September 1930.
148
 Desmond FitzGerald, a veteran when 
it came to propaganda, assisted the newspaper’s editor M.J. Sweeney as a member of its 
directing committee which also included Professor Tierney, T.F. O’Higgins, Blythe, (J.N. 
Dolan the editor) and Liam Burke. The Star ran into further difficulties when Sweeney 
resigned as editor in 1931 to take up a position with the Irish Independent.
149
 During its 
existence, The Star carried the party message and provided Ministers with column space for 
articles on their policy initiatives. Christmas and Easter editions were another highlight. 
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However, The Star was replaced by another familiar title, United Irishman in 1932. United 
Irishman was the most vitriolic Cumann na nGaedheal newspaper to emerge and gave a 
great deal of column inches to a section called ‘Organisation notes’, which encouraged 
cumainn to inform the wider organisation of their activities. The paper was in existence 
until the foundation of Fine Gael in 1933, at which point United Ireland became the name 
of the party newspaper. 
 
Holding its own as Depression hits 
 
By 1930 the Treatyite position had evolved considerably from the original coalition 
of Griffithite Sinn Féiners and militarist republicans. This was acknowledged at the 1930 
party convention which took place on 6 and 7 May 1930 in the Mansion House. As usual, 
Cumann na nGaedheal leaders participated in a commemoration of 1916 at Arbour Hill on 
the morning of the convention. O’Sullivan, adopting a more staid style than his predecessor, 
told delegates that Cumann na nGaedheal’s greatest achievement was that there was now a 
general desire for peace among all parties.
150
 Blythe, as Vice President of the Executive 
Council, stepped in for an ill Cosgrave. Blythe’s speech stressed the disparate origins of 
Cumann na nGaedheal. He described it as the most important organisation in Irish history 
since it had been the first to elect a government and maintain it in power. Blythe discussed 
the party’s roots in the 1916 Rising, Sinn Féin and the War of Independence before 
acknowledging that there were people in the organisation who had not been republicans 
during the revolutionary period but had simply accepted the new state in 1922 and were 
loyal citizens. Blythe also paid tribute to the Irish party, describing them as ‘sterling 
Nationalists’.151 Blythe said Cumann na nGaedheal did not care about the theoretical views 
of party members so long as they accepted the principle of Nationalism, the sovereignty of 
the Irish people and their right to be free and in control of their own affairs.  
There were seven by-elections between 1927 and 1932. Each of these by-elections 
indicated that the prospect of an alternative government under de Valera was having a 
polarising affect on the electorate. Cumann na nGaedheal won two separate by-elections in 
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Dublin North, while General Seán MacEoin announced the resumption of his political 
career in spectacular fashion by gaining a seat in Leitrim/Sligo following the death of the 
sitting Fianna Fáil deputy. MacEoin’s desk diary indicates that the General had been keen 
to get out of the army. He had become frustrated as his role in the higher echelons of the 
army had required of him to be ‘too much confined to [my] office’. 152  Cumann na 
nGaedheal fought a negative campaign in Leitrim/Sligo, and spent much time highlighting 
perceived weaknesses in Fianna Fáil’s economic policies. 153  MacEoin increased the 
Cumann na nGaedheal vote in the constituency by winning 28,445 first-preference votes. 
The Star was particularly pleased with MacEoin’s victory, being sure that he ‘will continue 
to be a tower of strength to the Government party in the Dail and in the country’.154  
Given the tight Dáil arithmetic, party discipline came to dominate Cumann na 
nGaedheal parliamentary party meetings. In March 1930 the party discussed the problem of 
government backbenchers missing Dáil votes. A resolution was adopted requesting 
deputies who had recently missed important divisions to promise to attend more regularly 
in future. Furthermore, the party resolved that deputies could not raise matters ‘likely to 
injuriously affect the interests of the Party’ until it had been discussed at a parliamentary 
party meeting.
155
 Cumann na nGaedheal actually lost a Dáil vote later that month forcing 
Cosgrave to resign. However, the failure of the opposition to form an alternative resulted in 
Cosgrave’s re-election by the Dáil. Party discipline remained an issue, particularly as the 
party’s vote declined in by-elections (see chapters four and five). In June 1931 a motion 
was adopted by the parliamentary party to expel any deputy who voted against any measure 
introduced by a minister without Cumann na nGaedheal’s written permission.156 
In two further by-elections, the two big parties held seats following the death of a 
sitting T.D. However, the result of the Kildare by-election in 1931, brought about by the 
death of Hugh Colohan of Labour, would provide a clue as to the type of campaign that 
might be expected in the upcoming general election, and indeed the result hinted at its 
outcome too. Cumann na nGaedheal’s candidate John Conlon, previously a member of the 
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National League, battled it out with Fianna Fáil’s Tom Harris in an intense and bitter 
campaign. The government party’s propaganda was negative and offered little by way of a 
discernible new policy programme. As had been the case in Leitrim/Sligo, Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s campaign merely reiterated its achievements over the past nine years while 
calling various Fianna Fail policies into question. Fianna Fail on the other hand was able to 
successfully portray Cumann na nGaedheal as an out-of-touch government, with one Harris 
poster calling on voters to ‘sack the lot’, a slogan that would be repeated in the subsequent 
general election.
157
 The pro-Treaty vote was slipping as the anti-Treaty vote was solidifying, 
and Harris comfortably won the seat for Fianna Fáil. 
  
 
Government party to opposition party 
 
By 1932 Cumann na nGaedheal had come full circle. The anti-Treatyites had been 
defeated in the Civil War but they were now snapping at the heels of the government party 
at the ballot box. Speculation was rife towards the end of 1931 that the Dáil would be 
dissolved early in the new year and an election called in the spring. On 30 December, the 
Irish Press speculated that Cumann na nGaedheal’s Standing Committee had instructed the 
constituencies to complete selection conventions by 24 January. According to the paper, 
Cumann na nGaedheal had been assessing its organisational strength in the constituencies 
and its team of workers would be augmented through the appointment of more salaried 
organisers. Cumann na nGaedheal, continued the paper, was keen to inject some new blood 
into its party by dropping older backbenchers in favour of more energetic candidates.
158
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation lagged behind that of the new anti-Treaty party. 
Fianna Fáil was a well oiled machine better prepared than ever to unseat Cosgrave and his 
colleagues. In response Cumann na nGaedheal came up with some eye catching 
propaganda posters that portrayed its rival as gunmen and communists while emphasising 
the government’s law-and-order credentials.  
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 Cumann na nGaedheal again produced a guide for its grass-root activists. This time a 
substantial 160 page book was published. Titled Fighting Points for Cumann na nGaedheal 
speakers and workers General election 1932, it focussed on national policy positions and 
the perceived frailties of the opposition’s policy. Unlike the 1927 booklet, it devoted little 
space to organisational matters.
159
 Going into the election Cumann na nGaedheal deputies 
were also asked to question the ability of Fianna Fáil to win the election and to trot out the 
achievements of the Treaty party since 1922.
160
 As the country grappled with the economic 
problems stemming from the Wall Street crash, the party’s promise to continue on with the 
same policies as before did little to excite an electorate itching for change in 1932. Fianna 
Fáil offered radical policies to improve the country’s economy and fought an energetic 
campaign that again asked voters to ‘sack the lot’.161 Voters responded by putting Cosgrave 
and his party on the opposition benches. However, Cumann na nGaedheal had not been 
routed. Its organisation performed well in the election (see subsequent chapters) and it 
dropped a mere 3,000 votes nationally, showing that it still had a substantial base to build 
upon. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s period of soul-searching began. There was a level of 
frustration at all levels of the party that power had slipped from its hands by such a slight 
margin. Barry Egan in Cork told Liam Burke that Cumann na nGaedheal had ‘laid the 
foundations’ only to watch Fianna Fáil ‘capitalise’.162 Such navel gazing betrayed the fact 
that some Treatyites had not accepted the shortcomings of their own party. In Cork there 
was frustration that party activists had not been listened to, either by the local constituency 
committee or the government, and that the organisation had not been as strong as it could 
have been.
163
 However, there was even at this stage a realisation that the policy agenda of 
the new Fianna Fáil government would provide an opportunity for Cumann na nGaedheal 
to rebuild from the opposition. Egan anticipated that the ‘flood’ of tariffs would lead to the 
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formation of a new, united opposition and that Cumann na nGaedheal should throw its 
weight ‘tactfully and manfully, for the uniting of national Ireland’.164 
 Mulcahy spearheaded Cumann na nGaedheal’s efforts to reorganise in 1932 and 
particularly in 1933 after the party’s defeat in the snap election of January 1933. De 
Valera’s decision to go to the country ten months into his premiership caught Cumann na 
nGaedheal off-guard and it slumped a further nine seats. Most commentators expected 
Cumann na nGaedheal to lose seats and the party seems to have been putting on a brave 
face in predicting gains of seven seats.
165
 Cumann na nGaedheal was demoralised and 
confused after the loss of nine seats and set about reviving its fortunes. At an ex-ministers 
meeting in February 1933, a new organisation committee of Mulcahy, Blythe and John A. 
Costello was formed to ‘consider and report on the reorganisation of the constituencies’.166 
Mulcahy worked on a new scheme of organisation for the party which placed particular 
emphasis on reaching the young, labourers and women voters.
167
 In March Burke 
circularised each deputy with a copy of the new scheme of organisation that Mulcahy had 
been working on. Minimum branch membership was reduced from twelve to six, while it 
was proposed to reduce branch affiliation fees to ten shillings.
168
 Moreover, district 
committees were put on a more formal footing within the organisation and were envisaged 
as a link between individual branches and constituency committees. Increased social 
functions were to be encouraged and meetings of units were to be more regular and it was 
recommended that at least twelve copies of the party newspaper United Irishman be 
circulated in each cumann area. Moreover, as indicated above, the decision taken at this 
time to contest local elections showed that Cumann na nGaedheal was serious about using 
its base to mobilise a strong opposition to the Fianna Fáil government. However, other 
Treatyites were already mobilising a more potent force through the auspices of the 
Blueshirts. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation served it quite well in the decade 1923-33. On 
its foundation, it had the appearance of a national coalition of diverse elements who had 
supported the Treaty. Organisational progress halted in 1924 as funds dried up. The split 
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with the National Group in 1925 was the catalyst for reorganisation and a new cohesiveness 
within Cumann na nGaedheal. Walsh’s reorganising committee improved the organisation 
in 1925 and the constituencies were well prepared for the election of 1927. However, 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s right flank was exposed and it suffered its most severe electoral 
setback in June 1927 only just managing to hold onto power. Again, remedial action was 
taken to correct deficiencies evident during the campaign. A strong performance in the 
September 1927 election showed that the efforts to recover the lost ground bore fruit. In 
1932 Cumann na nGaedheal dropped a mere 3,000 votes but lost power as Fianna Fáil 
mobilised support among previously apathetic voters. Economic decline from 1930 
combined with the radical policy agenda and organisational prowess of Fianna Fáil were 
the main factors behind Cumann na nGaedheal’s defeat rather than the perceived 
shortcomings of its own party machinery. In opposition, the party made real efforts to use a 
revitalised grass-roots’ structure to take on the new government. In advance of September’s 
merger, Cumann na nGaedheal was in good shape in the constituencies and Fine Gael 
inherited a rejuvenated organisation from its parent party. The next three chapters will shed 
more light on Cumann na nGaedheal’s constituency machinery and will help us to define it 
as either a loosely affiliated cadre style entity or mass organised party. 
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 Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in Clare 
 
 
 
This chapter will examine the structures, strengths and weaknesses of the 
Cumann na nGaedheal party organisation in the south-western, single county 
constituency of Clare. Clare’s Dáil representation increased by one in 1923, and it 
returned five deputies to parliament throughout the period under review. This chapter 
aims to provide a flavour of pre-independence politics in Clare before analysing the 
Cumann na nGaedheal party organisation in the county from its inception until its 
eventual submersion within the new Fine Gael party in September 1933. 
 
Background 
 
In Clare, as elsewhere, some IRB members began to support and join Griffith’s 
new party upon its foundation in 1905 and branches of Sinn Féin existed in the 
county from an early stage in the party’s life. An IRB member, Thomas O’Loughlin, 
established the county’s first Sinn Féin branch in 1907, while clubs soon cropped up 
in Crusheen and Cranny. Parts of north and west Clare were classified as congested 
and land agitation was common.
1
 Agrarian violence was so widespread in the county 
in the first decade of the twentieth century that in 1910 RIC garrisons throughout 
Clare were strengthened to the extent that only Cork and Galway possessed a stronger 
RIC force. On the eve of the Great War, Clare was an unsettled county. This was 
accentuated during the European war as numerous emigration outlets were closed off 
creating the potential for political and social unrest.
2
 Much of this frustrated 
generation were later attracted to the ranks of the IRA, often in the hope that the 
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revolution would result in land re-distribution.  Many IRA leaders such as Clare’s 
Michael Brennan sometimes used land hunger to tempt men into the revolutionary 
army.
3
 
Companies of the Irish Volunteers were established throughout Clare in the 
months after the movement’s inception in 1913. Sinn Féin’s decline from 1909/1910 
onwards, as depicted by Michael Laffan, was evident in county Clare. In 1916, the 
authorities noted that members of the Sinn Féin branch in Carron only ever met on 
Sundays when they talked to each other on the road before Mass.
4
 As noted 
previously, all that changed after 1916. East Clare was the scene of an important by-
election in 1917 caused by the death of Major William Redmond, brother of 
nationalist leader John Redmond, and an Irish party M.P. since 1892. Over 200 
people, including sixty priests, attended the convention to select Sinn Féin’s by-
election candidate 
5
 Eamon de Valera, having been selected, won the seat for Sinn 
Féin. Arthur Griffith, Laurence Ginnell and Eoin MacNeill all campaigned in Clare 
on de Valera’s behalf while Sinn Féin supporters waved tricolours and organised 
parades and street rallies in celebration of their victory.
6
 
Clare saw much violence and bloodshed during the War of Independence. The 
Clare Volunteers had been among the first to reorganise after 1916 and Richard 
Mulcahy travelled to Clare in January 1919 to preside over the division of the county 
into three separate brigade areas. This division was necessary due to intense rivalries 
between the Brennans in east Clare, the Barretts in mid-Clare and the O’Donnells in 
west Clare.
7
 Ernie O’Malley was later dispatched to the county to further organise 
these three brigades.
8
 The conflict in County Clare followed much the same pattern as 
elsewhere with raids for arms and ammunition in early 1919 followed up by attacks 
on the RIC, before tactics of guerrilla war were developed to counter the effectiveness 
of an increasingly mobile British response. In Clare, attacks on police barracks began 
as early as August 1919.
9
 These proved successful from the outset in driving the RIC 
from the more peripheral barracks in the county. For the duration of the war, the IRA 
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in County Clare grappled with the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries but they were 
unable to maintain their early successes. The failure to inflict a heavy blow in Clare 
towards the end of the war was a source of disappointment among members of GHQ 
in Dublin. 
Tensions within the Clare IRA during the War of Independence were a factor in 
shaping attitudes to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Just before the July Truce, Michael 
Brennan whose brothers Austin and Paddy were also prominent during the war, was 
appointed O/C of the new 1
st
 Western Division and when he declared support for the 
Treaty, the majority of his men fell in line.
10
 Frank Barrett of mid-Clare, believed by 
some to have resented Brennan’s status in the IRA, took the opposite side. In the 
summer and autumn of 1922 Brennan, now in the Free State army, led his men in 
fierce fighting in Limerick and Kerry. While Brennan’s units were in Limerick and 
Kerry, anti-Treaty forces gained a foothold in mid-Clare and west-Clare. However, 
they were dislodged by Brennan on his return in mid autumn 1922.
11
  
Political reaction to the Treaty was mixed in Clare. While the county’s most 
prominent politician led the political opposition to the settlement, there was support 
for the Treaty too. Clare County Council passed a motion urging acceptance of the 
Treaty. Leading up to the ‘Pact’ election, Michael Collins and Seán MacEoin 
addressed a large pro-Treaty demonstration in Ennis on 30 April 1922. Indeed, Tom 
Garvin cites the enthusiastic welcome given to the Free State army in west Clare and 
other western counties as evidence of the public’s exasperation with the antics of the 
anti-Treaty IRA. 
12
 Despite de Valera’s opposition, numerous Clare Sinn Féiners took 
a pro-Treaty stance. At the height of the Civil War, Clare Sinn Féiners Canon 
William O’Kennedy of St. Flannan’s college, Ennis, and Commandant Paddy 
Brennan attended the preliminary conference of Cumann na nGaedheal in December 
1922.
13
 O’Kennedy would play an active role in Clare Cumann na nGaedheal. 
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Establishment of Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare 
 
Three days before the party’s official launch in April 1923, Treaty supporters 
gathered in the county courthouse Ennis to elect officers for a new cumann that had 
been formed in March.
14
 Cannon O’Kennedy, a ‘pillar’ of revolutionary Sinn Féin, 
presided. His involvement with the revolutionary movement resulted in his 
internment for six months in 1921 during which time he was made Canon by Bishop 
Michael Fogarty, also a Sinn Féin sympathiser.
15
 Other members of the clergy 
attended the Ennis Cumann na nGaedheal meeting reflecting the widespread clerical 
support for the government in county Clare. Ennis Treatyites elected a committee and 
elected delegates to attend the convention in Dublin. Underlining the state of turmoil 
that Ireland was in at the time the party was established, Clare man Patrick 
O’Mahony was executed on 26 April for his part in an ambush that resulted in the 
death of Private Stephen Canty of the Free State army, in Ennis, on 21 April. On 2 
May 1923 Christopher Quinn and William O’Shaughnessy were also executed at 
Ennis jail for their part in the same ambush. All three had been sentenced to death by 
military tribunal.
16
 Quinn and O’Shaughnessy were the last of the seventy-seven Civil 
War executions.
17
  
In June 1923 Cumann na nGaedheal began organising for the August 1923 
election. According to the Clare Champion, on 17 June a number of supporters from 
Clare attended a Cumann na nGaedheal rally in Limerick. Addressing the Limerick 
meeting, Cosgrave asserted that his party was ‘as old as the hills’ and had ‘the same 
objects, built on the same foundation and achieving the same purpose as the very best 
national organisations they [the Irish people] ever had’.18 Cosgrave clearly wished to 
link the new party with various shades of Irish nationalism, from the moderate 
constitutionalists of the Irish party to revolutionary Sinn Féiners. Cumann na 
nGaedheal was always eager to expand beyond its pro-Treaty Sinn Féin base. 
Cosgrave urged people who were prepared to subordinate their personal interests to 
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those of the country to join the new party. O’Kennedy also addressed the Limerick 
meeting, insisting Clare voters did not want a ‘sectional government’.19 The best 
organised political organisation in Clare at this time was that of the Farmers’ Party 
which held regular meetings across the county and would compete with Cumann na 
nGaedheal for the farming vote. Rivalry between the two was intense.
20
 
On 28 July an advert appeared in the Clare Champion which for ‘want of 
organisation’ simply invited Treaty supporters to the courthouse Ennis on 30 July to 
select the Cumann na nGaedheal candidates for the upcoming election. Clearly, the 
organisation had not yet spread outside Ennis to the outlying rural districts. Invited to 
the Convention were: 
 
 
1. All priests in the county. 
2. All County, District and Urban councillors 
3. All officers of Sinn Féin Executive east and west 
4. All former officers of Sinn Féin Cumainn 
5. All pre-Truce Volunteers not attached to the National Army 
6. Representative Famers, Businessmen and workers21 
 
 
On the one hand, the list reveals the esteem in which priests were held at the 
time of the state’s foundation, and the lengths to which the local Cumann na 
nGaedheal organisation went to capitalise on their influence. Also evident is the 
practical application at a grass-roots level of the party’s stated aim to bring about the 
cooperation of as many sectors of society as possible, in this case farmers, 
businessmen and workers. Also evident is a tacit identification with pre-schism Sinn 
Féin, as the party claimed continuity with its revolutionary progenitor and welcomed 
lapsed members into the Cumann na nGaedheal fold. On the other, the list also 
demonstrates something of a hierarchical view of society. Clare’s community leaders, 
the local notables characteristic of cadre style parties,
22
 would come together to select 
the party’s candidates and presumably their flock would follow with their votes.. 
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Certainly the invitation to representative farmers, businessmen and workers 
showed that Cumann na nGaedheal was serious about reconciling diverse elements 
through the guise of a ‘National’ party. The invitation to former Sinn Féin officers 
also demonstrates something of the confused nature of the split, with Cumann na 
nGaedheal in Clare sending out a general invitation to former members and perhaps 
waiting to see who exactly would follow them into the government party. As a further 
expression of the party’s need to identify with the revolution, the official report of the 
selection convention went on to say that the meeting included ‘a majority of the men 
who have borne the brunt of the struggle for independence for many years past’.23 
Séamus Hughes chaired the convention and, as was standard practice during 1923, 
outlined the aims and programme of the new party. Five candidates were selected 
including Eoin MacNeill, who was not in attendance, and had already been chosen as 
a candidate for the National University panel. Having selected the Cumann na 
nGaedheal candidates the meeting then established a constituency committee 
comprising members from across Clare.  
An election headquarters for the county was established in the Queens Hotel 
Ennis and a busy programme of election meetings was arranged. Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s campaign opened on 5 August, with a public meeting in Kilkee 
addressed by all five candidates.
24
 At this meeting MacNeill said he was only 
standing as a candidate on the invitation of the people of Clare, while one of the 
candidates, Michael Hehir, was introduced as having been Michael Brennan’s right-
hand man during the War of Independence.
25
 The meeting in Kilkee was chaired by 
Fr. Charles Culligan, another former member of Sinn Féin,
26
 who said the people had 
a right to free speech and that any interference with that right was a ‘worse tyranny’ 
than the one they had just ‘put an end to’. While subjected to interjections, the 
meeting was able to conclude its business. Cumann na nGaedheal’s campaign in 
Clare gathered momentum as its election machinery grew stronger. Writing to his 
wife on 14 August, MacNeill, who had been staying with O’Kennedy before moving 
to the Queen’s Hotel, praised the county’s organisation and expressed his optimism 
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that the party would perform well in the constituency.
27
 After a tame start, the 
election in Clare was ‘getting more lively every day’. The campaign took a decisive 
turn on 15 August when de Valera was arrested by Free State troops in Ennis as he 
rose to address a Sinn Féin meeting.
28
 While de Valera’s arrest was a propaganda 
victory for Sinn Féin, The Economist supported the action on the grounds that his 
followers had been executed, killed and interned while their leader had been safely 
hid away.
29
 However, endorsements from the pro-British magazine were not what the 
Free State government needed. Evidence suggests the arrest caused a discernible 
backlash against Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare. Writing to MacNeill, Séamus 
Hughes talked of a reaction against the party in the county following the arrest.
30
  
On 19 August Cosgrave attended a Cumann na nGaedheal rally in Ennis 
chaired by Fr. John Meade, a native of Mullagh.
31
 Meade elucidated his usual 
aversion to attending such meetings but that he now saw it as his duty to ‘declare 
openly’ that he was on the side of law-and-order, opposed war and stood for peace.32 
Meade went on to introduce Cosgrave as the ‘deliverer of our people, the protector of 
our rights, and the liberator of our country’. During his address, Cosgrave used the 
analogy of the family to describe Cumann na nGaedheal’s basic philosophy. A 
family’s resources would be dissipated if a son wanted to ‘attend race meetings and 
dances...[to] see the world at the cost of the rest of the family’ and so it was with the 
country. Cosgrave implied that his party would prudently husband Ireland’s resources 
in the same way in which good parents managed the family’s resources. In de 
Valera’s heartland, Cosgrave attacked his one-time comrade for not attending the 
Treaty negotiations and recalled how he had urged de Valera to go to London in 
1921. Collins, according to Cosgrave, had been a straight talker who did not have to 
re-write his sentences ‘unlike some of the apostles of metaphysics that we have on the 
other side’.33Addressing the same meeting, MacNeill also attacked de Valera. 
Replying to a question about the Civil War executions, MacNeill stated that nobody 
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had liked them but that they had saved Ireland and, more pointedly, that his answers 
would not be  ‘wrapped up in mystifying phrases’.  
Cumann na nGaedheal’s election result in Clare proved particularly 
disappointing. Despite the Clare Champion’s assertion that the party’s organisation 
had gained strength in the county as the campaign progressed,
34
 MacNeill was the 
sole Cumann na nGaedheal T.D. returned for Clare, while his four party colleagues 
performed poorly. MacNeill had been expected to elect a running mate.
35
 In spite of 
de Valera’s strong vote, and the publicity surrounding ‘the chief’s’ arrest, Sinn Féin 
failed to increase its representation in the constituency, again returning two anti-
Treaty deputies. Terence Dooley has observed that Clare was one of just three 
congested areas where Cumann na nGaedheal was outpolled by Sinn Féin. Both main 
parties languished behind the Farmers’ Party in Cork North, a constituency 
dominated by large dairy farmers. Dooley suggests that such constituencies were 
weaned off irregularism by the promises held out in the 1923 Land Act.
36
 Moreover, 
he points out that the fortunate Sinn Féin candidate Brian O’Higgins, elected on de 
Valera’s transfers, had a track record of opposing agrarian participation. Clare was an 
exception in that Sinn Féin outpolled the combined vote of Cumann na nGaedheal 
and the Farmers’ Party. It seems likely that de Valera’s influence was the main reason 
for Sinn Féin’s strong performance in Clare, as shown in the table below. Labour and 
the Farmers’ Party each gained a seat showing that sectional interests were well 
represented in the county. Indeed, writing in 1933, the American political scientist 
Warner Moss remarked that Clare was part of a Labour party stronghold stretching 
across a belt of counties to Wicklow in the east.
37
 Having also been elected by the 
National University constituency, MacNeill had a choice to make. He decided to give 
up the University seat rather than force a by-election in Clare, one that would have 
been almost impossible for Cumann na nGaedheal to win.  
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Figure 1: First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates in 1923.
38
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
Eamon de Valera Sinn Féin 17,762 
Prof Eoin Mac Neill Cumann na nGaedheal 8,196 
Patrick Hogan Labour 2,083 
Conor Hogan Farmers’ Party 1,914 
Brian O’Higgins Sinn Féin 114. 
 
 
Post election difficulties in Clare 
 
In the aftermath of the August election, the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation 
in Clare disintegrated. By contrast, the party machinery in nearby Limerick remained 
active in 1924, continuing to form new branches through to July.
39
 Activism in Clare 
was not helped by the fact that the constituency committee was £630 in debt after the 
election, with headquarters initially able to contribute only £150 towards the 
alleviation of the liability. Harry Guinane, Clare constituency secretary requested 
£500 to cover the election deposits of the five candidates.
40
  
John Regan notes a pre-Treaty culture of profligacy in Clare with the Sinn Féin 
organisation there in a precarious financial position as early as 1919. This trait was 
inherited by Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare, although it was by no means the only 
political organisation or body guilty of extravagance. Clare Cumann na nGaedheal 
certainly seems to have fought the election in quite an extravagant manner. Bills for 
dinners, teas and apartments with William’s Hotel Kilrush went unpaid as did 
electrical work carried out on party offices in Kilrush. Acrimony between 
headquarters and Clare rumbled on until 1925 with the constituency secretary Harry 
Guinane, having to bombard the Standing Committee and MacNeill with letters. The 
constituency executive was unable to meet its financial obligations after the Standing 
Committee reneged on its commitment to meet the cost of election deposits. Injured 
parties in Clare themselves were forced to join Guinane in raising the matter with 
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MacNeill when informed there were no funds locally. Only two candidates, Hehir and 
MacNeill had received enough votes to secure their deposits and the amount 
furnished by the Standing Committee still left the constituency £200 in arrears, or the 
deposits put down for two candidates. Guinane agreed that only three candidates 
should have been selected in Clare and that those who wanted to field a full team had 
‘on a most extravagant and irresponsible manner run the election’.41  
The failure of the machine in Clare to effectively manage its resources, and the 
less than speedy resolution of the matter by the Standing Committee, ensured that the 
party’s organisational strength in Clare melted away. O’Kennedy and Guinane were 
left to pick up the pieces. Unsurprisingly given the mishandling of the situation, Clare 
was unrepresented at the 1924 Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention.
42
 Cumann 
na nGaedheal paid the price for its shoddy handling of party funds in Clare. Similarly, 
in 1929, a Fianna Fáil branch in Cork would lapse having been left to foot bills 
incurred by the constituency committee. There, enthusiasm had also waned due to 
local members having to pay for constituency level extravagance.
43
 Clare Cumann na 
nGaedheal was moribund, largely through the constituency committee’s own 
alienation of local support and the inability of the Standing Committee to cover the 
losses in time. As already stated these difficulties were compounded by the fact that 
de Valera’s arrest during the election campaign had not gone down well.  
In 1925, facing into a metaphorical stiff-wind in Clare, Cumann na nGaedheal 
would have to begin the work of organising the constituency from scratch. However, 
the dearth of organisation in Clare was somewhat balanced by the close friendship 
between Cosgrave and Bishop Michael Fogarty. The two men maintained a regular 
correspondence throughout Cosgrave’s period in government and Fogarty often wrote 
directly to Cosgrave about local problems. Although he donated to the party, Fogarty 
was unprepared to support Cumann na nGaedheal publically, intimating to the 
Standing Committee in 1923 that the time for overt political involvement by the 
hierarchy had passed now that the country had gained independence.
44
 Similarly, 
Bishop Charles O’Sullivan of Kerry declined an invitation to address a Tralee 
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Cumann na nGaedheal meeting. In a letter to the branch president, Bishop O’Sullivan 
talked of the tenacity, firmness, self-sacrifice and courage of Cosgrave and his 
colleagues and wished the Tralee cumann well.
45
  
 
Reorganisation effort of spring 1925: Purcell to the rescue 
 
In the spring of 1925 action was taken to re-establish Cumann na nGaedheal in 
Clare as part of the wider renewal of the party organisation discussed in chapter two. 
R.J. Purcell arrived in Clare to direct efforts to reform the constituency’s structures. 
In April, a new cumann was formed in Ennis with Fr. P.J. Vaughan as President. 
Vaughan, renowned for his height, would one day replace O’Kennedy as President of 
St. Flannan’s College.46 Purcell told the meeting that encouraging reports from 
around the county indicated there would be an active branch in every parish within 
weeks.
47
 Cumainn were subsequently established in Kilrush and Kilmala while steps 
were taken to form branches in Clarecastle, Miltown Malbay, Kilkee and 
Ennistymon. At this time new branches were also formed at Killaloe and Tulla.
48
 The 
new Ennis cumann met again on 29 April to select its delegates to the annual 
convention. Members passed three resolutions for debate at the party conference, and 
urged their delegates to argue strongly for their adoption by the convention. The first 
resolution dealt with the need to drain the river Fergus, the second called for a loan to 
be made available to farmers who had suffered loss of livestock to fluke while the 
third argued that lands on the banks of the Fergus were ‘in every way’ suitable to the 
growing of sugar beet.
49
 Members were also informed that the party’s reorganising 
efforts had produced new branches in Clarecastle and Ennistymon. At this time Clare 
was one of Sinn Féin’s best organised counties. In 1925, there were twenty-four Sinn 
Féin clubs in the county.
50
 
The drive to organise Cumann na nGaedheal in county Clare continued apace 
during the summer of 1925. Adverts appeared in May asking those interested in 
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establishing cumainn to contact Purcell,
51
 while the Ennistymon branch enrolled new 
members at a public meeting on grants and land division.
52
 New branches were also 
established at Lahinch and Corafin while the attendance of Cosgrave at a county 
convention at the end of May was widely publicised. Addressing the convention, 
Cosgrave claimed it did not matter to him who was in government so long as the 
Treaty was maintained and the country’s best interests were served. Cosgrave was 
confident that Cumann na nGaedheal’s pledges of a self-reliant state would be 
realised at the time of the next general election. Dealing with partition, Cosgrave 
displayed a degree of political maturity by claiming that the south had to attract their 
‘Northern countrymen’ by showing them that ‘the Government of the Free State is a 
well-balanced Government, acting in the best interests of the people’.53 Clearly, 
Cosgrave did not see the language of a jingoistic, irredentist nationalism as a solution 
to partition. The speech implied that only Cumann na nGaedheal could bring about 
Irish unity. On the same day as the meeting in Ennis, Cosgrave also addressed 
meetings in Lahinch and Kilrush. Cosgrave spent a week in Clare as part of the 
reorganising effort and he was accompanied by Fisheries minister Fionán Lynch and 
Liam Burke.
54
 Cosgrave’s visit to Clare at a time when the local organisation was re-
establishing itself after a lengthy hiatus, suggests that he did in fact take an interest in 
building the party organisation in places where it was weak. Minister Patrick Hogan 
also travelled to Clare in May 1925. Cumann na nGaedheal advertisements boasted 
that his ‘Land Act is his credentials’ as the party’s reorganising efforts made a play 
for the support of smallholders.
55
 
 Local elections were due in the summer of 1925 and while Cumann na 
nGaedheal had decided not to contest these, they still occupied a great deal of the 
party’s time. On 11 June, toeing the party line, the Sixmilebridge cumann president 
James O’Regan told members that the branch had decided not to interfere with local 
government other than to recommend that electors choose candidates who would 
work economically and efficiently ‘regardless of State politics’.56 He advised 
Cumann na nGaedheal members that they were free to support Labour or Farmer 
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candidates but not anti-Treatyites who might receive orders to ‘smash and destroy as 
– a political move – all the work of local Government’. In the event, numerous 
Cumann na nGaedhealers stood for election as independents.
57
  
Local elections were not the only item discussed at the Sixmilebridge meeting. 
O’Regan, an election candidate for the party in 1923, was keen that the branch co-
operate with the clergy and others to ensure the Estate Commissioner would receive 
the best local advice on land division when inspecting the district. Land 
Commissioners, when assessing an area, were often subjected to intimidation from 
various categories of claimants. Clare was such an example.
58
 Earlier in the summer 
there had been a number of outrages, particularly in the area surrounding Ennis. In 
March a seventy-two year old man died as a result of multiple wounds sustained in a 
shooting incident.
59
 In May, a gory notice in red ink was found in the vicinity of 250 
acres of land for sale near Ennis. In addition, there had been destruction of stone 
walls and illegal trespassing on property near Ballyvaughen, and hay burning and 
outhouse burning in Rathlahine and Ennistymon.
60
 These incidents point to continued 
agrarian unrest in county Clare in the mid-1920s. Independence had not solved rural 
Clare’s problems.  
Aware that portions of land were about to be divided in Sixmilebridge and its 
environs, the Cumann na nGaedheal branch wanted to secure building sites for 
houses, a new school and a sports field. The sites would ‘improve and beautify the 
town of Sixmilebridge’.61 The cumann subsequently passed a resolution calling for 
the formation of a committee representative of Sixmilebridge Cumann na nGaedheal 
‘none of whom are claimants for allotments of land’ to help guide the Commissioner 
in his work. In like manner, on 21 June, the Ennistymon Cumann na nGaedheal 
branch discussed the division of the Ennistymon House lands. However, Ennistymon 
party members were not quite as civic minded as their colleagues in Sixmilebridge. 
The cumann made four appeals. The first three called for the acquisition of the lands 
in question, their immediate distribution and that due consideration be given to 
townspeople and uneconomic land holders. However, the fourth appeal asked that 
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preference be given to applicants who were members of Cumann na nGaedheal.
62
  A 
party did not have to be in power to exert this type of influence and numerous 
associations gave structure to the lobbying process.
63
 Under both Cumann na 
nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil governments, inspectors called on ‘local politicians, 
clergymen, schoolteachers and other notables of the community’ for direction.64 
Fianna Fáil would prove more successful in exploiting land issues for organisational 
gain. 
By August 1925 Cumann na nGaedheal was quite well organised across county 
Clare with branches in Barefield, Clarecastle, Ennis, Ennistymon, Kilmally, Kilrush, 
Sixmilebridge, Tulla, Corafin and Lahinch.
65
 These branches did not have much 
contact with their local T.D. who, as Minister for Education and delegate to the 
Boundary Commission, had little spare time for constituency work. However, 
MacNeill had some time off towards the end of September and, responding to Liam 
Burke’s 22 June circular, arranged to liaise with the Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisation in Clare. Constituency secretary Harry Guinane informed Liam Burke 
that MacNeill would address supporters attending a constituency committee meeting 
in Ennis on 23 September.
66
 Clare cumainn were asked to forward resolutions by 21 
September so that MacNeill could respond at the meeting. Following the Ennis 
meeting, MacNeill spent a couple of days travelling around county Clare. He spent 24 
September in west Clare hearing deputations from locals, while on 26 September he 
inspected lands in Clarecastle which had been subject to flooding. He also heard 
deputations from the ratepayers of Ennis who had been angered by the spendthrift 
tendencies of Ennis Urban Council, a recurrent theme in Clare’s politics it seems. 
MacNeill was also informed that the town’s roads, housing, sewerage and water 
supply needed attention. MacNeill pledged to deal with these issues. 
Cumann na nGaedheal activism in Clare again declined in the winter of 1925. 
Aside from a rare Cumann na nGaedheal branch meeting in Ennis in November, the 
organisation appeared to have slipped back to the dormant position of 1924 and early 
1925. Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare failed to capitalise on the progress it had made 
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in 1925. Sinn Féin remained strong in Clare and organised a demonstration in Ennis 
to denounce the London Agreement.
67
 It is probable that further negative feelings 
were generated against the organisation in Clare by MacNeill’s involvement with the 
failed Boundary Commission. On 28 December, an unarmed garda, Thomas 
Dowling, was killed in north county Clare by a party of ambushers lurking behind a 
wall. At this time Clare was possibly the most ‘incorrigibly republican county in the 
state’ and deeply unsettled. Republicans ambushed gardaí and intimidated their 
families. This cycle of violence intensified as the decade wore on.
68
 
 Perhaps the political structures in place were failing to deal adequately with 
social and economic problems that existed in the more peripheral constituencies such 
as Clare. It is likely the ‘government party’ machine was guilty by association. 
Certainly, Terence Dooley attributes Cumann na nGaedheal’s declining fortunes in 
western constituencies in the late 1920s with the failure of the government’s Land 
Act 1923 to relieve congestion or match people’s expectations.69 Moreover, from its 
inception, Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare was associated with: the arrest of de 
Valera; an austere policy of balanced budgets; incompetent management of local 
party finances and from December 1925 with the shattering of nationalist dreams of a 
united Ireland. Given that Clare was de Valera’s constituency, the county had a 
talisman through which to channel its disenchantment with the government. 
Furthermore, the perception that MacNeill devoted little time to his constituency can 
scarcely have benefitted the local party organisation. Furthermore, the financial mess 
left in the wake of the August 1923 election had alienated middle class voters whom 
Cumann na nGaedheal needed to attract. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal inactivity in Clare continued throughout 1926. 
Meanwhile, the Clare Farmers’ Union remained the most active political organisation 
in the county. However, it too was in financial difficulty and, in keeping with the 
theme running through this chapter, was accused of profligacy by the local press. The 
Clare Champion also lamented the apathy of the county’s farmers, claiming that of 
18,000 farmers in the constituency, only 1,000 gave the organisation any form of 
support. Sinn Féin showed signs of sporadic activity in some parts of the county but it 
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too lagged behind the Famers’ Union.70 There was strong criticism of MacNeill’s 
performance at a Farmers’ Union meeting in May. There appears to have been a 
prevailing view in the county, even within Cumann na nGaedheal circles, that 
MacNeill spent too much time in Dublin and was disinterested in the concerns of his 
constituents.
71
 Evidently the effects of the minister’s September 1925 visit had 
quickly worn off.  
Despite his popularity in the county, de Valera’s new Fianna Fáil party was 
slow to appear in Clare. Fianna Fáil branches appeared in August and had spread 
throughout the county by the end of the month.
72
 Like Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna 
Fáil too would encounter organisational problems in Clare. For example there were 
complaints in 1929 that the Fianna Fáil organisation in Clare had operated without a 
constituency executive for over two years.
73
  
 
Cumann na nGaedheal prepares for electioneering 
 
           By early 1927, the financial difficulties of the Farmers’ Union in Clare had 
become such a problem that dissolution of its local organisation was given serious 
consideration. A slight improvement in its finances enabled it to continue in existence 
but, to the chagrin of the Clare Champion, apathy prevailed among the county’s 
farmers with only twenty five of 112 entitled delegates attending its constituency 
AGM in January 1927.
74
 The Farmers’ Union was generally perceived as the party of 
large, commercial farming interests whilst county Clare was a county dominated by 
smaller farmers and labourers. In many constituencies, the Farmers’ Party and 
Cumann na nGaedheal competed for the votes of commercial farmers.
75
 However, in 
Clare, Cumann na nGaedheal did not benefit from the difficulties experienced by the 
Farmers’ Union. In terms of organisation and support, the two would remain less than 
the sum of their parts in Clare. In February 1927 Labour and the National League 
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formed new branches in the constituency as both main parties remained somewhat 
mute.
76
  
In early March Cumann na nGaedheal in Clare finally awoke from its slumber. 
Fr. Smith chaired a party meeting at Cross on 6 March. Cumann na nGaedheal 
organiser for Clare, a Mr. McCarthy, told the meeting at Cross that there was a place 
in the party for every member of the community.
77
 Various government policies were 
outlined as were the benefits that would come in the future from the Shannon 
Scheme, the Carlow sugar factory and the improvement of Irish agricultural produce. 
Councillor James O’Flynn, officially a Farmers’ Party representative, chaired a 
meeting to reorganise Cumann na nGaedheal in Sixmilebridge.
78
 O’Flynn 
acknowledged the important role of the Farmers’ Party in representing agricultural 
interests but had come to realise that ‘a purely National organisation [...] best suited 
to the interests of all classes’ now warranted his endorsement. O’Flynn told the 
meeting that he had at times found fault with Cosgrave’s government but realised 
they were men of vision and enterprise and that any future amalgamation concerning 
the Farmers’ Party should be with Cumann na nGaedheal. Presumably the party 
hoped that O’Flynn’s supporters would transfer their allegiance to Cumann na 
nGaedheal in the election. A new cumann was also formed in Feakle.
79
  
On 23 March Minister for Agriculture Patrick Hogan addressed a large meeting, 
chaired by Canon O’Kennedy, in the Ennis Courthouse. Hogan did not sugar-coat his 
address in rhetoric, stating that he was in Ennis to ‘talk business’ and was unable to 
find a short-cut to wealth for any farmer in the country. 
80
 Hogan stated firmly that 
‘tariffs were of no use to Irish agriculture’.81 In response to the emerging National 
League organisation, and in recognition of the constitutional tradition of Clare, Hogan 
paid tribute to John Redmond for the service he had given his country but argued that 
the old Irish party policy had no relevance now that self-government was achieved in 
1922. Liam Burke accompanied Hogan to Ennis in an attempt to improve 
organisation. Burke openly made reference to the weakness of the party in Clare and 
stated that in re-organising the constituency, he did not intend it to remain active for 
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election purposes only, intimating that Cumann na nGaedheal had to function 
between elections. Burke suggested that two district executives should be formed in 
the county, one in west Clare and one in the east. 
82
  
Clare Cumann na nGaedheal was criticised for failing to elect a new 
constituency committee or to send delegates to National Executive meetings. In a 
pointed attack on MacNeill, one rank-and-file member enquired as to the point in 
forming constituency executives if ‘we do not get a deputy that will take orders from 
the executive?’.83 There remained considerable disappointment in Clare with the 
performance of MacNeill. O’Kennedy joined in the attack, stating to applause that it 
was up to the people to elect a better Dáil deputy and that he hoped in future Cumann 
na nGaedheal would select candidates from within ‘its own shores and not go outside 
for them’. Burke told the meeting that headquarters would provide organisers and 
supply them with all they needed to do their job. He also warned that the constituency 
organisation would be responsible for any additional expenses incurred. Local party 
personnel would have to husband party finances competently. With a selection 
convention looming, haste was required to reorganise existing branches, and to form 
new ones where cumainn had fallen away. 
On 3 April a cumann was formed at Doonaha with Fr. Madden, formerly of  the 
Farmers’ Union, presiding. Fr. Madden called on the farmers’ organisation to merge 
with Cumann na nGaedheal to provide the country with a ‘better government’.84 In 
this the speaker echoed the statements of Dennis Gorey, who resigned as leader of the 
Farmers’ Party to join Cumann na nGaedheal.85 Gorey failed to bring the rest of his 
party with him. McCarthy told the meeting of policies that would bring prosperity to 
farmers while suggesting Cumann na nGaedheal did not hope to remain in power 
indefinitely. The same day a cumann was formed in Monmore where there were calls 
for all members of the community to work together in building up the country so that 
it could hold its own in the markets of the world. On 4 April a cumann in Miltown 
Malbay was reorganised. Dr. Dan MacClancy, presiding, informed those gathered 
that Cumann na nGaedheal offered hope for the country and that ‘Nationality for us 
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all is a spiritual thing, an immortal thing and all should endeavour to make the most 
of the freedom we have gained’.86  
It is interesting to note the numerous calls made by speakers at Cumann na 
nGaedheal meetings in Clare for a merger with the Farmers’ Party. The presence of 
Farmers’ Union representatives on Cumann na nGaedheal platforms is also 
significant.
87
 Clearly people were prepared to put aside their differences as they could 
see that in a constituency such as Clare, the best way to counter de Valera’s 
alternative was to form a united front of those broadly supportive of the government’s 
economic policy. Nonetheless, the Clare Farmers’ Union formally rejected Cumann 
na nGaedheal’s overtures in mid April.88 Advocates for fusion remained a minority. 
The Clare Cumann na nGaedheal selection convention took place on 1 May 
with over 100 branch delegates in attendance.
89
 The frantic efforts to create a new 
branch structure in Clare over the previous months had paid off. George Nicholls, 
T.D. for Galway and parliamentary secretary to the minister for Defence, chaired the 
convention and explained to members the directions issued to him by the Standing 
Committee. Three candidates were subsequently selected as headquarters ensured 
Clare did not repeat the mistakes of 1923. In a further indicator of Clare Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s desire to unite with the farmers’ organisation, O’Flynn, was selected as a 
reserve candidate and eventually replaced Patrick Brennan on the party’s ticket.90 The 
Labour party had been reorganising in Clare since the summer of 1926 and continued 
to meet regularly in Ennis in the lead up the election. Before the Cumann na 
nGaedheal convention, O’Kennedy told members that it had been decided to proceed 
in forming one executive for the county rather than two as Burke had suggested in 
Ennis on 23 March. Instead the new executive would select three vice Presidents 
representing east, west and mid-Clare. Thomas McGrath and Dennis McMahon were 
appointed as the new constituency committee’s representatives on the National 
Executive. Later, the constituency organisation formed election and finance 
committees to oversee the election campaign and ensure the purse strings were well 
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guarded.
91
 On 8 May meetings took place in Lisdoonvarna and Cratlae. One of the 
candidates, H.J. Hunt,
92
 told the meeting in Lisdoonvarna of his support for lower 
rates. More laudable was his assertion that every elector should use their vote even if 
to vote against him.
93
 A Clare Champion editorial on 14 May was critical of 
MacNeill saying that he had displayed little interest in his constituency and that he 
had not visited Clare once ‘since the Boundary fiasco’. The editorial implied 
government party weakness in the constituency by suggesting that Cumann na 
nGaedheal supporters had requested prominent speakers for meetings in Clare. 
MacNeill’s performance as a T.D. caused difficulties for the organisation even though 
he was no longer a candidate in Clare having decided to seek election for the National 
University. Fianna Fáil was active from early April and its meetings in the build up to 
the election were characterised by stinging criticism of the government and its 
continuous attempts to play the ‘green card’.94 At one such meeting, it was claimed 
that under Cumann na nGaedheal, ‘Freemasonry and Imperialism have got a worse 
hold than ever in the country’.95  
 
Promoting an unpopular government 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal government remained a difficult product to pitch to 
Clare voters. With little prospect of making a gain,
96
 the party focussed on retaining 
MacNeill’s seat. Ennistymon Fair on 16 May showed up the fraught relationships that 
existed between the main parties on the eve of the June 1927 election. Cumann na 
nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil and the National League all attempted to hold public meetings 
at the fair. Willie Redmond and the National League candidate courteously decided to 
wait until Desmond FitzGerald concluded his address to a Cumann na nGaedheal 
crowd before commencing their own meeting. However, when the Fianna Fáil 
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candidates arrived, they were not as cordial. Fianna Fáil’s meeting began 
immediately. FitzGerald tried to continue speaking over the noise emanating from the 
Fianna Fáil meeting. According to FitzGerald, Cumann na nGaedheal had given the 
Irish people the right to change their government while alleging that de Valera’s 
followers had tried to prevent the people from registering their votes.
97
 He also 
implied that de Valera’s recent trip to the United States had secured funds to enable 
Fianna Fáil organisers travel around Ireland in ‘motor cars’. All parties were prone to 
sensational accusations in the throes of an electoral battle, it would seem.  
Cumann na nGaedheal’s separatist roots, and the reason why it had not been 
able to fully integrate Home Rulers, soon became apparent as FitzGerald launched a 
scathing broadside at Redmond’s party. FitzGerald said the Irish party leaders had 
promised Irishmen Home Rule if they fought for Britain in Flanders but instead the 
country was handed the Black and Tans. Now, Captain Redmond had the ‘d-----d 
cheek’ to come to Clare asking for votes after ‘tens of thousands of Irishmen had left 
their bones in Flanders’.98 FitzGerald also addressed meetings in Ennis and Miltown 
Malbay the previous day.
99
 At those meetings FitzGerald countered claims made by 
the opposition. Indeed Cumann na nGaedheal spent much of this campaign on the 
back foot, rebutting accusations made by Fianna Fáil.  
Some Cumann na nGaedheal meetings in Clare were interrupted, such as that at 
Kildysart, while other meetings received an ‘excellent hearing’, according to the 
Clare Champion.
100
 Richard Mulcahy successfully addressed meetings in Kilmally 
and Mullough. On 5 June another big personality, Kevin O’Higgins, spoke at various 
Cumann na nGaedheal meetings in Clare. Again, some of these meetings were 
characterised by bitter attacks on the National League. It seems that Cumann na 
nGaedheal feared the presence of the National League in Clare and decided on a 
strategy of attack to counter the threat of the new party. Speaking in Ennis, O’Higgins 
described voting as the ‘supreme act of citizenship’ and the Cumann na nGaedheal 
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government as a ‘Committee of the People’.101 O’Higgins reviewed the policy of the 
government and asked voters to choose the best team to run the country and to 
consider carefully the policies of all the parties. O’Kennedy concluded the meeting by 
attacking Fianna Fáil, for having no policy on unemployment or agriculture.  
 
Figure 2: First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates in June 1927.
102 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
Eamon de Valera Fianna Fáil 13,029 
Thomas Falvey Farmers’ Party 5,140 
Patrick Hogan Labour 4,147 
Patrick Michael Kelly Cumann na nGaedheal 3,612 
Patrick Houlihan Fianna Fáil 1,500 
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s overall popularity in the constituency declined 
dramatically from 11,748 votes in 1923 to 7,321 in June 1927. Patrick Kelly held the 
party’s seat with a modest share of the vote. However, Cumann na nGaedheal was 
nowhere near catching Fianna Fáil, which won the bulk of the Republican vote in 
Clare. The Political scientist Warner Moss noted that Cumann na nGaedheal voters in 
Clare transferred heavily in favour of the National League candidate,
103
 indicating 
that party supporters there identified with its constitutional credentials and that the 
two competed for votes from the same pool.  Brian O’Higgins, carrying the flag for 
uncompromising Republicans, polled 1,412 votes for Sinn Féin, which retained at 
least the semblance of an organisation in Clare, while the National League obtained 
2,830 votes.
104
 Cumann na nGaedheal support was now dangerously weak in Clare 
and had slipped substantially since 1923. Over the summer the Farmers’ Union’s 
difficulties continued in Clare as the organisation struggled to pay its bills. The Clare 
Champion lamented its lack of an ‘active, numerous and determined membership’.105 
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Cumann na nGaedheal failed to capitalise on the difficulties that beset the farmers’ 
movement in Clare. 
 Soon after the murder of Kevin O’Higgins in July, the Doonbeg cumann 
passed a resolution recording their ‘utter abhorrence of the dastardly murder of Mr. 
Kevin O’Higgins, Minister of Justice’ who had ‘added such lustre to Ireland by his 
dazzling brilliancy [as] displayed in the Council Chamber of the Commonwealth and 
in the deliberations of the League of Nations’.106 Given that O’Higgins appeared in so 
many parts of the country at election time, he no doubt was a popular figure with 
Cumann na nGaedheal supporters, as the resolution from the Doonbeg cumann 
shows. 
The government party campaign for the September 1927 election began at the 
end of August in Quin. The reorganising efforts of the spring and summer meant that 
Cumann na nGaedheal was at least spared the ignominy of having to manufacture a 
party machinery in the county in advance of the election. Cumann na nGaedheal 
speakers in Quin portrayed the upcoming election as a two-horse race between two 
rival governments. Clearly the strategy in Clare, as elsewhere, was to limit the 
potential damage smaller parties could inflict on Cumann na nGaedheal. In the event, 
the National League did not field a candidate in Clare, while the Farmers’ Union’s 
standing as a national organisation was effectively ended in June.
107
 If ever there was 
an opportunity to gain a seat in Clare, this was it, as the snap election caught the 
opposition parties off guard. Clare Cumann na nGaedheal had an opportunity to 
attract the wider constitutional vote. Dr. Seán O’Dea, eventually selected as a party 
candidate, addressed the meeting in Quin. O’Dea said he did not hate England but 
loved Ireland, a message designed to differentiate his party from Fianna Fáil in the 
quest for nationalist votes.
108
 Cumann na nGaedheal devoted more time to portraying 
Cosgrave in a positive light ever before. One such advert in the Clare Champion 
contrasted de Valera’s record with that of Cosgrave. Cosgrave was ‘All For Ireland’ 
while de Valera was ‘All For Empty Formula’.109 Cumann na nGaedheal used the 
snap election to its advantage by attacking the other parties. In June it had been 
forced on the defensive by opponents.  
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The attendance at the Cumann na nGaedheal selection convention was much 
higher than it had been in May. While the quoted figure is probably an exaggeration, 
a report of the convention proceedings claimed that 350 delegates, including twenty-
five clergymen, met in Ennis to select the party’s candidates on 31 August. Whether 
the figure quoted is accurate or not, we can be reasonably certain that the second 
convention of the year was better attended, unless of course the reporter miscounted 
by over 200. 
However, Fianna Fáil too had an opportunity to gain a seat. Whether the 
possibility of a gain for de Valera compelled him or not, Cosgrave addressed a 
Cumann na nGaedheal demonstration in Ennis on 4 September. Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s weakness in Clare had always been a factor in attracting Cosgrave and 
high profile ministers to the constituency during elections. Cosgrave’s tone was 
defiant and he spent much of his speech aggressively contrasting his approach to 
leadership with that of de Valera. According to Cosgrave, an empty formula had 
stopped de Valera from doing his duty earlier and forming a stronger and better 
opposition to the government inside the Dáil. As he had done in Ennis four years 
earlier, Cosgrave referred to de Valera’s refusal to lead the Irish delegation at the 
Treaty talks. He stated ‘My policy has always been that if there is a post of danger the 
man to take it is the man at the head of affairs’.110 Cosgrave’s speech went down well 
with party supporters as he rounded on de Valera for dividing the country. He went 
further:  
 
It is little satisfaction to this country that Mr. de Valera has learned political sense now that 
we have lost three giant statesmen, whom this country could ill afford to lose - [voters] bring 
home to Fianna Fail [sic] the enormity of their political nonsense during the last five years in 
their own interests, in the interests of the country and in the interests of your own families. 
 
 
Cosgrave was quite obviously in no mood to surrender power, and if the party 
had appeared defensive and weak in June, the snap election provided the organisation 
with a welcome opportunity to go on the offensive. Clare’s former T.D. Eoin 
MacNeill also addressed the meeting in Ennis. Aggressively denouncing de Valera, 
MacNeill said Cumann na nGaedheal was not afraid of Fianna Fáil, and warned their 
policy would not succeed. O’Higgins’s assassination seems to have further polarised 
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relations between the two main parties and MacNeill’s remarks at this rally should be 
considered in light of the fact that he had witnessed, first hand, the attack on 
O’Higgins in July.111 
On the weekend before polling, a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Kilrush 
was interrupted by Republicans, some of whom had to be removed by the police. Old 
prejudices were again dragged up as Joseph Clancy, an IRA and National army 
veteran, told the meeting that he had received no help in fighting the Black and Tans 
from ‘the heroes who were now anxious to distinguish themselves by interrupting the 
meeting’.112 This type of exchange was typical of election meetings in this period.113 
O’Dea told supporters that a win for the Cosgrave government was the only hope for 
the country. At Crusheen, Bourke described Cumann na nGaedheal as a farmers’ 
party and a labour party, the ‘true all Ireland Party in the Free State’.114 This meeting 
was reported in the Irish Independent under the heading ‘A strenuous effort by 
government party’. Meetings took place right across the county, in much the same 
vein as previous electoral contests, with the organisational structure developed earlier 
in the year serving the party well for the September election. 
 
Figure 3:  First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates in September 1927.
115 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
Eamon de Valera Fianna Fáil 13,902 
Patrick Michael Kelly Cumann na nGaedheal 5,646 
Patrick Hogan Labour 4,683 
Martin Sexton Fianna Fáil 3,506 
Patrick Houlihan Fianna Fáil 3,003 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s vote increased to 11,983 from its poor showing in 
June. However, yet again the party returned just one deputy from Clare. Fianna Fáil, 
the party pitching for the votes of smallholders, capitalised on the weakness of the 
Farmers’ Party to gain a third seat in the constituency. Bonfires were lit in Miltown 
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Malbay by Fianna Fáil supporters celebrating the election of Martin Sexton. In Clare, 
Fianna Fáil had broadened its appeal beyond its traditional anti-Treatyite base. While 
Cumann na nGaedheal had increased its vote, it had been presented with a golden 
opportunity to gain a second seat and had failed. Clare remained barren territory for 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisers. 
 
Another slump in Clare activism 
 
Political organisations in Clare remained inactive for the remainder of 1927. 
Two elections in a matter of months had exhausted reserves of energy and finance. 
Those parties contesting local elections began to select candidates in the spring of 
1928. Cumann na nGaedheal was not officially contesting these elections and 
activism was sporadic where it was not non-existent. In 1928 Clare Cumann na 
nGaedheal lost two members in early summer. When Canon Burke, the constituency 
treasurer, passed away in April the Clare executive met to pass a resolution of 
sympathy to his relatives.
116
 Similarly, on 13 May the Bodyke cumann met to express 
its condolences to the family of a deceased activist, P.J. Hogan. The branch had lost 
‘one whose sound advice and generous purse had always been at its disposal’.117  
These meetings aside, Cumann na nGaedheal activism in Clare plummeted again. 
 As his correspondence with Cosgrave shows, Bishop Fogarty tried to use his 
influence to procure information.
118
 Enquiring about the division of lands at Claureen 
in Co. Clare, Fogarty was assured by Cosgrave that they would be redistributed as 
‘expeditiously’ as possible.  Bishop Fogarty continued to show great loyalty to 
Cosgrave. In November, he warned Cosgrave of disparaging remarks that had been 
made by American visitors to Ennis. The visitors alleged that Cumann na nGaedheal 
had secured funds from the British government for party and election purposes. Later, 
on being rumbled, the two Americans claimed to have been misrepresented by 
Fogarty. A furious Cosgrave wrote to each man to refute the original suggestion: ‘I 
doubt if you fully realise my feelings in this matter. I know of course that my 
opponents have made charges of this kind against me, but I had hoped that my friends 
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[,] before being satisfied that such charges were true [,] would have given me the 
opportunity of refuting them’.119 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation in Clare again disintegrated. It was 
largely dormant in Clare during 1929 and 1930 although, as has been pointed out, 
other political organisations also showed a lack of activity in the constituency. 
However, given the strength of the Fianna Fáil vote in Clare, de Valera’s party at 
least had a rich reservoir of support to tap into if required. In early 1931 Cumann na 
nGaedheal yet again had to begin the arduous task of rebuilding its organisation 
across county Clare as it had failed to grow and develop independently following 
previous efforts to establish the party machine. 
 
Reorganising in 1931 
 
 In January, the new party organiser for Clare, J.J. Dineen, participated in the 
revival of the old branch in Doonaha. Dineen oversaw the election of a new 
committee and told the branch it was important that each district was in close touch 
with the party through strong organisation.
120
 Meetings addressed by the minister 
Fionán Lynch also took place in Quilty and Kilrush. Patrick Kelly T.D., Liam Burke 
and Batt O’Connor joined Lynch for the meetings.121 The minister used his visit to 
hear the concerns of fishermen in the district, before asking them to continue 
supporting the government party.
122
 At Kilrush, there was criticism of the opposition 
while Burke, realising that the party faced problems in Clare, emphasised the 
importance of having a strong organisation in west Clare. To that end the services of 
an organiser would be made available in the district. Lynch heard a number of 
deputations before departing. On 8 February Doonbeg Cumann na nGaedheal met to 
select its delegates for the newly formed Kilrush area executive. The well attended 
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meeting also passed a resolution calling on the Land Commission to repair two 
‘impassable’ roads in the district.123  
 Burke again travelled to Clare in March, to attend a well attended Kilrush 
executive meeting. If the strength of a party in an area depended on the success of its 
organisers,
124
 then the frequent visits of the party’s general secretary to Clare 
indicated Cumann na nGaedheal’s continued weakness in the constituency. Officers 
for the executive were elected and a report on organisational progress was read in the 
presence of Burke. Based on the report, it was decided to continue the work of 
forming branches in as yet unorganised parishes.
125
 There was praise for Lynch from 
the Chairperson of Kilrush Urban Council, who was present to thank the Minister for 
the sympathetic hearing he had given locals during his visit and for allocating the sum 
of £1,500 for the rebuilding of the market house. The frequent visits of Lynch 
reflected the party’s desire to court the fishermen’s vote in the constituency. The 
process of branch formation continued on 19 April with officers elected to the 
committee of a new cumann in Kilkee.
126
 
In early 1931, there was an urgency about Cumann na nGaedheal attempts to 
organise county Clare that had not been seen in the county before. In 1925 a strong 
branch structure had been put in place only to wither away. On the eve of the June 
1927 election the organisation was hurriedly patched but again disintegrated and 
became dormant after the contest. Now the party was laying down firm organisational 
roots in the Clare constituency. May brought a further intensification of Cumann na 
nGaedheal political organisation in Clare. On 1 May delegates representing Scariff, 
Bodyke, O’Gonnelloe, Whitegate and Tuamgraney met to form an executive for east 
Clare. Regrets were expressed that Cumann na nGaedheal had no active organisation 
in east Clare but expressed hope that this was about to change. An organising 
committee was formed to arrange details for a public meeting in Scariff with Minister 
for Agriculture, Patrick Hogan.
127
 
 In the weeks following the meeting, there were further Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisational efforts in east Clare, while the Bodyke Farmers’ Union resolved to 
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present an address of welcome to the Minister for Agriculture on his visit to Scariff. 
According to the Clare Champion report, over 500 people gave Hogan an attentive 
hearing in Scariff. Dr. O’Connor introduced Hogan as the ‘best Minister for 
Agriculture in Europe’ while Kelly optimistically assured his audience Cumann na 
nGaedheal would gain a seat in Clare at the next election. The deputy urged 
supporters to ‘get ready from now onwards in the work of organisation’. The 
government party was clearly on an election footing and determined to improve its 
electoral machinery in the county. In his address, Hogan nodded to the party’s 
revolutionary heritage noting that many east Clare men prominent in the War of 
Independence and Civil War had played an important role in establishing a ‘decent 
civilised State’.128 Dr. T.F. O’Higgins accompanied Hogan on his visit to Clare and 
described Fianna Fáil policy as the very antithesis of Republicanism which, he 
suggested, should be about the ‘purest and broadest form of democracy’ before 
stating that the army and police were ‘emblems of Irish nationality’. Fianna Fáil, 
alleged O’Higgins, would prove a ‘shield and barrier between the criminal and 
justice’. Referring to the onset of the Great Depression, O’Higgins assured those 
present that the country’s credit still stood high and would do so long as the Cosgrave 
government continued implementing sensible policies. Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
artillery was focussed on the one party that could remove it from power. Cumann na 
nGaedheal tried to shore up support by attacking Fianna Fáil’s law-and-order 
credentials and by portraying their alternative economic policies as a gamble at a time 
of economic depression. Cumann na nGaedheal was attempting to sell itself as a safe 
bet as the state sailed into stormy waters. This went hand in hand with an all 
pervasive red scare in the early 1930s. 
In the autumn there was further Cumann na nGaedheal organising activity in 
Clare. New branches were formed while existing ones began to hold meetings again 
after a quiet summer. In September Kelly addressed a well attended meeting in 
Miltown Malbay.  Miltown had been at the forefront of the struggle for independence 
and had ‘stood solidly behind the Cumann na nGaedheal party’ since, according to 
Kelly. Again the party tried to claim a direct lineage with the revolutionary period. 
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Dineen, the constituency organiser was in attendance in Miltown Malbay and a new 
committee was elected.
129
 
 Clare’s continued state of disturbance was illustrated on 14 September in two 
shootings. The IRA remained strong in west Clare much to the chagrin of Eoin 
O’Duffy.130 William McInerney, a prominent supporter of Cumann na nGaedheal, 
was lucky to survive having been shot by attackers just outside his home in the early 
hours of 14 September. On the same night, an attempt was made on the life of Mr. 
James Lynch, state solicitor for county Clare.
131
 Lynch was due to participate in a 
case at Kilrush District Court on 15 September where the Land Commission were 
plaintiffs.
132
 The incidents played on Cumann na nGaedheal fears that a communistic 
conspiracy was afoot with Fogarty’s condemnation of the outrages on 20 September 
suggesting that a group in the country were adopting the methods and principles of 
Soviet Russia.
133
 Whatever about the motives of the attackers, the outrages had the 
effect of hardening Cumann na nGaedheal attitudes in Clare. On his second visit to 
Clare in less than a year, Lynch described the outrages as being part of a widespread 
Communist conspiracy aimed at intimidating the people and overthrowing the 
state.
134
 A Cumann na nGaedheal west Clare executive meeting on 27 September was 
dominated by the outrages. Prominent Cumann na nGaedheal member Fr. Michael 
Breen, a former revolutionary Sinn Féiner and fishermen’s representative,135 
presiding made reference to the absence of McInerney because he ‘had raised his 
voice in condemnation of an illegal organisation’. Breen said it was only thanks to 
God that McInerney had not been killed in the attack.
136
 The executive went on to 
pass a motion condemning the attempted murder of McInerney and recent hay 
burnings in the area. A resolution was passed calling on the government to ‘quench’ 
the ‘evil campaign of terror’ that threatened Church and state.137 At this time 
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supporters of the party believed the government was guiding the country through the 
Depression with some success. Breen ‘could not understand the mentality of those 
who, at a time when other Governments were falling in financial ruin, could attempt 
to bring about the ruin of this little island, which so far had at least been able to 
weather the gale of depression’.138 The Clare outrages fed into the ‘red scare’ which 
would form the backdrop to the 1932 general election. 
Liam Burke had accompanied Lynch on his trip to Miltown Malbay. Burke 
believed the party had won enough votes in September 1927 to secure two seats but 
had not done so due to inadequate organisation in the constituency. He suggested that 
improved structures and activism were the key to securing two seats at the next 
election. Perhaps Cumann na nGaedheal believed an alliance with farming interests 
could see it take one of the Fianna Fáil seats; after all, there had been a Farmers’ 
Party seat in the constituency before it ran into difficulties in 1927. Various grass-root 
activists were of a more pessimistic view, with a Mr. F. Maloney suggesting that 
keeping the organisation alive in Clare would in itself prove difficult in the face of a 
de Valera onslaught. A meeting of the recently reorganised Ennis branch took place 
on 8 October. Kerrin, chairing the meeting, urged those present to increase party 
membership while it was also brought to the meeting’s attention that a party of men 
had visited deputy Kelly’s home to warn him about the forthcoming Dáil vote on the 
Public Safety Bill.
139
 Cumann na nGaedheal seemed to be under siege. 
In October and November Cumann na nGaedheal branches at Barefield and 
Newmarket were reorganised with seventy members enrolling at Newmarket. At their 
next meeting Newmarket Cumann na nGaedheal passed a resolution asking for a 
grant to repair damaged roads in the district.
140
 Cumann na nGaedheal seems to have 
genuinely believed it could finally win two seats in the long problematic constituency 
of Clare. Various meetings of the party bemoaned the fact it was under-represented in 
the county. Such sentiments were in evidence at meetings of the west Clare and mid 
Clare executives where members expressed their determination to work for a second 
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seat.
141
 Sensing that an election was imminent, given the levels of Cumann na 
nGaedheal activism,
142
 Fianna Fáil branches in Clare began to organise more 
effectively around this time. Fianna Fáil’s organisation in Clare had declined in 1929 
and 1930. In 1928 Clare came under the heading ‘good activity’ and the party had 
fifty-seven branches in the county. However this number declined to thirty-seven in 
1929 and twenty-six in 1930.
143
 Like Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil activism 
declined in non election years, albeit from a stronger position. Reorganised or newly 
established Cumann na nGaedheal cumainn selected delegates to the party’s selection 
convention throughout December and January 1932.
144
 
 
February 1932 general election 
 
Cosgrave addressed a large Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Ennis on 10 
January 1932. The meeting aroused great interest in the county, partly for the novelty 
that microphones and loudspeakers were deployed for the occasion.
145
 New 
technology was now being utilised for electoral purposes. A social function to 
coincide with Cosgrave’s visit was also organised by Cumann na nGaedheal. Such 
events, as we will see later, became ever more a feature of the party’s life from 1927 
onwards. Mulcahy chaired the Clare selection convention the previous day and stayed 
in the county to address Cosgrave’s rally in Ennis. Banners and streamers welcomed 
Cosgrave to Ennis while, in a pitch for the votes of the constitutional tradition, he 
shared the platform with Redmond, whom Desmond FitzGerald had denounced so 
venomously in 1927. Cosgrave’s speech contrasted sharply with that delivered during 
his previous visit to Ennis. This time he focussed on the economic Depression facing 
the world. Cosgrave predicted far-reaching changes over the coming five years and 
pointed out that the policies of the past were being ‘laid aside’ in many countries. 
Cosgrave continued by saying that Ireland could not ‘plough a lonely furrow’ but 
would have to adapt and take advantage of whatever opportunities changing 
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conditions may afford.
146
 Cosgrave asked voters to select a government which had 
proved itself one of action. Admitting he disagreed with captain Redmond on minor 
issues, and that both came from different political traditions, Cosgrave said they both 
now recognised the danger of Fianna Fáil and both stood for ordered government at 
home and ‘straight dealing in our relations abroad’. Redmond himself went on to say 
that he was answering his country’s call by appearing on a Cumann na nGaedheal 
platform and that the men of the now defunct Irish party  would have responded 
similarly. Cumann na nGaedheal was portraying itself as the heir to the revolution in 
some quarters and as the inheritor of John Redmond’s legacy in others, a synthesis of 
diverse national traditions. In this there was a clear continuity with the founding 
objectives of Cumann na nGaedheal as expressed by Cosgrave in Limerick in 1923. 
Michael Tierney also addressed the meeting in Ennis while the dance organised to 
coincide with Cosgrave’s visit was attended by 150 couples. 
In 1932, Cumann na nGaedheal focussed its election campaign on the western 
constituencies knowing that Fianna Fáil’s message was resonating in those areas. 
Cosgrave toured all the western counties and, when not working their own 
constituencies, ministers were asked to travel westwards in support of the party.
147
 
Meetings followed right across Clare for the duration of the election campaign. Party 
candidates addressed meetings at Tulla, Kilmally and Connolly at the end of January. 
At Tulla, Kerrin criticised Fianna Fáil policy and said his party was underrepresented 
in the constituency.
148
At Ennistymon, Redmond again spoke from a Cumann na 
nGaedheal platform, this time stating that he was answering Cosgrave’s call to 
cooperate in doing the nation’s work and that as a lifelong constitutionalist he saw 
Cumann na nGaedheal as the one national and constitutional party fighting the 
election. Cumann na nGaedheal, he said, was the party that had built up the country, 
carried out its work for all sectors of the community and stood for the forces of law-
and-order.
149
 At the same meeting Kerrin was subjected to interruptions while Kelly, 
hand firmly grasping the parish pump, listed out all that he had achieved for the 
county in his time as a T.D. At Doonbeg, Cumann na nGaedheal had the audacity to 
criticise the Fianna Fáil controlled county council even though they had not officially 
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contested the elections themselves. On 7 February further Cumann na nGaedheal 
meetings took place with Kelly advising a meeting in Quilty that they would be better 
served by increasing Cumann na nGaedheal’s representation in the county.150 Was 
this a return to zero-sum electioneering? Bishop Fogarty,
151
 known to dislike de 
Valera intensely, made a generous contribution of £25 in private to the Cumann na 
nGaedheal election fund and was thanked by Cosgrave, on behalf of the government, 
for doing so.
152
 Highlighting the vacuous nature of Cumann na nGaedheal’s attacks 
on its credentials, Fianna Fáil demonstrated its commitment to Catholicism during the 
1932 election campaign. De Valera affirmed his belief in Catholic doctrine at 
numerous meetings and it was reported in the Irish Press that the would-be President 
silently recited the Angelus on being interrupted by the Church bell during an election 
meeting in Tulla Co. Clare. His supporters followed their leader’s example by silently 
praying in unison in what must have been quite a spectacle.
153
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s machine held its own in the constituency of Clare, but 
the party’s vote remained static. Cumann na nGaedheal’s overall vote in Clare 
declined by little more than 600 votes since September 1927, while Fianna Fáil seems 
to have benefitted most from the absence of a Farmers’ Party candidate with its vote 
increasing by over 3,000.
154
 Small farming interests in the former Clare Farmers’ 
Union seem to have aligned themselves with de Valera - former Farmers’ Party T.D. 
Conor Hogan appeared on a Fianna Fáil platform during the campaign.
155
 The failure 
to successfully court the farming vote in Clare scuppered Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
hopes of a gain. Patrick Kelly lost his seat to party colleague Patrick Bourke. 
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Figure 4: First preference vote Obtained by successful Clare candidates in February 1932.
156
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
Eamon de Valera Fianna Fáil 12,504 
Patrick Hogan Labour  5,701 
Martin Sexton Fianna Fáil 5,444 
Patrick Burke Cumann na nGaedheal 5,254 
Sean O’Grady Fianna Fáil 4,002 
 
 
Party of opposition 
 
Fianna Fáil’s organisation in Clare benefitted from its ascent to power. Fianna 
Fáil branches became much more active during 1932 and on 10 April over 1,000 
people greeted de Valera in Ennis on his return as the new President of the Executive 
Council.
157
 Meanwhile, at the Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention in May, Fr. 
Breen was elected to the National Executive as the party adjusted to its new role in 
opposition. Clare branches of Cumann na nGaedheal remained quiet immediately 
after the loss of power although the Army Comrades Association (ACA) spread 
through the county from March 1932. 
As noted previously, the dissolution of the Dáil in January 1933 came as a 
surprise at every level in Cumann na nGaedheal. In Clare, the organisation awaited 
instructions from Dublin before simply calling on all those who had attended the 
previous selection convention to gather in the Queens Hotel Ennis on 7 January to 
select the party’s candidates for this election.158 On 7 January, 120 Cumann na 
nGaedheal delegates turned up at short notice to select candidates. Only two were 
selected, with Thomas Falvey, formerly of the Farmers’ Union joining Burke on the 
party ticket. This time Cumann na nGaedheal sought to secure the support of 
disgruntled farmers, though the new Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ League had already 
found its niche there, particularly among larger farmers. Continued ill health stopped 
Kelly seeking re-election. In Clare, T. Brown acted as the party’s director of 
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elections, while an election meeting took place on 8 January at Kilkee as the party’s 
campaign took on much the same character as before.
159
 Blueshirts, or the ‘white 
army’ as they were known in the international press,160 were visible at a Cumann na 
nGaedheal meeting in Ennis on 15 January. Disturbances between this new Treatyite 
force and Fianna Fáil sympathisers were common across the country as emboldened 
Republicans sought to disrupt the meetings of their political opponents (see chapters 
four and five). Some interrupters had to be removed from the meeting in Ennis but 
the speakers, including Michael Tierney, were able to conclude the meeting.
161
 Centre 
Party meetings in Clare were also interrupted. Rival Fianna Fáil and Cumann na 
nGaedheal public meetings took place in Killaloe on 16 January. Cumann na 
nGaedheal advised farmers not to part with their stock until after the election when 
they would get a better price under a Cosgrave-led government. The Fianna Fáil 
supporting Irish Press claimed that Cumann na nGaedheal’s meeting ended with 
cheers for De Valera.
162
 Moreover, the paper reported a breathtaking display of 
Orwellian doublethink by Fianna Fáil’s Patrick Houlihan. He apparently told his 
supporters in Killaloe that the Economic War had been dragged out as a result of the 
‘traitorous opposition of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party’.163 Meanwhile, as he 
toured Clare, de Valera claimed that many Cumann na nGaedheal supporters had 
switched allegiance to Fianna Fáil.
164
 This was the era before opinion polls and exit 
polls so it is impossible to corroborate the Fianna Fáil leader’s statement. Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s vote in the constituency dropped by a staggering 4,000 votes, though 
this figure corresponds with the 4,041 votes obtained by the Centre Party. Cumann na 
nGaedheal had fallen between two stools in Clare. Small farmers and smallholders 
favoured de Valera while the commercial farmers found a home in the Centre Party. 
Divided, the two parties fell with Cosgrave writing to Fogarty ‘the result is 
disappointing, no one knows what the cost may be’.165 
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Figure 5: First Preference vote obtained by successful candidates in Clare 1933.
166
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
Eamon de Valera Fianna Fáil 18,574 
Patrick Burke Cumann na nGaedheal 5,254 
Patrick Hogan Labour 4,307 
Patrick Houlihan Fianna Fáil 3,289 
Sean O’Grady Fianna Fáil 3,079 
 
 
On 11 February a letter appeared in the Clare Champion from Liam Burke 
thanking Cumann na nGaedheal followers for their support and efforts on behalf of 
the party. Burke expressed hope that the party would one day form a government 
again and add to its achievements in the first decade of independence.
167
 In April the 
Cumann na nGaedheal fight-back in Clare began. Mulcahy, spearheading efforts to 
remodel the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation,
168
 travelled to the county on the 
weekend of 8 April to oversee root and branch reform of the organisation in the Clare 
constituency. The need to address the party’s weakness in Clare was given serious 
attention by a new organisation committee formed in February 1933. The plan was to 
establish four district executives in the county and to reorganise all cumainn. A 
convention was arranged for 29 April where the best means of contesting the 
upcoming local elections would be discussed.
169
 It was decided that an annual 
constituency convention should take place in Clare each April.
170
  
There was no shortage of gusto as Mulcahy addressed a constituency 
convention in Clare at the end of April. Mulcahy claimed that the party was steeped 
in the spirit of the old national organisations of the past. According to Mulcahy, ‘the 
spirit that enabled the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation’ to do the work it had done 
‘had been a combination of the spirits that came together in 1916 [to raise] the flag of 
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Irish nationality’.171 The convention called for a strong party performance in the local 
elections and the need to cooperate with the Centre Party was recognised. The 
reorganising efforts continued over the summer of 1933 as a much more dynamic 
Cumann na nGaedheal party organisation developed in Clare. In June, Longford T.D. 
Seán MacEoin addressed a meeting in Ennis which dealt with the Economic War, the 
issue that helped mobilise opposition to Fianna Fáil in the summer of 1933. MacEoin, 
disingenuously claimed that Cumann na nGaedheal had been defeated in the election 
by a well organised minority and stressed the importance of developing a strong party 
organisation. At a time when Treatyite politicians were looking enviously at the 
organisational reach of the ACA. MacEoin also called on young men to join the 
Blueshirts so as to ‘voluntarily support a State depleted of resources’.172 Burke, 
addressing the same meeting, said that Fianna Fáil’s main policy was to ‘exterminate 
Cumann na nGaedheal’. Various speakers paid tribute to the work of the Blueshirts 
before the meeting adjourned. Mulcahy returned to Clare at the end of June to oversee 
the new scheme of organisation for the Clare constituency. Mulcahy urged Cumann 
na nGaedheal supporters to ‘shake off’ their apathy and work to return the party to 
government. Numerous people attended the meeting in their blue shirts, showing the 
degree of overlap in membership between the two organisations at that time.
173
 
The evidence to hand suggests that the January 1933 election defeat 
spearheaded a revitalisation of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in county 
Clare. Perhaps the increase in activity can be put down to the fact that supporters had 
been stirred to action by the party’s stint in opposition. National efforts to reform the 
party machine must not be overlooked and as mentioned, the problems in Clare 
exercised much of the new organising committee’s thoughts. Unless it reformed, the 
party risked having no representation in Clare. Meetings in Clare were frequent 
throughout the summer of 1933 as de Valera’s Economic War gave the party a 
significant issue to take a stand on. Thomas Crowe, the new constituency organiser, 
helped to develop a live organisation throughout the county. Despite a strong vote in 
the January election, the Centre Party’s machine was quiet in Clare during 1933 with 
the result that in this constituency, most of the impetus for the establishment of Fine 
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Gael came directly from Cumann na nGaedheal. The party machine had been 
rejuvenated by the summer of 1933, displaying new structures, energy and heightened 
enthusiasm. Party meetings showed the extent to which membership overlapped with 
the Blueshirt movement. When Fine Gael was launched in September, in Clare, it 
picked up where Cumann na nGaedheal had left off in being a reenergised opposition 
party machine. 
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                                                  4 
 
    
Longford/Westmeath Cumann na nGaedheal 
 
 
 
The following chapter will examine the strength of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisation in the midland constituency of Longford/Westmeath. This constituency 
comprised the small, north-midland county of Longford nestled into the bigger county 
of Westmeath lying to its south and east. As a study of the party apparatus in a two-
county constituency, this chapter highlights some interesting points of contrast in the 
approach of the organisation within each county, and the effectiveness of party 
structures across a large and diverse geographical area. Accordingly, the chapter will 
detail the workings of the party’s structures from branch to constituency level across 
the two counties, while examining party activism between the years 1923 to 1933.  
 
Political background 
 
During the War of Independence, Longford was the most violent county outside 
Dublin or Munster, with Seán MacEoin ranking amongst the best-known guerrilla 
commanders of the period. Volunteer activity was centred on the village of Ballinalee 
in the northern portion of the county with the North Longford flying column under 
MacEoin’s command exploiting the region’s more rugged terrain effectively in their 
encounters with crown forces. Westmeath, like south Longford, played a somewhat 
more muted role in the conflict. There, farming was more prosperous, with better 
land, bigger farms, and a substantial, rural bourgeoisie having been created through 
the various land purchase schemes of the previous three decades. Dairying was 
practiced in both counties, particularly Longford, while in Westmeath there was also 
a considerable social gap between smallholders and those farmers occupying larger, 
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grazing ranches.
1
 Antagonism between the two strata was evident in many parts of 
the country, sometimes resulting in outrages being perpetrated against the occupiers 
of the larger, grazing farms (though much less prevalent than in Clare).  
It is worth pointing out that the only political organisations of significance in 
the two counties before 1917 had been those associated with Home Rule. Longford 
and Westmeath are among the five counties of ‘middle Ireland’ chosen by Michael 
Wheatley in his study of the supporting grass-root organisations of the Irish party.
2
 
The United Irish League (UIL) became in effect the local, rural, organisation of the 
Irish party and had twenty-two Longford branches in 1901.
3
 However the UIL was in 
a state of decline by the time the Great War broke out in 1914, with most believing 
that Ireland would soon achieve a form of self government given that the Home Rule 
Bill was on the statute books. Moreover, Wheatley argues that land purchase resulted 
in organisational decay as farmers became less likely to become politically active.
4
 
The Irish party failed to adapt to the changes that were taking place in Irish society 
and, as in Clare, it began to lose followers to Griffith’s monarchical Sinn Féin party 
as early as 1907. In spite of a decline in UIL activism and some defections to 
Griffith’s party, most notably William Ganly, who in 1907 was involved in the first 
Sinn Féin branch formed in the county,
5
 the Home Rule movement remained 
dominant in Longford and Westmeath. UIL membership fluctuated in both counties 
between 1904 and the outbreak of the Great War. By 1910, UIL branches nationwide 
had declined from 1,357 in 1905 to 1,076. There were fourteen affiliated branches in  
Longford and nine (including a ladies branch) in Westmeath although the actual 
number was probably higher with units slow to pay their fees.
 6
 While the UIL 
declined, another Irish party-supporting organisation flourished.
7
 There were fourteen 
Ancient Order of Hibernians branches in Longford at this time. As such, with Sinn 
Féin in decline by 1914, it seemed that numerous internal divisions posed the only 
threat to the continued dominance of the Irish party. 
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It is apparent that there was considerable annoyance at the prolonged 
postponement of Home Rule and in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising defections from 
the movement as a whole increased. After the rebellion, disappointment with 
Redmond’s party was exploited by a rejuvenated Sinn Féin, whose growth around 
this time has been described in the opening chapter. A shift from the Irish party to 
Sinn Féin was manifest in county Longford, as prominent Home Rulers like the 
McGuinness brothers Frank and Joseph switched to Sinn Féin. Indeed Joseph 
McGuinness, formerly J.P. Farrell M.P.’s right-hand man, became leader of Sinn Féin 
in north Longford.
8
 Conscription was exploited by Sinn Féin during the South 
Longford by-election of May 1917, an election which proved indicative of a 
transformation that was taking place in nationalist politics across Ireland. MacEoin 
believed that the ‘Conscription crisis’ compelled many Home Rulers, disillusioned 
with the Irish party, to join the ranks of Sinn Féin. Gradually, Sinn Féin replaced the 
Irish party as the voice of nationalist Ireland.
9
 A number of Sinn Féiners had served 
their apprenticeship in the Home Rule movement, and would take lessons learned 
from their involvement with the Irish party into Sinn Féin and the parties that 
emerged from it after the Civil War. Sinn Féin rather than the Irish party now 
represented the disaffection of a new generation of nationalists radicalised by the 
Great War, the 1916 Rising and the threat of conscription.
10
 
The 1917 South Longford by-election itself was contested on behalf of Sinn 
Féin by Joseph McGuinness, who at the time, was imprisoned in Lewes jail for his 
part in the Rising. Sinn Féin posters depicted a jailed McGuinness, clad in prison 
uniform, alongside the imaginative slogan ‘Put Him In To Get Him Out’. The result 
showed that the tide was on the way out for the Irish party. Not even the Union-Jack 
waving wives of Longford men fighting for Britain in the Great War could prevent 
the Sinn Féin candidate from emerging victorious. In the 1918 general election, 
McGuinness successfully defended his seat from the Irish party challenger, J.P. 
Farrell, founder of the nationalist Longford Leader. The relationships forged during 
the by-election campaign proved lasting and were important during the War of 
Independence. Ballinalee and the surrounding area became the scene of fierce battles 
between Seán MacEoin’s flying column and the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries 
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stationed in the county. In the ‘Battle of Ballinalee’, the IRA successfully prevented 
the Black and Tans’ effort to burn the village. In 1921 in what became known as the 
Clonfin ambush, MacEoin’s column took the surrender of two lorry loads of 
Auxiliaries.  MacEoin was strongly supported by the parish priest in Clonbroney, Fr. 
Patrick Markey. His support of MacEoin and his men attracted the unwelcome 
attention of the crown forces.
11
 
Westmeath was represented in the Dáil by staunch Republican Laurence 
Ginnell. Ginnell was appointed director of propaganda in the second Dáil and was a 
well respected figure.  Ginnell’s background was in Home Rule politics, where he 
had been regarded as a rebel for speaking out on the plight of tenant farmers in the 
late nineteenth century. He was expelled from the Irish party in 1910 and formed his 
own machine in North Westmeath in opposition to the UIL branches there. He lived 
up to the rebel tag by defecting to Sinn Féin at a time when the party had few 
followers,
12
 and brought his supporters with him.
13
 During the War of Independence 
the south Westmeath and south Roscommon volunteers co-operated as the Athlone 
brigade. Westmeath saw little republican action during the revolutionary war. Its 
terrain was unsuited to ambushes and its largest town was dominated by the British 
garrison. Even in ‘such a superficially quiet area, the Black and Tan and Auxiliary 
presence resulted in burnings and lootings’.14 Volunteers saw active service during 
the conflict and a well planned ambush at Parkwood near Moate was not so well 
executed. Volunteers intended to capture the lorries, arms and ammunition of a Black 
and Tan patrol before using the dark green and khaki uniforms of the defeated ‘tans’ 
to get inside the barracks in Moate. However, the patrol contained a larger contingent 
of crown forces than anticipated and the volunteers retreated from the ambuscade 
without suffering any casualties.
15
  
Ginnell strongly opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The high profile deputy’s 
opposition to the settlement did not stir widespread violence in county Westmeath, 
although a Free State soldier was killed in Glasson during a skirmish with anti-Treaty 
forces in the autumn of 1922.
16
 Ginnell died in the United States in 1923 and became 
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a martyr-like figure for Republicans across the two counties with numerous 
commemorative events taking place in the years that followed. In Longford, where 
the IRA had been active during the War of Independence, there was near unanimous 
support for the Treaty with most people in the county being desirous of peace after 
witnessing so much bloodshed. Longford County Council passed a motion urging 
acceptance of the settlement as did other public bodies such as the Granard rural 
district council.
17
 In Longford, the military and political leadership of the separatist 
movement, MacEoin and McGuinness, rowed in behind the deal. Joe McGuinness 
died soon after being selected as a pro-Treaty candidate for the June 1922 ‘Pact’ 
election by delegates attending a pro-Treaty convention in Edgeworthstown on 20 
May.
18
 The Treatyite General Election Committee approached his brother Frank to 
stand in his place in the Longford/Westmeath constituency.
19
 The anti-Treaty IRA 
was not a significant force in county Longford with most men who had fought with 
MacEoin following his lead. In spite of Ginnell’s opposition to the settlement, there 
was considerable support for the Treaty in Westmeath also. In December 1921, the 
secretary of the Westmeath Farmers’ Union informed MacEoin of his organisation’s 
unanimous support for the Treaty as expressed at a recent meeting in Mullingar.
20
 As 
such, there was quite a solid pro-Treaty base across the two counties and the events 
described above provide the background to efforts to establish a pro-government 
political machine in the constituency of Longford/Westmeath from 1923 onwards. 
 
Branch formation in Longford/Westmeath 
 
As has been described in previous chapters, the August 1923 election got in the 
way of efforts to bed down firm Cumann na nGaedheal roots in the constituencies in 
the aftermath of the party’s official launch in April. That was especially true in 
Longford/Westmeath where Longford was energetically organised in early 1924 
while Westmeath had to wait until 1925 before Cumann na nGaedheal properly took 
root. This reflects part of a theme that will emerge in this chapter: the 
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Longford/Westmeath Cumann na nGaedheal organisation rarely acted as a single, 
constituency unit. Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation behaved more or less 
independently in each county in spite of the party’s official organisational structures 
and rules. For example, in considering a request for an advance on his election 
expenses from defeated Longford candidate Frank McGuinness’s election agent, the 
Standing Committee decided that it could only deal with Longford as part of the 
constituency of Longford/Westmeath. As such, the committee summoned a joint 
meeting of its candidates across the constituency to discuss the matter.
21
 Early in the 
party’s life, there was scant evidence of organisational unity between the two counties 
comprising this constituency. 
 As in Clare, Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation in Longford/Westmeath was 
patchy in August 1923. That is not to say that branches were not formed; some were 
in the big towns, but they were established hurriedly and would need to be worked on 
after the election. Labour, anti-Treatyites, and the Farmers’ Union were all better 
organised than the government party. In July a branch of Cumann na nGaedheal was 
launched in Longford town where ‘a fairly large attendance of townspeople’ gathered 
in the courthouse for the purpose of establishing a cumann.
22
 Mr. Michael O’Hara, 
party organiser for Longford/Westmeath,
23
 outlined to the assembled gathering the 
objects of Cumann na nGaedheal by stating that the party wished to ‘combine the 
divergent elements of the nation in a common bond of citizenship in harmony with 
national security’.24 To applause, the Cosgrave government was praised for their 
efforts before branch officers were elected. Steps were taken to form branches in 
‘Granard, Ballinalee, and other central districts in the county’.25 By 29 July Cumann 
na nGaedheal had appeared in Lanesboro in south County Longford. At an after-Mass 
Cumann na nGaedheal election meeting in the town, various speakers including 
businessman P.J. McCrann, formerly active in the local Gaelic League,
26
  boasted of 
their exploits during the War of Independence. 
27
 Clearly the Treatyites of County 
Longford were keen to identify with the revolution, reflecting the residual influence 
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of it in shaping their political beliefs post independence. It is clear that these meetings 
in the summer of 1923 had more of an electoral purpose than an organisational one. 
Cumann na nGaedheal was still a work in progress and of paramount importance now 
was securing a vote of confidence from the public rather than bedding down a strong 
branch structure. 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s appearance in county Westmeath was somewhat 
belated. A Westmeath Examiner editorial around the time of the party’s launch in 
April 1923 stated that the old political organisations belonged to the past and warned 
voters to exercise caution when turning to the new ones that were emerging.
28
 It 
would be August before the people of Westmeath were introduced to the new 
government party’s machine. By 20 July, county Westmeath was allocated its own 
organiser with the appointment of Laurence Kelly.
29
 On Sunday 5 August a Mullingar 
town branch of Cumann na nGaedheal was established, the first cumann to appear in 
the county. This was a more significant affair than the launch in Longford town had 
been and was attended by Kevin O’Higgins. Echoing the statements of party leaders, 
the meeting heard that Cumann na nGaedheal wanted each man, regardless of his 
class, to realise that he was first and foremost an Irishman. In his speech, O’Higgins 
summarised the events of the previous few years before declaring that his main 
objection to the anti-Treaty party was their attempt to dictate their views to the 
majority.
30
 A priest, Fr. Macken was elected president of the new branch. As in Clare, 
numerous cumainn in Longford/Westmeath reserved a lead role for the local 
clergyman. Before independence the Church was the strongest organisation in 
provincial Ireland and priests played a significant role as community leaders, placing 
themselves at the heart of clubs and societies.
31
 As witnessed in the previous chapter, 
priests often played a role in advising visiting land commissioners. 
Further meetings took place in the run-up to the election. In Athlone, a 
burgeoning Cumann na nGaedheal branch was chaired by solicitor H.J. Walker. 
Walker presided at a successful rally in the town on 19 August.
32
 In Kinnegad, the 
local priest presided at an election meeting, while the Mullingar town cumann 
organised a great rally in the town on 21 August. The Mullingar rally proved quite a 
                                                          
28
 Westmeath Examiner, 28 Apr. 1923. 
29
 Chief organiser’s report, 20 July 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1). 
30
 Westmeath Examiner, 11 Aug. 1923. 
31
 Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish party, p. 70. 
32
 Irish Independent, 20 Aug. 1923. 
129 
 
spectacle. A motor lorry decorated with tricolour flags was fitted out as a platform 
from which Cumann na nGaedheal speakers could address the townspeople. 
33
 P.W. 
Shaw, the Mullingar-based Cumann na nGaedheal candidate, stated that voters would 
choose between ordered government and anarchy, while reiterating that Cumann na 
nGaedheal stood for the interests of every class of the people. The Shaw family were 
well connected and close to the clergy. In pre-independence politics, Wheatley 
describes the Shaws as having attempted to remain neutral within the divided Irish 
party machine of north Westmeath.
34
 On 22 August, an application from the 
constituency for a grant of £50 was accepted by the Standing Committee, but with the 
recommendation that a greater effort should be made to raise funds locally.
35
 Funding 
the election campaign proved quite a challenge for the fledgling organisation 
although greater prudence was displayed by party workers in the midland 
constituency than was the case in Clare. 
As in Clare, the Farmers’ Union was well organised in both Longford and 
Westmeath with active branches in most parishes and regular meetings. Anti-
Treatyite activism was less evident in Westmeath than in Longford, suggesting that 
the biggest threat to the Cumann na nGaedheal vote across the entire constituency, as 
elsewhere, was the actual fragmentation of pro-Treaty support. Of course, the 
decision of General Seán MacEoin to concentrate on his career in the army rather 
than seek re-election was a further blow the party could ill afford.
36
 In June 1922 
MacEoin won over 10,000 first preference votes. Much of that personal vote was now 
lost to the government party. In the event, Cumann na nGaedheal’s performance in 
the 1923 election did not compare favourably with that of pro-Treaty Sinn Féin in 
1922. Despite Longford/Westmeath increasing from a four-seat to a five-seat 
constituency, the anti-Treatyites almost doubled their vote, in the process of gaining a 
seat, while the new Treatyite party actually managed to lose a seat.  
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    Figure 1. First preference vote obtained by successful Longford/Westmeath candidates 1923.
37
 
Candidate Party First preference vote 
Conor Byrne Sinn Féin 5, 299 
Patrick Walter Shaw Cumann na nGaedheal 5,147 
John Lyons Independent Labour 4,452 
Patrick J. McKenna Farmers’ Party 3, 274 
James Joseph Killane Sinn Féin 2, 757 
 
As can be gauged from figure 1 above, feelings had changed over the course of 
the Civil War in Longford/Westmeath. The mood had switched from one of 
overwhelming support for the Treaty to mild approval and a desire, especially in 
county Westmeath, to simply return to bread-and-butter politics. As in Clare, farming 
and labour interests each succeeded in winning a seat. With no big vote winner like 
MacEoin in the field to share out a large surplus, the Cumann na nGaedheal party had 
been humbled in Longford/Westmeath. Frank McGuinness narrowly failed to retain 
the seat he had won as a Treatyite Sinn Féiner in 1922 but would play an active role 
in the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in Longford throughout the 1920s, and 
eventually served on the party’s Ard Comhairle or National Executive. 
 
Seán Scanlon arrives in Longford 
 
Seán Scanlon, a Cumann na nGaedheal organiser during the 1923 election, was 
despatched to Longford in early 1924. He worked throughout the year to build up a 
strong organisation in the county and appeared in every corner of Longford, 
establishing cumainn, arranging meetings and writing press reports. Scanlon brought 
a rigorous work ethic to the task of organising branches and his efforts were 
successful as a vibrant Cumann na nGaedheal organisation emerged in county 
Longford in early 1924. By mid March, meetings to establish branches had been held 
with varying degrees of success in most parishes in Longford. This was done in a 
systematic way, usually on a Sunday after Mass, and would be advertised well in 
advance. Longford town, being the first area organised, was usually the venue for 
county executive meetings in this period, although later they would rotate around 
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various centres in the county such as Ballinalee and Edgeworthstown.
38
 In March, the 
Longford town branch organised a St. Patrick’s night banquet and dance for 300 
people in the Temperance Hall. Originally, somewhat naively, it was hoped Cosgrave 
would be in attendance.
39
 In the end the event went ahead without the President and 
showed that the organisation could have a purpose besides holding political meetings. 
Part of Scanlon’s success, however, lay in his ability to dangle the prospect of 
patronage in front of prospective party members. Moreover, the organiser’s efforts in 
Longford correspond with Séamus Hughes’s expansion scheme outlined by John 
Regan.
40
 Such tactics did not curry support with the party leadership.
41
 Indeed, 
Scanlon’s antics in Longford piled pressure on the government. Joe McGrath, 
answering on behalf of Minister Patrick Hogan, had to deny in the Dáil that land 
claims filed at Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters would receive first attention after 
the Farmers’ Party alerted him to claims made by Cumann na nGaedheal organisers 
in Longford. McGrath’s response made it clear that party members would not receive 
preferential treatment and that ‘all applications of uneconomic holders and landless 
men will be considered on their merits in the re-distribution of untenanted land, 
irrespective of whether they belong to any political organisation or not’ .42 However, 
Scanlon continued undeterred. At a meeting of the Killoe branch of Cumann na 
nGaedheal on 6 April 1924, Scanlon again used the prospect of patronage as an 
inducement to join. He told the meeting that people who wanted to see the young 
landless men benefit from the break-up of the grazing ranches should join Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
43
 Cumann na nGaedheal leaders were not as attuned as their party 
workers to the potency of promised patronage as a means of building support.
44
 By 
then, branches had also appeared in Clonguish and Drumlish, with meetings called to 
organise cumainn in Ballymahon, Purth and Colmcille. The Farmers’ Union remained 
active at this time, while Sinn Féin branches met sporadically across the constituency.  
In April 1924 Scanlon published the details of estates that were soon to be 
acquired in county Longford and advised that parishes not yet organised should avail 
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of his services.
45
 Again the implication was clear; party members’ claims would 
receive first attention. Overall Scanlon’s efforts were successful with a large number 
of branches sending delegates to the county executive meeting in Clonbroney on 4 
May. At this time the County Longford executive usually met once a month. It is 
unclear from the reports of these meetings if they took place in the type of austere 
surroundings of the Cork city executive. De Róiste noted in his diary that the Cork 
executive met in the whitewashed ground floor of a back room in Cook Street that 
reminded him of revolutionary days.
46
 In Longford, notices of upcoming meetings 
continued to stress the need to inform the organiser of the land claims in the area 
covered by each cumann. Scanlon, in targeting new members, wanted them to believe 
that the local Cumann na nGaedheal branch was an essential part of the land-division 
process, although, as we have seen, this ran contrary to the views of the government 
and party hierarchy. In July Scanlon claimed personal credit for having advance 
notice of lands to be distributed in county Longford, again reinforcing an image of an 
organisation capable of divvying up the spoils of office among friends and 
supporters.
47
 This approach left Scanlon open to criticism when patronage was not 
forthcoming, and as time passed, party members in Longford, as in other 
constituencies, did express disappointment that, if anything, they were disadvantaged 
in their dealings with the state by virtue of their membership of the government party. 
Scanlon’s actions risked losing active recruits to disillusionment when promised 
preferment was unforthcoming. Scanlon was the consummate politician, making 
representations on behalf of members and cumainn and in September 1924 he was 
part of a deputation to the Minister for Agriculture Patrick Hogan, where he no doubt 
pressed the land issues then prevalent in county Longford.
48
  
 Fifteen branches from across Longford were represented at July’s county 
executive meeting in Longford town as the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation 
continued to grow. Reports of meetings sometimes carried criticism of the Cumann 
na nGaedheal government. A meeting in August drew sharp condemnation from 
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Frank McGuinness of the government’s decision to reduce old age pensions.49 Such 
criticism was also evident in Cumann na nGaedheal branches in other constituencies.  
All the while Scanlon was making inroads in county Longford, nothing 
happened in Westmeath. No organiser worked that county during 1924. Again, it 
seems strange that there could be such discrepancies existing in one constituency. 
Why Scanlon was busy organising cumainn in Longford and nobody fulfilled the 
same function in Westmeath is unclear. It seems that the blame for Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s disappointing election performance was shouldered by Longford given 
that Shaw came from Westmeath. This probably explains the party’s decision to focus 
its energies on organising County Longford, while a degree of complacency seems to 
have crept in within Westmeath Cumann na nGaedheal. In addition, there was a 
greater degree of political fragmentation in County Westmeath, with John Lyons 
representing a Labour tradition there and graziers gravitating towards the Farmer’s 
Party. Any basic Cumann na nGaedheal branch structure that had existed in 
Westmeath during the election had disintegrated by mid 1924. Interestingly, the July 
meeting of the Longford executive decided that efforts to establish a constituency 
committee should be left in the hands of Scanlon.
50
 This suggests Scanlon bore some 
responsibility for the failure to organise Westmeath, though the lack of party records 
make it difficult to establish why Longford was focussed on. This is appears even 
more unusual given that in 1924 Cumann na nGaedheal was making great progress in 
neighbouring counties Offaly and Roscommon, but was dormant in county 
Westmeath.
51
 In January 1924 R.J. Purcell was busily organising branches in 
neighbouring Roscommon where a concerted effort was then being made to extend 
the party’s machine.52  
Despite Cumann na nGaedheal’s lack of structures in Westmeath, it enjoyed the 
support of the county’s main newspapers. Both the Westmeath Examiner, and more 
particularly the Westmeath Independent, gave favourable coverage to the party in 
their columns. The November 1925 by-elections in Cork Borough, Cork East, 
Donegal, Dublin South and Mayo North seem to have spiked the two papers’ interest 
in Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation in Westmeath. A December 1924 post 
mortem on the by-elections in the Irish Independent reported the Westmeath 
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Independent’s strong criticism of the party’s approach to organisation.53 A November 
1924 editorial in the Westmeath Independent was tantamount to an appeal to Cumann 
na nGaedheal to become better organised in the county. The editorial stated that 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s policy was that of Collins and Griffith and reminded people 
of their duty to ‘subscribe to this splendid organisation which is doing so much to 
help the country. All genuine supporters of the Treaty should become members’.54 
Critical of Cumann na nGaedheal’s performance in the by-elections, the Westmeath 
Independent welcomed the formation of J.J. Walsh’s new Organising Committee. On 
6 December the paper’s editorial stated that there should be a branch in every parish 
and criticised the manner in which the cumainn had lapsed in Westmeath since the 
1923 election. The editorial speculated that there was not a single active branch of 
Cumann na nGaedheal in the county, a conclusion that was accurate.
55
 The 
Westmeath Independent remained supportive of the party throughout its existence as 
noted by the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in neighbouring Roscommon in 
1933. Roscommon’s county secretary urged Cumann na nGaedhealers to buy the 
Westmeath Independent so as ‘to support those papers who support us’.56  
In January 1925, it was the turn of the Westmeath Examiner to criticise Cumann 
na nGaedheal’s failure to maintain and build an organisation in the county. This 
newspaper, like the Longford Leader and Westmeath Independent, had supported the 
Irish party but now favoured the Free State. An opinion piece by former Irish party 
M.P. William O’Malley in early 1925 showed that it was more concerned with 
practical politics than questions that remained unanswered by the revolution. 
O’Malley praised the Cosgrave administration, but lamented the fact most of its 
leadership was associated with the defeat of the Irish party in 1918. The piece 
speculated as to why Cumann na nGaedheal had not ‘caught on’ to the extent that had 
been expected by most observers. O’Malley proposed the establishment of a new 
Conservative party in Ireland and stated that Cumann na nGaedheal’s very name 
proved a hindrance as most people could not ‘pronounce it or understand exactly 
what it means’.57 As these editorials suggest, the government party had made little 
effort to organise in Westmeath even though it ought to have been fertile territory for 
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Cumann na nGaedheal organisers. In neighbouring counties the party machine was 
strong with regular meetings and occasional social functions.
58
 
Cumann na nGaedheal remained active in Longford, with live branches and 
members prepared to speak out on the issues of the day. Meetings discussed national 
and local problems while supporters did not shy away from criticising the 
performance of the government. Reports from various branch meetings indicate that 
unpopular measures were open to criticism. One such example was the cumann in 
Clonbroney where Fr. Markey was a long-standing branch president. It passed 
resolutions calling for a drainage bill, preference in land division for men who fought 
in the War of Independence, and criticised the decision to reduce old age pensions. 
59
 
Most branches in Longford were critical of the reduction in the old age pension, with 
some members suggesting the salaries of higher paid officials could have been 
reduced instead. As for the party’s main opponent, in March 1924 Sinn Féin was 
quite unorganised in the constituency with no affiliated branch in Longford and 
thirteen in Westmeath, mostly in the north of the county.
60
  
 
Westmeath reorganised: 1925 
 
More than a year passed between Seán Scanlon’s efforts to mobilise supporters 
in Longford before Westmeath was hit by an organisational drive that finally saw the 
establishment of cumainn right across the county. In March the Mullingar cumann 
came back to life. At a meeting in the town on 30 March, Shaw asked his constituents 
to ‘rally to our assistance and to form branches of Cumann na nGaedheal in every 
town and village’. New members would be sought after-Mass the following Sunday 
after which efforts to form branches in other parts of the county would be made.
61
 On 
5 April Shaw addressed the after-Mass meeting. As occurred elsewhere, Shaw said 
that members of the Farmers’ Union or Labour could join Cumann na nGaedheal 
without prejudicing their free action. Cumann na nGaedheal was a national, pro-
Treaty party. One of Shaw’s constituents, Mrs Daly of Tyrrellspass, mother of one of 
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the executed Connacht Rangers mutineers in 1916, was also in attendance. Shaw 
seems to have helped her obtain a grant.
62
 On 11 April the Westmeath Independent 
announced that Archdeacon Thomas Langan would preside at a meeting to establish a 
branch of Cumann na nGaedheal in Moate. The advertisement went on to invite all 
those interested in ‘the stability and future of Ireland’ to attend.63 On the day of the 
meeting, Langan was elected president of the cumann and a committee was formed. 
The Archdeacon was a native of county Longford who had been educated in St. Mel’s 
college Longford before being ordained in Rome in 1878. Langan taught in St. Mel’s 
before transferring from Abbeylara in north county Longford to Moate as parish 
priest in 1913.
64
 He had been active in the UIL and the Gaelic League while in 
Abbeylara and Moate.
65
 By mid-May, Cumann na nGaedheal had a branch in Athlone 
town with a committee in place by the end of the month.
66
 Again the local clergy took 
a leading role on the committee. A cumann in Ballynacargy in north Westmeath was 
revived at this time with branch secretary Thomas O’Regan, seeking new members in 
June.
67
 Mullingar’s revived branch also sought out new members at this time while 
Joseph McEvoy, cumann secretary, arranged for a meeting of delegates of each 
affiliated branch to form a county executive for Westmeath.
68
 Further south, it was 
the Moate cumann that became the focus of the burgeoning south Westmeath 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. A convention representative of South 
Westmeath Cumann na nGaedheal was held in Moate in October with P.W. Shaw and 
Liam Burke in attendance. Burke, possibly exaggerating, claimed that there were over 
800 branches of Cumann na nGaedheal nationwide (see chapter two), and that many 
new cumainn had been formed recently. A temporary executive for the district was 
set up, as the organisation was extended in the area.  
The drive to organise Cumann na nGaedheal in county Westmeath was part of 
the wider efforts, discussed in chapters two and three, to improve the organisation in 
constituencies where it remained weak. In November 1925 Liam Burke was able to 
inform the Standing Committee of thirty-six new cumainn that had recently been 
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formed nationwide.
69
 Burke further informed the committee that there were three 
organisers employed in the task of forming new branches, and that successful public 
meetings had taken place in previously problematic areas such as Mullingar, in 
county Westmeath. Cosgrave addressed the meeting in Mullingar where he had been 
escorted to the podium by a band before making a speech that touched mainly on 
taxation and trade.
70
 During this period of organisational renewal Seán Scanlon and 
Archdeacon Langan of Longford/Westmeath sat on the Cumann na nGaedheal 
National Executive. Scanlon was as vocal as ever, pressing Minister Patrick Hogan 
for information relating to the division of the Bond estate in Longford. He also 
succeeded in securing agreement from Blythe that new grants were necessary for the 
relief of distress in rural Ireland during the winter months.
71
 
November brought a flurry of Cumann na nGaedheal organising activity in 
Westmeath. Branches were subsequently formed in Ballymore, Castledaly, 
Drumraney, Mount Temple, Tubberclair, Kilbeggan and Horsleap while steps were 
taken to form cumainn in areas such as Ballynahowen, Tang, and Toher. The newly 
formed south Westmeath executive was content with the organisational progress 
made. A meeting in Moate in November was attended by former Irish party M.P. 
William O’Malley and by Burke. Trade was discussed at the meeting and the mutual 
dependence of Britain and Ireland was noted. Langan also told the meeting Cumann 
na nGaedheal was ‘not an organisation for jobbery’.72 Joseph McCormack, party 
organiser, emphasised Cumann na nGaedheal’s democratic credentials while 
addressing supporters in Athlone. In an interesting contrast with the approach of Seán 
Scanlon a year earlier, McCormack did use the organisation’s support of the 
government as an inducement to join, but crucially, did not suggest it would use that 
power to further the interests of its own supporters. Instead, McCormack suggested 
branches could discuss local matters and bring grievances to a level in the party 
whereby leaders could be alerted. In McCormack’s view of the political system he 
was part of, members of Cumann na nGaedheal had an opportunity to shape policy by 
virtue of their support of the government. In Scanlon’s view, members could benefit 
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from their association with the government party by receiving preferential treatment. 
It would seem that organisers despatched to the country in 1925, in the wake of the 
National Group’s secession and the rise of O’Higgins and Liam Burke within 
Cumann na nGaedheal, used quite different methods than did the class of 1923/24,
73
 
when Séamus Hughes was general secretary. In spite of McCormack’s stance on the 
issue, there is evidence that some branches took it upon themselves to forward the 
land claims of their own members to Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters in the hope 
of gaining an advantage. However, it is unclear how successful the Tubberclair 
cumainn was in forwarding on the claims of ‘deserving members’ of its branch.74  
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s zenith in microcosm  
 
Cumann na nGaedheal was probably at its most active across 
Longford/Westmeath during 1925 and 1926. As stated in previous chapters, this 
corresponds with what might be regarded as the peak of Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
organisational reach across the Free State. As the organisation was growing in most 
parts of Westmeath, it remained strong in Longford, particularly so in the County’s 
main town. Edgeworthstown and Ballinalee in north Longford, areas that had been 
associated with IRA activity during the War of Independence, were also Cumann na 
nGaedheal strongholds. Interestingly, in 1925 the chairman of the Longford town 
branch travelled to Dublin on a fact-finding mission of sorts and on his return, 
updated members on the way cumainn around the rest of the country operated.
75
 In 
April, the Longford town branch advertised for new members, and asked supporters 
of the government to enrol after Mass on Sunday 12 April.
76
 As is true of any 
organisation, those involved in Cumann na nGaedheal were keen to see it grow.  
While branches were active across county Longford, plans were made to 
organise in those few places where cumainn had failed to take root. In June 1925 
after-Mass meetings were organised to that end in Legan, Carrickedmond, Ardagh 
and Moydow. It seems that of these meetings, only Legan and Carrickedmond were 
successful. However, there was a historical precedent for the lack of activism in 
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Ardagh and Moydow, given that even the UIL had struggled to stir the people of 
Ardagh, with a delegate to that organisation’s south Longford executive meeting in 
1914 stating that ‘it would take an earthquake shock to move them into a proper 
position at the present time’. 77 A Sinn Féin branch in Ardagh had been chaired by the 
parish priest Fr. Guinan,
78
 later pro-Treaty and leader of a Cumann na nGaedheal club 
by 1932. A cursory glance at the UIL National Directory minute book suggests too 
that north Longford was much more of a stronghold of that organisation than the 
southern part of the county.
79
 On 18 July 1925 the push to increase membership 
continued. An advertisement in the Longford Leader stated ‘our country is ours for 
the making. Join your parish branch of Cumann na nGaedheal’.80 Cumann na 
nGaedheal marketing in county Longford during 1925 mirrored the language used in 
Westmeath, and was evidently placing much less emphasis on the availability of 
patronage than had been the case in 1924. 
In 1926, Cumann na nGaedheal activism in county Westmeath was, if anything, 
even more pronounced than in Longford where things had quietened somewhat. 
South Westmeath was now the most active part of the constituency machinery. On 16 
January, following the move to direct cumann representation, branches were asked by 
the district executive to select delegates to the annual convention.
81
 In the following 
weeks, various branches in the district met as requested and selected their delegates. 
In addition, the south Westmeath executive submitted two resolutions for debate. 
Both resolutions reflected the rural background of the organisation in south 
Westmeath, with one calling for the swift passage of the 1926 Land Act, and the other 
asking that the government immediately begin work on schemes submitted under the 
Arterial Drainage Act.
82
 Cumann na nGaedheal branches in Moate, Tubberclair, 
Mount Temple and Athlone continued to meet regularly and there was an AGM of 
the Tyrellspass branch in March. Occasional meetings took place in Drumraney while 
a new cumann was established in Clonmacnoise on 13 March.
83
 Branches were less 
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active further north, although the Mullingar cumann did meet occasionally. In 
addition, the north Westmeath executive met soon after the party’s annual convention 
in May. Addressing that meeting, Shaw told members that criticism of the 
government at the conference had been justified and that he hoped ministers would 
now take the need for greater economy in public spending more seriously.
84
 It seems 
the Westmeath rank-and-file were more amenable to the need for retrenchment than 
were party activists in Longford.  
In contrast to what was evident in Clare, Fianna Fáil branches were quick to 
spread throughout Longford/Westmeath during 1926. However, Cumann na 
nGaedheal remained well drilled in the constituency and it more than held its own in 
the summer of 1926. Nationally, as documented in chapter two, Cumann na 
nGaedheal did not make life easy for itself in this period as internal policy differences 
over tariffs became apparent, as did the sorry nature of the party’s finances. Branches 
in Edgeworthstown and Clonguish remained very active as did Longford town and 
the cumainn covering Clonbroney (at times the parish had two branches with a 
separate one in the village of Ballinalee). These were the most consistent areas of 
Cumann na nGaedheal activism in Longford, with cumainn in other parishes going 
into hibernation for lengthy periods. Clonbroney Cumann na nGaedheal continued to 
call for a restoration of the old age pension while, unsurprisingly given its role in the 
revolutionary war, the branch also called for compensation to be paid to those who 
suffered ill health as a result of the War of Independence. It also criticised the 
amounts of money being paid by the Land Commission for ranches.
85
 Various 
attempts to start cumainn in Ardagh and Moydow were unsuccessful though branches 
of the Farmers’ Union and eventually Fianna Fáil took root there.86 Cumann na 
nGaedheal was active in the neighbouring counties of Leitrim and Roscommon in 
1926.
87
  In May, a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Tulsk Co. Roscommon called 
on the Land Commission not to send any migrants as there was not enough land for 
them. Opposition to migrants in the receiving counties and elements within the party 
saw it as a means of protecting the status of the commercial farming class.
88
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Fianna Fáil could devote its energy to organisation in 1926 without the worry of 
an impending general election and laid strong roots across the constituency. However, 
the Cumann na nGaedheal machine was as robust as it had ever been in 
Longford/Westmeath and again, the main threat facing it in the June 1927 election 
came from the sheer number of broadly pro-Treaty organisations in existence. 
 
Mixed fortunes in two general elections  
 
De Valera addressed supporters gathered in the county Hall, Mullingar, on New 
Year’s day 1927. There, the extra-parliamentary opposition leader outlined his party’s 
programme while criticising aspects of government policy and the cost to the 
taxpayer of the Governor General, an election issue for Fianna Fáil.
89
 However, most 
towns and villages across Longford/Westmeath now had working branches of 
Cumann na nGaedheal. Most of these branches were fully functioning. A routine 
meeting of the Tang branch took place in March. New members were enrolled and 
the cumainn affiliation fees were forwarded to headquarters.
90
 The other new party 
established in 1926 was the National League and it, like the Farmers’ Union, found 
fertile territory to exploit in Westmeath. Branches of the National League began to 
appear sporadically, with a meeting in Kilbeggan being particularly well attended.
91
 
In Longford/Westmeath, the consequences of the failure of the party hierarchy to 
reach a broad agreement with parties to its right would be felt quite acutely. Sinn Féin 
had virtually collapsed in the constituency with the foundation of Fianna Fáil leaving 
this party with a monopoly on anti-Treaty support that Cumann na nGaedheal did not 
enjoy with regards to Treaty support.  
In April, the Cumann na nGaedheal campaign stepped up a gear with meetings 
in Rochfortbridge and Milltownpass. In Milltownpass, the secretary of the north 
Westmeath district committee, Joseph McEvoy, reminded those in attendance that 
Cumann na nGaedheal had virtually no organisation in 1923 yet managed to return 
the strongest party to the Dáil. McEvoy said they now had strong branches across the 
constituency where important national and local matters could be discussed and this 
would prove telling in the election. It was revealed at the meeting that an organiser 
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would soon visit inactive parts of Westmeath. 
92
 Shaw addressed numerous meetings 
in the county and remained popular with Cumann na nGaedheal supporters in 
Westmeath. Various meetings in the less well organised north Westmeath heard calls 
for the establishment of new branches and lists of prospective members were drawn 
up.
93
 Cumann na nGaedheal in south Westmeath remained well marshalled, matching 
Fianna Fáil activism in the spring of 1927. The Athlone cumann met regularly while 
the south Westmeath branches of Tubberclair, Mount Temple, Castledaly, Rosemount 
and Moate remained active.
94
 An Athlone cumann meeting heard that party central 
funds were to be used for general organisation and that each constituency had to 
manage its own spending. As noted, this was a break with the procedure in 1923 (see 
chapters two and three)  
The three district executives of Longford/ Westmeath continued to act more or 
less independently. Candidate selection was the one area where cooperation was 
necessary. The Longford/Westmeath selection convention took place on 1 May and 
was attended by 120 delegates from across the constituency.
95
 Various speakers at the 
selection convention expressed strong opposition to the Farmers’ Union which of 
course had recently spurned Cumann na nGaedheal’s advances.96 Attacks on the 
Farmers’ Union were part and parcel of Cumann na nGaedheal’s belief that only a 
non class based party, with the strength to represent and express the interests of the 
whole community, could govern in the Irish Free State.
97
 To compare, the Fianna Fáil 
convention was attended by 118 delegates indicating that the main parties were quite 
evenly matched in the midland constituency.
98
 There was resentment within Athlone 
Cumann na nGaedheal that the convention had not selected a standard bearer from 
that end of the constituency. Canon Crowe of the Athlone cumann complained that 
Athlone was an important branch representing 14,000 people and that ‘their right to a 
representative in the Dáil had been ignored at the Longford-Westmeath convention’.99  
The Cumann na nGaedheal ticket did seem to lack balance with Shaw representing 
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Mullingar, M.J. Connolly Longford and P.J. McCrann (whom we met earlier) the 
grey area between south Longford and north Westmeath. Candidate selection was 
democratic within Cumann na nGaedheal with little role for the party hierarchy, as 
lamented by Kevin O’Higgins,100 so the very public nature of disquiet in Athlone was 
somewhat unjustified. Athlone delegates could have gone to the convention better 
organised.
101
 However, the failure to select a balanced party ticket betrays a lack of 
electoral strategy within the Longford/Westmeath organisation. McCrann was based 
in the same end of the constituency as Connolly and Shaw while a candidate in 
Athlone would be better placed to maximise the party vote in that important urban 
centre. The Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in other constituencies seem to have 
placed a much greater emphasis on electoral strategy, sometimes calling constituency 
meetings to discuss matters of approach.
102
  
Surprisingly, the Cumann na nGaedheal election campaign was somewhat staid 
given the dense cumainn network developed in the constituency over the previous 
two years. In Longford, the organisation only became thoroughly active in election 
work after the selection convention, with after-Mass meetings taking place in 
Kilashee, Clondra and Newtownforbes in early May.
103
  The mood of what was an 
exciting election campaign nationwide was captured in Ballinalee on 22 May where 
three rival after-Mass meetings of Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil and the 
Farmers’ Union took place simultaneously. It was early summer, though the 
temperature was high in Ballinalee on that day for political reasons. De Valera came 
to Longford as he crisscrossed the nation on his party’s first election campaign. 
Government leaders also toured the country with Kevin O’Higgins making an 
appearance in Longford on 23 May. One of the Cumann na nGaedheal candidates, 
M.J. Connolly, organised a platform for O’Higgins to speak from. From his podium 
at the top of Dublin Street, at the junction with Ballymahon Street and Main Street, 
O’Higgins addressed a large, though somewhat subdued gathering according to the 
Roscommon Herald.
104
 O’Higgins was a popular choice of speaker and the frequency 
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of his trips to other regions damaged the party in his own Dublin county 
constituency.
105
 He addressed a similar rally in Athlone on 1 June. 
106
 
The results of the June 1927 election were as disappointing for Cumann na 
nGaedheal in Longford/Westmeath as they had been around the country. Fianna Fáil 
held the two seats that had been won by anti-Treaty Sinn Féin in 1923. In spite of 
having a better organisation than at the previous general election, the government 
party still only managed to win one seat in Longford/Westmeath.  
 
    Figure 2. Vote obtained by successful Longford/Westmeath candidates June 1927. 107 
Candidate Party First preference vote 
P. W. Shaw Cumann na nGaedheal 6, 094 
Henry Broderick Labour 4, 282 
Hugh Garahan Farmers’ Party 2, 623 
M. J. Kennedy Fianna Fáil 2, 504 
James Victory Fianna Fáil 2, 557 
 
As explained in chapter two, the organisation was given a swift opportunity for 
atonement as a snap election in September followed the assassination of Kevin 
O’Higgins. In Longford/Westmeath, Cumann na nGaedheal again selected three 
candidates to Fianna Fáil’s four, with Owen Dolan replacing P.J. McCrann as the 
party’s third standard bearer. The September election was more of a two-horse race as 
smaller parties simply did not have the resources to fight two general elections in 
such a short period of time. As such, the Cumann na nGaedheal party now had an 
opportunity to monopolise the broader pro-Treaty vote. Nine Longford branches sent 
delegates to the selection convention in Mullingar. As usual Edgeworthstown and 
Newtownforbes were represented, although Ardagh was also able to send a delegate 
showing that a branch had finally taken root there.
108
 Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
national campaign for the September election was more robust than in June with 
strong attacks on the opposition and more advertisements appearing in the national 
and local newspapers as part of the party’s recruitment of the O’Kennedy-Brindley 
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advertising agency. One such advert attacked ‘empty formulas and emptier 
pledges’,109 while Cosgrave was much more prominent in Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
literature than he had been in any previous election. Fianna Fáil too was susceptible 
to negative campaigning, with one of its adverts portraying Cumann na nGaedheal as 
a party of ‘Freemasons and West Britons’.110 Lemass had first propounded his 
‘Masonic Scare’ in 1925. In reality, Republican dreams of a Masonic conspiracy in 
cabinet were as grounded in reality as the 1932 ‘Red Scare’ directed at Fianna Fáil.111 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s campaign again relied on public meetings with 
prominent speakers. Cosgrave and McGilligan were due to address a meeting in the 
Market Square in Longford town but were replaced by Professor Michael Tierney 
when they could not fulfil the engagement.
112
 Tierney was interrupted numerous 
times during his address but was able to complete the meeting successfully. Longford 
voters were asked to vote for ‘honesty’ and ‘truth’ while Frank McGuinness repeated 
the slogan on one of the party’s more bellicose pamphlets by stating that Cumann na 
nGaedheal had taken the oath to save the country whereas Fianna Fáil had taken it to 
change the government. Longford Cumann na nGaedheal printed a leaflet, instructing 
supporters to vote ‘1 Connolly, 2 Dolan, 3 Shaw’.113 Another handbill was printed 
showing voters ‘The money Mr. De Valera cost Ireland’114 as the party sought to 
counter Fianna Fáil attacks on the cost of the Governor General.
115
 In Westmeath 
similar sentiments were aired at public meetings in this high stakes election. 
Addressing a Westmeath county executive meeting, Shaw acknowledged that the 
organising efforts for the previous election were still paying dividends in 
September.
116
  
The results in September were much more encouraging for Cumann na 
nGaedheal. M.J. Connolly from Longford recorded a strong vote to join Shaw as a 
Cumann na nGaedheal T.D. for Longford/Westmeath. However, the seat had been 
gained from the Farmers’ Party, a natural ally of the government. Fianna Fáil also 
increased its vote as it retained its two seats. Cumann na nGaedheal had shown 
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resilience nationwide, while the seat gain in Longford/Westmeath showed that it had 
made progress there. However, the party had simply held its own with Fianna Fáil 
and not as such made a significant breakthrough. 
 
   Figure 3. First preference vote of successful Longford/Westmeath candidates September 1927.
117
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
P. W Shaw Cumann na nGaedheal 6,814 
M. J. Kennedy Fianna Fáil 4, 244 
M. J. Connolly Cumann na nGaedheal 4, 044 
Henry Broderick Labour 4, 047 
J. J. Killane Fianna Fáil 3, 434 
 
Post-election blues  
 
The two general elections of 1927 had drained the parties’ of energy and funds. 
There was a definite cooling off in political activism after the September contest. 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s organisation in county Longford remained quiet for some 
time after the election, while Fianna Fáil established some new branches in the 
autumn.
118
 At a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Clonbroney in November, Deputy 
Connolly thanked the branch for their help during the election while Frank 
McGuinness pointed out that this was the first time the party had won a seat in county 
Longford.
119
 The Ballinalee cumann held its AGM on 11 December. Father Markey, 
branch president, called on members to become regular readers of The Freeman, the 
Cumann na nGaedheal newspaper established in August. It was also decided at the 
meting that the branch ought to become a ‘medium of social entertainment for the 
district’120 As if to underline the fact that branches needed to become active again, a 
notice subsequently appeared in the Longford Leader in December to the effect that 
the organiser Mr. Grant would soon visit all districts in Longford/Westmeath for the 
purpose of reorganising the branches.
121
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As promised, Ardagh and Edgeworthstown cumainn reorganised on 10 January 
while Colmcille had its AGM on 8 January.
122
 On 12 January the Granard cumann 
commended Cumann na nGaedheal on winning its first seat in county Longford and 
warned that strong local organisation would have to be sustained if progress was to be 
maintained.
123
 Grant told the same meeting that the overall position of the party’s 
support structures in county Longford had improved over the previous twelve 
months. Members in Granard also requested that The Freeman be made available in 
the town each week, while the question of unemployment grants was also raised. 
North Longford remained a Cumann na nGaedheal stronghold. In south Longford 
activism levels lagged behind with branches there often disappearing between 
elections. Activism in Westmeath declined somewhat although a meeting took place 
in Mullingar on 28 March 1928. Shaw explained the new agricultural credit scheme 
to those in attendance and discussed the importance of creameries.
124
 
Longford Cumann na nGaedheal was pleased to have its own T.D., Shaw 
always having been regarded as a Westmeath politician. Cumann na nGaedheal 
remained very active in Clonbroney in the spring of 1928, although their continued 
use of school premises for meetings was raised in the Dáil by Fianna Fáil T.D. James 
Killane. On three separate occasions, Killane raised the issue with the Minister for 
Education John Marcus O’Sullivan. In March the Fianna Fáil deputy alleged Cumann 
na nGaedheal use of the national schools at Breaghy and Ballinalee for meetings. 
Both Connolly and the minister somewhat unconvincingly asserted that the meetings 
were convened to discuss unemployment and that all political representatives were 
invited to attend.
125
 In May and June a dance held at St. Bernard’s school Clonbroney 
on 6 January also became the subject of controversy. Killane raised the question of 
the dance twice within the space of a week and on both occasions was assured by 
O’Sullivan that it had not been held under the auspices of any political party. 
Unsatisfied, Killane jibed the Minister asking by ‘how much the proceeds of the 
dance were deficient in paying the expenses of the delegates to the Cumann na 
nGaedheal Convention?’126  
                                                          
122
 Ibid., 7 Jan. 1928. 
123
 Ibid., 21 Jan. 1928. 
124
Westmeath Examiner, 31 Mar. 1928. 
125
 Dáil Debates, vol. 22, col. 941, 8 Mar. 1928 (Killane, Connolly, O’Sullivan). 
126
 Dáil Debates, vol, 24, col. 6, 6 June 1928 (Killane). 
148 
 
Fianna Fáil activists had the local elections of 1928 to prepare for, whereas, as 
usual, the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation stood aloof from the contest. Indeed, 
Cumann na nGaedheal speakers often sought to discredit Fianna Fáil by attacking it 
for trying to politicise local government. Speaking in Edgeworthstown, Connolly 
stated that political candidates on the council would neglect the business they were 
elected for, while in neighbouring Leitrim, deputy Patrick Reynolds asked voters to 
support candidates with ‘more laudable ambitions than turning the council into a 
voting machine for the Fianna Fáil organisation’.127 Contradicting Reynolds’ rhetoric, 
the organisation in south Leitrim did ratify some candidates to contest the local 
elections. In Longford, with nothing to prepare for, Cumann na nGaedheal activism 
quietened down. 
H. J. Walker, secretary of Athlone Cumann na nGaedheal, remained a 
prominent member of the party who played an important role in the life of the 
organisation in south Westmeath. In 1926, Walker represented the constituency on 
the National Executive alongside Frank McGuinness.
128
 Walker, generally an Athlone 
delegate to the Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention, was in attendance for a 
reception held in the Gresham hotel for Cosgrave on his return from the United States 
in February 1928. Welcome addresses for Cosgrave from the south Westmeath 
executive and the Athlone cumann were read out at the function, probably on 
Walker’s initiative.129 However, Westmeath Cumann na nGaedheal activism levels 
once again dropped below that expended in neighbouring counties such as Offaly and 
Roscommon. The Longford/Westmeath organiser attended a rare Moate branch 
meeting in May as Cumann na nGaedheal retreated back to its strongholds in 
Longford and Westmeath. Speaking in the Dáil on 7 March 1928, Shaw hinted at the 
reasons behind the lack of party activism in Westmeath. Rebutting claims made by 
Fianna Fáil’s Ruttledge, Shaw used his own county to prove political patronage was 
not the hallmark of Cumann na nGaedheal. According to Shaw, quite a lot of land had 
been divided in Westmeath, between 6,000 and 8,000 acres. Before the distribution of 
this land, there had been between thirty and forty Cumann na nGaedheal branches in 
the county. However, when members had not received favouritism, nearly all of these 
had died. Speaking of the decline in party organisation in Westmeath, Shaw was sure 
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that the ‘fair division of land, by the Land Commission is the cause of that. I only 
speak for the place I know about myself’.130 Shaw had made a similar point in March 
1927 at a time when cumainn had in fact been active.
131
 In March 1928 new Longford 
T.D. M.J. Connolly told Mulcahy that Fianna Fáil supporters had been appointed 
gangers by the Land Commission and that ‘no one known to be a C Na nG [sic] 
supporter was taken on’.132 
Cumann na nGaedheal remained quiet in the constituency during 1929, 
especially when compared to Fianna Fáil and the activity levels of its own 
organisation in neighbouring constituencies. However, that a party organisation 
would become inactive between elections is scarcely surprising. Even Fianna Fáil’s 
organisation suffered between elections. Figures quoted in Brian Reynolds’s thesis 
indicate that Fianna Fáil’s membership declined from 1,307 in 1927 to 550 in 1930 
before moving on an upward trajectory again to 759 in 1931.
133
 Moreover, the 
Reynolds thesis shows that there were eight affiliated Fianna Fáil branches in 
Longford in 1930 and seven in 1931 while the county came under the heading ‘need 
for improvement’ at the Ard Fheis of 1928.134 In 1929, Longford’s Seán MacEoin 
romped to victory as the Cumann na nGaedheal candidate in the Leitrim/Sligo by 
election. However, the ‘Blacksmith of Ballinalee’ addressed a meeting of the Athlone 
cumann in September indicating that MacEoin saw that his political career would 
eventually take him back to his home constituency. MacEoin’s involvement could 
only strengthen the party organisation given the immense personal value he placed on 
organisation and the popular reputation he built up as a hero of the revolutionary 
period. 
 
President Cosgrave tours the midlands 
 
 In the autumn of 1929 Cosgrave embarked on what appears to have been a 
leader’s tour of sorts. In September, Cumann na nGaedheal’s leader had appeared in 
Tullamore County Offaly, where he was given a good reception, and it seems that he 
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now realised the need to spend more time on the ground, meeting the people, than he 
had before. Cosgrave’s visits to Longford town in October, and to Athlone in 
November, gave the party organisation in each county something to prepare for. 
Cosgrave’s meeting in Longford, his first visit to the county, was keenly advertised in 
the Longford Leader where it was made known the President would hear deputations 
from locals on matters requiring his attention. A platform was erected outside the 
courthouse on Main Street. On the approach to Longford town, a banner at St. Mel’s 
Cathedral greeted Cosgrave with a hearty ‘Céad mile Fáilte’, while various streamers 
through the town simply read ‘Welcome to Longford’.135 Cosgrave was joined in 
Longford by the constituency’s two sitting Cumann na nGaedheal T.D.s, by MacEoin 
and minister Hogan. Hogan strongly condemned Fianna Fáil’s economic policies, 
particularly with regard to protectionism, a debate that captured the political 
differences between the two big parties at the time. Cosgrave’s address focussed on 
the changes in world politics since the end of the Great War. Cosgrave stated that 
industry and offices now made a great nation, not armaments and battleships. Making 
reference to his government’s orthodox financial policies, Cosgrave admitted that 
attempts to eliminate waste and cut costs were unpopular but, he argued, such policies 
were necessary. After Cosgrave heard deputations from locals, the well attended 
meeting was brought to a close. 
Cosgrave was pencilled in to speak in Athlone on 17 November and in October 
the local Cumann na nGaedheal organisation began preparing for the visit. As in 
Longford, branches of Cumann na nGaedheal, and other organisations, were given 
the opportunity to make representations to Cosgrave.
136
 Advertisements appeared in 
the local press three weeks before the visit with a list of fifteen deputations Cosgrave 
would hear.
137
 Although the meeting was held on a cold day, there was a large 
turnout. Welcome addresses from the local Cumann na nGaedheal branch and the 
Urban council were read before Cosgrave rose to speak. Here, Cosgrave’s speech 
dealt with numerous issues including land division and the country’s financial 
position. Interestingly, Cosgrave also expressed the importance of bringing the 
Fianna Fáil opposition into the Dáil chamber. Such meetings between elections 
challenge the perception of a Treatyite élite ensconced in government buildings with 
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little care for the concerns of ordinary voters. The Cumann na nGaedheal organisation 
had successfully arranged meetings in the three midland towns of Tullamore, 
Longford and Athlone in late 1929. What is most striking about the meetings 
however, is the lack of cooperation between Longford and Westmeath. Again, it 
seems that Cumann na nGaedheal did not act as a constituency organisation there, but 
rather organised through the three district committees. 
 
The Longford/Westmeath by-election 
 
During 1930 and 1931 the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation across 
Longford/Westmeath remained rather quiet - the visits of Cosgrave had done little to 
stir greater activism among members. Athlone Cumann na nGaedheal held its AGM 
on 14 January 1930 amid a very quiet time for all the political parties,
138
 though the 
Fianna Fáil cumann in Ballinamuck county Longford was a rare exception this 
rule.
139
  However, the various party machines were given an opportunity to limber up 
following the death of Longford Fianna Fáil T.D. James Killane in April. The ensuing 
by-election made Longford/Westmeath the centre of national attention. On 10 May 
activity was reported in Colmcille, Ballymahon, Granard and Lanesboro and rumours 
that party bosses were secretly taking soundings from activists about candidate 
selection and strategy.
140
 Fianna Fáil was first in the race on the weekend of 10 May 
as borne out by the Longford Leader headline ‘Fianna Fáil start the ball rolling’.141 
Cumann na nGaedheal was also active and had in mind as its candidate Dr. Vincent 
Delany. Various names were linked with the Cumann na nGaedheal nomination, but 
Delany was the clear front-runner with the Longford Leader speculating the others 
would step aside in favour of a man who was ‘extremely popular with all classes, 
irrespective of politics or creed’.142 Delany seemed to embody Cumann na nGaedheal 
nationalism and was a prominent figure in Longford through his presidency of the 
county’s nursing association and Longford town’s Rugby and boxing clubs.  
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The Cumann na nGaedheal selection convention was a lively affair chaired by 
Séamus Dolan and attended by John Marcus O’Sullivan and Liam Burke. Almost all 
parishes and towns across each county were represented. Westmeath delegates 
proposed Captain Malone for the vacancy. Malone withdrew his nomination, an act 
with which Dolan and most delegates agreed. Dolan supported Malone’s withdrawal, 
stating that the vacancy was a Longford one and so the Cumann na nGaedheal 
candidate should hail from that part of the constituency. MacEoin told the convention 
that the eyes of the world were on the constituency and urged Westmeath party 
activists to support the Longford candidate during the campaign.
143
 
 Various high profile speakers campaigned in the constituency, with Richard 
Mulcahy addressing a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Moate on 18 May. Seán 
MacEoin, involved in the candidate’s campaign team,144 addressed a meeting in 
Ballymahon on the same day.
145
 Blythe, Collins-O’Driscoll, Hogan, Milroy and 
Tierney also travelled to the constituency as Cumann na nGaedheal looked to gain 
some Dáil breathing space by gaining the Fianna Fáil seat.
146
 Cumann na nGaedheal 
made a determined effort to win the seat and even allowed deputies who wanted to 
campaign in Longford/Westmeath miss Dáil business.
147
  Delany also had the support 
of the Farmers’ Union, and Lord Longford,148 as the ideological battle lines of the 
following general election were drawn as the world absorbed the shock of the Wall 
Street crash. The secretary of the Longford Famers’ Union, M.J. Lyons, told a 
meeting of farmers that Fianna Fáil policies would devastate agriculture. Lyons also 
appeared on Cumann na nGaedheal platforms during the campaign. MacEoin echoed 
the call made at the Farmers’ Party meeting, by asking voters not to endorse Fianna 
Fáil’s policies.149  
On balance, Cumann na nGaedheal’s chances of taking the Fianna Fáil seat 
were slim. It was clear from The Star that the party was not confident of a gain. The 
Star’s columns stated the odds were stacked against Cumann na nGaedheal and that 
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the seat could only be won if ‘sufficient energy is put into the struggle’.150 Supporters 
could not be faulted for lack of effort, the machine was active throughout the 
campaign. The selection convention had been representative of each corner of the 
constituency and the campaign in the localities was lively. Heckling of speakers 
remained a feature of the campaign while the party’s meetings in general trumpeted 
the government’s record and questioned the promises that Fianna Fáil had made.151 
While the by-election was a three cornered contest, Labour delegates met in Athlone 
to select Michael Duffy as its candidate, in reality, it was a fight between the two big 
parties. In the end, Fianna Fáil retained the seat, although the Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisation had held its own during the campaign. The Star was satisfied with the 
performance of the party machine and that no ground had been lost in 
Longford/Westmeath since the previous general election.
152
 Both the main parties 
increased their vote but the overall position in the constituency remained as it had 
been at the previous general election with the two big parties on two seats apiece. It 
was the first time Fianna Fáil had outpolled Cumann na nGaedheal in a by-
election.
153
 
Grass-roots activism was maintained in 1931 with meetings taking place in 
various locations in Longford/Westmeath. Organising efforts for the by-election 
served to oil the machine in advance of the general election. Efforts to reorganise in 
all constituencies were discussed by the parliamentary party. Liam Burke asked that 
deputies cooperate with party workers in building up the machine.
154
 Cumann na 
nGaedheal in neighbouring Roscommon was very strong in this period, with thirty 
two branches represented at that county’s executive meeting on 25 January 1931.155 
In Longford/Westmeath, Cumann na nGaedheal held public meetings in Moate in 
May and in Drumraney in August. In this period, the party pretty much had a quasi 
monopoly on the constituency’s pro-Treaty vote as the Farmers’ Union had 
disintegrated to quite an extent following the September 1927 election. Moreover, its 
alliance with Cumann na nGaedheal in the by-election probably identified it as the 
party of farming interests. The Labour party continued to build its constituency 
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organisation under the direction of a reorganising committee,
156
 forming new 
branches in late 1930 and having regular meetings in 1931. By then, buoyed by its 
by-election victory, Fianna Fáil was the most active organisation in the build up to the 
1932 election. 
In 1932 Clonbroney remained a Cumann na nGaedheal stronghold in county 
Longford with regular branch meetings while other centres had quietened somewhat. 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s selection convention took place in the county hall in 
Mullingar on 17 January, a full eleven days after Fianna Fáil had selected its 
candidates- a statement of intent by the opposition party. The mood of the Cumann na 
nGaedheal convention was upbeat. Seán MacEoin, as had been widely anticipated, 
came back to his ‘own people’ in Longford to ‘carry your banner and defend your 
interests’.157 Connolly told the convention that the Cumann na nGaedheal government 
had succeeded in its task of bringing together various strands of Irish nationalism 
while the chairman of the convention J.J. Byrne T.D. commented on the strong 
financial position of the state compared with other European nations, a catch cry 
heard at party meetings throughout the country in 1932.
158
  
Branches such as those in Mullinaghta and Ballymahon became active again 
after lengthy periods of idleness. Election meetings were widespread, showing that 
the party’s organisation network in the constituency remained strong beneath the 
surface. Even if invisible for lengthy periods, it was there when called upon. Having 
MacEoin as a candidate boosted the party’s campaign as his daring exploits during 
the revolutionary war became the theme at numerous election rallies in county 
Longford.
159
 Election meetings were arranged as before and party supporters in north 
Westmeath interested in loaning their cars to the organisation were asked to forward 
their names to the director of transport at the party’s election rooms Earl Street 
Mullingar.
160
 MacEoin’s desk diary reveals something of the gruelling task faced by 
candidates electioneering in a geographically large constituency such as 
Longford/Westmeath. Much ground had to be covered, first in calling on the rank-
and-file membership to ask for their support at the Cumann na nGaedheal selection 
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convention,
161
 and secondly in addressing election rallies in both counties once 
confirmed as a candidate for the party.
162
 MacEoin’s diary also shows that the party’s 
schedule of election meetings in the constituency was arranged centrally by a 
committee and in consultation with the other Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. 
Before the convention, MacEoin met with Shaw and Connolly to arrange election 
meetings while a further schedule was worked on by a Cumann na nGaedheal 
committee on 20 January.
163
 
 Economic policy was a major issue in this election with Cumann na nGaedheal 
articulating the need for cooperation with England as against the more radical 
protectionist policies advocated by Fianna Fáil. Voters in Mullingar experienced the 
government argument first hand as Minister for Industry and Commerce Patrick 
McGilligan addressed a meeting in support of the government’s candidates on 11 
February.
164
 Economics were not the only divisive issue of this election as both 
Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil were guilty of raking over old Civil War 
wounds during the campaign. Meetings of both parties could be marked by the 
rehashing of the debates of the 1922 general election.
165
 As before, the parties made 
an effort to organise meetings that would clash with fairs or markets. MacEoin 
addressed meetings of the Longford fair on 1 February
166
 and at Lanesboro on 12 
February.
167
 
As the table below shows, the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in 
Longford/Westmeath again held its own in an election campaign, but the government 
it supported nevertheless lost power. Fianna Fáil gained a seat, taking its total in 
Longford/Westmeath to three. Cumann na nGaedheal retained its two seats with 
MacEoin replacing Connolly in the Dáil. In MacEoin, the constituency organisation 
gained a politician of national stature who would play a leading role in the party for 
the following three decades. 
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Figure 4. First Preference Vote obtained by successful candidates in Longford/Westmeath in 1932. 
168
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
James Geoghegan Fianna Fáil 7,202 
M. J. Kennedy Fianna Fáil 6,484 
Gen. Seán Mac Eoin Cumann na nGaedheal 6, 249 
P. W Shaw Cumann na nGaedheal 6, 128 
Francis Gormley Fianna Fáil 3, 796 
 
 
Party of power to party of protest 
 
The loss of power initially hurt the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. 
Treatyites watched as de Valera set about changing the state they had spent a decade 
building up. Speaking in Trim Co. Meath in September, Cosgrave, now leader of the 
opposition, expressed his disappointment that under Fianna Fáil, the army had not 
been allowed to honour its founder, Michael Collins as had been the case under 
Cumann na nGaedheal.
169
 While Treatyites were riled at the failure of de Valera to 
honour their icons, it was opposition to the government’s economic policies that 
provided the impetus for Treatyite political mobilisation after 1932. In Trim, 
Cosgrave was escorted to the podium by 150 Army Comrades members as a varied 
opposition to Fianna Fáil was emerging. A Blueshirt meeting took place in Mullingar 
in early September 1932 while the new Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ League’s 
‘spontaneous growth’ in the county was the source of editorial comment in 
October.
170
 Having been a party of government and responsibility for ten years, it was 
scarcely surprising that disgruntled Treatyites and farmers would channel their 
radicalism and frustration into the new organisations rather than Cumann na 
nGaedheal. However, Cumann na nGaedheal in Longford/Westmeath did continue to 
function in 1932 with the Longford county executive meeting in May on the eve of 
the party’s annual convention in the Gresham hotel. Westmeath was also represented 
at the party conference, though as usual, the impetus came from the southern part of 
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the county.
171
 The south Westmeath executive proposed a vote of sympathy to the 
late William Redmond’s family for the ‘services which he and his family rendered 
throughout many years to the cause of Ireland’.172 
Scarcely having had time to regroup since defeat at the polls in 1932, over one 
hundred delegates descended on Mullingar for the Cumann na nGaedheal selection 
convention in January 1933 as de Valera’s snap election caught them by surprise.173 
Reports of the convention suggest delegates were resolute and firm in their belief that 
Cumann na nGaedheal would return to power after the election. Shaw defiantly 
referred to the leader of the opposition as ‘President Cosgrave’, being confident that 
his party leader would once again assume that title once all seats were filled after the 
election.
174
 On balance, Cumann na nGaedheal fought a more positive campaign in 
1933 than it had at the previous election,
175
 and Cosgrave’s national record was 
lauded in party adverts in newspapers across the country as Treatyites tried to counter 
Fianna Fáil’s clever use of the green card. This was part of Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
attempt to ‘reconnect with its nationalist background’.176 
Nationally, Cumann na nGaedheal fielded fewer candidates than in any 
previous election in order to avoid splitting the broader pro-Treaty vote.
177
 Its 
selection of just two candidates in Longford/Westmeath was indicative of its more 
defensive posture going into the 1933 election. Cumann na nGaedheal in 
Longford/Westmeath cooperated with the Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ League, now the 
party organisation of the newly established National Centre Party, by selecting two 
candidates so as not to ‘interfere unduly’ with farming interests. As we have seen, in 
both Clare and Longford Westmeath, there had been incidents of cooperation between 
Cumann na nGaedheal and the old Farmers’ Union in previous elections. However, 
the Economic War embarked on by the new Fianna Fáil government helped to draw 
Cumann na nGaedheal even closer to the party representing farming interests and 
quite possibly made fusion of the two inevitable. The Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ 
League were strong in both counties its ticket boasted a candidate from Longford and 
Westmeath.  
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A boisterous campaign by Cumann na nGaedheal locally brought Cosgrave to 
Longford on 17 January for an election rally. Republican interrupters cried ‘Up de 
Valera’ during Cosgrave’s address. However, Cosgrave, long renowned for his ability 
to deliver a sharp rejoinder, calmly retorted that the ‘issue is up Ireland and not up de 
Valera or anybody else’.178 In 1933 Cumann na nGaedheal also made use of a 
‘talking film’ of Cosgrave which was brought to various constituencies by cinema 
vans.
179
 On the same day that Cosgrave spoke in Longford, a fair in Athlone was 
interrupted when the ‘Cumann na nGaedheal talkie film van passed through the 
crowd and was received with some cheers and some derisive cries’.180 Clearly those 
attending the Athlone fair were determined to recreate in full the conditions of a 
boisterous election meeting when greeted by the ‘talkie film’.  However, in spite of 
Cosgrave’s best efforts, and partly through opposition fracture, Cumann na 
nGaedheal lost a seat in Longford/Westmeath. As in Clare, radical change would 
follow in the party’s constituency apparatus. 
 
  Figure 5. First preference Vote Obtained by successful candidates in Longford/Westmeath in 1933.
181
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote 
M. J. Kennedy Fianna Fáil 7,784 
Gen. Seán Mac Eoin Cumann na nGaedheal 6,171 
James Victory Fianna Fáil 5,935 
Charles Fagan National Centre Party 5,729 
James Geoghegan Fianna Fáil 4,649 
 
In April 1933, with their political party licking its wounds following another 
electoral defeat, Treatyites began organising in Longford/Westmeath with renewed 
zeal as part of Richard Mulcahy’s reorganising efforts. A county convention of 
Cumann na nGaedheal was organised in Longford in early April in advance of the 
party’s annual conference. At this meeting, in a break with previous practice, it was 
decided to form three separate executives for county Longford, seemingly in an 
attempt to execute a successful local election campaign. Previously the constituency 
had been divided in three with executives for Longford, south Westmeath and north 
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Westmeath. Fianna Fáil, on the other hand, had always had north and south Longford 
district executives. The proposed north Longford executive would be centred on 
Ballinalee; the one for mid Longford would be based around Longford town; and 
Ballymahon would be the focus of the new south Longford district.
182
 A new branch 
of Cumann na nGaedheal was established in Arva in north county Longford, while 
existing cumainn such as Newtownforbes and Edgeworthstown became much more 
active over the summer months as organisational renewal became key. Meanwhile, 
steps were taken locally to act on the national executive’s decision to contest the local 
elections of 1933. The constituency was well represented at the 1933 annual 
convention showing that the party’s core strength remained solid.183  
While there had been an ACA presence in Westmeath since 1932, Longford 
had no branch until one was formed in Edgeworthstown in May 1933.
184
 Though 
MacEoin stressed at its inaugural meeting that the new organisation was apolitical, it 
quickly became ever more politicised during the summer months. The Farmers’ and 
Ratepayers’ League was active too, holding numerous meetings to discuss the 
Economic War. James Dillon and Frank MacDermot addressed a reported 3,000 
disgruntled farmers in Mullingar at the end of August.
185
 Merger with Cumann na 
nGaedheal was openly discussed during the meeting. Fusion was also discussed at the 
Longford executive of the Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ League with near unanimous 
support expressed for a merger with Cumann na nGaedheal as the Economic War 
drove the Centre Party ever closer to Cosgrave. However, the Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisation across the two counties was also making its opposition to the Economic 
War known at this time. Longford/Westmeath joined forces with its colleagues in 
Carlow and Mayo in calling on the Fianna Fáil government to discontinue collecting 
the Land Annuities for the duration of the Economic War.
186
 There was a marked 
increase in Cumann na nGaedheal activism in county Longford from the spring of 
1933 until the foundation of Fine Gael in early September, while the impetus for the 
new party in Westmeath came almost exclusively from the Centre Party although 
there remained pockets of Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in the county.
187
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The foundation of Fine Gael gave Treatyites a new stridency and sense of 
purpose across the whole constituency. For the remainder of 1933, Fine Gael activism 
levels far outpaced that of Fianna Fáil, and the organisation was even given its own 
section in the Longford Leader. Immediately upon the party’s establishment, 
branches of the United Ireland Party began to appear in every corner of the 
constituency. It was quick to appear in old Cumann na nGaedheal strongholds in 
Longford such as Ballinalee and Edgeworthstown, and more than likely such 
branches of Fine Gael were in reality old Cumann na nGaedheal units revitalised with 
the addition of the farmers’ organisation. The same was true in Westmeath where 
branches of United Ireland began to appear immediately upon the merger. However, 
it must be noted that in county Longford Treatyite reorganisation predated the 
foundation of Fine Gael. However the same could not be said of Westmeath where by 
1933 much of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation had lapsed after the party lost 
power, its support in the county had always been weakened by the potential strength 
of effective farmers’ mobilisation. There had been some Cumann na nGaedheal 
activism in Westmeath during 1932,
188
 though by 1933 most Treatyite activism in the 
county was channelled through the ACA.
189
 In Westmeath, Blueshirtism proved 
radical with widespread tree felling and telephone wire cuttings. Numerous files in 
the Department of Justice papers bear testimony to the scale of outrages in the county 
during 1933 and 1934. Moreover, Blueshirt meetings and dances often provoked a 
violent reaction from the movement’s opponents.190 
 Following the merger, numerous Farmers’ and Ratepayers’ League branches in 
Westmeath decided to continue on as branches of Fine Gael.
191
 Representatives of 
Cumann na nGaedheal, the Blueshirts and the Centre Party gathered in Mullingar to 
form a branch of the United Ireland Party. The group decided to elect a committee of 
twelve. Six officers would be selected from the Famers’ and Ratepayer’s League, four 
from Cumann na nGaedheal and two from the National Guard.
192
 In Westmeath’s 
second largest town, the former party of government had found itself in a subordinate 
position within the new opposition party. By October, the new party was sufficiently 
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organised for O’Duffy to address 1,000 supporters in Mullingar, while Fine Gael 
platforms and branches became swelled with Blueshirted members.
193
 The new party, 
created from elements that had long shared a common political outlook seemed set to 
become the most colourful and most vibrant organisation in Longford/Westmeath.  
Cumann na nGaedheal had a presence in the constituency of 
Longford/Westmeath from its foundation right up until its dissolution in 1933. 
Longford was energetically organised in the aftermath of the 1923 election, while 
Westmeath had to wait until 1925 before it received similar attention, when the party 
at national level attempted to iron out organisational problems that had existed in a 
number of constituencies. The party was at its best organised in the constituency 
between 1925 and 1927 when its presence across county Westmeath was most 
notable. In September 1927 the organisation delivered two Cumann na nGaedheal 
seats for the first time, a feat that especially pleased the organisation in county 
Longford. Rather than form a constituency committee, the organisation in 
Longford/Westmeath instead formed three district executives: county Longford, north 
Westmeath and south Westmeath. Given the large geographical area it covered, this 
approach probably served the organisation well. These executives formed the focal 
point for the branches under their watch and could also co-ordinate their efforts. 
Almost all villages, towns and parishes in the constituency had cumainn established 
but many of these disappeared between elections. Nevertheless, there were a quite a 
number of consistent strongholds such as Ballinalee, Longford town, 
Edgeworthstown, Moate and Athlone where activism was solid throughout the 
period. From 1925 onwards the dangling of patronage as an inducement to join 
became less evident as the party instead seemed to focus on attracting members who 
would support government policy. In 1929 President Cosgrave visited the 
constituency twice, with no elections imminent. These visits brought people into 
contact with the head of government while the leader displayed more of a ‘hands on’ 
approach to his political machinery. Even as it lost power to a resurgent Fianna Fáil 
in 1932, Cumann na nGaedheal held onto the seat it had gained in the election of 
September 1927 showing that it had built up a strong support base in 
Longford/Westmeath. However, managing to stand still in the face of the Fianna Fáil 
onslaught of 1932 was not enough to keep Cosgrave and his party in power. 
                                                          
193
 Westmeath Independent, 21 Oct. 1933. 
162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
162 
 
                                                  5 
    
 
Cumann na nGaedheal in Dublin North 
 
 
 
The third constituency in our study of the Cumann na nGaedheal grass-root 
organisation, Dublin North, contrasts quite sharply with the two constituencies looked at in 
chapters three and four. Located in the country‟s capital, close to parliament buildings on 
Kildare street and containing party headquarters on Parnell Square, this constituency had 
an in-built organisational advantage over more rural and peripheral areas such as Clare and 
Longford/Westmeath. 
Throughout the period, Dublin North proved fertile ground for Cumann na 
nGaedheal. It was formed in 1923 through a merger of the old Mid Dublin and Dublin 
North West parliamentary constituencies. In June 1922 these constituencies were 
overwhelmingly pro-Treaty. In June 1922, Mid Dublin returned two independents, a 
Treatyite Sinn Féiner and an anti-Treatyite Sinn Féiner to the Dáil. Meanwhile Dublin 
North West elected four Treatyite Dáil deputies in 1922. There had been no anti-Treaty 
candidate in that constituency.
1
 As such, Cumann na nGaedheal inherited a strong base in 
the Dublin North constituency  
Dublin North was one of the few constituencies to organise Cumann na nGaedheal 
branches in the immediate aftermath of the preliminary conference of 7 December 1922. 
As noted in preceding chapters, organisational work until the formal launch of the party in 
April 1923 was of a relatively quiet nature. Dublin North on the other hand was 
energetically organised from early January 1923 with the Treatyite General Election 
Committee noting the formation of a cumann in Fairview at its meeting of 5 January.
2
 At a 
further meeting of the same committee on 26 January, Treatyite organiser par excellence 
R.J. Purcell was appointed to organise Dublin. Purcell first became involved with the 
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Treatyites in 1922 on Michael Collins‟s recommendation to the Treaty election committees 
and brought to the Cumann na nGaedheal party his experience of political organisation 
over many years in Britain. Within days of Purcell‟s appointment, branches of Cumann na 
nGaedheal had been formed in east Clontarf, Drumcondra and the Mountjoy Ward.
3
 
However, after finding only eight to ten willing workers in East Clontarf, the provisional 
Standing Committee decided that those prospective members could link up with the branch 
which had been established in Fairview in early January. A cumann was started in 
Glasnevin by 8 February while efforts to establish the party machine in Arran‟s Quay were 
also underway at that time.
4
 Purcell was pro-active in establishing branches, attending their 
meetings and making sure the new cumainn were speedily affiliated with headquarters. He 
also kept the provisional Standing Committee well briefed on the progress he was making 
in Dublin, reporting on the regularity of meetings, and on any increase in membership 
within the new branches. Cumann na nGaedheal made a promising start in Dublin North 
with regular meetings and cumainn established in most wards. 
By 16 March, with the official launch of Cumann na nGaedheal still over a month 
away, Purcell was able to report that a branch had been established in every part of the 
constituency except the Rotunda ward.
5
 Whether his work in Dublin was done, or as was 
perhaps more likely, his talents were needed elsewhere, Purcell was sent to Kilkenny and 
J.J. Egan became the new organiser for Dublin North.  
Early in its life the North Dublin Cumann na nGaedheal organisation was well 
organised, active and outspoken in shaping the party that was developing out of the pro-
Treaty wing of revolutionary Sinn Féin. A constituency committee was formed in April, 
well in advance of such developments in either Clare or Longford/Westmeath, and the 
cumainn themselves proved keen to make their voices heard within the organisation. 
Glasnevin cumann had a constitutional amendment defeated at the Cumann na nGaedheal 
Mansion House launch,
6
 while the constituency committee and numerous branches 
forcefully expressed their views about such matters as the local elections and the 
prevalence of Gaelic features within the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. By the end of 
June, Clontarf had its own branch with Seán McGarry chairing a cumann meeting there on 
29 June. In revolutionary Sinn Féin days, there were two branches in Clontarf with 
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McGarry chairing the west Clontarf club.
7
 Mulcahy addressed the meeting first in Irish and 
then in English. He asked those present to use the organisation to „build up solid, lasting, 
public opinion‟.8 Seán Milroy went on to laud Clontarf‟s national associations, which he 
claimed stretched back to the battle of 1014, and he expressed hope it would long be 
associated with General Mulcahy. Following the meeting, steps were taken to extend the 
organisation in the district. In June the constituency once again lost an organiser with J.J. 
Egan moving to Cavan.
9
 Might it be that the organisation in Dublin North at this time was 
robust enough to do without the services of an organiser? It seems that Dublin North was 
sacrificed whenever an organiser was needed elsewhere because the party recognised its 
early organisational vitality.  
The Dublin North constituency committee often acted on its own initiative and was 
never reliant upon the services of a paid organiser in the party‟s formative days. On its 
suggestion, a public meeting for the two city constituencies was organised for 12 August, 
while it arranged a selection convention in a more efficient manner than the evidence has 
suggested was the case in either Clare or Longford/Westmeath. The branches busily sought 
a role in selecting the party‟s candidates, and in the week before the 1 August selection 
convention, numerous local meetings were held across north Dublin. For internal 
organisation matters, north city branches often used the party‟s headquarters which was of 
course located within the constituency. At one such meeting of the Glasnevin cumann on 
23 July, Michael Staines, previously a pro-Treaty T.D. for Dublin North West told 
members that he would not stand as a candidate in Dublin North.
10
 Members attending this 
meeting also thanked a resident of Botanic road for taking wounded national army soldiers 
on trips to the countryside.
11
 Mr Breen, newly appointed Dublin city organiser, attended a 
meeting at headquarters on 24 July and seemed confident that each part of the constituency 
would be represented at the upcoming selection convention. Meanwhile McGarry informed 
the constituency committee that he was willing to stand as a candidate. Dublin North 
cumainn would play a prominent role during the election. The party‟s campaign in the 
capital began on 12 August with a public meeting addressed by all Cumann na nGaedheal 
candidates from across the three Dublin constituencies. The rally had been suggested by 
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the Dublin North constituency committee though it is likely that such a rally would have 
been arranged in any case.
12
 Addressing the 5,000 strong meeting, Irish-American leader 
Judge Cohalan endorsed the Cumann na nGaedheal candidates for Dublin.  
The constituency committee took a lead role in directing the election campaign 
across Dublin North. It met at party headquarters in mid August to plan numerous election 
meetings. Meetings were subsequently arranged to take place on the Finglas road and on 
Manor Street.
13
 During the campaign, Cumann na nGaedheal public meetings took place 
across the various north city wards. Suitable locations with good acoustics were sought out 
by members before these rallies were organised. As was the case in the more rural 
constituencies, Cumann na nGaedheal in Dublin North used these meetings to convey the 
government‟s policy directly to the electors. Coverage of these Dublin North gatherings 
was less extensive than was the case in more rural constituencies. As noted in previous 
chapters, and by American political scientist Warner Moss, local newspapers in this period 
were gossipy by nature and the sheer attention to detail of reporters significantly widened a 
politician‟s audience.14 However, in Dublin North, there was no constituency-wide local 
newspaper leaving the coverage of meetings in the hands of the national papers or the daily 
Dublin Evening Mail. As such, the coverage of election meetings in the city tended to be of 
a thinner consistency than that found in the rural press. Still, the parish pump could be as 
much of a factor in the political life of an urban constituency as anywhere else. On the eve 
of the general election, a committee of Glasnevin residents lobbied all the political parties 
to reopen the Finglas road post office. Following the election, Cumann na nGaedheal T.D. 
Seán McGarry introduced a delegation of local residents from Glasnevin to the Postmaster 
General J.J. Walsh. Walsh informed the group that he had decided to reopen the post 
office.
15
 A Cumann na nGaedheal minister had capitulated to a local pressure group. 
As can be gleaned from the table below, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s first electoral 
outing in Dublin North was a success. The party won four of the constituency‟s eight seats. 
Moreover, Alfred Byrne was a strong supporter of the Treaty as was the Businessman‟s 
party showing that sentiment in Dublin North remained strongly pro-Free State. Séamus 
Hughes, soon to be Cumann na nGaedheal‟s general secretary, obtained a somewhat 
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disappointing 365 votes as the party‟s fifth candidate. Treatyites had been well drilled in 
north Dublin, and the organisation of the so called „Cumann Party‟ was praised in the 
Times of London. Treaty supporters in the capital had voted solidly for the Cumann na 
nGaedheal party ticket according to The Times which also praised the manner in which 
Republican voters had been marshalled in the city.
16
 Dublin North, and indeed Dublin 
County and Dublin South would remain Cumann na nGaedheal strongholds throughout the 
party‟s life. 
 
Figure 1: Vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates 1923.
17
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote. 
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedheal 22,205 
Alfred Byrne Independent 10,518 
Ernest O‟Malley Anti-Treaty SF 4,602 
Seán T. O‟Kelly Anti-Treaty SF 4,233 
William Hewat Businessman‟s Party 2,594 
Seán McGarry Cumann na nGaedheal 1,397 
Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll Cumann na nGaedheal 1,247 
Francis Cahill Cumann na nGaedheal 790 
 
Unlike the two previous constituencies which have been scrutinised, the work of 
Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in Dublin North did not abate with the passing of the 
general election. Rather, the party organisation in the constituency remained active and 
took a leading role in trying to shape the new party. Following the general election, two 
themes emerge which were to remain a cornerstone of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
organisation in Dublin North: its preoccupation with developing as a centre of 
entertainment for members and its clear interest in the pursuit of a policy of Gaelicisation 
in the newly independent state. 
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Politics as a pastime? 
 
Dublin North Cumann na nGaedheal continued a longstanding nationalist tradition of 
combining leisure and politics.
18
 It was from the seed of a Dublin North constituency 
committee meeting in September that the first Cumann na nGaedheal central branch or 
ard-chumann grew. Discussing the question of organising entertainment during the winter 
season, the constituency decided to bring the Dublin County and Dublin South 
constituency organisations together to arrange such a forum for members in the capital.
19
 
Members of the Standing Committee were invited to a meeting with the three Dublin 
constituency committees on 24 September. The meeting was called to arrange the 
establishment of a central branch.
20
 Speaking at the launch of the Ard- chumann, Mulcahy 
said he hoped that it would become a centre of „progressive ideas‟ and „Gaelicisation‟. The 
central branch committee was made up of delegates representing each of the constituency 
committees in Dublin with Seán O‟Kelly, Councillor Paddy McIntyre and Séamus Hughes 
representing Dublin North. Members of the central branch had to be members of a local 
cumann and its existence seems to have resided outside the remit of the Cumann na 
nGaedheal constitution. Subscriptions for central branch membership were set at 5 s. The 
central branch aimed to provide a forum for lectures,
21
 educate party members politically 
and organise social functions. It hoped to host and organise lectures in the same 
atmosphere as „the old Celtic Literary Club‟.22 On 21 November 1923 John Marcus 
O‟Sullivan lectured members of the central branch on the phases of revolution. The lecture 
was subsequently published.
23
 
Reflecting a general Dublin North concern with Irish nationality, the central branch 
developed an Irish language committee. There is an inescapable sense that in this period, 
Dublin city, or more especially north city, Cumann na nGaedheal, was determined to shape 
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the new organisation which it saw as crucial in inculcating a sense of Irish nationality and 
political education among members and the wider population. As noted by Fearghall 
McGarry, a gaelicising zeal was also evident in the early years of the Garda Síochána. As 
Commissioner, Eoin O‟Duffy saw the GAA as a potential force for healing the Civil War 
divide and Irish cultural pursuits more generally as a means of countering moral and 
physical degeneration.
24
 Deep within Irish nationalism was a cultural chauvinism which 
sometimes displayed a sinister streak. In 1927, Irish-Irelanders in Tipperary called on 
Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil to promote gaelic culture and to stamp out 
„degrading‟ jazz and other foreign forms of entertainment.25  
 Professor William Magennis welcomed members to the first Cumann na nGaedheal 
central branch meeting of winter 1924. Magennis, reviewing the work of the club in the 
previous year, said its programme „included lectures and social meetings, and at the latter 
nothing but Irish was spoken‟.26 Magennis then introduced the season‟s first speaker, 
President Cosgrave. In his usual modest way, Cosgrave said he hoped members would hear 
subsequent lectures of a more important and far reaching nature than that he would deliver 
that night. His lecture involved taking stock of the country‟s position, an exposition on the 
„duties and responsibilities of Irish citizenship, and what were the political obligations of 
the moment‟. Cosgrave advised supporters to buy Irish goods, and not to ignore the duties 
of citizenship.
27
 
Dublin North branches proposed a number of resolutions for discussion at the 
January 1924 Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention. The resolutions submitted for 
debate represent the same general theme as those proposed by rural branches of the party. 
For instance, the land claims of War of Independence and Civil War veterans were pressed 
in a Glasnevin resolution that called for a portion of untenanted land to be set aside for old 
IRA and ex-National Army men.
28
 Changes to the way branches were represented at the 
party convention were also proposed by Glasnevin while the Inns Quay cumann suggested 
that government produce a book annually „giving particulars as to salaries in the Civil 
Service‟.29 The constituency committee itself submitted a motion for debate by the party 
conference. It called for Irish dances and music to comprise at least 50% of the programme 
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at all Cumann na nGaedheal social functions. Again, cultural and national considerations 
were at the forefront of the constituency‟s thinking. Dublin North Cumann na nGaedheal 
seems to have been driven by a clear awareness of the possibilities before the country now 
that it had obtained its independence. Revolutionary rhetoric had spilled over into the north 
city Cumann na nGaedheal organisation and for it, the national revolution was a process 
which would continue to evolve under the Free State. Dublin North T.D. Richard Mulcahy 
was elected one of the Cumann na nGaedheal vice presidents, alongside Jenny Wyse 
Power, by delegates to the annual convention. 
The Dublin North constituency AGM took place on 26 February 1924. Councillor 
McIntyre was elected to the chair with Mr. O‟Driscoll, husband of the constituency‟s 
female T.D, elected constituency secretary. Those present were asked to ensure that the 
voting lists were accurate and advised that it was the duty of each conscientious citizen to 
ensure that „no bogus voters‟ remained on the list.30 In addition, members were provided 
with a breakdown of the number of electors in each of the ten wards in the constituency. 
31
 
Reflecting the levels of cooperation that existed between the Dublin constituencies, north 
city branches were encouraged to help the South Dublin by-election effort by visiting the 
constituency organisation‟s election rooms on College Street. Councillor McIntyre was 
also chosen as the constituency‟s representative on the National Executive, and from there 
he was chosen as a member of the Standing Committee where he would play a leading role 
in the party organisation nationally. 
McIntyre was a member of the Standing Committee during the tumultuous days of 
the Army Mutiny. On the party‟s governing committee, McIntyre proved proficient in 
pressing the interests of the Dublin North constituency committee. The constituency 
committee met on 27 March, between Standing Committee meetings on 25 and 28 of the 
month. McIntyre advised the Standing Committee that his constituency was generally 
supportive of its line on the mutiny. The „Army Crisis‟ was a particularly sensitive issue in 
Dublin North given that Mulcahy was Minister for Defence. McIntyre further pushed an 
issue which Dublin North independent T.D. Alfie Byrne had raised in the Dáil, that of an 
order placed with a company in Leeds for suits for demobilised Free State soldiers. 
McIntyre pointed out that a number of clothing factories in the capital had recently closed 
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down and that such orders should be placed locally. The Standing Committee agreed to 
refer the matter to the Minister for Defence.
32
  
A Dublin North constituency resolution on 17 April 1924, during the party‟s crisis, 
sought to clarify the relationship that existed between the government, the party in the Dáil 
and the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation.
33
 MacNeill‟s efforts of the previous 
November had clearly been in vain. Dublin North wanted the Standing Committee to 
summon a national convention of party members to discuss and to define the relationships 
between organisation, Dáil party and government and to clarify the aims and policy of 
Cumann na nGaedheal. This proposal was unrealistic given that the annual convention had 
just taken place in January. The resolution was referred to the national executive which 
was summoned specially to a meeting on 13 May. Showing that the Dublin North 
constituency was independent, even of its (national) poll-topping T.D., Mulcahy wrote to 
Hughes to „protest most emphatically‟34 against the decision to convene a special meeting 
of the National Executive. McIntyre, in proposing the constituency‟s amended motion to 
the tempestuous 13 May meeting, called for greater consultation between the government 
and the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation prior to the introduction of unpopular 
legislation, that in future all the party‟s deputies be paid up members of cumainn, and that 
the deputies maintain closer contact with their constituency organisation. Deputies ought to 
maintain contact with „the people who have elected them‟, according to the Dublin North 
constituency chair. McIntyre also argued from the rank-and-file member‟s perspective that 
unpopular measures could plunge Cumann na nGaedheal into a general election where it 
would be expected to secure the re-election of an unpopular government.
35
 National 
Executive members from various constituencies concurred with McIntyre‟s analysis, and a 
discussion of the negative effect of government policies ensued. Kevin O‟Higgins told the 
meeting that McIntyre was doing the organisation a service by putting down his motion 
and urged that ministers be given greater opportunities to speak at grass-root meetings. The 
Standing Committee subsequently met a deputation from the Dáil party to arrange the 
means of more regular communication between the organisation and government. 
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In June the fallout from the secession of the National Group affected Dublin North. 
Two of the constituency‟s Cumann na nGaedheal deputies, Cahill and McGarry, had 
already left the party with the other secessionists. As John Regan has pointed out, the 
National Group deputies elicited little support in the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation, 
even in their own constituencies.
36
 In Dublin North, given that two of its deputies had left 
the party, there was a strong desire to reach some sort of compromise with the National 
Group. As such on 6 June, speaking at a Standing Committee meeting, McIntyre urged 
reunion with the McGrathites. As other historians have documented, the Standing 
Committee and organisation generally sought to maintain the unity of the party. Cosgrave 
too, as seen in previous chapters, appears to have adopted a more conciliatory line than 
some of his ministerial colleagues. The position of the Dublin North constituency was not 
out of line with the general feeling at many levels within Cumann na nGaedheal. 
Incidentally, correspondence from the Drumcondra cumann asking what action had been 
taken to act on decisions taken at the annual convention was also discussed at this meeting 
of the Standing Committee.
37
 However, by 17 June, Drumcondra and the Mountjoy ward 
branches told a constituency committee meeting of their intention to withdraw from 
Cumann na nGaedheal.
38
 The Standing Committee decided that four of its members, 
O‟Connor, McCullough, Doyle and Tierney, should meet the Dublin North cumainn to 
steady the ship in the city. The Dublin North organisation emerged intact, although 
undoubtedly it had been shaken by the secession of two deputies. By March 1925, a new 
branch had been established in Drumcondra.
39
 
Meetings of the Dublin North constituency committee continued to take place 
regularly. These enabled constituency officers to oversee the cumainn, which in turn could 
use that forum to raise issues deemed important by branch members. The constituency 
committee met at party headquarters in September, October, November and December 
1924 showing that party structures remained effective in Dublin North.  Branches were 
also active in the autumn and winter of 1924. Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll attended a 
meeting of the Glasnevin cumann, of which she was a member, in late September. There 
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she revealed that many of her party colleagues in the Dáil were opposed to the concept of 
paying dole money to the unemployed. The deputy, however, believed the dole was 
necessary until public work schemes could be found to replace it. The Glasnevin branch 
found the idea of paying money to the unemployed objectionable and agreed on a 
resolution to that effect. The branch meeting also referred to the work of the constituency 
committee of April and May in trying to work out the relations that should exist between 
the government, party and organisation. The branch decided to request that the 
constituency advise the Standing Committee of the desirability of summoning a special 
convention of the organisation to review its work and its relationship with the government 
and parliamentary party.
40
 This issue, originally raised by the constituency committee, 
rumbled on in the north city cumainn. The meeting also discussed the possible formation 
of a national boy-scout movement, a question that interested some of the members present. 
Glasnevin branch‟s resolution objecting to the dole was debated by members attending the 
October constituency meeting. Glasnevin branch succeeded in having the constituency 
committee adopt its motion calling for the abolition of the dole which was „undermining 
the character, and ruining the moral of the people‟.41  However, it should also be pointed 
out that the meeting also passed resolutions calling on the government to repeal or amend 
the Act reducing the Old Age Pension and to alert the Dublin Union Commissioners of the 
need to provide a coal supply for the city‟s destitute in winter. At this time Paddy McIntyre 
was sent to North Mayo by the Standing Committee to help organise it for the November 
1924 by-election.
42
 His value as an organiser was obviously appreciated by the Standing 
Committee. However, with two vacancies to be filled in Dublin North as a result of the 
resignation of Cahill and McGarry, McIntyre‟s talents would soon be needed in his own 
constituency. 
March 1925 by-election 
Chairing a Dublin North constituency meeting in November, McIntyre noted that the 
constituency had provided volunteers for by-elections in South Dublin and that his own 
Arran Quay cumann had authorised him to say such cooperation would again be 
forthcoming. Delegates from the Rotunda, Inns Quay, Clontarf east, north Dock and north 
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City branches promised to do likewise.
43
 Perhaps they were hoping for the favour to be 
reciprocated at the forthcoming March 1925 by-election in Dublin North? J.J. Walsh‟s new 
Organising Committee, discussed in chapter two, came into being as a consequence of the 
party‟s poor showing in the five November by-elections. It was charged with ensuring the 
March by-elections bore more fruitful results. The new committee paid close attention to 
candidate selection, and organisation, in Dublin North. A selection convention was held in 
headquarters on 28 December with Batt O‟Connor presiding. This convention selected 
Donal J. O‟Connor and a P.J. Lawrence as candidates. O‟Connor was described as an old 
Sinn Féiner and Gaelic League activist who lectured in accountancy in UCD. Lawrence, a 
prominent businessman, was selected to broaden the party‟s traditional Sinn Féin base as it 
attempted the gargantuan task of winning two seats in a constituency by-election. 
Interestingly, Séamus Hughes and McIntyre were proposed as candidates but both declined 
to let their names go before the convention.
44
 Perhaps the pair knew that the new party 
committee had a definite candidate strategy designed to attract middle-class and business 
support in the city. The Standing Committee ratified O‟Connor as a candidate on 9 January 
but not Lawrence.
45
 Another convention was arranged for 16 January to select the 
candidate for the second Dublin North vacancy. P.J. Leonard, also a prominent 
businessman was selected, 
46
 with the Standing Committee, still reserving the right of 
candidate ratification over Walsh‟s committee, providing formal sanction on the 23 
January.
47
 Dublin North was thrust once again into election mode. 
Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters became a bee-hive of election activity as the 
nine by-elections assumed the status of a mini general election. The party‟s campaign in 
Dublin was scheduled to begin on 1 February with a large meeting on College Green to be 
addressed by Cosgrave, Mulcahy and the two candidates. The two candidates for Dublin 
North held a meeting with party members on 28 January at headquarters. Leonard claimed 
that Cumann na nGaedheal had approached him to stand as a candidate because of the need 
to have strong business representatives in the Dáil, while O‟Connor said it was important 
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that voters shake off their apathy.
48
 The Dublin Evening Mail commented that Cumann na 
nGaedheal was in the field earlier than usual for this by-election contest and that if it 
performed poorly „the fault can hardly be traced to [a] lack of organisation‟.49 
 Cumann na nGaedheal‟s campaign opening was well attended and passed off with 
only minor interruptions. Characteristically, Cosgrave answered the interrupters with a 
sharp retort that questioned where the unruly section of his audience had been when they 
were needed during the War of Independence. Cosgrave paid a generous tribute to 
Mulcahy, who remained exiled on the Cumann na nGaedheal backbenches following the 
Army Mutiny, stating that the country‟s nationality was „safe in General Mulcahy‟s 
keeping‟.50 Cosgrave also made reference to the Dublin city North and South secessionists 
during his speech. He described Cahill, McGarry and Dublin South‟s McCarthy as old 
friends who had made a political mistake by resigning their seats. By 1927, it seems that at 
least some of the fall-out from the secessionists in Dublin North had been resolved. During 
the September 1927 election campaign, Francis Cahill, presided at a Cumann na nGaedheal 
meeting.
51
 Another meeting of North Dublin party members was held on 4 February. J.J. 
Walsh, as head of the new Organising Committee, chaired the meeting. A house-to-house 
collection in North Dublin was organised to secure funds for the campaign while a 
committee to secure finance from the „more wealthy people‟ was established under the 
chairmanship of M.J. Moran.
52
 In what seems to have been part of the overall strategy of 
attracting the support of business people, the report of the meeting noted that a large 
number of businessmen attended. 
Sinn Féin tried to portray Cumann na nGaedheal as a pro-British party during the 
March by-elections. One effective poster depicted a skeleton waving a Union flag from a 
cupboard marked „Cumann na nGaedheal‟.53 The anti-Treaty party also capitalised on 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s internal difficulties by portraying it as a government at war with 
itself. Other posters were more provocative, such as that portraying Ireland as a woman, 
tied to a stake, with both Cosgrave and Craig holding a knife to her neck. Other posters 
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alleged that the Dublin constituencies where Cumann na nGaedheal support was strong 
benefited from patronage.  
 As in any other constituency, numerous Cumann na nGaedheal public meetings 
were organised as part of the campaign. In addition, a large placard supporting the North 
Dublin candidates adorned party headquarters. According to the placard, the two 
candidates stood for peace and stability while this slogan was flanked by quotes from both 
Griffith and Collins.
54
 Another meeting of election workers was held on 9 February. This 
meeting was addressed by Mulcahy, Batt O‟Connor and the two candidates. When asked 
for their thoughts on progress, workers said there was more interest in the party than before 
and that they believed the two seats in Dublin North could be won.
55
 Meetings with the 
candidates took place at various centres in the constituency, such as Spensor Dock and 
Amiens Street. Walsh‟s committee was happy with the performance of the party machine 
in Dublin North, describing it as „practically perfect‟. However, the committee faced up to 
the reality and acknowledged that unless 60,000 votes were secured there was little chance 
of the party winning both seats on offer.
56
 On the day of the election itself, Cumann na 
nGaedheal paraded a donkey through the streets of north Dublin which bore the slogan 
„Everybody but me is voting for Leonard and O‟Connor‟. Confident it would win in 
Dublin North, the party arranged a victory demonstration on College Green with Cosgrave 
and O‟Higgins as the main speakers. Cumann na nGaedheal secured seven of the nine 
vacancies, with Dublin North‟s two seats being shared between Leonard and anti-Treaty 
Sinn Féin‟s Oscar Traynor. Seán Milroy, representing the National Group, finished bottom 
of the poll.
57
 Given that the party had done well nationally, and that the strength of the 
original Treaty party had not been weakened by the secessionists, the Dublin Evening Mail 
reported that the spirits of government supporters attending the College Green 
demonstration were high.
58
 
By the summer of 1925, it would appear that some of the Dublin North branches had 
failed, or were slow, to affiliate. Again, we are hampered by the absence of party 
membership records from the period but we can say that in June there seems to have been 
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no affiliated branch in Clontarf, while the Rotunda ward was now incorporated in the Inns 
Quay branch. The north city, Arran Quay, Glasnevin and Drumcondra cumainn completed 
a list of five constituency branches which existed in June 1925. 
59
 However, the 
constituency committee continued to play an active role in the life of the organisation 
nationally. It submitted a resolution to the 1925 annual convention which called for the 
enactment of legislation to enable the seats of deputies who failed to take their seats in the 
Dáil to be given to the candidate with the next highest number of votes.
60
   
Two of the constituency‟s T.D.s continued to show strong interest in the organisation 
and the minutes of the 1925 annual convention show that both Mulcahy and Collins-
O‟Driscoll were elected to the National Executive with the strong support of delegates. 
Mulcahy later used his strong support within the Cumann na nGaedheal grass-roots to 
manoeuvre his way back into the Executive Council. Mulcahy topped the poll in elections 
to the National Executive at consecutive annual conferences and pointed this out to his 
colleagues in 1926. Having been under the impression he was not wanted in cabinet, 
Mulcahy said: 
In March 1924 a political accident occurred which has prevented me since that time having any 
hand or say in the administrative work of the government or in the Counsels of the Executive. In 
withdrawing from the Executive Council at the time I considered that I served best the interests 
of the country and of the Organisation...from many individual members in many parts of the 
country I have over and over again received every mark of confidence. The fact that each Ard 
Fheis held since that time placed me at the head of the members elected on the Ard Comhairle 
has been to me, at any rate, a mark of sustained confidence.
61
 
 Given that the constituency lay so close to the seat of power, it was reasonably easy 
for deputies to maintain regular contact with the organisation through their attendance at 
cumainn meetings. The constituency organisation itself was a broad church, even with the 
secession of the National Group element. In September, the constituency committee passed 
a resolution more in keeping with de Valera‟s Fianna Fáil party of the 1930s. The 
resolution proposed the rolling out of a new tillage scheme in Irish agriculture. Hugh 
Conway argued that such a plan would provide employment in the countryside and stop the 
trickle of men from Kildare and Meath coming into Dublin seeking work. As noted 
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elsewhere, there was a sense that Dubliners resented the migration of the rural poor to the 
capital.
62
 Conway also said he was surprised that narrow self-interest was blinding the 
opponents of tillage, even if he admitted he understood such opposition given that grazing 
yielded many farmers big profits. The constituency‟s newly elected T.D. P.J. Leonard 
interjected that while he could see the merits in the proposal, he could not agree to 
compulsory tillage, given that some soils were simply unsuited to the practice.
63
 It is likely 
that few of those who attended the meeting were involved in farming and as such the 
discussion was probably of a less partial nature than that likely to have taken place in more 
rural settings. However, those who spoke displayed a keen knowledge of agricultural 
policy, a willingness to speak out against the prevailing orthodoxy in their own party and 
most interestingly, a concern with a higher national ideal than the „narrow self interest‟ 
denounced by Hugh Conway. Creating employment and making better use of the country‟s 
land appear to be the main motivations behind the debate. 
As noted in chapter two, in December 1925 the Boundary Agreement, also known as 
the London Agreement, occupied the agenda of many cumainn meetings as the party tried 
to avoid the ruptures which characterised the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. A private 
meeting of representatives of Cumann na nGaedheal in the three Dublin constituencies was 
held in 5 Parnell Square on 13 December. Though the meeting was held behind closed 
doors, a report of the proceedings was issued to the press. It is unlikely any opposition to 
the Agreement expressed by members would have evaded publication. O‟Higgins took the 
lead in explaining the circumstances leading to the Agreement while two Ulstermen in 
attendance, a Mr. Chromie and H.M Murphy, expressed support for the accord. It is 
possible that the two Ulstermen were strategically chosen for the official report of the 
meeting. Both men were active in the organisation but their support of the Boundary 
Agreement must have carried heavier weight than that of members from outside the 
northern province.
64
 
The newly established National League was busily organised branches in North 
Dublin, with some success, in the autumn and winter of 1926. However, Cumann na 
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nGaedheal was still active, even if it lacked the dynamism of previous years. The 
Glasnevin cumann brought a resolution to the 1926 annual convention suggesting the 
raising of the rate of interest on deposits in the GPO to 4% on the grounds that it would 
offer a safe investment for the thrifty members of society, make cheap money available to 
people for development schemes, and that it would give people an interest in electing 
stable government.
65
 With no election imminent, the North Dublin machine was less 
visible than it had been at any time since the party‟s foundation. Meetings at this time were 
of a routine nature. The aforementioned Ulsterman H.M. Murphy presided at the AGM of 
the Glasnevin branch in December. Collins-O‟Driscoll, as branch secretary (it seems 
deputies could be cumann officers), read a report of its activities over the course of the 
previous year. Members were told that the future of the country would depend on their 
work on behalf of Cumann na nGaedheal before the next general election. Citing the 
remarkably low electoral turnout in the constituency at both the previous general election 
and the by-election of the previous year, many members expressed support for the 
introduction of a compulsory voting Bill.
66
 This had been discussed at the May annual 
convention on the proposition of the Dundalk branch. Whether influenced by their 
colleagues in Dundalk or not, the issue was now taken up by the Glasnevin cumann. 
There was a noticeable sense of purpose about the efforts of the Dublin North 
constituency organisation from January 1927. This was a general election year and the 
political machine of the government was warming up for the contest. The Dublin Evening 
Mail remarked in early January on the electoral preparations then taking place at Cumann 
na nGaedheal headquarters. It was clear that the organisation was limbering up for a 
general election campaign. Glasnevin Cumann na nGaedheal met again in early January. A 
discussion of the role of the National Army ensued at the meeting. One branch member 
was keen to see the army utilised as a means of inculcating a sense of national pride and 
dispelling a „pessimism and cynicism which is so prevalent in some quarters‟.67 Showing 
something of the cultural division between the capital and the countryside, the member 
proposing the new role for the army suggested that it should be engaged occasionally in 
colourful marches and parades in rural areas. Clearly to this Dublin member at least, it was 
rural areas where enhanced nationality and citizenship needed to be fostered. Being 
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supportive of the Free State, perhaps the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation was 
determined to show that the new state was in fact coterminous with national identity. By 
marching the army through the countryside, and thereby showcasing an important 
manifestation of Irish independence, the Free State and its government could be more 
readily reconciled with the nationalist aspirations of the population at large. However, save 
for the annual commemoration of Collins and Griffith and the St. Patrick‟s day parade, the 
government had little time (or resources) for pageantry and since the Civil War had shown 
a clear determination to becalm militarism within the regime by showing that power lay 
within the cabinet and ultimately with the civilian ministers. The idea remained just that, 
an idea.
68
 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s reorganising efforts in Dublin north continued in spring 
1927 with a meeting of the Wood Quay branch in early February and the formation of a 
new cumann in Clontarf in March. The former Clontarf east and west branches had lapsed 
and the new cumann was designed to cover both wards. Liam Burke, alongside deputies 
Leonard and Collins-O‟Driscoll, attended the meeting to establish the new Clontarf branch 
on 1 March.
69
 A new committee was formed and the meeting concluded after discussing 
how to thoroughly organise the party in both wards. The important work of organising for 
the general election was also discussed at the meeting while the two deputies explained 
government policy to those present.
70
 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s campaign in Dublin North began on 19 May with the 
party‟s five candidates addressing a large meeting in the Rotunda concert hall. Mulcahy 
told the meeting that no country had a higher status in the Commonwealth than Ireland and 
that the government was prepared to cooperate and have friendly relations with Britain and 
other nations. Collins-O‟Driscoll told the meeting that the Republicans were trying to fool 
the unemployed and the destitute by blaming the government for their woes.
71
 Meetings 
were organised in much the same way as they had been for the previous general election. 
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Figure 2: Vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates June 1927.
72
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote. 
Alfred Byrne Independent 17,780 
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedheal 11,726 
Seán Thomas O‟Kelly Fianna Fáil 6,040 
Oscar Traynor Sinn Féin  4,351 
Kathleen Clarke Fianna Fáil 3,818 
John Joseph Byrne Cumann na nGaedheal 2,267 
Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll Cumann na nGaedheal 2,267 
Dennis Cullen Labour 1,692 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s June 1927 election result in Dublin North was as 
disappointing as it had been anywhere else. P.J. Leonard lost his seat as the party returned 
just three members from Dublin North to the Dáil. Moreover, the party‟s overall vote was 
down in the constituency and its representation in Dublin North was now on a par with the 
combined seat total of the anti-Treatyites of Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin. There had been 
considerable slippage in the Cumann na nGaedheal vote in its urban stronghold. As noted 
previously, the election left Cosgrave with just a precarious hold on power and the decision 
of Fianna Fáil to take the Oath further tightened the Dáil arithmetic. Cosgrave‟s 
administration, having survived a confidence motion on the casting vote of the Ceann 
Conhairle, the Dublin North constituency committee met in early August to pass a 
resolution commending the parliamentary party for their continued support of the 
government in the Dáil.
73
 The loss of a seat in Dublin North rankled and the organisation 
stepped up its activism in response. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s campaign in Dublin North for the September 1927 election 
was marked by a greater intensity, and more closely resembled the activism evident in the 
1923 contest. Constituency public meetings were covered more extensively by the press 
than in June and parades and bands arranged to coincide with campaigning added a splash 
of colour to the party‟s efforts to regain its lost seat.74 In contrast to the two rural 
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constituencies looked at in this study, Dublin North‟s geographical size allowed for a lot of 
ground to be covered in one day of electioneering. As such, meetings in different parts of 
Dublin North could be scheduled in one evening with the same speakers. On 6 September 
meetings were held in Hardwicke Place and Doyle‟s Corner. These reflected a palpable 
frustration in Treatyite circles with the inconclusive verdict of the people in June. Margaret 
Collins-O‟Driscoll, as she did numerous times during the campaign, asked voters to give a 
decisive verdict in favour of the government. She also criticised de Valera‟s visit to the 
United States during the War of Independence while her „poor brother [Collins] could not 
get a bed to lie on in Dublin‟.75 The tone of many Dublin North meetings was negative 
with candidates expressing their opposition to all the other parties, rather than focussing on 
the positive reasons why people should support Cumann na nGaedheal. On the following 
evening meetings on Fairview Avenue and Church Road heard a somewhat more positive 
message emanating from the Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. Cumann na nGaedheal 
was the party of „peace and stability‟ while Collins-O‟Driscoll said the people did not want 
another quarrel with England, implying this would be the result if the reins of government 
changed hands.
76
 The Church Road meeting also heard that Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
platform was broad enough to hold all the people of the Free State. In its own eyes at least, 
Cumann na nGaedheal was still the National Party it set its stall out as in 1922/23. Cumann 
na nGaedheal‟s grass-root support in the north city was in high spirits concluding the 
Church Road meeting with three cheers for President Cosgrave. 
Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll‟s re-election efforts were noticed by the Irish 
Independent, which described her as a tireless worker who had on numerous occasions 
addressed two to three meetings in the constituency each night.
77
 The well respected vice-
chair of the party organisation, was at the forefront of the Cumann na nGaedheal campaign 
in her constituency. Again she implored her constituents to leave no doubt as to their 
preferred choice of government on this occasion when addressing a meeting in Glasnevin 
on 9 September. Invoking the faith Arthur Griffith had placed in the intelligence of the 
Irish electorate Collins-O‟Driscoll asked voters to support Cumann na nGaedheal. 
Promised peace the dangers of a de Valera government and the memory of the dead 
Treatyite leaders were all utilised in Dublin North in an effort to gain support.  Liam 
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Burke, noted the enthusiasm of Dublin North members and the fact that it had secured 
more vehicles than any other party to help transport voters to the polling stations.
78
 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s election strategy and organisational efforts worked. Patrick 
Leonard regained his seat as Fianna Fáil failed to capitalise on the withdrawal of Sinn Féin 
from the contest. The pro-Treaty vote had rallied to the government. In Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s old stronghold, the forward march of de Valera had been halted. 
Figure 3: Vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates September 1927.
79
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote. 
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedheal 14,597 
Alfred Byrne Independent 11,864 
James Larkin (Sen.) Independent Labour 7.490 
Seán Thomas O‟Kelly Fianna Fáil 6,958 
Eamon Cooney Fianna Fáil 3,477 
John Joseph Byrne Cumann na nGaedheal 2,935 
Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll Cumann na nGaedheal 2,274 
Patrick Leonard Cumann na nGaedheal 2,068 
 
Dublin North Social Club 
Having successfully completed its electoral task, the Dublin North constituency 
organisation turned once again to the question of providing social entertainment for its 
members. By November 1927, Cumann na nGaedheal had formed a constituency social 
club in Dublin North which operated from party headquarters. The club, which was 
pioneering in its own right, organised a wide variety of activities for members. These 
ranged from billiard and snooker nights, Irish dancing classes and card games. Dance 
classes for children took place on Saturday afternoons, Monday evening was bridge night 
with whist drives taking place on Thursday‟s at 8pm. There was something for everyone, 
and in keeping with the constituency organisation‟s concern with nationality, Irish events 
held a prominent place in the club‟s programme. An advert for the social club placed in the 
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Freeman assured Cumann na nGaedheal members: „[It is] a Ceád Mile Fáilte they‟ll give 
you down at No.5‟.80  
 In terms of providing a social outlet for members, Dublin North was something of a 
trend-setter within Cumann na nGaedheal. As noted above, the impetus for the original 
central branch came from the constituency committee‟s concern with providing a social 
outlet for members. The Freeman was keen to impress upon its readers the merits in the 
organisation becoming a facilitator of the social entertainment of party supporters. For 
example, on Christmas Eve 1927, cumainn were urged not to neglect the social side of 
political organisation over the course of the new year. Members were warned that 
sometimes the best workers were lost to the party because they had to look outside 
Cumann na nGaedheal when seeking a social life.
81
 Of course, we must bear in mind that it 
was much easier for the city-based organisation to arrange an attractive array of social 
events given that it could use party headquarters for a small fee and members did not have 
to travel great distances. Even though we saw Fr. Markey in Ballinalee inform his branch 
that it ought to become a medium of social entertainment for the district, we must 
recognise that it would be extremely difficult for rural branches such as Ballinalee in 
Longford or Lahinch in Clare to maintain anything like the more regular schedule of events 
on offer in Dublin North. Such was the in-built advantage of organisation in the country‟s 
capital. 
Fianna Fáil at this time was also engaged in similar cultural activities. In fact some of 
Fianna Fail‟s pronouncements mirrored those of Dublin North Cumann na nGaedheal. 
Fianna Fáil urged members to join Irish language classes, to take lectures in Irish history 
and to ensure social events were comprised at least partially of Irish dancing. In addition, 
the party pledged to support that year‟s Tailteann games.82 In 1924, anti-Treatyites had 
boycotted the games. In January 1929, a Fianna Fáil central branch was established. 
Named, Craobh na Féinne, like its Cumann na nGaedheal counterpart, it operated outside 
the party‟s official structures. Membership was by invitation or by election of a local 
Fianna Fáil cumann.
83
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Jim Larkin‟s disqualification as a T.D. caused an April 1928 by-election in Dublin 
North. As such, the Cumann na nGaedheal constituency committee and social club were 
both busy organising in January and February. Batt O‟Connor delivered a lecture on the 
lives of Griffith and Collins to the Dublin North organisation in early January, while the 
constituency committee itself passed a resolution in early February congratulating 
Cosgrave on the success of his recent visit to the United States.
84
 The constituency social 
club marked Cosgrave‟s return by hosting a smoking concert at party headquarters. These 
smoking concerts were a favourite of the club, and talented musicians were generally 
invited to perform.
85
 Social events may have helped to maintain the cohesion of the 
organisation which was called into action in March for the aforementioned by-election. 
Cumann na nGaedheal selected Vincent Rice, formerly of the National League, as its 
candidate. In a three way contest Rice saw off the challenge of Kathleen Clarke and James 
Larkin.
86
 Following the by-election the organisation remained active, with occasional 
cumainn meetings during the summer. Not to be outdone by the cumainn, the constituency 
social club organised some summer activities in the process maintaining its good repute 
within the wider national organisation. Ms. M. Coleman was secretary of the club in 
August 1928. Membership was set at 10s annually and the club was open to „all citizens 
who support Cumann na nGaedheal‟.87 This suggests that one did not necessary have to be 
a card carrying branch member to avail of the club‟s offerings. The party newspaper was 
very supportive of the club‟s activities and by September social clubs began to appear in 
other parts of the country. The positive coverage of the Dublin North social club seems to 
have sparked interest in other centres showing that the constituency had lead the way 
within the Treatyite organisation. 
Political considerations dominated the early months of 1929 as the Dublin North 
constituency faced yet another by-election test. This by-election was caused by the election 
of independent deputy Alfie Byrne, as a Cumann na nGaedheal nominee,
88
 to the Free 
State Senate. T.F. O‟Higgins, brother of the late Vice-President, was chosen as the party‟s 
candidate for the Dublin North by-election by a selection convention that took place in the 
Rotunda. O‟Higgins was educated at Clongowes Wood and U.C.D where he studied 
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medicine before practicing as a doctor. Cumann na nGaedheal began its campaign for the 
14 March by-election in February. Fianna Fáil selected Oscar Traynor, a late convert from 
the rump left behind in Sinn Féin, as its candidate, and both parties were actively 
campaigning by late February.
89
 The indefatigable R.J. Purcell was drafted in to help 
organise the constituency for the by-election campaign. On 28 February, he presided at a 
large meeting on Seville Place in support of O‟Higgins. The meeting was also addressed 
by Liam Burke, transatlantic flight hero Colonel Fitzmaurice and the candidate himself.
90
 
Fitzmaurice helped garner support for Cumann na nGaedheal‟s candidate by dropping 
handbills in support of O‟Higgins, from his plane, onto the streets of north Dublin. It was 
the first time an aeroplane was used in an Irish election campaign.
91
  Like his late brother 
O‟Higgins proved an able public speaker with a keen grasp of both local and national 
issues. He told the Seville Place meeting that £6m had been spent on trying to alleviate 
unemployment and that there were a higher percentage of people out of work in Belfast 
than there was in Dublin. On 10 March Cosgrave addressed an election meeting on middle 
Abbey Street. The new Cumann na nGaedheal newspaper, The Star, clearly believed the 
result of the by-election was a forgone conclusion. The party had a candidate who was a 
„Nationalist to the core‟ and the contest would be easily won with „energetic campaigning‟ 
in a constituency described as intelligent and nationally minded.
92
 The Star‟s optimism was 
justified given that the constituency was consistently a party stronghold. However, the seat 
was won only by a narrow majority with O‟Higgins finishing just 151 votes ahead of Oscar 
Traynor.
93
 In the international press, O‟Higgins‟s victory in Dublin North was portrayed as 
having saved the Cosgrave government.
94
 Little cheer was evident in the Cumann na 
nGaedheal paper. The Star lamented the ingratitude of the electorate. According to its 
columns, „millions‟ benefited from economy in spending but there were no electoral 
rewards for those who implemented it; meanwhile the handful of those negatively affected 
generated a „frenzy‟ of outrage.95 However, the Dublin North organisation was quite 
satisfied with the result and modestly passed a motion congratulating the government on its 
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victory in the by-election.
96
 The National Executive was equally impressed that the seat 
was won. O‟Higgins had overcome a powerful alliance of anti-Treatyites and the „Larkin 
element‟ to secure victory according to the minutes of its end of year meeting.97 
In 1930, Cumann na nGaedheal in Dublin continued to cooperate with business 
interests. With municipal elections due, it was widely held that Cumann na nGaedheal 
would not challenge the business vote but rather would support their candidates.
98
 In 
October, the Dublin North constituency executive met. John Homan presided. It is worth 
noting that Francis Cahill attended this meeting though its main business reveals the close 
ties between Cumann na nGaedheal and Alfred Byrne at this time. At the meeting, T.F. 
O‟Higgins announced that Cumann na nGaedheal would endorse Byrne as Lord Mayor of 
Dublin.
99
 Alfred Byrne of course had given up his seat in the Dáil to become a Senator but 
would return to the Dáil after the 1932 election. The report of the meeting also reveals that 
Collins-O‟Driscoll continued her long crusade on behalf of the unemployed. In her 
remarks, the T.D. urged the government to launch a national development scheme to 
alleviate unemployment. The social functions of the organisation in Dublin North 
continued to cover a wide spectrum. For example, in September 1931 Mrs. Mulcahy 
presented medals to the champions of various tennis competitions organised by it duringthe 
year. The club organised a dance after the presentations and Liam Burke attended 
alongside Cumann na nGaedheal deputies for Dublin North.
100
 
 
The 1932 election in Dublin North 
Dublin North was one of the last constituencies to select its Cumann na nGaedheal 
candidates for the 1932 election. As before, the Cumann na nGaedheal campaign 
comprised public meetings in various parts of the constituency combined with major 
demonstrations taking place in the city centre for the candidates from both the capital‟s 
constituencies. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s Dublin North agent for the candidates was once 
again P.F. O‟Reilly. As part of its election campaign, a pamphlet providing biographical 
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details of the party‟s six candidates was published. In addition to providing those details, 
The North Dublin Election News also offered stern anti-Fianna Fáil propaganda.
101
 From 6 
February, both major parties were in full campaign mode in the constituency with 
numerous meetings taking place while Cosgrave was scheduled to address a major Dublin 
city rally on 14 February.
102
 The rally was well attended with amplifiers carrying President 
Cosgrave‟s address to all those present. However, as the table below shows, the Cumann 
na nGaedheal vote in Dublin North did not hold up. Despite possessing a strong 
organisation in the north city, the party‟s campaign betrayed an element of complacency 
and lack of dynamism. Fianna Fáil gained two seats in the former Cumann na nGaedheal 
stronghold. 
 
Figure 4: Vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates in 1932.
103
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote. 
Alfred Byrne Independent 18,170 
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedheal 9,477 
Seán Thomas O‟Kelly Fianna Fáil 9,176 
Oscar Traynor Fianna Fáil 7,850 
Cormac Breathnach  Fianna Fáil 3,491 
Eamon Cooney Fianna Fáil 3,060 
Margaret Collins-O‟Driscoll Cumann na nGaedheal 2,715 
John Joseph Byrne Cumann na nGaedheal 2,113 
 
The Dublin North organisation proposed a motion to the 1932 annual convention 
which dealt with the disturbances that had taken place at Cumann na nGaedheal election 
meetings across the country. The motion urged that „it behoves Cumann na nGaedheal to 
organise in every parish in the Saorstát a body of men pledged to stand shoulder to 
shoulder in the putting down of organised rowdyism [sic] and disorder at public 
meetings‟.104 This suggests that the eventual synthesis of the Army Comrades Association 
into an organisation of stewards for Treatyite political meetings had roots deep in the 
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Cumann na nGaedheal organisation too. We have seen that Cumann na nGaedheal 
meetings in Dublin were subject to frequent interruption, albeit of a less severe nature than 
that witnessed in Clare or Longford/Westmeath. Disruption of political meetings was a 
national issue, which affected Treatyites in particular, and Dublin North‟s motion can be 
interpreted as a response to the disturbances. Again, the constituency can be seen as 
something of a microcosm of the mutterings heard within broader Treatyite circles in 1932. 
Addressing Dublin North Cumann na nGaedheal in 1933, Mulcahy claimed that the ACA 
had checked a movement of great violence during the recent elections. He asked for the 
same spirit that had resisted laws against „the wearing of the green‟ to again show itself 
and questioned what national purpose was served in making laws against the „wearing of 
the blue‟.105 Such rhetoric was unlikely to resonate outside the Cumann na nGaedheal fold. 
There was no wholesale reorganisation of the party in Dublin North, of the type of 
scale witnessed in Clare or Dublin North, after the 1932 election. It seems that what branch 
structure was already in place was deemed sufficient, and instead, organising efforts were 
directed towards weak constituencies such as Clare. The snap election of January 1933 
provided the party organisation with what would prove to be its last electoral challenge. 
With headquarters now located on Merrion Square in Dublin South, the hustle and bustle 
of the opposition party‟s campaign emanated from there rather than 5 Parnell Square and 
its environs. Cosgrave‟s national tour has been discussed in previous chapters so it is 
sufficient to state here that a major campaign effort was also planned in the supposedly 
„safe‟ Cumann na nGaedheal heartland of Dublin City.106 An Evening Mail reporter 
described, in some detail, the scene in Merrion Square in the early stages of the 1933 
campaign. Ex ministers were constantly „in and out‟ of party headquarters, over 100 people 
were busily engaged in various duties on the ground floor while paid Cumann na 
nGaedheal staff were quietly working upstairs.
107
 The seemingly supportive reporter went 
further: „Cumann na nGaedheal is one of the best organised political machines in any 
country. The fact that there are only three weeks to the election will make little difference 
to its prospects‟.  
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s Dublin North selection convention took place on 4 January. 
As witnessed elsewhere, a more nationalistic tone was struck at the convention, with 
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Mulcahy calling for the immediate union of Ireland and laying the blame for partition 
firmly on England‟s shoulders.108 Now that it was an opposition party Cumann na 
nGaedheal could not help but have recourse to the type of nationalistic rhetoric it had long 
denounced its opponents for engaging in. The Cumann na nGaedheal campaign in Dublin 
North opened on 8 January with a meeting of its candidates on Findlater‟s corner 
O‟Connell street. This meeting was a stormy affair which witnessed fierce disruption. It 
seems that the lorry used as a platform was set upon by interrupters as Mulcahy faced „the 
angry element with an extraordinarily calm demeanour‟ while the „lorry on which he stood 
rocked like a boat on a rough sea‟.109 The meeting had been rushed by Republicans who 
succeeded in collapsing the platform.
110
 This violent meeting made the international press. 
The Manchester Guardian reported that wild scenes had marked the meeting and that 
groups of interrupters had chanted slogans and sang songs as speakers tried to address 
voters.
111
 Only those near the platform could hear the speeches and a determined effort to 
rush the platform was made while Collins-O‟Driscoll spoke. Windows were smashed at 5 
Parnell square and a reported 700 Blueshirt stewards were present at the Cumann na 
nGaedheal meeting. Later Cumann na nGaedheal charged that the meeting had been 
inadequately policed although Mulcahy‟s courage in the face of the attempt to wreck the 
meeting was widely lauded in the press. Cumann na nGaedheal enlisted the support of the 
Blueshirts for its final rally in Dublin. This meeting was addressed by Cosgrave under a 
banner which read „Cosgrave for Ireland, Ireland for Cosgrave‟. That there was a crowd of 
30,000 in College Green is attested to by surviving film footage of the meeting on the 
British pathe website.
112
 Large numbers of Blueshirts were deployed through the crowd 
and the meeting passed without major incident with just two cases arising out of 
disturbances at the meeting being brought before Dublin District court.
113
 United Irishman 
was most pleased with the success of the College Green demonstration.
114
 In the final days 
of the campaign the Cumann na nGaedheal apparatus rolled into Marina, Cabra, 
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Phibsboro‟ and Aughrim street.115  In Fairview, the gardaí took extensive precaution to 
ensure the Cumann na nGaedheal speakers received a fair hearing.
116
The constituency 
closed its campaign with a rally in 1 and 2 North Earl Street where last minute advice was 
dispatched to voters. A musical programme brought the final rally, and the opposition 
party‟s general election campaign, to a close.117 
 
Figure 5: Vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates in 1933.
118
 
Candidate Party First Preference Vote. 
Seán Thomas O‟Kelly Fianna Fáil 17,053 
Alfred Byrne Independent 14,472 
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedheal 8,864 
Cormac Breathnach Fianna Fáil 5,923 
Oscar Traynor Fianna Fáil 5,143 
Vincent Rice Cumann na nGaedheal 5,045 
Eamon Cooney Fianna Fáil 4,685 
Patrick Belton Cumann na nGaedheal 2,989 
 
As can be gauged from the table above, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s strength in the 
constituency remained as it had been in 1932. Patrick Belton, formerly of Fianna Fáil, and 
active farming representative,
119
 replaced Collins-O‟Driscoll as a Cumann na nGaedheal 
T.D. for Dublin North. Commenting on the election, the New York Times described the loss 
of Collins-O‟Driscoll as an „outstanding defeat‟ for Cumann na nGaedheal on a day when 
it had lost votes to the Centre Party and Fianna Fáil.
120
 Belton was a sinister figure who 
began as an advocate of Griffithite protectionism in Fianna Fáil before leaving to join 
Cumann na nGaedheal. He would later become a dabbler in the politics of the far right as a 
leading Blueshirt and Irish Christian Front activist.
121
 Belton was later expelled from Fine 
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Gael in 1934 in the wake of O‟Duffy‟s rancorous departure as the movement‟s 
president.
122
  
In January 1933 the electorate had, by a decisive an unambiguous margin, placed 
Cumann na nGaedheal in opposition. For the organisation in Dublin North, life continued 
largely as before. Whereas the party apparatus received considerable attention in the spring 
of 1933 under the direction of Mulcahy and his reorganising efforts, in Dublin North, the 
structures remained as they had been while the cumainn themselves got on with the 
mundane work of organising meetings and social functions. On 7 March the North Dock 
Michael Collins cumann elected a new committee at its AGM in the former party 
headquarters of 5 Parnell Square, which was still used by the north city organisation. 
Possibly exaggerating for propaganda purposes, the latest party newspaper United 
Irishman reported that the meeting had attracted an unusually large attendance.
123
 The 
branch elected a separate committee to oversee the preparation of social functions. In this 
period, branch meetings were sometimes held in the homes of grass-root members. For 
instance, in June the Drumcondra cumann AGM took place at the home of Mark Wilson of 
81 lower Dorset Street. Again United Irishman reported that a large number of people 
attended and that „new blood‟ had enrolled during the meeting.124 
 Once again, social functions became the mainstay of Cumann na nGaedheal life in 
Dublin North. Whether it functioned as a society or was just a label given to party 
supporters who liked the sport, a Dublin North Michael Collins boxing club existed in the 
spring of 1933. Boxing was a feature of the Blueshirt movement‟s sporting features 
showing considerable overlap between the various Treatyite organisations in 1933. The 
Arthur Griffith cumann, which enrolled twenty eight new members according to United 
Irishman, ended its AGM with musical entertainment at 5 Parnell Square. A constituency 
social club meeting on 29 March was attended by 120 members showing that the machine 
remained strong in the constituency. Mulcahy and John A. Costello addressed the meeting. 
Each cumann was asked to select two delegates to represent them on the social club 
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committee.
125
 The powers behind the social club were quite clearly trying to tie the rest of 
the constituency organisation into its endeavours to provide social entertainment.  
Ladies‟ branches of Cumann na nGaedheal, pioneered by female party supporters in 
Cork, spread to Dublin in March 1933. Liam Burke attended a meeting at party 
headquarters on 27 March where it was decided to extend the initiative to the Dublin city 
constituencies. Mrs. Cosgrave was also in attendance as Burke said the new body could 
induce „larger numbers of women and young girls to take an active part in the work of the 
organisation‟.126 It was intended that women‟s branches of Cumann na nGaedheal would 
spread across the city, north and south. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s ladies‟ branches coincided 
with the growth of the Blue blouses in perhaps more rural constituencies. Women were 
attracted into O‟Duffy‟s uniformed movement for the same reasons as men with cultural 
and sporting activities providing social interaction.
127
 On Fine Gael‟s foundation, a party 
handbook, similar to those issued by Cumann na nGaedheal in previous years, advocated 
the „organisation of women either in separate or in mixed branches as local circumstances 
may determine‟. In a reference to the Blue blouses and Cumann na nGaedheal‟s ladies‟ 
branches the handbook said existing women‟s organisation had shown its worth. Women 
were often more important and „effective in Organisation than the man‟.128 
 However, segregation of the sexes was not a feature of Cumann na nGaedheal 
generally and some women were involved in the regular branches. One such woman was a 
Mrs. F. Ceannt newly elected to the chair of the Rotunda branch. She led a committee that 
was dominated by male officers.
129
 Following the lead of other Dublin North branches who 
had recently honoured Collins and Griffith in their names, the Rotunda branch decided that 
in future it would be known as the Tom Keogh cumann. The Dublin North branches 
themselves were very active at this time, particularly the Mountjoy ward, and the Michael 
Collins and Arthur Griffith cumainn. Membership of the Michael Collins cumann had 
doubled according to the United Irishman. As alluded to, the constituency structure in 
Dublin North remained as it had been. Whereas in the large rural constituencies, district 
committees had always marked Cumann na nGaedheal organisation, these never made an 
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appearance in Dublin North. Even with Cumann na nGaedheal preparing to contest local 
elections for the first time, there was no attempt to sub-divide the constituency into new 
local divisions as there was in the spring and summer of 1933 in Clare and 
Longford/Westmeath. Instead the constituency committee continued as the sole overseeing 
unit, with Mulcahy addressing a meeting of it in July.
130
 
As the evidence in the preceding paragraphs suggest, as in the constituencies of Clare 
and Longford/Westmeath, the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in Dublin North was in 
good shape before the foundation of Fine Gael in September 1933. The only difference 
there being that the activism of Cumann na nGaedheal in the city seems to have been 
organic and not extracted through any pressure piled from above on the local organisation. 
The new Fine Gael organisation inherited from Cumann na nGaedheal in Dublin North an 
enthusiastic and active branch structure. The experience of the John Devoy Cumann na 
nGaedheal branch is typical of the plight of the party‟s local units in the capital after the 
merger. Meeting on 5 October, members of the branch were introduced to the new party‟s 
scheme of organisation by an organiser. After listening to the organiser‟s presentation, 
branch member P.J. Murray proposed a resolution that „this branch adopt the principles 
and policy of Fine Gael and that the branch be known as the John Devoy Cumann Fine 
Gael‟.131 Without the presence of the Farmers‟ and Ratepayers‟ League organisation, 
Dublin North Fine Gael simply took on much the appearance of a renamed Cumann na 
nGaedheal. 
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6 
 
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal: Isolated instance or part of a European 
phenomenon? 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapters Cumann na nGaedheal‟s organisational strength was 
examined. Numerous works have linked the party‟s electoral demise with a perceived 
paucity of living, pro-Treaty constituency structures in the 1920s and early 1930s. Party 
leaders were said to have displayed a „positive contempt‟ for the whole business of grass-
root mobilisation in contrast to the organisational flair that characterised their opponents in 
Fianna Fáil. Part I of this thesis has shed new light on Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
constituency activism while demonstrating that organisational problems were even 
prevalent in the legendary Fianna Fáil political machine.
1
 As such, it is no longer enough 
to attribute Cosgrave‟s descent in 1932/33 to inferior political machinery. Instead we must 
factor in the policy choices made by the Cumann na nGaedheal government and these must 
be examined against the backdrop of wider, international events. That Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s demise in 1933 coincided with the onset of the Great Depression and far 
reaching political upheaval in Britain, Spain, Germany, Japan and the United States cannot 
be overlooked.  
In this second part of the thesis it is hoped to ascertain to what extent the Free State‟s 
political realignment of 1932/1933 was the product of wider political and economic trends. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s initial years in government were marked by the stabilisation of 
international relations and European politics. Moderate conservatives dominated the 
politics of Britain, France and the United States for much of the 1920s as the pre-war 
liberal economic order was resurrected.
2
 However, by the beginning of the 1930s 
everything had altered as a tense era characterised by the absence of international 
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cooperation and the collapse of free trade beckoned. Given that Cumann na nGaedheal 
held power in the period of economic liberalism‟s renewal, and lost it at a time when 
economic chaos caused political convulsions across the globe, the chapters that follow 
argue that international factors cannot be overlooked in accounting for the party‟s demise. 
Before analysing the Free State government‟s domestic policies, it is necessary to provide 
a broad outline of the wider, international backdrop against which they are set. Drawing 
primarily on secondary sources, this chapter aims to provide such an overview of the 
international trend in politics and economics from the end of the Great War until the 
political convulsions of the early 1930s. 
 
 
  Europe, before and during the Great War 
 
The decades immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 saw 
Europe reach the zenith of its power. The so called „Belle Époque’, which many Europeans 
hankered after in the Inter-war period, would be remembered fondly, especially by the 
middle classes, as a time of peace and prosperity when the onward progress of European 
culture and civilisation seemed inevitable. This happy era was made possible by the 
scientific and technological advances of the so called „Second Industrial revolution‟ of the 
late nineteenth century. In turn, industrial development created a new and expanding urban 
working class in the major cities, a class which clamoured increasingly for greater political 
participation and social change. The position of the old élites was further threatened by the 
expansion of the middle classes in this period through such forces as the „managerial 
revolution‟ and the growth of bureaucracies, both public and private, and that of the 
professions. Of course, the nineteenth century had largely consolidated the values of the 
Enlightenment and the French revolution, especially after 1848, and absolutist forms of 
government by and large had given way as political liberties in general were extended. 
With their deep attachment to liberal values, active political participation and their clear 
rejection of more aristocratic or absolutist forms of government, the middle class became 
an increasingly dominant political player. The monarchies which dominated Europe ceded 
political rights to ensure the more active consent from those they governed while the 
French, of course, had embarked on the Republican route once more in 1871 after defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian war. A further consequence of that war was the creation of the 
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Prussian-dominated German empire, which had become a major industrial powerhouse by 
the turn of the twentieth century. For the increasingly influential middle classes of Europe, 
diets were improving as were overall hygiene and living standards. Prices continued to rise 
while bourgeois „faith in progress‟ went hand in hand with the apparent modernising forces 
of the age.
3
 Writing in 1929 in his famous The revolt of the masses, the Spanish 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset referred to the pre-war period outlined above as one of 
plenitude, a time when humanity felt it had achieved a long sought after state of living, that 
the pinnacle of the civilising journey had been reached. Gasset also pointed out that this 
was an epoch that labelled itself „Modern‟, indicating that sense of being a definitive or 
final „height of time‟ or end of history.4 The society of the late nineteenth century had 
come to view itself as the culmination of the history of progress that had come before it. It 
was this self perception of the period as a time of unprecedented prosperity and European 
dominance that would shape the policies of politicians and economists charged with the 
reconstruction of the continent after 1918.
5
 
The pre-1914 era was also one of globalisation and levels of economic 
interdependence between countries not seen again until after the Second World War.
6
 
Europe was the centre of the world economy, London its financial capital and sterling its 
dominant currency. Between 1871-1900 most of the world‟s leading powers joined the 
gold standard. This was a fixed exchange mechanism which meant currencies could be 
converted to gold at a fixed rate. As such, the trade of goods between countries was 
facilitated by the system.
7
 The successful operation of the gold standard demanded a 
degree of cooperation and that those countries played by the rules, that is adhered to 
orthodox economic and financial policies that balanced national budgets and maintained a 
positive balance of payments. In essence gold standard orthodoxy entailed pursuing 
deflationary policies.
8
 Adherence to the rules of gold standard orthodoxy served as a „good 
housekeeping seal of approval‟,9 signalling a country‟s fiscal and monetary prudence. 
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The portion of the earth under European control expanded in the decades before 1900 
as parts of Asia, and much of Africa, were carved up and conquered by the „New 
Imperialism‟ of the continent‟s major powers. Much of Europe itself was under the control 
of the multi-national empires of Imperial Russia, the Ottoman Turks and Austria-Hungary, 
while Italian and German unification had been effectively completed by 1870 and 1871 
respectively. In an age of laissez-faire economics and free trade it seemed correct, from an 
economic and political viewpoint, that the continent be divided into these great, political 
blocks. Large political blocks provided a substantial market for the produce of agriculture 
and industry. 
10
 Single currencies covered large areas and the vast empires amounted to 
bigger markets. Elsewhere in Europe, France was still a major power and actively sought 
colonies in Africa in the process of recovering from her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. 
Spain and Portugal, formerly great powers, were in decline and Ireland remained an 
integral part of the United Kingdom, a political entity described by Niall Ferguson as itself, 
„to all intents and purposes an English empire‟.11 
 Already, before 1900, Friedrich Nietzsche and other philosophers stood out from the 
prevailing optimistic view of the age of liberalism,
12
 and articulated a much more 
pessimistic vision. „God was dead‟ as a result of scientific discovery and increased 
secularisation giving modernism its first critics who questioned the direction this 
„progress‟ was taking Europe. As political power gradually became more readily contested, 
socialists, nationalists and conservatives espoused views which ran against the seemingly 
inexorable triumph of bourgeois liberalism. The German Social Democrat party had 
become the largest party in the Reichstag by 1912, while many rural German conservatives 
came to reject modernising forces such as industrialisation, urbanisation and increased 
political liberties encroaching on their position. A more autocratic and anti-modern form of 
government was desired by Germany‟s rural conservatives. Nationalism itself was 
evolving. Having been an ideology which had created German and Italian nation states in 
the nineteenth century, on the eve of the First World War, nationalism took a discernable 
chauvinistic turn as political debate moved from the rational to the irrational ground. Alan 
Kramer argues that in the final years of the Belle Époque many of the ideas of a militant, 
sometimes racist nationalism „were not only developed in theory but tried out in 
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practice‟.13 European colonial wars, and in particular that of Italy in Libya, and atrocities 
on all sides during the Balkan wars, showed the uglier side of an ideology which had its 
roots in the linguistic and cultural ties that it argued bound people together. Of course, at 
both the micro and macro level, it was nationalism that caused the outbreak of the Great 
War. Serb nationalists provided the spark which needed only the fuel provided by the 
territorial ambitions of Europe‟s great powers to engulf the whole continent in its flame. 
The same industrial revolution which had transformed the continent economically and 
socially, now provided the means for war on a scale never seen before. 
Without delving into the complex reasons for the outbreak of war in 1914, it suffices 
to mention here the extent to which the war challenged the pre-dominant liberal 
assumptions of politics, economics and society. The Great War unleashed forces that 
manifested themselves in the 1920s and 1930s as direct challenges to the ascent of 
parliamentary democracy and economic liberalism. Anticipated as a war of movement, the 
Great War quickly became a war of attrition in the absence of a swift victory as all sides 
became bogged down in the static warfare of the trenches. Belligerents had to mobilise all 
their human and material resources for the war effort, making the „home front‟ more 
important than ever. The language of nationalism was used to overcome domestic class and 
political divisions and in most cases, such conflict was subordinated to the war effort as the 
mainstream left made its peace with those in office.
14
 War, in some ways, offered the 
European powers a distraction from their domestic political problems. In pre-war Britain, 
the Irish question dominated the agenda at Westminster. In 1912-1914, a civil war seemed 
likely in Ireland over the granting of Home Rule as loyalists and nationalists armed in 
opposition to each other and in defence of their interests, while the Conservative party in 
collusion with Irish Unionists stoked mutinous and anti-democratic sentiment in the British 
army. On the outbreak of war, the majority of the Ulster and Irish Volunteers and their 
political leaders rallied to the British war effort and Westminster shelved dealing with the 
crisis until the war in Europe had ended. The majority of the Irish Volunteers who 
supported Redmond‟s call to fight in support of Britain became known as the National 
Volunteers. We have already dealt in previous chapters with the separate trajectory on 
which Ireland developed thereafter largely on the initiative of the IRB influenced Irish 
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Volunteers who responded negatively to John Redmond‟s call to fight in return for Irish 
Home Rule. Subsequently, constitutional nationalism was superseded by the revolutionary 
tradition which allied itself with the reconstituted Sinn Féin party in 1917. During the 
subsequent revolutionary period, the Irish Labour party rallied to the nationalist cause in 
much the same way as their counterparts in various European had joined in the war effort.  
    
Consequences of the war  
 
European governments at war increasingly found themselves abandoning the liberal 
„rules of the game‟ by which they had organised their economies. War, especially on this 
scale was costly, especially when prices doubled,
15
 and countries could not finance the 
effort by remaining wedded to the policies that would give them the „seal of approval‟.  
Instead of pursuing their orthodox policies and allowing the invisible hand of supply and 
demand set the economic parameters, they found themselves forced to ration food, fix 
prices and intervening in their economies in ways that had not been countenanced before. 
War was largely financed through inflation rather than tax increases and all belligerents 
abandoned the gold standard. In Britain Treasury control was abandoned as it waived its 
right to vet army and navy purchases.
16
 By borrowing, governments ensured future 
generations would be made to share the cost of a victory they would benefit from but 
accumulated enormous debts. Capacity to repay these was questionable.  
Domestic economies were reorganised to mobilise vast resources in isolation from 
the world economy giving governments a more interventionist role in the economy.
17
 Free 
trade and other pillars of the pre-war international economic order were seriously 
undermined by the phenomenal success of the war economies as countries looked within 
their own borders rather than to international trade to gather the necessary resources to 
wage war on a scale unprecedented.
18
 Indeed, both Keynes and Salazar took as their model 
in developing their economic theories, the organisation of the war economies. As a lecturer 
at Coimbra, the future leader of Portugal used each country‟s war economy „as a source of 
examples for his Political Economy class‟.19 Also using the war economies as an example, 
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Keynes developed his unorthodox views on counter-cyclical economic planning that came 
into more general acceptance after the Second World War. 
 In Britain, the war seriously damaged the Liberal party. War did not sit easily on the 
shoulders of the Liberals and the Conservatives would have been the natural party of 
government in wartime. Traditionally, the Liberal party fought the Tories by „denouncing 
their jingoism rather than outbidding their militarism‟.20 In fact, during the course of the 
war, under Liberal-led governments, various tenets of the Liberals were abandoned as in 
turn the parliament‟s term was extended, the party entered coalition government with its 
traditional Conservative enemy and in December 1916 the party split over the introduction 
of conscription. The effects of the First World War were lasting for the British Liberal 
party as it remained divided in the long term and relinquished its dominance of the party 
system. Post-war British politics would be dominated by the Conservatives and Labour. 
Politically, the war unleashed a new wave of national feeling across much of the 
continent and was greeted with particular enthusiasm in central Europe. In Germany it was 
seen as an opportunity to end British and French domination of Western culture, enabling 
that of Germany to replace it.
21
 Moreover, it was far from inevitable that the war would 
usher in a new era of democratisation. It must be remembered that Wilson did not even 
consider the British or French governments as wholly representative of their peoples. 
Towards the end of the war, in Germany, a new and short-lived nationalist Fatherland 
Party emerged in the hope of providing a national front „uniting all classes behind a 
militarist and imperialist‟ programme under „strong leadership, while carefully avoiding 
any alteration of domestic social relations‟.22 Germany‟s defeat in 1918 helped collapse the 
initiative. In Russia, the most absolutist regime in Europe was replaced first by the 
provisional government in February and then in October 1917 by the Bolsheviks. The 
spectre of Bolshevik Russia now acted as a further source of destabilisation in the Europe 
to emerge after the war and the country now posed as a serious economic alternative to 
capitalism. The world as it had existed in 1914 was becoming an ever more distant reality, 
faced as it was by working alternatives. In 1917, the Entente powers had made the war an 
ideological conflict- between the democracies of America, Britain and France (the latter 
two still in their evolution) and the apparently absolutist regimes of the central powers. 
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President Wilson‟s „Fourteen Points‟ essentially laid the basis of a new, democratic post-
war order of nation states that would follow an allied victory. Wilson described the 
German campaign as a war against mankind and all nations. He also talked of the conflict 
as a war for free peoples and called for partnership between democratic nations.
23
 Not just 
democracy, but the idea of national self-determination was to emerge ascendant on the 
victory of the allies in 1918. However, the triumph for national self-determination did not 
usher in the era of democracy, partnership or peace Wilson had hoped for. 
The First World War destroyed the relative peace that had marked Europe since 
Napoleon, and destabilised the predominant Liberal cultural, economic and political ethos. 
War destroyed central pillars on which the world economy had been based. Governments 
had been compelled to intervene in their national economies, gold was abandoned, 
inflationary policies had been pursued and states had borrowed extensively to fund the war 
effort. Governments had temporarily abandoned gold and financial orthodoxy to meet the 
unusual spending of war on the assumption that taxes would be raised after the war to 
service the debts and restore credibility.
24
 Moreover, the war exacerbated the same 
militarism and national feeling that had helped cause the conflict in the first place. The 
immediate consequence of the war was the break-up of the multi-national empires of the 
defeated central powers while the Russian Revolution, and the harsh peace extracted by 
Germany at Brest-Litovsk, had put paid to that country‟s control of much of the eastern 
European territory previously governed by Imperial Russia. Europe emerged from the First 
World War with a host of new nation states having been created from the rubble of 
Austria-Hungary, the German Empire, Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Many of 
these new states lay precisely where German and Russian Imperial ambitions had resided, 
and few would prove ethnically homogenous given the diverse peoples that populated the 
remnants of the multi-ethnic empires. The war had cost Europe dearly with as many as 
9,450,000 military deaths alone
25
 and the wholesale destruction of towns, cities and prime 
agricultural land. Moreover, the economic balance had shifted considerably as Britain lost 
its place as a major creditor nation. Instead, both Britain and France emerged with large 
debts to America, which President Wilson would not repudiate, necessitating harsh 
economic terms being demanded of the vanquished powers, particularly Germany. 
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America emerged from the conflict in a strengthened position with New York replacing 
London as the world‟s financial capital and world banker.26 Having seen the pre-war world 
with all its safe conventions turned upside down, many on the victorious side longed to 
recreate the Europe of the golden Belle Époque, even though the altered landscape left in 
the war‟s wake made such a task almost impossible.27 The tension between those who 
wanted to turn the clock back to 1914, and those who wanted to apply whatever lessons 
they had taken from the experience of the war to the post 1918 world would frame the 
politics of Europe for the next two decades. 
 
Post-War Europe and democratisation 
 
The victorious powers immediately set about restructuring Europe, and imposing a 
new order in their own image upon it. As promised, national self-determination was 
rigorously applied on the former territories of the fallen empires. Interestingly, the victors 
only applied this principle where it suited them. Determined to ensure German weakness, 
the Austrian rump that remained of the Habsburg empire was prohibited from uniting with 
Germany.
28
 Both Germany and Austria desired union, the latter initially referred to itself as 
„German Austria‟,29 but that would have led to the encirclement of the new state of 
Czechoslovakia. Instead Germany lost something in the region of 10% of its continental 
population and 13% of its territory as German speakers of the Sudetenland (formerly part 
of Austria-Hungary) found themselves within the boundaries of the new Czechoslovakian 
state. In addition, the Polish corridor gave the new state of Poland a route to the sea which 
cut Germany from East Prussia to the chagrin of German nationalists. It was easier for the 
allies to attempt the recreation of the old order through the imposition of democracy in the 
defeated countries and new nation states than it was for either Germany and Austria who 
were forced to accept the realities of the new world order and look to the future. The 
defeated countries came to terms with the new realities while the victorious side looked 
back to the pre-1914 world of the Belle Époque.  
                                                          
26
 Clavin, Great Depression, pp 18-20. 
27
 Payne,  Fascism,  p. 79. 
28
  Stevenson, First World War, pp 523-9. 
29
 Peter Gerlich and David Campbell, „Austria: from compromise to authoritarianism‟ in Dirk Berg-Schlosser 
and Jeremy Mitchell (eds), Conditions of democracy in Europe, 1919-39: systematic case studies (London, 
2000), p. 44. 
204 
 
German governments before 1914 had been authoritarian in nature with the 
Reichstag having little power. In addition, the country lacked a strong liberal tradition. A 
new democratic settlement in Germany was not the result of slow evolution, but was 
hastily applied in the war‟s aftermath. Indeed, German generals staring military defeat in 
the face hurriedly initiated reforms in the autumn of 1918 that made Imperial Germany a 
constitutional monarchy. These reforms were undertaken to help stave off revolution from 
below and to place the burden of responsibility for Germany‟s defeat on the shoulders of 
democratic politicians rather than the German high command. In Britain, slow and steady 
liberal reform continued its long evolution in 1918 with December‟s election held on the 
widest franchise yet known. Under the Representation of the People Act of 1918, universal 
adult male suffrage and the vote for all women over thirty were introduced. In Britain and 
the United States the war was generally regarded as a victory for democracy. According to 
the Times „In arms, this is the year of the victory of democracy, triumphant over the most 
arrogant autocracy that the world has ever seen‟. However, there were warnings about 
complacency. The Times warned of the peril of class antagonism, complaining that 
workers sometimes did not see the connection between their work and the welfare of the 
country. Resolving and restraining class antagonisms was the next challenge for 
democracy as the clamour for more representative government increased.
30
 In the United 
States, supporters of Irish self-determination often referred to the war for democracy in 
presenting their case,
31
 as pro-British elements in America were predisposed to regard the 
1916 Rising as a „stab in the back‟.32 
Like their Czechoslovakian counterparts, Poland and the Baltic states lost no time in 
drawing up appropriately democratic constitutions.
33
 The 9 November revolutionary 
proclamation of the Weimar Republic in Germany was copper-fastened by the election of a 
National Constituent Assembly on 19 January by universal adult suffrage. Under the 
Chancellorship of the Social Democratic leader Friedrich Ebert, a transitional liberal 
regime was followed by a government of a more avowedly social democratic ethos. 
Between the wars, social democracy evolved as a means of mediating relations between 
government and the workers and tended to prosper in countries that were late to 
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democratise or lacked a liberal tradition.
34
 In drafting Germany‟s new constitution, middle 
class lawyers looked to established liberal polities for inspiration. The end product differed 
from those of the nineteenth century in its extension of rights from political and civil 
liberties to the realm of social policy. As such, social policy goals with regard to health, 
welfare and land were set out clearly in constitutional provisions.
35
 The constitutional 
footing given to these, entitling German citizens to avail of the services of the welfare 
state, represented a quantum leap for social policy. Until then Bolshevik Russia had been 
the only country to make the provision of social needs a goal of the state. From the 1880s 
Britain and Germany had been moving from local to national provision of relief,
36
 but not 
as a policy goal of the state. In the German case classic liberal values were mixed with 
popular social democratic demands which helped to win workers to the side of 
parliamentarianism as against that of revolution during the tumultuous days of 1918-1919. 
Despite this, Weimar Germany would be a characterised by political division, a quest for 
popular legitimacy and economic, social and political instability. From the outset, the party 
system was seriously fragmented with the pro-democratic elements holding only a slim 
majority over the forces both of counter-revolution and those who supported Soviet-style 
soldiers‟ and workers‟ councils. To make matters worse, a split ran through most parties 
between centralists and federalists,
37
 the latter being, for the moment, in the ascendency. 
The road ahead was anything but smooth for Germany‟s new democracy as right wing 
nationalists regarded national solidarity as having been replaced by fractious party politics. 
Moreover, the „stab in the back myth‟ also took hold. Weimar Germany struggled to assert 
its legitimacy and gain the widespread approval of Germans in a way that in some respects 
mirrored the experience in the Irish Free State under Cumann na nGaedheal. 
The new Austrian state retrospectively referred to the events of 1918 as a „national 
revolution‟, a term that would come to typify regime changes across Europe. Moreover, 
there was a strong desire in Austria to complete this process by uniting with Germany. 
There was an atmosphere of political cooperation and consensus at the drafting of the 
Austrian constitution in 1920 which was implemented on 1 October. However, this 
atmosphere was quickly replaced by a more divisive political tone when the Christian 
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Socials preferred to share power with the Austrian right and to exclude the country‟s 
socialists.
38
 Austrian politics assumed a confrontational image with deep polarisation 
between the left and right. The pluralism and tolerance of the old empire was lost as the 
new state of Austria was divided between cosmopolitan „Red Vienna‟ and the rest of the 
country, which was predominantly rural and conservative. 
Where does Ireland fit within this phase of post war democratisation? Home Rule for 
Ireland made it to the statute book only to be postponed in 1914 until the war in Europe 
had ended. Irish nationalist politics had been radicalised during the First World War and 
the „Irish problem‟ was again centre stage by 1919. This time, Irish Home Rule was not a 
credible solution given nationalist Ireland‟s reaction to the execution of the rebel leaders, 
the conscription crisis and support for Sinn Féin at the ballot box. It would appear that the 
principle of national self-determination was not applied to the Irish case as it did not suit 
the Allies, who were content to let Britain deal with the Irish question as an internal and 
complex political problem for the United Kingdom. As such, the Government of Ireland 
Act of 1920 provided for the establishment of two Home Rule parliaments in Ireland, one 
in Belfast and one in Dublin. Ireland would remain a component of the United Kingdom, 
albeit a part with a limited form of self-government. Alvin Jackson argues that this act did 
represent the force of liberal opinion and the drive for self-determination and federalism 
evident after the war. Dismissing arguments for Irish exceptionalism, Jackson nevertheless 
points out that aspects of its twentieth-century history are distinctive.
39
 Without desiring to 
repeat the arguments made in earlier chapters, the establishment of the Irish Free State in 
December 1922 shows that Ireland ran on a very different track to the other new states and 
democracies created in the aftermath of the First World War. They were created as part of 
a general assertion of the Liberal world view held by America, Britain and France on the 
post-war European order, and in particular on the former territories of the defeated central 
European empires. Ireland, in theory a victor in the war, was caught between the fact of its 
being a part of the territory of the victorious United Kingdom and the forces unleashed 
during the revolutionary period. In addition, the Free State differed from the other 
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Dominions that would make up the British Commonwealth. Those former colonies had 
achieved their Dominion status through evolution, the Free State through revolution.
40
 
Whereas the new states on the continent were forged from lands of the defeated 
powers, advanced Irish nationalism faced a triumphant Britain in laying claim to its right to 
self-determination. Compromise was inevitable as Irish nationalism went to the negotiating 
table to reconcile its aspirations with British imperialism (see chapter one). Partition had 
been mooted for some time, and was made a reality by the Government of Ireland Act 
1920. The origins of the settlement with Sinn Féin can be traced to the King‟s speech on 
the opening of the Northern parliament on 7 June 1921. The new Ireland that emerged after 
the Great War contained, as in the patchwork of new states dotted across Europe, ethnic 
minorities either side of the border. There was a substantial nationalist minority in the 
Northern state which would remain part of the United Kingdom and a much smaller but 
still significant, ex-Unionist population in the southern state.
41
 The Irish Free State, was 
not just a unique case in the history of the Dominions, but also presents a contrast with the 
new states created in post-war Europe. It was established through its own internal forces 
and not as part of the great wave of democratisation after 1918 (though there may have 
been a rather elastic argument for this had the Government of Ireland Act 1920 endured). 
As such, the Free State (with which we are concerned, given our focus on the Cumann na 
nGaedheal party) owed its existence to internal factors though, as we shall see, it would be 
heavily influenced by external events, especially given that it was created a couple of years 
after the new states of central and eastern Europe, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc. 
The Free State also differed from the new states on the continent in that it was a Dominion 
linked to Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand through membership of the 
Commonwealth.  
On examining the Irish state, we see that, while its origins lay within its own borders, 
it fits in with the theme being developed in this section. The Irish Free State conforms with 
the general re-assertion of Liberal political values that followed the First World War and 
the attempt to recreate the world of laissez-faire economics.
42
 The Free State constitution, 
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even with the face-saving Imperial trappings insisted upon by the British, and so repugnant 
to the sentiments of many Irish nationalists on all sides,
43
 has been praised by Dermot 
Keogh and others for its liberal tone. The constitution was based de facto on popular 
sovereignty,
44
 although like Poland it differed from other new constitutions in its assertion 
that sovereignty emanated from the „nation‟ rather than from the people.45 As in Poland, 
the Irish constitution granted the vote to men and women aged twenty-one or over, a 
reform which went further than that embodied in Britain‟s Representation of the People 
Act 1918. In line with the trend of the time, popular participation was emphasised largely 
through the referendum and initiative with the head of government destined for a role as 
cabinet chairman rather than master.
46
 The drafters of Ireland‟s new constitution in 1922 
seem to have been motivated by a mixture of liberal and democratic political values and a 
commitment to developing a distinctive Irish polity, suited to the country and the 
„character‟ of the people.47 The Constitution Committee, picked by Collins and answerable 
to him as its chair, was furnished with constitutional examples from Europe and the 
Dominions. As such the constitutions of such countries as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, Poland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa were distributed to 
members of the Committee. The Committee drafted three alternative constitutions, drafts 
A, B and C. The advocates of each draft wrote to Collins to plead their case. In their 
explanatory statements to Collins, the authors of each draft outlined the thinking behind the 
constitutional provisions they had chosen while criticising those adopted in the drafts 
submitted by other members of the committee. 
 Cumann na nGaedheal formed the first governments in the Free State at a time when 
Liberalism was reasserting itself in Europe after the convulsions of the First World War 
(and the revolution and civil strife in Ireland). As noted in chapter one, Tom Garvin 
labelled the pro-Treaty side „Nationalist pragmatist‟, reflecting a political style marked 
perhaps by a cold commitment to democratic procedure, political rights and voter rule 
whereas the anti-Treatyites were „Republican moralist‟ with a more radical political style 
displaying a culture of emotion, moralism and communalism in contrast to the legalism 
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and conservative nature of the Free State side. In the economic sphere this dichotomy was 
continued. There is a case that the state‟s prosecution of the Civil War, particularly with 
regard to the executions and murky atrocities such as that carried out at Ballyseedy, 
damaged the government‟s democratic credentials. However, all things considered, that 
democracy emerged ascendant in Ireland with the defeat of the anti-Treatyites in 1923 
cannot be disputed, with government depending on the support of a parliament elected by 
universal suffrage emerging on a firm basis by 1932. Pro-Treatyites and later Cumann na 
nGaedheal were marked by commercialism, free trade, financial orthodoxy and a 
recognition of the state‟s economic relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth 
whereas de Valera‟s Sinn Féin and later Fianna Fáil were characterised by self-sufficiency, 
protectionism, and an economic nationalism increasingly popular in Europe after 1929.
48
  
In short, the world view espoused by Cosgrave‟s party from 1922, even if it lacked the 
social democratic flavour of Weimar Germany, was in keeping with the general theme of 
the years 1918-1922, which is hardly surprising, given that the new state‟s proximity to 
Britain and membership of the Commonwealth. During the state‟s formative years, de 
Valera‟s party‟s world view was out of step with that trend although circumstances would 
change in its favour over the course of the decade. For the duration of this chapter it may 
be possible to move away from what Roy Foster has dubbed the „cliché‟ of the Free State‟s 
rigorous conservatism under Cumann na nGaedheal and arrive at a more nuanced 
interpretation of the state in this period.
49
 
 
Reaction against the new democratic order in Europe  
 
Having emerged a few years later than other new polities, the Irish Free State had 
some catching up to do. As such, by the time of its foundation, teething problems were 
already becoming apparent in the new liberal and democratic European order. Hungary 
experienced a brief period of Bolshevik rule as Béla Kun overthrew the Liberal Hungarian 
Republic only to see his anti-Liberal regime replaced by the restored Kingdom of Hungary. 
Hungary‟s political convulsions from Republic to Communist dictatorship to restored 
Monarchy reflect the aftershock of a war which had challenged the accepted political order 
of the continent. The traditionally Liberal state of Italy became the first Fascist country in 
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October 1922, just as the Irish Provisional Government was preparing the way for the 
formal establishment of the Free State. Benito Mussolini, originally a Socialist, was pushed 
to the nationalist right by his experience of the First World War. War had heightened the 
sense of Italian national identity, and Italian nationalists believed they had not been 
sufficiently rewarded for their victory in the war. Mussolini believed that Liberalism 
belonged to the pre-1914 world and in June 1920 when the seventy-eight year old 
Giovanni Giolitti again became prime minister, his appointment seemed to symbolise a 
political system which was in decline.
50
 Addressing Fascists in Naples on 24 October 
1922, Mussolini described his movement as the „most interesting, most original and most 
powerful phenomenon which has appeared in the world since the war‟.51 On 29 October 
1922, after his Blackshirt „March on Rome‟ Mussolini was invited by the King to lead a 
new coalition government. The Times correspondent in Rome met Mussolini on 30 
October and in the ensuing interview captures perfectly Fascism‟s lack of a coherent 
programme to underpin it. Mussolini described his ascent to power as a bloodless 
„Nationalist revolution‟ and indicated that he would close down superfluous branches of 
the state, restore law-and-order and maintain friendly relations with countries possessing 
stores of raw materials.
52
 By 1925, Fascism had consolidated its grip on power in Italy. In 
that country liberal democracy had appeared weak and divided in comparison to the 
strident forces of the left and right.
53
  
While it opposed the subverting of the Italian nation by an internationalist left-wing 
ideology, Italian Fascism nevertheless envisaged a strong role for the state in the 
coordination of the economy. This was a clear break with the accepted wisdom of western 
European countries in this period. Originally differing only in degree from the prevailing 
laissez-faire view of the economy, Italian Fascism became ever more interventionist as the 
years wore on.  As such, in Fascism we are dealing with a revolutionary doctrine, seeking 
not to restore an old reactionary, élite or laissez-faire system, but rather to govern by a new 
(continually evolving) attitude based simply on action and dynamism.
54
 Events in Italy 
caused considerable alarm in Britain with Viscount Grey referring to the worrying 
precedent that saw the collapse of representative government in the face of a movement of 
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considerable organizational force.
55
 Events in Italy were unpalatable for most Liberals, 
while the antics of the extreme left in British politics during the 1924 general election 
further upset Liberal sensibilities. Asquith claimed that free speech was under threat during 
the campaign having been subjected to cat calls and interruptions during a particularly 
tense election meeting. Asquith blamed the Socialist and Communist parties for „this 
interference with free speech‟.56 The election itself resulted in the first Labour party 
government. As in France, Britain‟s 1924 experiment with left leaning government did not 
last,
57
 and the government itself had proved „gaffe prone‟.58 
  Little over two weeks after Cumann na nGaedheal had won its first general election 
in August 1923, thereby cementing the Free State‟s constitutional position, democracy 
suffered a further blow on the continent as Miguel Primo de Rivera staged a military coup 
in Spain on 13 September 1923. Spain had been marked by uneven economic development 
with much modernisation and industrialisation taking place in the capitals of Catalonia and 
the Basque country which sought to restore their regional autonomy. In addition, Spain‟s 
politics in the nineteenth century had been divisive with those of a liberal persuasion 
opposed by the defenders of Monarchy and Church domination.
59
 Traditionally, in Spain, 
nationalism had been largely the domain of the regional separatists as Spanish national 
identity remained quite weakly developed in many parts of the country. However, military 
defeat to the United States in 1898 underlined the country‟s decline as a power and the lack 
of a Spanish national consciousness was a cause of political discussion thereafter. The 
country was not yet a true democracy, being governed by an elitist liberalism common to 
the Iberian peninsula, and as a neutral in the war it was largely immune as democracy 
asserted itself in much of Europe after the First World War. The years 1918-21 were 
marked by rural and urban upheaval as landless peasants agitated for land distribution and 
workers clashed with employers in Barcelona. Political murder was rife and by 1923 it was 
clear that the existing political system could not survive.
60
 Spain‟s élite-led liberal order 
proved unable to adjust to the new era of mass politics and democracy.
61
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Like Mussolini‟s Fascist takeover in Italy, de Rivera‟s military dictatorship went 
against the general trend of liberal democratisation that had followed the war and showed 
that Liberalism had not in fact won the post-war argument. Economic decline and hardship 
were clear indicators for many that the status quo was not delivering. In fact, as Patricia 
Clavin argues, more representative government actually changed expectations and altered 
the context of economic policy as governments had to look to more of their people for re-
election.
62
 For de Rivera, decadence and regional nationalism were leading to the 
disintegration of Spain. The country would have to be regenerated by a government which 
would promote Spanish nationalism, crush regional separatists and pursue as a policy goal 
of the state, the inculcating of a sense of Spanish identity in the population.
63
 De Rivera‟s 
arguments were typical of democracy‟s opponents on the right of the political spectrum. 
Decadence and fractious party politics associated with the triumph of Liberal democracy 
proved the bane of those of the right across Europe who wished to experiment in new 
forms of government. Primo de Rivera‟s regime differed from Mussolini‟s fascist 
dictatorship in its reliance on old elites and its identification of Spanish national identity 
with Catholicism. First under military rule, and from 1925 under the Civil Directory, de 
Rivera‟s regime sought to suppress the separatist nationalism of the Basque country and 
Catalonia and to use the state apparatus to aggressively develop a sense of Spanish national 
identity. Censorship was extensive and civil liberties such as free speech were viewed by 
the dictator as decadent and superfluous rights as political debate in the country was 
reduced to the very minimum.
64
 The Spanish state posed as the protector of the nation 
which was envisaged as a community of Spaniards and the Education system was 
identified as a key agent of promoting Castilian as the language and culture of Spain. 
José Ortega y Gasset had clear views about how Fascist and authoritarian regimes 
came to power in Europe at this time. Nineteenth-century liberalism had failed to secure its 
perpetuation by creating a generation which failed to appreciate the principles upon which 
its organisation of state politics was based. Because it saw itself as a culmination of 
history‟s progression, the ascendant liberalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century had taken the future for granted. The masses, the very people who benefitted most 
from this progression, did not understand its importance as a historical development and 
                                                          
62
 Clavin, Great Depression, p. 8. 
63
 Alejandro Quiroga, Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the nationalization of the masses, 1923-30 
(Basingstoke, 2007), pp 6-8. 
64
 Ibid., pp 34-5. 
213 
 
hence took it for granted.
65
 In a scathing indictment of these masses, Gasset went on to 
suggest that mass politics threatened the advances of the Liberal order. For the Spanish 
philosopher, Fascism was a movement of the masses. As an anti-liberal movement it 
posited the recreation of the pre-liberal order which pre-dated the French Revolution. For 
Gasset, such ideologies of the masses, based on brute force rather than reasoned debate, 
would return Europe to a state of barbarism. Rather than using arguments to put forward a 
political programme, opinions were being forced on others by a violent creed which 
threatened to undo all the progress of the previous century. For Gasset, Bolshevism and 
Fascism were examples of retrogression.
66
 Because it followed a period of plenitude, the 
post-war generation had been left directionless and insecure of its position in the world, 
hence the common assertion of Europe‟s decadence and decline by politicians, 
demagogues and philosophers such as Oswald Spengler. The war punctuated a period of 
plenitude from one of pessimism, instead of believing tomorrow would be better than 
today, the post-war generation believed tomorrow would be the same as today. Gasset 
believed, post-war Europe saw itself as amounting to more than the past but conceived of 
itself as a beginning of an uncertain new age rather than a culmination of history‟s 
progress. It was superior to previous epochs, yet inferior to what it ought to have been.  
The post-war generation saw itself as a disappointment in an age that was unsure of itself.
67
 
Parliamentary systems were increasingly seen as the cause of an apparent „decay‟, disputed 
by Gasset in his writings, and opposition to parliamentary rule, and the compromises 
associated with it, would characterise Europe by the early 1930s.  
It is clear that the experience of the Irish Free State under Cumann na nGaedheal in 
this period stands in stark contrast to events in countries such as Italy, Hungary and Spain. 
The Civil War could be regarded as an event which might have ushered in a more radical 
regime of the right or left but victory for the anti-Treatyites would most probably have 
resulted in a return of the British army than in a more exotic style of native Irish 
government. Moreover, the Irish Labour movement was moderate.
68
 It was not 
revolutionary and remained on reasonably good terms with Cumann na nGaedheal, due to 
its support of the Treaty, and with Irish nationalism in general given their cooperation from 
the 1916 rising, through to the 1918 general election and subsequent War of Independence. 
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Neither was there a significant right wing threat to the Irish experiment in democratic 
government during the 1920s. The splinter groups spawned by Cumann na nGaedheal, the 
National Group and Clann Éireann, generally framed their grievances in the language of a 
more populist brand of Irish nationalism that wanted free-trade to be replaced by 
Protectionism, and the personnel of the public service to reflect the views of the 
revolutionary generation. Ex Unionists were numerically too small to pose a serious threat 
to the constitution, if they had so desired, and generally accepted the new State. The Free 
State Senate ensured political representation for the ex Unionist community. The Farmers‟ 
Party, Labour, Cumann na nGaedheal and independent Unionists all accepted the 
Constitution and the anti-Treatyites in the guise of Fianna Fáil came to accept it by 1927. 
By August 1927, most anti-Treatyites were working within the constitution and the state 
almost had its first left-wing led government when a putative Labour party/National 
League coalition supported by Fianna Fáil was scuppered as Cosgrave survived a vote of 
confidence on the casting vote of the Ceann Comhairle.
69
 In addition, the outcome of the 
army mutiny showed that the civilian government was secure enough in its position to 
becalm militarism within the administration and to face down any perceived threat to the 
authority of the government. Cumann na nGaedheal throughout its period in office was 
determined to bed down functioning democratic institutions. It developed the 
administrative machine of the state without any wholesale purges of former personnel of 
the ancien regime and the decision of Fianna Fáil to accept the legitimacy of those 
institutions of state in August 1927 has been described as W.T. Cosgrave‟s finest hour.  
In 1923, Mussolini had admirers in Germany, and elements of his political style were 
copied in Spain. Hitler admired Mussolini‟s nationalism and saw him as the only leader in 
Europe who had crushed Marxism and purged his nation of its enemies.
70
 However, 
Hitler‟s Beer Hall putsch of 9 November 1923 was easily defeated and the Nazis remained 
on the fringes of German politics until the end of the decade. In 1920s Ireland Cumann na 
nGaedheal continued to govern within the democratic constitution. During the Civil War, 
proposals did emanate from within the pro-Treaty organisation that an armed militia of 
Treaty supporters be formed to help defeat the anti-Treaty military effort. J.J. Walsh used 
the word fascisti in advocating the proposal. John Regan quotes O‟Higgins as responding 
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curtly „No fascisti‟.71 Regan notes that during the Civil War, the government did not 
succumb to the temptation to merge the state‟s security apparatus with their party 
organisation and that the principle, first enunciated by Collins, of government rather than 
party control of the police was adhered to. 
Political developments in Ireland during 1924 and 1925 have been described by 
numerous historians as critical in the evolution of Cumann na nGaedheal. It has become 
common to describe the army mutiny, the secession of the National Group, the acceptance 
by the government of the London Agreement and the further split with what became Clann 
Éireann as demonstrating the ascendancy within Cumann na nGaedheal of its 
„consolidationist wing‟.72 But what were the alternatives? Cumann na nGaedheal, as seen 
in previous chapters did use the language of the nation and did eschew more popular 
policies because of the economic constraints it was working under. From its inception it 
talked of representing the whole of the nation as distinct from any social group and in that 
regard differed little from post-war continental governments keen to avoid class politics. 
We have also seen, in chapter two the language of nation being used by W.T. Cosgrave in 
his speeches to party conferences to justify and enunciate his government‟s policy. 
Different factions continued to exist within Cumann na nGaedheal throughout its existence 
though most large parties generally are made up of different strands. In fact, it could be 
argued that these more radical elements within Cumann na nGaedheal had greater scope 
for expression in 1933 after the moderate or „consolidationist wing‟ led the party to a 
second electoral defeat in 1933. The 1920s were an inopportune time for Griffithite 
Protectionists to come to the fore, while John Regan has already discussed the attempt by 
Séamus Hughes to infuse the Cumann na nGaedheal party constitution with a distinctly 
Socially Democratic ethos in 1922.
73
 Had Hughes succeeded in having his decidedly 
welfarist clauses on the health and education of Irish children included in the Cumann na 
nGaedheal constitution, and supposing the government acted on the constitution of its 
party apparatus, the Free State might now be regarded, like Weimar Germany, as one of 
the first examples of a working Social Democracy. Instead, radical impulses within the 
party remained in check as Cumann na nGaedheal stuck to a somewhat middle road 
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between the radical forces of left and right then asserting themselves on the continent of 
Europe. Inside the Dáil, the party played the role of a centrist party between Labour on one 
side and the Farmers‟ party, independents and National League on the other. 
Despite the seemingly successful attempt to recreate the pre-1914 world order, as is 
apparent in the writings of Ortega y Gasset, by the mid 1920s, the triumph of liberal 
democracy in Europe had become increasingly contested. Various political creeds 
espoused alternative ways of providing government in an age of industrialisation, social 
change, modernisation and economic difficulties. Over-reliance on heavy industry, the 
emergence of new non European powers the United States and Japan and the struggle of 
agriculture to adapt to the post-war economy were among the problems European 
politicians grappled with. Economic problems were compounded by low consumer 
confidence and the deflationary policies necessary for a return to the gold standard.
74
 In 
addition, capitalist countries were more concerned with containing Communism than they 
were in challenging the emergence of the right-wing dictatorships. Democracy had few 
„unambiguous‟ defenders in the 1920s,75 while the success of Liberal reform in the 
previous century seemed to remove its raison d'être as a force for change. Indeed, some of 
its own successes such as increased suffrage threatened it as Socialists gained ground with 
the extension of the franchise and Nationalist and Conservative forces increased support as 
they came to be seen as a more effective counterweight to the rise of the Left.  
Liberalism was seen as an ideology no longer suited to the problems of a 
modernizing world, while for others its insistence on pluralism and tolerance were failing 
the nation.
76
 British liberals were split and in terminal decline (Blythe, as we noted in 
Chapter One, had used this as a model for Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in 1922). 
Weimar Germany was a Social Democracy rather than a Liberal Democracy and countries 
such as Italy, Spain and now Portugal in May 1926 chose an entirely different form of 
government. In the mid 1920s, Portugal could not be regarded as democratic as coup 
remained the most effective means of bringing about political change.
77
 The country had 
been a functioning Republic since 1910 but for a year‟s interruption in 1917. It had a 
tradition of liberal constitutional government, but it was an élitist liberalism, much like that 
of Spain, which had not evolved into a stable and democratic parliamentary style 
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government.
78
 On 28 May 1926, General Gomes da Costa staged a coup against the ailing 
Portuguese Republic. Portugal was in the midst of a long standing fiscal crisis, while, as 
elsewhere, the pace of change in this traditionally Catholic country was too fast for some 
who had already witnessed the separation of Church and state. The Republic had 
antagonised Catholic sentiment while, as in Spain, a perceived lack of national sentiment, 
decadence and the need to reform and modernise Portugal motivated many of the 
instigators and in particular loomed large in the thinking of the country‟s future head of 
government, António de Oliveira Salazar.
79
 As „Financial dictator‟, Salazar, an ex 
seminarian, showed an interest in the neo thomist current then prevalent in Europe. As in 
Spain, the regime that would come to characterise Portugal from the late 1920s cannot be 
regarded as in the Fascist mould of Mussolini‟s Italy. Salazar, as an increasingly well 
regarded Minister for Finance from his appointment in April 1928, wanted to direct the 
economy towards production and the more efficient consumption of wealth. He wanted 
Portugal to produce a lot more and spend carefully.
80
 Salazar‟s state would actively co-
ordinate the economic sphere, although this was combined with a degree of orthodox 
financial policy as balanced budgets were quickly achieved. In this regard, the Finance 
Minister drew the plaudits.
81
 Like so many others, Salazar believed that the political 
apparatus of the nineteenth century was unsuited to the demands of the new century. 
Excessive individualism and political liberties had weakened the state and the nation, both 
of which had to be protected from damaging international currents and internal decay. 
Class struggle too would be subordinated to national unity in the new, apparently 
corporatist constitution that Salazar would set about drawing up for Portugal and its New 
State. 
 In Spain and Portugal, Liberal democracy failed to assert itself in the post-war 
period and, instead, each country found itself going down an authoritarian path. The break 
with Liberalism, and Salazar‟s economic and financial prowess, enabled Portugal to pursue 
less orthodox spending policies- public works, education, infrastructure and 
communications- that would characterise the 1930s recovery elsewhere.
82
 Portugal and 
Spain were followed by Poland, Greece and Lithuania, countries that experimented with 
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authoritarian regimes between 1926 and 1928.
83
 Greece returned to parliamentary rule after 
seven months but the force of nationalism held together the regimes of Poland and 
Lithuania.  Pilsudski‟s Polish dictatorship was opposed by democrats, nationalists and 
Socialists.
84
 The Irish Free State‟s democracy was coming of age at a time when much of 
Europe was turning its back on parliamentarianism and towards dictatorship or the party 
state. In 1927, the legitimacy of the Free State constitution was enhanced as Fianna Fáil 
took their seats in the Dáil. As Depression struck in the early 1930s, Ireland was an 
increasingly lonely outpost of parliamentary democracy marked by universal suffrage and 
keen electoral competition between the two main parties. However, combined with the 
country‟s commitment to democracy was an adherence on the part of Cumann na 
nGaedheal to an economic policy that began to unravel as the world economy collapsed. 
The Depression would prove the catalyst for far reaching political and economic changes. 
The relative economic stability of the mid 1920s, with most governments adopting a 
policy of balanced budgets and deflation, made the growth of fascist, communist and 
authoritarian alternatives difficult, even if they were increasingly noisy in their political 
contributions. The potential for political instability remained given the radicalising impact 
of the Great War and the multiplicity of political creeds appealing to the various interest 
groups. Anti-liberal movements gained ground as the 1920s wore on and exploited a 
political vacuum once the Great Depression struck. This was a visual age where the 
collectivity became a more evident reality in a further threat to liberal individualism. It was 
a time of mass leisure, cinema and sporting events that were watched by tens of thousands 
of spectators huddled together as one. Social psychologists analysed the thinking and 
emotion of crowds with the Frenchman Gustave le Bon concluding that crowds were 
essentially irrational in behaviour, which led him to the theory that there was a need for 
strong leadership in society.
85
 Flying in the face of liberal individualism was the front 
generation, particularly potent in Germany and Austria. They had been a collectivity, 
huddled together in the trenches during the war. It was also an age where various 
ideologies posed as offering an imagined but achievable utopia and escape from the 
problems associated with the status quo.  For the believers in a better, radically different 
future, staid, unstable and fractious parliamentary democracy of course stood in the way. 
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When a downturn came, as it did in the late 1920s, democracy in Europe would be shown 
to have been built on quite shaky foundations. The right believed socialism and class 
warfare were threats to the national community and in many instances sought to build an 
alternative that was, in the words of James Hogan, as „definite and fundamental as the 
theories of socialism‟.86 
Weimar Germany struggled to assert its authority throughout the 1920s. As in the 
Irish Free State, its legitimacy was question by a considerable segment of the electorate, 
this time the German nationalist right, and we have already mentioned the abortive Beer 
Hall Putsch of 1923. More extremist German nationalists still talked of an undefeated 
German army which had not been pushed back onto German soil during the First World 
War but had been betrayed by internal enemies; this became the „stab in the back‟ myth.87 
When the republic‟s first President Friedrich Ebert died in February 1925, a fatal blow was 
struck against the state. In the ensuing Presidential election, the right‟s candidate, Field 
Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, a monarchist career officer, emerged as the winner with 
48.3% of the vote. His victory marked a shift to the right and was a boon to the old élites 
who had been loyal to the monarchy.
88
 Meanwhile the symbols of the new Republic 
remained contested. The government of Hans Luther fell over the question of allowing 
German embassies and consulates fly the old flag of the monarchy or the new flag of 
democracy and republicanism. Many rejected the new black, red and gold flag of the 
Republic preferring to fly the black, red and white flag of the former German Empire. The 
flag of the Republic was sometimes subject to vandalism and by 1927, on the annual 
celebration of Weimar, The Times of London noted that the number of Republican flags 
flying was largely the result of compulsion orders placed on municipalities which had 
hitherto boycotted the flag.
89
 Indeed, the Chancellor in his closing remarks at the ceremony 
acknowledged that there remained considerable apathy among the German public for the 
Republic but optimistically stated appreciation for the new constitution was growing. 
However, political instability continued to be the hallmark of Weimar Germany with 
parties struggling to form stable governments and failing to reach compromises with each 
other. Weimar‟s problems were exacerbated by the economic crash of 1929. 
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Europe in the maelstrom of Depression 
 
After the Wall Street crash in October 1929, the position of democracy in Europe 
became even more fragile. Many economic historians argue that the depression in Europe 
pre-dated the Wall Street crash by two years. Creaks were evident as early 1927 though 
these were worsened by America‟s collapse in 1929 now that it had become the world 
banker. The economic and financial crisis left in its wake served to exacerbate 
disillusionment with liberal political institutions and laissez-faire economics at the outset 
of the 1930s. Trade was in retreat, unemployment rose and governments struggled to cope 
with the crisis facing capitalism.
90
 Reluctant to abandon conventional economic theory at 
first, most countries sought to pursue the deflationary policies consistent with membership 
of the gold standard and cut spending which only deepened the hardship of ordinary people 
and served to worsen the problem. Gold standard orthodoxy was omnipresent in the 1920s. 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden was as committed to thrift and economic 
orthodoxy as any Conservative or Liberal minister while the Labour party he belonged to 
had come to accept capitalism and had abandoned much of its early Socialism. Economic 
collapse placed enormous pressure on the political institutions of most countries. In 
Britain, the Depression eventually divided the Labour party, with some of its members 
even serving in a national government with the Conservatives. This became in effect a 
Conservative government after the election of October 1931 as the Labour party was 
decimated and remained divided. The Conservatives supported Protectionist policies in 
1931, hinting at an increased realisation across Europe that countries would have to „go it 
alone‟ as the depression forced the adoption of a new economic nationalism. Communism 
and economic nationalism emerged as serious alternatives to a style of economic 
management which seemed doomed to failure.  
The death knell of conventional economic policy was effectively tolled in September 
1931 when Britain came off the gold standard, devalued and was now free to abandon the 
orthodox policies that were worsening the crisis. Cheap money would encourage demand 
and investment while balanced budgets and free trade were no longer the holy grail of 
British policy.
91
 Still adhering to its traditional policy of retrenchment and only limited 
tariffs in 1932, Cumann na nGaedheal must have seemed out of step with the new 
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economic realities as de Valera‟s advocacy of economic nationalism and self-sufficiency 
was more in tune with the trend of the time. Free trade and other tenets of liberalism 
seemed outdated, as the world economy crumbled. Cumann na nGaedheal was slow to 
adapt and move away from its conventional policies and lost power in February 1932 just 
as new economic theories were making an impact on government policy in Europe.
92
 With 
protectionist parties in government on each side of the Irish Sea from 1932, and in 
particular with a new Irish government that was determined to cut all imperial ties, trade 
war between Britain and Ireland was the almost inevitable outcome. However, relations 
between the two countries were further damaged by de Valera‟s reluctance to take 
advantage of Imperial preference, while nationalism generally was a force for tense 
relations in the 1930s. 
  In Germany, the Nazi party emerged as liberalism‟s most extreme opponent as it 
increased its support as the effects of the Depression were felt in Germany. Having 
emerged from the economic difficulties of the hyper-inflation, the Weimar Republic 
enjoyed some years of relative calm in the mid 1920s, during which time the extremes of 
right and left lost ground, until the economic collapse of 1929. Nevertheless, the Weimar 
Republic had always been dogged by political instability that saw governments struggle to 
maintain parliamentary majorities. Even during the years of relative stability, German 
governments were either in a minority and dependent for survival on the goodwill of an 
SPD which had become more dogmatically left-wing, or comprised uneasy coalitions of 
the left and right. None of the Republic‟s underlying political problems were addressed 
during the years 1924 to 1928 and they resurfaced once the country‟s economy 
nosedived.
93
 There remained little emotional attachment to the Weimar Republic - even the 
German People‟s Party (DVP) of its star performer Gustav Stresemann were unenthusiastic 
supporters of the Republic, and right-wing nationalists associated it with surrender, 
compromise and national decay. After the Wall Street crash, Germany was unable to 
borrow from the United States and unemployment rose at an alarming rate.
94
 From 29 
March 1930, the German Chancellor Heinrich Bruning assumed the power to rule by 
decree and no longer depended on a parliamentary majority.
95
 In his first address to the 
Reichstag, Bruning warned that this was the country‟s last experiment with parliamentary 
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government and that he would rule by decree if necessary. Through a mixture of increased 
taxes, retrenchment and protective tariffs, Bruning sought to overcome the country‟s dire 
economic problems. When the Reichstag voted against his plan to cut the salaries of civil 
servants, Bruning turned to President Hindenburg, who passed the legislation through the 
agency of Article 48. The Reichstag was dissolved before it could veto the move, having 
previously resisted attempts to use the emergency constitutional provision.
96
 The ensuing 
election returned an even more divided parliament with Hitler‟s Nazi party emerging as the 
second largest in parliament. German society and politics remained divided as 
parliamentary democracy‟s credibility was further eroded by continued instability and the 
use of article 48. The new Chancellor, von Papen, proposed to govern without the 
Reichstag and to suppress political organisations and parties. His cabinet disagreed as the 
Republic ran out of options. Believing the only alternative to forming a military 
dictatorship was to appoint Hitler as Chancellor, Hindenburg chose the latter option. On 30 
January 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany. Before long the Weimar 
Republic was replaced by the totalitarian state of the Nazi party. 
Like Germany, after some initial economic difficulties, particularly a period of 
hyperinflation caused by numerous factors, Austria had stabilised between 1923 and 1929. 
This period was marked by balanced budgets and a stable currency. Depression struck 
Austria in 1930 and the economic problems of the early 1930s helped to radicalise the 
country‟s politics. The country had many underlying problems. It had inherited an 
oversized bureaucracy from the remnants of the old Habsburg empire, the regional division 
of labour in the empire meant that the new state of Austria was oversized in some sectors 
and undersized in others. Moreover economic self-sufficiency became a goal of many of its 
neighbouring countries which damaged Austria‟s trade relationship with states which had 
formerly been part of its empire.
97
 Eventually parliament was banned in Austria as the 
divisions between the extremes of left and right threatened to get out of hand and the 
country moved from parliamentarianism to authoritarianism. 
In Spain, this time an anomaly in the history of inter-war Europe, the dictatorship of 
Primo de Rivera was brought to an end as the army which had originally brought him to 
power turned against the dictator in January 1930. Instead a new democratic order 
followed in Spain with the inauguration of the Republic. After some initial attempts at 
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preserving the monarchy and restoring the 1923 constitution failed, the left, pressing for a 
socialist and republican Spain, gained power. Dictatorship had crumbled in Spain at a time 
when it was democracy which was on the retreat in much of the continent. The new 
Spanish Republic was copper-fastened in the elections to a constituent assembly in June 
1931 and the approval of a mildly socialistic constitution in December.
98
 Church and state 
were separated and regional autonomy promised to the separatists as the new government 
took Spain in a new direction at a time of instability and economic chaos across Europe. 
Fearghal McGarry likens the transition of power in Spain at this time to that in the Irish 
Free State in February 1932.
99
 The new Spanish government represented a marked shift to 
the left for that country and its policy, particularly with regard to regional autonomy, stood 
in contrast to the „national regeneration‟ agenda of the military dictatorship. Radical 
change in this period was often met by right wing mobilisation. This is what happened in 
Spain resulting eventually in a Civil War between the Republicans and the right wing 
forces of Franco. 
It was in this context of the collapse in world trade, economic depression and global 
political insecurity and instability that Cumann na nGaedheal faced the Irish people in 
February 1932. In 1932 Cumann na nGaedheal, for most of the 1920s the champion of 
„impeccable nineteenth century liberal economics‟ in Ireland,100 watched as its policy was 
discredited by the global economic slump. We have noted how economic nationalism was 
much in vogue with the onset of the Great Depression, not so much as an effective remedy 
to the crisis, but as a last resort as governments were left with little other option. James 
Meenan noted this in 1967. He said there had been a „world-wide revulsion from the old 
orthodoxies‟ as international trade collapsed. Worldwide, the protectionist case had 
advanced slowly during the stable 1920s but accelerated with the onset of the Great 
Depression.
101
 Cumann na nGaedheal, during its term of office, had introduced moderate 
tariffs, as a revenue raising device rather than a shift in economic thinking. The party had 
not gone far enough to satisfy protectionists within its own ranks or the nationalist 
electorate at large. In Ireland, the advocate of an alternative economic vision based on the 
new economic reality of the Depression seemed to be Fianna Fáil. In June 1932 as free 
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trade retreated across the world to be replaced by tariffs, the New York Times lamented 
what it referred to as the „bitter fruits of Nationalism‟. The paper claimed trade and 
industry were stagnant as each country pursued material self-sufficiency.
102
 For its part, the 
Manchester Guardian had had a premonition of what would engulf Europe in the early 
1930s. Then, the newspaper had warned that Fianna Fáil‟s nationalism was of the type that 
would „oppose irresistible world forces which are breaking down the barriers between 
nation and nation‟.103 The paper claimed Fianna Fáil was suspicious of Britain, looked 
inwards and opposed exports which generated wealth for the country. By 1932, this was 
the predominant theme in the continent‟s politics as the „viability of the political and 
economic basis of post-war Europe was being brought increasingly into doubt‟.104 
As in other countries, under Cumann na nGaedheal part of the initial solution was 
retrenchment and cuts in public spending. On the eve of the election, Cumann na 
nGaedheal duly obliged with across-the-board cuts for public servants as they attempted to 
stick to the rigours of financial orthodoxy as they had done before the economic crisis set 
in. Cumann na nGaedheal went to the country with the sort of budgetary policy which may 
have been possible in Portugal in 1928,
105
 or which had needed the flouting of democratic 
procedure to be implemented in Germany under Bruning but was almost unthinkable in a 
parliamentary democracy such as the Free State. Cumann na nGaedheal lost the 1932 
general election bringing to an end ten years of relatively stable, single-party government. 
The Free State‟s change of government also ended a decade of an „outward looking‟ 
commercial policy based on pursuing the country‟s comparative advantage in pastoral 
agriculture.
106
 However, fears that the Free State was about to go the way of a Spain, an 
Italy or a Russia proved well wide of the mark as instead the peaceful transfer of power 
from Civil War victor to vanquished consolidated the Free State. In Cosgrave‟s words, „the 
other fellows‟ were given a chance to implement their policies within the framework of a 
working parliamentary democracy. It is against this backdrop that we now analyse Free 
State government policy 1923-33 in the following two chapters. 
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7 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal policy in government, 1923-28 
 
 
 
In chapter six something of the ‘temper’1 of Europe between the two world wars was 
provided. In that chapter we learned that the Great War had something of a radicalising 
effect on the politics of Europe, unleashing new forces of both the left and right. Soviet 
Russia cast a shadow across the continent while Britain, Denmark and France flirted 
briefly with left-wing governments during 1924. Initially, an attempt was made to recreate 
the golden pre-war age of the Belle Époque as countries returned to the fixed exchange rate 
mechanism of the gold standard and the financial orthodoxy that went hand in hand with 
that. For much of the 1920s, moderate conservative governments generally tried to balance 
budgets and send out the signal that they were prudently managing the affairs of the state. 
In this chapter, we build on the themes developed in chapter six by analysing 
Cumann na nGaedheal policy in the years of relative stability in Europe. The government’s 
decision-making process will be studied through an examination of primary and secondary 
sources, in the hope of understanding why and in what spirit certain decisions were made 
by this hard-pressed group of ministers. By examining Cumann na nGaedheal decision 
making in government, and by analysing the general thrust of the world economy, it will 
be possible to reach a more nuanced interpretation of the party’s demise in 1933. 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s 1923 ‘address to the nation’, penned by Hugh Kennedy, set 
out the strategy of the first independent Irish government. In language reminiscent of the 
1916 proclamation, the document asked the ‘Men and women of Ireland’2 to secure the 
status of national security attained through the Anglo-Irish Treaty by supporting Cumann 
na nGaedheal’s programme in the election. The party’s appeal to voters set out the 
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aspirations of a native Irish government facing enormous challenges. The task of state-
building would prove difficult and would require discipline, resolve and sacrifice on the 
part of the Irish people. Partition was a reality and the Boundary Commission envisaged in 
article twelve of the Treaty would be dealt with during the lifetime of the government 
elected in August 1923. Secondly, the state would have to grapple with the problem of 
spiralling expenditure given the inheritance of a quite lavish system of public spending 
from the British administration in Ireland, the legacy of the progressive social policies of 
the last Liberal governments.
3
 This was not to mention the costs (material, wages and 
pensions) incurred by the fledgling state during the Civil War. A native Irish government 
would have to fund itself and could not count on the ample resources of the British treasury 
as the Castle administration had done. Another rock on the road to recovery and 
consolidation was the bitter legacy of the Civil War which left the southern polity divided, 
with the defeated side refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the Free State and its 
government. As late as 1929, de Valera talked of the events of 1922 as a coup that had 
swept the true custodians of the Republic from power.
4
 Cumann na nGaedheal claimed it 
wanted to move beyond the divisions engendered by the fratricidal conflict and aspired 
towards Irish unity in the long term and national solidarity in the south in the short term. 
Until greater progress had been made towards Irish unity, and the status of the Free State 
made secure, the party urged the people: 
 
Now that you have under your control the shaping of the future destiny of the nation, it is 
manifestly your first interest to secure and to safeguard the status of national sovereignty [ ] 
which you have attained. This we ask you to do by supporting with your united strength the 
party whose programme stands for the realisation of the immense possibilities the ratification of 
the Treaty and of the Constitution open up for our country. Convinced of the necessity of 
national solidarity for years to come and until our people shall have made invulnerable from any 
attack, internal or external, the historic one-ness and territorial integrity of our ancient nation, 
and shall have brought about by common consent a re-united Ireland, at peace within her own 
borders and with all the world, we earnestly exhort you and your fellow countrymen everywhere 
to rally in active organisation in defence of the rights and liberties which now are yours to hold 
and develop.
5
 
 
National solidarity was desirable in the short term as the government needed to work 
immediately towards the thorough transfer of power in Ireland from British to native 
government while a constructive programme would ‘evolve itself accordingly’ once the 
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Free State Constitution was secured from ‘internal’ and ‘external’ threats. Bedding down 
the new state and ensuring its security was the government’s priority; everything else was 
secondary. Vaguely dealing with a policy programme that could be developed once the 
state had been secured, the document promised it would have a wide national aspect 
embracing the interests of all the people, ‘no matter how powerful or influential’ the 
various sectional interests may be. Showcasing its Irish-Ireland credentials, the party 
claimed to stand for the gradual ‘gaelicising’ of the country’s life and promised to 
complete land distribution holding out the Land Act as proof of its credentials. In 
government, the party pledged to secure access for the people to ‘legitimate and reasonable 
prosperity’ and to support a ‘greatly increased population’ through the extension of 
intensive agricultural cultivation. Moreover, the document promised to develop the 
nation’s industrial life so that ‘towns will require constantly increasing supplies from the 
country[side], and so that the country[side] will require the increasing manufactured 
products of the towns’. 
 In the arena of social policy, local and national government would cooperate to 
secure a ‘higher standard of living for the masses of the people’. Citizens would have 
‘direct association’ with plans to solve problems such as unemployment and housing. 
Moreover, Cumann na nGaedheal’s Ireland, as outlined in the manifesto, would be 
meritocratic, with state employment open to ‘every Irish man or woman’ best qualified for 
the job. Given the immediate challenges facing the Executive Council, it would be 
unreasonable, concluded the document, to expect the government to immediately turn its 
attention to fisheries, afforestation or industrialisation. These would be addressed with 
‘peace and ordered national life re-established’. Cumann na nGaedheal’s appeal to the 
people ended by asking those who loved Ireland to band themselves together ‘in order to 
bring to fruition speedily the hopes for the country we cherish’. In August 1923, a vote for 
Cumann na nGaedheal was a vote to continue self-government under the Treaty. 
Unsurprisingly, the document told a more optimistic story than was the reality. The 
prospects facing the Free State government were bleak. To the outside world, the Free 
State seemed racked by political instability and it was clear that the new government would 
have to spend heavily on reconstruction following the destruction of railways, roads, 
bridges and buildings during the Civil War. In 1922, the state’s revenue was collected by 
the British and there were encouraging signs in the healthy returns from income tax even 
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as Civil War raged across the country,
6
 though these came with the proviso that there were 
as yet no indicators of the overall cost of the war. In August 1922 The Economist 
welcomed the Provisional Government’s reduction of income tax from six to five shillings 
in the pound. For the magazine, this was a good indicator that frugal and orthodox 
financial and economic policies would be pursued in the new state.
7
 As gleaned from the 
previous chapter, this was a period when a return to economic normalcy was desired; this 
normalcy implied a laissez-faire, free trade and balanced budget economy that had 
characterised the period before the Great War.
8
 In 1922 and 1923, the fledgling 
government wanted to portray itself as conventional, prudent and self-supporting so as to 
earn the ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’. However, the reality of governing an 
independent Ireland was far removed from the utopia envisaged during the years 1916-22. 
Whereas Britain had vast revenue with which to govern Ireland, the Free State was limited 
to tax raised within the twenty six counties. During its first term of office, Cumann na 
nGaedheal would play ‘the role of a centre party’ given that the farmers, business and 
unionist interests lay to its right and the Labour party to its left.
9
 Cumann na nGaedheal 
seemed content with a moderate role, The Freeman boasted ‘challenged from the right; 
challenged from the left; we will keep to the middle of the road’.10 
 
Financing the Free State 
 
In April 1923, the Free State took over full fiscal responsibility from the British and 
collected taxation for the first time. Given both that a costly Civil War marked the birth of 
the state, and that the international climate favoured financial orthodoxy-balanced budgets, 
it was clear that any Irish government would be well advised to initially pursue a cautious 
policy lest they alienate potential investors or invite the wrath of either Irish or 
international financial experts. In this regard, the government’s Land Act proved 
problematic with some investors believing it would swallow too much revenue. As Mary 
Daly has observed, any ‘radical departure on tariffs would have upset the British, worried 
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the Irish banks and alienated the large farmers and businessmen’.11 Therefore the new 
government needed to reassure the latter classes that the state was stable, secure and worth 
investing in.  
Achieving a balanced budget would prove problematic given the extent of services 
provided by the British in Ireland. The Free State would have to either fund these from 
much smaller revenue or reduce the amount spent on services. More pressing however, 
was the need to pay for the Civil War. The state would need to borrow, and given the 
difficulty of attracting investment from abroad, would eventually need to find the money at 
home. This would demonstrate the financial and economic independence of the state while 
tying its people to the principle of stable government. In like manner, the government was 
acutely aware of the need to demonstrate its financial prowess and established the Fiscal 
Inquiry Committee in July 1923. This committee met forty times and heard evidence from 
Irish industrialists. Jacobs opposed a tariff on flour milling while numerous free trade 
economists, such as George O’Brien, also gave evidence.12 Long established industries 
offered the strongest opposition to tariffs with weaker ones favouring protection.
13
 When it 
finished its work in September, the committee was lukewarm about Irish protectionism and 
further shaped the evolution of an orthodox Irish fiscal policy. Moreover, the department 
of Finance was ideologically laissez-faire while Girvin argues the nature of Irish society 
favoured caution over innovation. Ireland had always been suspicious of British welfare 
policies fearing they could bankrupt a Home Rule parliament. British society was 
dominated by the working classes, whereas in Ireland, the propertied class was strongest. 
14
 
 Determined not to seek out financial assistance from Britain, the government turned 
to the Irish banks for a temporary loan in 1923 to tide them over until the August election. 
Irish banks kept the state afloat in its formative months. In June, The Economist outlined 
the challenges facing the Free State and the inherent risks in securing capital. Ireland’s 
ability to borrow on favourable terms in the future would be secured if she could 
successfully float a national loan. Should the country become dependent on rival groups of 
investors in London or New York, it risked unseemly interference in her domestic politics 
by powerful lenders.
15
 As such, a strong Cumann na nGaedheal performance in the 
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election was crucial, and the country’s financial position helps explain the government’s 
determination to portray the state’s internal politics as settled and stable. The Economist, 
for its part, welcomed the ‘heavy vote for the Constitution and stability’ in the August 
election,
16
 believing that Ireland’s future economic well-being depended on the Treaty, 
Cumann na nGaedheal and on an end to damaging fratricidal conflict. The magazine 
generally painted a positive picture of the country and its government as they both tried to 
find their feet in the autumn and winter of 1923. 
 In the aftermath of the 1923 general election, New York investors were in 
communication with Blythe regarding the possibility of providing the Free State with a 
loan.
17
 C.J. France, representing the Guarantee Trust, assessed the Free State’s economic 
potential and reported back to the Trust on the political situation. France met with 
Cosgrave and department of Finance officials to discuss the immediate financial 
requirements of the new state. Dillon and Read, also of New York, indicated an interest in 
the Free State’s credit. They had already lent to the Dutch and Brazilian governments and 
seemed keen to explore the possibilities offered by investment in the Free State. The 
Guarantee Trust was impressed with Blythe’s plans to reduce spending and to balance the 
budget. Moreover, France was convinced of the economic and political soundness of the 
country. However, the government and state itself remained financially untested and while 
recommending ‘without reservation Ireland as a country worthy of real financial support’ it 
was apparent to him that ‘a successful internal loan would do much to strengthen external 
credit’.18 One problem facing the government was its lack of financial know-how, though 
there is evidence that attempts were made to recruit into the civil service people with such 
an expertise,
19
 and the advice of economists such as George O’Brien was valued. 
 The Free State Constitution embodied adherence to the principle of Treasury 
control,
20
 and many of the officials in the department of Finance were schooled in the 
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orthodoxies of British financial practice.
21
 The background of officials in the department 
was a cause of concern at times to Cumann na nGaedheal members and to the party’s 
political opponents. Fears that the ‘old gang’ still had too much control were commonplace 
while the continuity with the personnel of the Castle administration fed into Republican 
propaganda which portrayed Cumann na nGaedheal as Imperialists and ‘West Brits’. Still, 
it must be remembered that Joseph Brennan, secretary of the Department of Finance and 
formerly a member of the Castle administration, was recommended to Collins by 
McGilligan during the Treaty negotiations, and secretly helped the Irish delegates counter 
Britain’s financial claims. Moreover, J.J. McElligot, assistant secretary and later Brennan’s 
replacement, had been removed from the Castle administration on account of his 
involvement in the 1916 Rising. The expert financial journalism McElligot turned to after 
his expulsion caught the eye of both Collins and Blythe who were keen to bring talented 
people into the administrative machine of the fledgling state.
22
 As Fanning points out, the 
department of Finance which emerged was something of a synthesis between the 
revolutionary Dáil department controlled by Collins and the precedent set by the British 
Treasury tradition. Collins had placed Finance at the centre of the Dáil government, a 
custom carried on under the Free State where the tenet of finance control was maintained. 
Claims that officials were working for the benefit of British interests were unfounded, 
given that much of the Catholic middle class recruited by the Castle in the decades before 
independence would, like the Free State ministers they served, have aspired to Irish self-
government. Before 1922, the Irish administration was in contact with British reform era 
politics which embedded the notion of the neutral and impartial state.
23
 
  In January 1924, the government was made aware of a third prospective investor 
inspecting the financial prospects of the Free State. Again, the assessment was negative. 
Economist Raligh S. Rife outlined the reasons why investment would be impossible at that 
early stage of the new state’s life.  He feared that land purchase, as outlined in the Land 
Act of 1923, would place a considerable strain on the country’s resources while warning 
that the government needed to demonstrate its financial and economic credentials. Credit, 
generally, was tight in the winter of 1923-24 and British bankers feared a period of 
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inflation should the government decide to establish its own currency. The hyperinflation in 
Weimar Germany during 1923 probably made investors everywhere feel somewhat uneasy 
about taking a risk in countries trying to find their feet. Indeed, two lessons (mistakenly) 
learned from the German crisis was that budget deficits led to both inflation and monetary 
chaos, and that inflation was to be avoided at all costs, since it would lead to economic 
problems later. From 1923, ‘hostility towards inflation became the leitmotif of economic policy 
across Europe’.
24
 Before luring foreign investment, Blythe and his colleagues would have to 
show that ‘they comprehended the magnitude of their financial problem’,25 that is, that 
they would conform to international financial practice.
.
 Rife praised the government’s 
decision to appoint a fiscal commission in the summer of 1923. He also warned of 
widespread fears that ‘if the Free State had ample funds today, expenditure might be made 
more freely and in the long run the State would assume too heavy a financial burden’. 
Ireland, new to statehood and recovering from Civil War presented too great a risk for 
potential investors and the country had yet to prove itself capable of taking tough economic 
medicine. As it began its journey into full statehood, the Free State would have to 
demonstrate its financial and economic independence by raising a national loan to meet its 
needs.  
Before issuing the national loan, the government was determined to send out the 
right signals regarding their approach to fiscal policy and to create favourable conditions 
for a full subscription to the loan. Outlining the legislative programme of the new Free 
State government in the Dáil on 3 October 1923, Governor-General Tim Healey, in a 
widely reported speech, said that the nation’s resources had to be husbanded with the 
utmost care and that government and citizen alike needed to economise and play a part in 
repairing the financial ravages of recent years.
26
 In advance of issuing the national loan, 
this was a speech designed to reassure the public and potential investors. A policy of 
retrenchment was embarked upon in the months that followed to impress upon the world 
the financial intentions of the government; to deal with the heavy public spending bill 
inherited from the British, and to make some inroads into the deficit caused by the Civil 
War. In creating a suitable climate for investment, reductions in expenditure on the army, 
salaries, pensions and dependants allowances were announced. In informing the Dáil of the 
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decision to reduce the old-age pension, Blythe was at pains to point out the heavy burden 
the government had inherited from the British. In 1920/21, the cost of the old age pension 
for the whole island had been £4,463,500 out of total revenue of £48,845,000.  In 1923, the 
charge for old age pensions in the Free State stood at £3,277,000 out of revenue of 
£24,761,405.  According to Blythe, the government was ‘paying three quarters of the all-
Ireland pension charge of 1920/21 with only half the all-Ireland revenue of the same 
year’.27 The government argued that it simply could not afford to maintain the old age 
pension at the rate paid by the British, though the reduction was connected to 
demonstrating a commitment to sound finance before the national loan was issued.
28
  
As seen in other chapters, Cumann na nGaedheal members found defending such 
measures unedifying. In a letter to Blythe, the party’s general secretary outlined the 
organisation’s objection to the reduction. Rather than reducing the top figure by one 
shilling, members would have been satisfied with a ‘combing out’ of those on a pension 
who had private wealth at their disposal.
29
 At a time when new members were being 
sought out, party people regarded the move as having harmed organisational efforts. 
However, the government had more pressing issues to deal with and succeeded in having 
the £10m National loan oversubscribed by £200,000. Discontent with the policy of 
retrenchment rumbled on in the cumainn but ministers would not backtrack. A draft letter 
Kevin O’Higgins proposed to send to the discontented Fr. Malachy Brennan in 
Roscommon reveals their attitude.  According to O’Higgins’ letter, the government would 
have had to borrow to meet the cost of maintaining the old age pension at pre-
independence levels and this would have a consequent impact on the country’s credit. 
Alternatively, taxes could be raised to meet the cost of the pension but this would 
exacerbate the country’s woes by placing an unfair burden on taxpayers. Furthermore, 
maintaining the pension would reduce funds for relief and economic development. 
O’Higgins asked that supporters trust the government in its endeavour to ‘place the country 
on a sound economic footing’ and promised that national ideals would not be compromised 
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in the effort.
30
 Government priority now necessitated the pursuit of unpopular policies 
which would not endear them to either rank-and-file supporters or the electorate at large.  
On 23 November 1923, the terms of the national loan were outlined in a statement by 
Kevin O’Higgins to the Dáil. O’Higgins pointed out the advantageous terms of the Irish 
Free State loan in comparison to ‘gilt edged issues at present on the market’.31 Ireland’s 
national loan was to consist of £10m of 5% stock issued at 95 whereas the British 5% war 
loan was quoted at over 100. The central fund was offered as security for the loan. In order 
to further reduce credit risk, the government set aside a sinking fund - a fund established 
for the purpose of clearing or reducing outstanding loans or debts - in connection with the 
loan. £750,000 was to be set aside annually for the purpose of paying interest on the loan 
with the balance going to the sinking fund. According to O’Higgins, the sinking fund 
would tend to keep the market price up after issue and would be used to purchase stock 
issued on the market at or under par.
32
  
There were many advantages in issuing an internal loan. As we have seen, this was 
precisely what investors abroad wanted to see, a demonstration of the financial and 
economic independence of the state, but there were other advantages and these were 
outlined by O’Higgins. A loan issued abroad would have been less appealing as the terms 
offered would have been less favourable to investors. In addition, the interest yields of 
home investors would swell their incomes, bolstering the government’s yearly tax yield.33 
Dividends issued to foreign investors would bring no such rewards to domestic revenue. 
Moreover, borrowing abroad or continuing to look to the Irish banks for money would 
probably lead to inflation. It was a principle of sound finance, O’Higgins argued, that Free 
State individuals with deposits in the Irish banks transfer them to the government by 
investing in the loan. Such a step would not place an inflationary pressure on the economy. 
But the real benefit to the country of a successful national loan was spelled out. The 
establishment of sound national credit in the Free State’s infancy would contribute directly 
to the financing of the state on a cheaper basis in the future. If the state proved its ability to 
raise money at home, and pursued a sensible financial policy, it would only be a matter of 
time before the government could make its debut on the international lending markets. 
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 By the end of 1923 the government had succeeded in creating an image of itself and 
the new state as financially orthodox, responsible and self-contained. The Free State would 
conform to the prevailing post-war economic narrative by keeping government spending 
down and reducing the taxation burden. It had provided for its own immediate financial 
requirements through the raising of an internal loan and had been brave enough to impose 
the pinch of retrenchment on teachers,
34
 soldiers, pensioners and civil servants. For The 
Economist, the future was bright with growing confidence in the stability of the Free State. 
A ‘strong, firm and sympathetic government had the majority of the people with them’ 
while the national loan stood in excess of its issue price. 
35
 Apart from a brief slump in the 
value of the loan’s price, caused by the political instability of March 1924, the national 
loan had been a success with its oversubscription underpinning the reality that the 
country’s economic independence had been secured. 
 
Limited industrial development 
 
In 1924, the economic development of the state occupied much of the government’s 
energy. As early as 1922 and 1923 it had been a government priority to examine the 
prospects of Irish industrial growth. Nevertheless, throughout its time in government 
Cumann na nGaedheal would regard agriculture as the engine of Irish growth and 
prosperity. The Provisional Government had shown a willingness to ascertain the 
immediate problems facing the economy and appointed a Commission on Prices on 7 
November 1922.
36
 Before resigning from the government in March 1924, Joe McGrath had 
also been curious about electrification schemes undertaken in various European countries, 
particularly Germany,
37
 where Thomas McLaughlin worked as an employee of Siemens-
Schuckert.
38
 As outlined in the government approved Governor General’s speech on the 
opening of the third Dáil,
39
 pursuing a scheme of electrification would be a priority for the 
government. In Europe, electrical expansion was providing growth in new industries as 
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traditional sectors such as textiles, metals and mining declined.
40
 On 26 February 1924
41
 
the Executive Council asked the German firm Siemens to outline a commercially viable 
scheme for the hydro-electric exploitation of the river Shannon and the electrification of 
the Free State. Siemens’ proposal was to be scrutinised by European experts on 
completion. On replacing McGrath as minister for Industry and Commerce, McGilligan 
enthusiastically embraced the task of spearheading the electrification scheme. His papers 
reveal a commitment to understanding precedents set by the electricity industry abroad.
42
 
 Furthermore, the government was represented at the 1924 World Power Conference 
in London by Fred Allen. Between 30 June and 10 July, the conference heard a total of 420 
papers submitted by leading engineering and scientific experts. Allen seems to have been 
briefed to procure as much information for the government as possible and used his 
attendance at the conference to ascertain the various models then prevalent, and the levels 
of government control, adopted in countries that had recently embarked on electrification 
schemes.
43
 Having sought the views of delegates to the conference, Allen came to the 
conclusion that schemes in Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland were among 
the best. He also learned that European and American delegates considered Britain to have 
made poor progress towards electrification.  
Subsequently, the government used whatever channels of communication at its 
disposal to learn of best practice internationally in rolling out its electrification policy. 
Schemes developed in Ontario, Switzerland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries 
aroused particular interest. 
44
 The move towards hydro-electrification in Europe was noted 
by Allen as was the ‘rapid growth of electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries 
in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland’. These spin-off industries demonstrated the extent to 
which industry could follow electrification, and the possible benefits of such new 
industries in a country such as Ireland.
45
 In Norway, a scheme of electrical supply had been 
drawn up in 1922 at a cost of £16m, with Denmark agreeing to import the country’s 
surplus power. The consequent development of a nitrates industry in Norway made it an 
important supplier on the world market and in particular to its agricultural neighbour 
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Denmark. The development of a nitrates industry in Ireland was believed to be 
economically viable. In other countries, railways had been electrified, while both 
agriculture and industry benefitted from electrification. Electrification meant industrial 
progress in mid 1920s Europe, a fact which the Free State government was acutely aware 
of. Siemens published their scheme later that year and in September, in accordance with 
the original agreement of February, the government appointed four international experts to 
scrutinise their proposal.  
The so called ‘Shannon Scheme’ developed by Siemens made explicit reference to 
the success of electrification policies in other European countries. Explaining why the 
‘mighty Shannon’ poured its energy into the ocean while water power had been developed 
elsewhere, the document claimed British rule had hindered economic development and 
promised that the Free State government would devote itself to catching up so as to ‘raise 
their country to the same degree of cultural and industrial development enjoyed by the 
other nations of Europe’.46 The scheme booklet was at pains to point out the advantages to 
existing industry of providing cheaper power supply, the potential for new industries as 
evidenced by the experience of countries such as Norway, and the benefits to Irish 
agriculture of using electricity to lessen ‘the dullness and hardship’ of the farmer’s life.47  
  In a further effort to bolster the country’s move towards the development of native 
Irish industry, in the autumn of 1924 the government took steps towards a more 
coordinated approach to economic development by appointing a committee to advise it.
48
  
Subsequently, the government announced that it would consider proposals from sugar 
manufacturers for the establishment of a beet sugar factory in the Free State. On 3 
November 1924 two members of an interdepartmental committee, established to examine 
the feasibility of an Irish sugar beet industry, were authorised to meet with representatives 
of French, Belgian, Dutch and British sugar manufacturers to ascertain if they would be 
interested in contributing to the setting up of such an industry in Ireland and on what 
terms.
49
 In March 1925 an agreement was entered into with Maurice Lippens of Brussels to 
grant a ten year government subsidy in respect of sugar produced from home grown beet at 
a factory to be built at a location selected by him. Lippens established the Irish Sugar 
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Manufacturing Company in December 1925 with a share capital of £400,000. The 
company had Irish, Czechoslovak and Belgian directors.
50
 Sugar beet was a profitable 
product and its growth had been encouraged in countries such as Czechoslovakia.
51
 A site 
for the new factory was eventually selected outside Carlow town and the department of 
Agriculture undertook trials and experiments with farmers during 1925 and 1926 to 
familiarise them with the cultivation of sugar beet and to determine the likely yearly crop 
yield in Ireland. The company was inundated with offers to supply its sugar beet 
requirements with counties Carlow, Wexford, Laois, Tipperary, Kildare, Offaly and 
Waterford providing the bulk of supplies.  
    Where it lacked expertise, the government was keen to look outside the Free State 
for guidance. As Mary Daly has noted, the two major initiatives towards industrialisation 
under Cumann na nGaedheal were developed ‘by foreign, though non-British, 
companies’.52 Creeping German influence within the Free State was a source of some 
anxiety in both Britain and Ireland. It seemed to some observers that the newly 
independent state was being prepared for a future German invasion.  Between 1924 and 
1928 the Free State’s relations with German industry were the source of comment in 
British publications such as the Daily Mail, Northern Whig and the National Review. 
British industry had lost out as the Free State turned increasingly to German imports and 
negotiated local and national government contracts with German firms. Surely in the 
background a powerful brain was working to ‘regulate the advance of an invading army’?53 
The Irish Times too was wary of undue German influence in Ireland. The paper disagreed 
that Cumann na nGaedheal was oblivious to the danger of peaceful penetration by 
Germany pointing to Siemens’ willingness to accept the government’s stipulations that 
Irish labour and raw materials were to be used in the construction of the Ardnacrusha 
power station where possible. However, the paper stated that Germany was a country with 
‘a crowded and increasing population, with highly developed industries and with a 
prodigious technical equipment’. She also had a vast war debt while her ability to trade had 
been shattered by the Great War. For Germany ‘our Free State, underdeveloped, ambitious, 
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partly in ruins, humming with schemes of reconstruction, must offer the same temptation 
which Australia offers to the Japanese’.54 Germany remained a threat to those of a pro-
British outlook.  
Cumann na nGaedheal was often castigated by Republican opponents for its apparent 
willingness to placate the British, but as these articles show, we must not underestimate the 
perception that the new Irish state was a threat to British security. This was in part a 
consequence of the Cumann na nGaedheal government’s determination to assert the state’s 
independence and to secure the best terms for the country without due consideration of 
British sensibilities. With the Shannon-Scheme, the government seemed to be flouting the 
importance of its most indispensible customer in favour of the German enemy. Cumann na 
nGaedheal for its part was anxious to allay such fears. The party faced a difficult balancing 
act in asserting Irish independence from Britain, in securing the best international advice 
and skills for the state and in attempting to institute fair and friendly relations with its 
nearest neighbour. The Times of London covered an important speech made by O’Higgins 
at Dungarvan in Co. Waterford on 18 October 1925.
55
 In his contribution, O’Higgins 
denied that anti-British trade tendencies were manifesting themselves in the Free State. He 
intimated that had British firms made competitive offers they would have been given due 
consideration by the government. Ireland, he claimed, was an underdeveloped country, 
with no shortage of proposals for expansion, and when British engineers saw that potential 
which the Germans and Belgians had been quick to notice, they would find a government 
in Ireland prepared to do business with them.
56
 The Free State was growing in confidence 
and under Cumann na nGaedheal it was sure of its nationalism, self-reliant and self-
supporting but equally unprepared to engage in the type of anglophobia it knew would be 
damaging to the country’s vital interests. 
Despite modest successes, the party’s industrial policy in the 1920s remained 
disappointing. Conditions in Ireland did not favour industrial development and the 
government was slow to address the deficiency. Low prices led to dumping on the Irish 
market by British firms. A lack of skilled workers also mitigated against development, as 
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did high costs and wages.
57
 Failure to industrialise, even accounting for difficult 
circumstances, meant that emigration would remain a fact of Irish life after independence. 
 
Competing in a world market 
 
Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Féin and icon to many in Cumann na nGaedheal, 
had established the concept of ‘ourselves alone’ and applied it to both his political and 
economic teachings. For Griffith, and his numerous adherents within the ranks of Cumann 
na nGaedheal at every level, self-sufficiency combined with protective tariffs was the route 
to Irish economic development. Nationalists had always blamed Ireland’s economic woes 
and failure to industrialise on the Act of Union, and British sponsorship of free trade, 
which had suffocated Irish industrial growth by opening Irish markets to bigger British 
firms.
58
 As such, the economic nationalist line of thought argued that industrialisation 
could be advanced through the imposition of tariffs and duties on imports, which would 
encourage the growth of Irish firms by protecting them from foreign competition, which 
was particularly intense in the 1920s. As the party of Arthur Griffith, surely this kind of 
economic nationalism would characterise Cumann na nGaedheal government? 
Even before the establishment of the Free State, it was clear to some in the separatist 
movement that protection could prove a double-edged sword.
59
 Already, leading firms in 
numerous industrialised countries were trying to offset the effects of tariffs and the 
imposition of barriers to world trade by establishing factories in overseas markets. In 
wartime, the British government’s imposition of the McKenna duties in 1915 (named after 
Reginald McKenna the Chancellor of the Exchequer) led to the establishment of foreign 
engineering firms within the UK and was a factor in Ford’s decision to locate in Cork. 
Fiscal autonomy for the Free State in 1923 brought automatic protection for the Irish 
tobacco industry, which led to the establishment in Ireland of British tobacco factories, 
Gallahers and Imperial Tobacco.
60
 Irish producers and politicians alike noted this 
development.
61
 Not only could foreign companies jump the trade barrier by locating in 
Ireland, they were better organised than native concerns and could pay higher wages. 
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Another reason why Cumann na nGaedheal baulked at pursuing an avowedly protectionist 
agenda was that it knew there was a lack of native industrial capital and a shortage of 
skilled labour in Ireland. In addition, Hogan, O’Higgins and the department of Finance 
were opposed to a wholesale tariff policy on ideological grounds. Moreover, as stated, the 
Fiscal Inquiry Committee of July 1923 reinforced free trade tendencies in the new state.
62
 
McGilligan and his department were more pragmatic on the question of tariffs and 
displayed a more interventionist approach to policy in general.
63
 Opposition to free trade 
was symbolised by J.J. Walsh and elements within the parliamentary party and party 
organisation. Cumann na nGaedheal policy in government through the 1920s did little to 
reassure the malcontents. 
As discussed in chapter six, there was another reason why independent Ireland did 
not pursue the protectionist policy that might have been expected of it. In the period after 
the Great War, much of the world, particularly those who had been on the winning side, 
sought a return to the orthodoxies of the pre-1914 economic order of balanced budgets and 
free trade. As a member of the Commonwealth, it was natural that the Free State should 
seek to take advantage of the opportunities afforded it by free trade. By the mid 1920s the 
economic argument in most countries stabilised around a return to gold standard 
orthodoxy.
64
 Additionally, the spectre of Soviet Russia cast a shadow over the whole 
continent,
65
 and probably was one of a number of indicators that the pre-war economic 
order could not be re-created; that the world had changed too much. Britain returned to 
gold in 1925 further pushing it towards a tough, deflationary policy. It made sense that the 
Free State participate in the re-assertion of economic liberalism in the 1920s given that its 
most important trading partner was leading the charge. Evidence suggests, that O’Higgins’ 
adherence to liberal economics rested on an assumption that ‘Ulster unionism was based 
solely on its economic relationship with Britain and the Empire’.66 O’Higgins believed 
simple economics could tempt the Northern state into a united Ireland; for this to occur, the 
government needed to prove its financial credentials and that it was not, what we might 
now term, a ‘rogue state’. In speeches, articles and correspondence, O’Higgins revealed a 
clear belief that the country had to prove itself capable of stable government. Hostility with 
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Britain or ‘the North’ would be disastrous, spelling economic ruin for the country,67 while 
in lamenting the disappointing Cumann na nGaedheal election result of June 1927,  
O’Higgins claimed that the government had been making progress towards Irish unity 
before the election, only to see it derailed by its weakened position. According to 
O’Higgins, the state’s economic policies had engendered a feeling of envy north of the 
border where taxation remained high.
68
 Aside from domestic considerations and financial 
constraints it is difficult to see how the Free State could have traversed the road of 
economic nationalism at a time of international free trade and a return to gold. The time 
was not yet ripe for wholesale protection and economic autarky. 
Instead, the government plotted something of a middle road and experimented in 
1924 and 1925 with a policy of selective tariffs conceived as much as a revenue-raising 
device as a new means of stimulating Irish industry. Blythe’s budgets of 1924 and 1925 
shifted necessary import duties from articles Irish industry could not produce to ones it 
could.
69
 The boot tariff introduced in 1924 proved successful in raising revenue, creating 
employment and boosting wages. As such, in the following year, the tariff experiment was 
extended to articles of clothing, blanketing, rugs, bedsteads and wooden furniture, while 
the duty on black and green bottles was applied all glass bottles and jars. All of these tariffs 
resulted in increased employment in the protected industries.
70
 Moreover, the revenue 
raised from the imposition of the new duties compensated partly for the loss to revenue 
caused by the reduction in income tax and the abolition of duties on tea, coffee and 
cocoa.
71
 George O’Brien agreed with Blythe’s decision to reduce the tax burden and to 
abolish the duties on the ‘poor man’s luxuries’, claiming that the country had a relatively 
small public debt. O’Brien criticised the decision not to reduce the super tax on the highest 
earners and suggested that the retention of the corporation profits tax was a ‘clog on 
industrial enterprise’.72 Blythe had not gone far enough to please O’Brien’s orthodox 
sentiments. 
The government accepted that the Free State was primarily an agricultural country 
and worked on the basis that Irish agricultural produce needed to be of a high quality to 
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maintain its position of dominance in the British market.
73
  In a memo to his government 
colleagues in early January 1924, Hogan stated that ‘national development in Ireland, for 
our generation at least, is practically synonymous with agricultural development and [...] 
therefore, we must enunciate as soon as possible a policy for the development of 
agriculture which will get the sympathy and support of the intelligent and go-ahead 
farmers of the country’.74 Hogan urged his colleagues to consider his memo before the 
Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention of 29 January in order to pre-empt the criticism 
of farmers. Hogan’s memo cited the high cost of living, unemployment in congested 
districts and the need for agricultural loans as problems that needed to be tackled. 
Additionally, Hogan planned to take steps towards improving the quality of Irish 
agricultural produce. A national brand for butter, bacon and eggs was needed, as was a 
livestock policy to produce cattle and pigs ‘of equal or better quality than the Danish 
animal’. Denmark, a frequent source of comparison in the 1920s,75 was a substantial 
supplier of agricultural produce to Britain.
76
 Primary, secondary and university education 
in agricultural practices was also flagged as important in maintaining the farming sector as 
an important wealth generator for the country. Agriculture was the Free State’s largest 
source of employment while Irish farmers were primarily exporters. A free trade policy 
entailed keeping farm costs low, helping Irish farmers remain competitive at a time of 
fierce international competition.
77
 
 Efforts towards improvement were hampered initially by two wet years in 1923 and 
1924 and also by the post war economic readjustment that saw Irish agriculture lose the 
position of artificial prosperity it had enjoyed during the Great War, when Irish farmers 
had been able to supply the eggs and dairy produce which Britain’s war economy had been 
starved of. All of Europe was affected by the changed post-War climate and Ireland was no 
different. European agriculture suffered as the United States and Canada extended 
cultivation after the war.
78
 Cumann na nGaedheal continued to believe national prosperity 
depended on agriculture. Key to the success of Irish agriculture would be its ability to 
compete on the more competitive world market with strong continental rivals such as 
Denmark. The Shannon-Scheme report itself had referred to the need to keep farm costs 
                                                          
73
 David Johnson, The interwar economy in Ireland (Dundalk, 1989), p. 10. 
74
 Memorandum by Patrick Hogan, 25 Jan. 1924 (UCDA, Patrick McGilligan papers, P35b/2). 
75
 Ó Gráda, A new economic history, p. 380. 
76
 W. Glyn Jones, Nations of the modern world: Denmark (London, 1970), p. 135. 
77
 Daly, Social and economic history, pp140-1. 
78
 Mazower, Dark continent, p. 113. 
244 
 
down. Electrification would help effect the reductions in the cost of production that were 
critical to equipping Irish farmers for the task ahead.
79
 For now, mass production was not 
an option in agriculture or industry, so the focus shifted to the production of high quality 
products that would be synonymous with the Free State. 
The government were fortunate in that substantial progress had been made in the 
decades before independence towards land reform and the transfer of the ownership of 
agricultural land from landlords to tenant farmers. By 1920, owner occupancy had reached 
97% of the island’s land area.80 Cumann na nGaedheal’s Land Purchase Act of 1923 aimed 
to complete the process south of the border, by mandating the Land Commission to 
compulsorily purchase all remaining leasehold land. However, as shown by Terence 
Dooley the land question would remain of central importance in the politics of independent 
Ireland for many decades. There simply was not enough land to appease everybody. Many 
of the owner occupied farms were too small to be economically viable and a sense that the 
government favoured the strong farmers would hurt the Cumann na nGaedheal vote in 
many western constituencies (see chapter three). 
In order to maintain agricultural exports and for the country to hold its place in the 
competitive world markets, steps had to be taken to improve the quality of Irish produce. 
In a wide-ranging, often quoted, address to the Irish society at Oxford University on 31 
October 1924, Kevin O’Higgins indicated that this would be a priority for the government 
in the coming years.
81
 For O’Higgins, the 1923 Land Act had been designed to relieve a 
congestion problem ‘that is a disgrace to any civilised country’. Maintaining a competitive 
export industry in agriculture was underpinned by the acts passed in 1924 to govern the 
production of eggs and butter. Eggs intended for export had to be tested, graded and 
packed in a prescribed manner and were subject to government inspection. In addition, it 
was made a criminal offence to sell eggs which were dirty or in any way unfit for human 
consumption.
82
 After the act became operative, there were 23 prosecutions in the first eight 
months. Similar legislation regulating butter production was passed. Exporters had to 
register and premises, equipment and produce were subject to inspection. The new State 
was modernising and involving itself in aspects of the country’s economic life that had 
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been left untouched by the ancien regime. In 1925, similar attempts were made to improve 
the quality of Irish cattle by making it an offence to keep a bull unlicensed with the 
department of agriculture. In the first inspection of Irish bulls in the autumn of 1925, the 
department demonstrated that it was taking the matter seriously as 4,000 of the 18,000 
beasts inspected were rejected.
83
 
Another important plank in the government’s attempts to modernise and improve the 
country’s agricultural industry came in 1927 with the establishment of the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation. The ACC, as its name suggests, was set up as a state body to provide 
medium and long-term loans to Irish farmers. This policy probably arrived too late to be 
successful with the worldwide slump of 1929 and 1930,  causing prices to fall, agriculture 
to become depressed and making it even more difficult for farmers to repay loans they had 
taken out.
84
 The world wide post-war depression in agriculture forced governments 
everywhere to give considerable attention to reform of the industry, as the Free State had 
been doing on a small scale. In 1927, the government wanted to reform the Irish dairying 
industry. A memo on the Irish dairying industry reveals that the government was aware 
that in numerous countries, the sale of agricultural commodities was controlled by a board, 
citing the pool system in grain in both Canada and Australia.
85
 The same memo, compiled 
by Hogan, described dairying as the ‘foundation of our agricultural industry, and on it 
depends our cattle and pig trade’. Mixed farming, the production of dairy produce, eggs, 
cattle, pigs etc, was to remain the ‘only sound system of farming here’ until world 
conditions improved. As we will see in the next chapter, this was an analysis with which 
The Economist agreed, since economic thinking remained grounded in financial orthodoxy. 
In parts of the country where mixed farming was not practiced, acute depression was the 
result and efforts were made to introduce mixed farming to the primarily barley-growing 
districts.  
Hogan proposed three ways of reorganising the dairying industry along more 
commercial lines and away from the ‘unprofitable’ practice of home butter-making. The 
third proposal involved state purchase of the Limerick based Condensed Milk Company of 
Ireland’s 114 creameries at the cost of £350,000. Creameries appeared in Ireland towards 
the end of the nineteenth century with the first one emerging in limerick in 1884.  
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Creameries allowed for the faster and more thorough separation of cream from milk, and 
made the most of new technologies developed in Germany in the 1870s.
86
 By 
independence, there were too many private and cooperative creameries competing for 
business. In attempting to reorganise dairying, Hogan’s proposal implied the establishment 
of a state company to take over all private creameries and to transfer them, and insolvent 
cooperatives, to surviving cooperatives.
87
 The measure would stamp the government’s 
authority over the organisation of dairying, possibly encouraging farmers in non-dairying 
districts such as Clare, the midlands and the North West to take it up.
88
 To this end, the 
Dairy Disposal Company was established in 1927 with the remit of taking over insolvent 
cooperatives and private creameries. Within three years, 170 private creameries were 
acquired, half of which were closed down, and the establishment of new creameries was to 
be controlled by a new licensing system introduced in the 1928 Creameries Act. However, 
for most of its period in office Cumann na nGaedheal kept state interference to a minimum 
though Irish agriculture performed reasonably well until 1930.
89
 
 
Financial Orthodoxy 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal government pursued an orthodox financial policy throughout 
its period in power. As alluded to throughout this chapter, the stark reality of Irish 
independence meant that the government simply did not have the resources to embark on 
building a nationalistic or socialistic utopia, that is if indeed they wanted to. Instead, like 
most governments in Europe, they continued in the vein established during 1922 and 1923 
of endeavouring to keep the budget balanced (what was regarded by George O’Brien as the 
‘most important and gratifying feature’ of the 1925 budget) and to limit government action 
to providing the means for private interests to take the initiative towards expansion and to 
use surplus revenue to relieve the tax burden. The Free State had complete fiscal and 
monetary independence and could have embarked on a more experimental policy, as other 
countries (generally losers in the Great War), did with disastrous consequences. Germany 
succumbed to the temptation to print whatever money was required, leading to inflation 
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and hyperinflation that destroyed its currency, and shattered the economic and social 
cohesion of the middle class,
90
 (but wiped out war debt). Though the lessons learned from 
those crises themselves had negative long-term consequences as governments tried to 
avoid inflation at all costs. Despite the appeal of currency schemes, monetary practice was 
not meddled with in either the 1920s or 30s.
91
 Instead, the Free State government borrowed 
to overcome short-term problems because it was fortunate enough that its credit stood high. 
The Free State was a creditor nation based on capital outflows during the nineteenth 
century, steady exports and investment in British government stock during the Great 
War.
92
 In addition, agreements with Britain in 1925 and 1926 reduced the state’s liability 
for service of the British public debt. As such the state’s credit stood higher than that of 
most other European countries.  
Blythe as Finance Minister, and his all powerful department, maintained their 
cautious approach to budgetary policy and, as such, services remained underdeveloped.
93
 
In following through on an orthodox approach to finance, a conscious attempt was made to 
keep the taxation burden as low as possible. Revenue had been boosted by experimental 
tariffs during 1924 and the policy of experiment was continued in 1925. A deficit had been 
predicted in the budget of 1924 but prudent management of the State’s resources had 
resulted in a modest surplus. The Economist believed that a remission of taxation was now 
necessary and that the tariff experiments of the previous year had proved successful in 
increasing employment in the protected industries.
94
 Blythe was thinking along the same 
lines.
95
 Determined to relieve the taxation burden, the opportunity was seized upon in the 
lead-up to the budget of 1925. Anticipating a modest surplus of revenue,
96
 the government 
was able to reduce income tax from five shillings to four shillings in the pound. In 
addition, duties on tea, cocoa and coffee, the poor man’s luxuries, were abolished, as 
pointed out on Cumann na nGaedheal platforms around the country. Revenue had been 
boosted by tariff experiments such as the boot tax and charges placed on clothing, 
blanketing, rugs, bedsteads and wooden furniture and all glass bottles and jars. Cumann na 
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nGaedheal was praised for shifting the burden to commodities which could be produced in 
Ireland.
97
 The government was prepared to borrow modest sums to spend on non-recurrent 
items (or what would now be regarded as ‘capital projects’ such as the Shannon 
development) but saw borrowing for recurrent items such as the national army as a ‘dead 
weight’.98 
 
Legitimacy and stability 
 
Kevin O’Higgins is often credited with the successful re-establishment of law and 
order in the aftermath of the Civil War. As Minister for Home Affairs, later Justice after 
the enactment of the Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924,
99
 he presided over the 
establishment of an unarmed police force, An Garda Síochána, which quickly gained the 
respect of Free Staters and Republicans alike. The government wanted a return to normalcy 
as quickly as possible after the upheavals of the Civil War and the decision not to arm the 
Garda was a major factor in the population’s acceptance of the force. The RIC had been 
viewed with suspicion by large segments of the population, so having the new police force 
accepted was an important step on the road to legitimising the state. By 1925, O’Higgins 
was pleased with the progress he had made. In the aforementioned 18 October speech in 
Dungarvan, O’Higgins told his audience he had little now to complain about as Justice 
Minister and would have been delighted in 1922 to have known how settled the country 
would have become by 1925. Crime had also decreased and the people were increasingly 
cooperative with the forces of law and order.
100
 Around this time, the New York Times 
commented on the relative calm that had descended on Ireland. It reported that the 
radicalism of the Irish people had been replaced by conservatism.
101
 
Treatyite hard-man Eoin O’Duffy headed up the police as Garda Commissioner. 
O’Duffy was a well respected figure within Treatyite circles. He was sent for in 1924 at the 
time of the army mutiny and was appointed General officer commanding the Defence 
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forces of the Free State.
102
 As police chief O’Duffy built up a respected and reliable force 
although he was prone to exaggeration and displayed an over-enthusiastic interest in 
political crime. O’Duffy readily saw conspiracy and states of emergency where there were 
none and relations between O’Higgins and O’Duffy became increasingly strained. 
Following an IRA attack on twelve police barracks on 14 November 1926, an investigation 
authorised by the Justice Minister revealed that gardaí in Waterford had assaulted 
republican prisoners arrested in connection with the attacks. O’Higgins apologised in the 
Dáil and promised to compensate the victims. On being asked by O’Higgins to dismiss the 
accused officers, O’Duffy resisted threatening to resign himself. O’Higgins had called his 
bluff, O’Duffy could resign if he so wished. O’Duffy stayed on and the accused instead 
were disciplined.
103
 In response to the attacks, O’Duffy called on the government to arm 
the police force of which he was Commissioner. In a lengthy, almost hysterically worded 
memo, O’Duffy claimed that the Irish people had long been at war with authority and 
inhibiting national progress was a lack of appreciation of ‘the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship’. So long as a segment of the population believed authority could be overcome, 
efforts to build were wasted.
104
 Citizenship, until learned by the people at school and 
through the teachings of the statesmen and priests on platforms, had to be enforced by an 
armed police force capable of aggression. O’Duffy was proposing an aggressive role for 
the state in making citizens of the people. O’Higgins’ annotations on the memo betray his 
feelings towards O’Duffy. The most offensive sentences in the memo were underlined by 
O’Higgins such as that dealing with the ‘Extermination of the type that is incapable or 
unwilling to assume the responsibilities of citizenship’. On 3 January 1927, O’Higgins sat 
down to pen his opposition to O’Duffy’s proposals. In his response, O’Higgins indicated 
that arming the guards would send out the wrong signal, invite undue aggression and that 
the success of the force was based on it being un-armed. Arming the garda would create 
the wrong impression at home and abroad and would provoke attack.
105
 O’Duffy’s 
proposal was officially rejected by the government on 24 January,
106
 while for O’Higgins 
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there was no state of emergency in the first place. The attacks of 14 November were a 
‘stunt’ and ‘not to be taken seriously’.107 
In the administration of Justice, the government again seemed to move as if having 
scant regard for political popularity. In a series of legislative measures, O’Higgins 
managed to alienate interest group after interest group, something that smaller parties such 
as the National League were all happy to exploit. Particularly harmful to his party’s 
electoral prospects was the Intoxicating Liquor Act of 1927. Announced on the eve of the 
election, the Act responded to the recommendations of a Commission established by 
O’Higgins in 1925 in that it sought to reduce the number of licensed premises to one per 
400 people and to restrict opening hours. The measure was opposed by publicans and made 
life difficult for Cumann na nGaedheal candidates in June 1927. 
 
External affairs 
 
The term ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’ was first used in the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty of 1921 to convey the near autonomy of those former British colonies which had 
attained Dominion status.
108
 In the decades before the Great War Britain had granted such 
status to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. The Irish Free 
State was a co-equal member of the Commonwealth, with the same status of Canada, and 
the Cumann na nGaedheal government used diplomacy to assert the country’s position 
within the Commonwealth. The Free State did not just depend on Imperial diplomacy, it 
asserted its independence in other ways too. The Free State ‘threw itself into the maelstrom 
of post-war Europe’ and was determined that its presence would be felt at ‘Geneva and in 
the capitals of a few relevant states’.109 The League of Nations had been established to 
keep peace after the Great War and in early 1923 the newly independent state was keen to 
join. In February, Kevin O’Shiel, assistant legal adviser to the government, wrote to 
ministers criticising Britain’s new representative on the council of the League of Nations. 
Lord Balfour’s replacement, Ronald MacNeill was described as ‘a violent partisan of the 
Northern secession movement’ with his appointment ‘tantamount to giving the 
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Government of the Six Counties direct representation in the council’. In O’Shiel’s view, 
the government needed to ‘make haste’ in applying to join the League of Nations.110 An 
annotation by Cosgrave on the letter indicated his agreement. 
Over the summer further steps were taken to prepare Ireland’s application for 
membership of the League. Hugh Kennedy, the Attorney General, played an important role 
in drafting the necessary legislation. The North Eastern Boundary Bureau, established in 
1922 to prepare the Free State’s case for the Boundary Commission envisaged in article 
twelve of the Treaty, believed the state’s position could be furthered through membership 
of the League. In the event of failure on the Boundary Commission, the government could 
appeal to the League.
111
 The writer Francis Hackett also believed the League would 
provide a forum where the boundary position could be settled and ‘the personality of 
Ireland conveyed to best advantage to the world’. The League was deadlocked on account 
of the cross purposes of the great powers, France and Britain, with smaller countries not 
venturing to take a lead. An Irish delegate would be welcome: 
 
The entire liberal press, continental and American, is ready for a strong injection of sincerity by 
an Irish delegate. The dominions I gather, see in Ireland a force that can be active and positive so 
far as their own expansive tendencies are concerned.
112
 
 
On 11 September 1923, Cosgrave returned to Ireland from Geneva having secured 
Irish membership of the League of Nations. Cumann na nGaedheal, arranged a reception, 
‘as non political as possible’, to greet their leader on his return.113 As a member of the 
League, the Free State became the first Commonwealth country to establish a permanent 
delegation in Geneva. Within weeks of joining, the government decided to register the 
Treaty with the League.
114
 Against the wishes of Britain, the Treaty was formally 
registered as an international document on 11 July 1924. Cumann na nGaedheal continued 
to distrust the British in the first year or so of independence.
115
 At an Executive Council 
meeting on 18 December 1923 the government decided not to attend the forthcoming 
                                                          
110
 Kevin O’Shiel, to each member of the Executive Council, 20 Feb. 1923 (UCDA, Desmond FitzGerald 
papers, P80/517).  
111
 ‘Ireland and the League of Nations’, Kevin O’Shiel to each member of the Executive Council, undated 
[Mar. 1923?] (UCDA, Desmond FitzGerald papers, P80/518). 
112
 Francis Hackett, to Senator James Douglas, 1 July 1923 (UCDA, Desmond FitzGerald papers, P80/521).  
113
 Paul Banim, secretary to the President, to Desmond FitzGerald, 11 Sept. 1923 (UCDA, Desmond 
FitzGerald papers, P80/530). 
114
 Second Executive Council, minutes of meeting 27 Oct. 1923, (NAI, Department of the Taoiseach, G2/2). 
115
 Harkness, Restless Dominion, p. 32. 
252 
 
British Empire exhibition,
116
 while in 1924 the government took steps to sidestep the 
colonial office in London by opening its own diplomatic relations albeit on a small scale. 
While the department of External Affairs remained small but diligent throughout the 
lifetime of the government, and use was continually made of the Imperial relationship in 
learning of events overseas, the Free State was again pioneering among the Dominions in 
opening its own channels of diplomacy with non Commonwealth countries. The United 
States became the first non Commonwealth country to receive a Free State representative 
through the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington. The proposed 
representative would be the official channel of communication between the United States 
and Dublin concerning matters exclusively affecting the Free State. During conversations 
at the colonial office in London on 21 and 23 June 1924, FitzGerald met with the British to 
discuss the remit of the proposed new ambassador. This was new territory for the British 
and it seemed to alarm them to some extent that a Dominion would seek to appoint its own 
diplomatic representative in Washington. They wanted the proposed Minister 
plenipotentiary to remain in close contact with the British embassy in Washington in the 
event of any question proving of interest to the rest of the Commonwealth and empire. 
They were keen to impress on FitzGerald that the services of the British embassy would 
remain at the disposal of the Free State representative.
117
 On 23 June, FitzGerald was 
shown the drafts of three telegrams the foreign office planned to send the British embassy 
in Washington relating to the relationship between it and the Free State representative. He 
concurred with the terms and in return the British agreed with the Free State’s draft set of 
instructions to their proposed Minister plenipotentiary.
118
 Professor T.A. Smiddy, formerly 
chair of the Fiscal Inquiry Commission, was subsequently appointed to the post as the Free 
State asserted its newfound place among, not just the Dominions, but the nations of the 
world. The previous year, Eoin MacNeill’s brother James had been appointed Free State 
High Commissioner in London.
119
 While progress towards Free State representation 
abroad was slow, a commercial attaché was appointed for Paris and Brussels while by 
1929 delegates had been sent to Berlin and the Vatican. The diplomatic relationship 
between the Dominions and foreign governments was discussed at the 1926 Imperial 
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Conference. The summary of proceedings noted that since the previous conference the 
Free State government had appointed a representative in Washington. Showing that the 
Free State had seized the initiative, and was somewhat in advance of Commonwealth 
thinking in this regard, the report simply stated that there had been fruitful results of this 
endeavour.
120
 
In foreign policy, the Free State was an active participant at the League of Nations 
and at the Imperial Conferences, where it played a leading role. The Imperial Conference 
of 1923 proved a steep learning curve for the Irish delegates who, at the time, were 
preoccupied with domestic issues. Real progress was made by the Free State at the 
Conferences of 1926 and 1930. O’Higgins flourished on the diplomatic stage at both 
League of Nations and Imperial Conferences. In a letter to his wife from a 1925 conference 
in Geneva, the Vice President demonstrated a sharp awareness of world politics. For him, 
the League was a step in the right direction, though the time had not yet arrived where 
‘nations, like the individual, will lay aside the stone-axe and submit themselves to a 
Code’.121 There was a great deal about the League that O’Higgins, as a delegate from a 
small country trying to assert its independence, did not like. He disliked the selfishness of 
the great powers which adhered to the principles of the League so long as it suited their 
interests. O’Higgins found it distasteful that they were quite prepared to indulge in the 
grubby politics of packed meetings to achieve their policy goals. O’Higgins also had an 
aversion to what he termed the ‘semi-official involvement’ of the United States. They were 
not members of the League but Americans were ‘darting’ everywhere like ‘bluebottles’.122 
O’Higgins and FitzGerald had been invited to lunch by the Americans where they hoped to 
gain publicity for the ‘North-Eastern Situation’. O’Higgins was unimpressed with the 
hearing they received.  
O’Higgins seems to have excelled when in direct negotiations with the British,123 as 
would happen at a Geneva conference on armaments limitation in June 1927. He was able 
to both cajole and work with them, as the case demanded, in asserting the constitutional 
position of the Dominions. At Geneva, O’Higgins showed his brilliance in separate 
meetings that were arranged with the British delegation to the conference. The equality of 
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status between Britain and the Dominions had been recognised at the 1926 Imperial 
Conference. However, the Free State remained sensitive to any perceived British attempt to 
override this position, while the British remained unenthusiastic about the participation of 
Dominions in the League. The British were keen to stress at international conferences their 
predominance of the Commonwealth. At Geneva in 1927, Britain aimed to gain support for 
limitations to naval armament. However, it remained Britain’s aim to ensure at all League 
of Nations conferences that treaties were not to be regarded as regulating relations between 
the component parts of the Commonwealth.
124
 London wanted to preserve a unity of 
interests on the world stage. Previously the League has inserted clauses to specifically state 
that agreements did not affect territories forming part of the same sovereign state, even if 
individually they were members of the League. In 1925, the Dutch tried to secure a similar 
proviso to allow their government freedom of action in the East Indies. However, the Free 
State was unimpressed with such a continued curtailment of its freedom in international 
affairs and O’Higgins prepared to confront the issue.  
Once again, Britain’s position at Geneva in 1927 implied that the Commonwealth 
was a single international unit and that the Dominions were not sovereign on the 
international stage.
125
 It is worth remembering at this point that the Free State had, in 
previous years, tried to assert an independent position at the League. It had put itself 
forward for election to the council of the League of Nations in an effort to demonstrate its 
independence. Czechoslovakia unexpectedly won election to the council with the help of 
the votes of the displeased British delegate. At home, Fianna Fáil portrayed this setback as 
proof the other delegates regarded the ‘Free State as part of England’.126 
 Given Britain’s stance at the Geneva conference of 1927, the Free State, as stated, 
again felt the need to assert its independence and baulked at continued use of the term 
‘Empire’ which, it argued, had been expunged in the Treaty. If Ireland’s constitutional 
position was acknowledged and safeguarded by Britain, the Free State delegation would be 
willing to support British attempts to gain support at Geneva for proposals to limit naval 
armament.
127
 O’Higgins showed his skill by impressing upon the British the fact that the 
Free State was ‘an independent unit of the British Commonwealth in the matter of Treaty 
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making’. In essence, the Irish government was free to act independently of Britain at the 
conference and threatened that it would do so unless this fundamental principle was 
accepted by the British. O’Higgins read a memo that summarised the views of the Cumann 
na nGaedheal government. The government objected to Britain’s continued use of the term 
‘British Empire’ as it misrepresented the position of the self governing dominions of the 
Commonwealth and implied that they were all part of a single constitutional group. 
Dominions could form their own policy according to O’Higgins and their group character 
should be described by an expression such as ‘the Component states of the British 
Commonwealth’ or some such term as would ‘emphasise its plurality’.128 The British 
agreed to cross out the term British Empire in discussing the dominions and O’Higgins had 
secured the government’s objective in emphasising the independence of the dominions.  
 
 
More retrenchment and a second national loan 
 
At the end of 1927, O’Higgins had been assassinated and Fianna Fáil had taken their 
seats in the Dáil. De Valera had broken with the hardliners in Sinn Féin and it seemed that 
the legitimacy of the state was increasingly respected at home. The government decided 
that the time was now ripe to make its debut on the international money market. Between 
1923 and 1927, the government had earned its stripes, first by raising the national loan and 
then by pursuing a policy of financial orthodoxy, balancing the budget, cutting taxes and 
showing a willingness to trim public spending. It had successfully raised a £10m national 
loan within the borders of the Free State and had embarked upon at times unpopular, but 
prudent, financial policies that proved it was a good student of gold standard orthodoxy. In 
1927 Free State investors were asked to contribute £4m, while the more substantial part of 
the loan would see $15m raised abroad.
129
 The new loan would be floated in two stages, 
the second part in 1929. Somewhat controversially and in a further slight to Britain, New 
York was chosen over London for the external issue of the loan. In 1923, the government 
was at pains to paint a picture of a settled and self-reliant country with a government which 
subscribed to the financial and economic ‘rules of the game’ in power. In 1927, in its foray 
into international markets, a new challenge faced Cumann na nGaedheal. This time there 
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was a real prospect that a new government could come to power in the near future and 
what of the financial commitments entered into by Cumann na nGaedheal then? As The 
Times put it, there were grave doubts about the financial intentions of Fianna Fáil. Would a 
new government honour existing pledges? Would Fianna Fáil carry out its promise to 
withhold the land annuities? These were the concerns of investors in 1927. Blythe himself 
tried to allay such fears in the lead-up to the announcement of the second Free State loan. 
Addressing incorporated auditors and accountants, he suggested that while policy might 
change with the advent of a de Valera led government, in his view, there would be no 
repudiation of the financial commitments entered into by Cumann na nGaedheal and he 
believed a Fianna Fáil government would honour the financial obligations it would inherit 
from the outgoing administration.
130
 Cumann na nGaedheal remained keen to give the 
impression of a stable polity which would not be shaken by a change of government.  
By 1928 the financial position in the country had already begun to take a downward 
turn. As Patricia Clavin has stated, the Great Depression in many ways pre-dated the 1929 
Wall Street crash by as much as two years, though it was probably 1930 before its effects 
were truly felt in Ireland. Revenue dipped during 1928 and Finance demanded spending 
reductions to meet the deficit so as to prevent tax increases. In a letter to the heads of all 
departments in September 1928, McElligott outlined the remedy as a ‘rigid and 
unswerving policy of retrenchment’.131 This was in line with mainstream economic 
thinking at the time. The letter continued that in the early years of the state’s existence, 
heavy spending on reconstruction and development had been necessary but that now it was 
‘reasonable and proper to postpone the initiation of services which, however desirable, are 
not urgently necessary’. Ministers were told they were not to agree to proposals that might 
place an additional tax burden on the community. On the political side, Cosgrave took the 
letter seriously. He called a meeting with the heads of the departments for 4 October 1928. 
Addressing the meeting, Cosgrave outlined the seriousness of the situation. This was not, 
he claimed, a rhetorical repetition of the annual demand for economy and accounting 
officers were asked to immediately make the maximum effort towards new savings.
132
 
Balancing the budget would prove difficult and the government was particularly concerned 
with the effects of a fall in the yield of taxation and any failure to reduce spending in the 
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budgets of subsequent years. So far, revenue for 1928 was lower than estimated and, ‘in 
order that the Budget of the current year may balance’ large savings had to be effected. 
Cosgrave seemed to care little for the political fallout from this request and urged that ‘No 
Head of a Department should advance any project involving increased expenditure without 
giving it the fullest consideration’.133 Only proposals ‘absolutely essential for the public 
welfare’ were to be advanced. Using the language of the state in danger Cosgrave 
concluded: ‘If as a result of your efforts economies on the scale desired are secured you 
will have added a most potent contribution to the future prosperity of the country’.  
Between 1923 and 1928, Cumann na nGaedheal came through an extraordinarily 
challenging period in government. World economic conditions proved difficult as prices 
collapsed in the aftermath of the Great War and Irish agriculture in particular lost its 
position of wartime prosperity. Europe suffered as the United States, Canada and Japan 
had grown during the Great War to reduce the economic dominance of the European 
powers. The Free State government faced up to the Civil War legacy of lawlessness, 
political instability and destruction by establishing an unarmed police force, facilitating de 
Valera’s entrance to the Dáil and embarking on policies of reconstruction which helped 
provide employment in the mid 1920s.
134
 Moreover, the financial and economic 
independence of the state was established through the successful raising of the national 
loan and a demonstration of fiscal rectitude while the ambitious Shannon-Scheme laid the 
basis for future growth. Cumann na nGaedheal in this period showed itself to be an 
orthodox though reforming government that managed the affairs of state with limited 
resources. For many, the pace of change was slow but the Free State had attained a level of 
stability other countries could only dream of. However, if Cumann na nGaedheal’s first 
five years in power had proven difficult, the challenges it would face in its final years as 
the government party would prove an even sterner test. 
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Free State government Policy, 1928-33 
 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s policy in government during the 
state‟s formative years was analysed. Europe was beginning to stabilise around the 
economic consensus of laissez-faire and Cumann na nGaedheal proved its orthodox 
credentials. Difficult decisions were taken while the government made progress in 
asserting the state‟s independence at Geneva and the Imperial Conferences. In this chapter, 
the analysis of Free State government policy is taken through the collapse of the world 
economy from 1929, the international discrediting of the type of policy pursued by 
Cumann na nGaedheal and the change of government in 1932 as we try to understand the 
long-lasting political realignment that occurred in Ireland. Here we show that Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s limited response to the economic crisis remained grounded in liberalism. In 
1932, the Cumann na nGaedheal administration was one of many governments to collapse 
under the strain of the Great Depression and here the elections of the early 1930s are 
understood in that context. In this chapter we also evaluate the radicalising impact on Irish 
politics of the rapid political and economic changes that took place across the world. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s final years in power coincided with the onset of the deepest 
economic slump of the twentieth century. Economic difficulties from the late 1920s and 
early 1930s placed a considerable strain on governments of various persuasions across the 
globe.  An early to mid 1920s investment boom in the new electrical and chemical 
industries of the second industrial revolution had seemed to justify a deep-rooted desire to 
recreate the pre-1914 liberal world economy.
1
 However, the cessation of such outlay in 
those industries towards the end of the decade as the depression struck and the subsequent 
failure of conventional financial and economic policies to meet the new challenges, forced 
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countries to rethink their policies in the early 1930s. In broad terms, European economies 
in the aftermath of the Great War had been marked by over-capacity, excess production, 
low prices and the dominance of „gold standard orthodoxy‟. In Ireland too there was an 
assumption among those intellectuals with economic expertise that „the post-war world 
would be the pre-war world restored and improved‟.2 However, as Depression deepened in 
the early 1930s, many producers, workers and employers clamoured for governments to 
change their policies while opposition leaders, of both a democratic and non-democratic 
instinct, were quick to exploit the political opportunity afforded them by the economic 
collapse. In Ireland, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s political difficulties in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s were exacerbated by the presence of a viable, de Valera-led alternative 
government from August 1927. Economic malaise in Western Europe in particular forced a 
re-evaluation of the prevailing financial and economic policies that had, to contemporary 
observers, quite clearly failed.
3
 In this period, governments facing up to their domestic 
woes could no longer rely on robust global conditions to provide the basis for economic 
recovery at home as export prices collapsed everywhere, dragging down trade and forcing 
governments to seek national solutions.
4
  
Initially governments clung to deflationary policies, public spending cuts and 
balanced national budgets. Balancing the budget itself became increasingly difficult as 
unemployment rose, affecting the economic life of countries and placing a further drain on 
their exchequers as more and more people depended on welfare provision.
5
 Underlying 
economic difficulties in small countries such as the Irish Free State were exacerbated after 
the Wall Street crash of 1929 as US immigration restrictions forced a reduction in 
emigration and eventually the return home of many émigrés.
6
 As was evident at the end of 
the previous chapter, the difficult economic conditions that emerged soon after Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s election victory in September 1927 were about to force even more difficult 
decisions on a government which had already come through a period of financial and 
political crisis during its first five years in office.  
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The last Cumann na nGaedheal government 
 
In 1967, Kevin B. Nowlan wrote an article analysing W.T. Cosgrave‟s last 
government. He wrote that it „maintained a rather fixed political course, which could easily 
give the impression of an unbending rigidity, a too ready acceptance of the conventional, 
especially in relation to economic policy and social reform‟.7 As it embarked on a second 
period in government, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s approach seemed to be working. In its 
review of 1928, The Economist, a pillar of economic liberalism, believed that the Free 
State government had made progress and praised its agricultural policy in particular. 
Dairying had expanded under Hogan‟s direction, cattle prices had improved and exports of 
meat and live cattle had increased. Government inspection had resulted in better 
agricultural produce as Ireland tried to compete with her continental rivals, particularly 
Denmark. The magazine was satisfied with steps taken by the Executive Council to tackle 
an adverse balance of trade while claiming that the protected industries of clothes, boots 
and shoes were producing in greater quantities for the domestic market. Additionally, the 
Shannon-Scheme was on schedule, the semi-state Electricity Supply Board was gearing up 
to provide for the electrification of the country and a new currency (tied to sterling) had 
successfully been established in 1927. Cumann na nGaedheal was also praised by the 
Manchester Guardian for opposing a Labour proposal „that was not really taken too 
seriously by anybody‟. Labour had called on the government to raise a loan to provide 
work for the unemployed but Cumann na nGaedheal had displayed a „a far better grasp of 
the issue‟ and had demonstrated their credentials.8 It was not, according to the paper, a 
duty of a political party to force agricultural or industrial interests to re-orientate their 
businesses. Economic progress remained dependent on private enterprise and the paper 
claimed Fianna Fáil was learning its trade from the Cumann na nGaedheal government.
9
 
Cumann na nGaedheal remained a firm proponent of financial orthodoxy and was keen 
that its position be known internationally. In April 1929, Cosgrave told the New York 
Times the country was settled and was sound financially and socially.
10
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Against this optimistic assessment however, was a forecast of a more difficult 1929 
as economic clouds gathered on the horizon. As acknowledged in speeches by Blythe, the 
pool of income tax arrears being dipped into by the government was near exhaustion and a 
decline in duties from beer and spirits meant that there were rocks on the road to his 
desired budgetary position.
11
 As such, Ireland‟s 1929 budget would require a renewed 
focus on retrenchment or tax increases.
12
 Moreover, but for the success of the second 
national loan of 1927, Ernest Blythe would have faced a substantial deficit in preparing his 
budget for 1929. In advance of the budget speech, the Irish Times urged reduced 
expenditure and relief for taxpayers, given that „Mr Blythe has managed to balance his 
budget at the Free State taxpayers‟ cost‟. 13  According to the paper, the British „fairy 
godmother has gone and, henceforward the Saorstát‟s coat must be cut according to its 
rather exiguous cloth‟. However, given that exports would likely be hit by the downturn, 
there would be little opportunity in the years ahead to reduce the burden on the taxpayer. 
On the contrary, it seems fair to suggest that Blythe and his colleagues had probably gone 
too far in cutting tax in previous budgets even if they had done so in an attempt to send out 
the right economic signals. Throughout the 1920s Cumann na nGaedheal had been a tax 
cutting government and there was scarcely room for further cuts by 1928/29. As evidenced 
by the previous chapter, income tax had been cut considerably from six shillings in the 
pound in 1922 to three shillings in the pound by 1928. The Manchester Guardian believed 
Cumann na nGaedheal had gone too far in cutting taxes given the clamours for increased 
spending on education and other services.
14
 It seems low taxation was generally regarded 
as „a symbol of the Free State‟s fitness for self-government‟. 15  Meanwhile, the Irish 
Independent was fearful that Blythe would follow the precedent set by Winston Churchill 
by introducing a tax on petrol or even a new tax on tyres.
16
 The Irish Independent was 
partially right as new motoring charges were introduced, although petrol was left 
untouched.  
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Blythe‟s budget of April 1928 contained little comfort for anybody in the Free State. 
Blythe outlined the reasons why he had not been able to choose an easy course in his 
budget: 
 
 In the next few years we shall require considerable capital sums for constructive undertakings. 
Our credit is now such that we can borrow in the international money market on terms of which 
no country need be ashamed. In the interests of national development, it is vital that this position 
be maintained. Investors at home and abroad have subscribed to our loans because our financial 
policy has satisfied them that the Saorstát will pay its way; that it will so handle its budgetary 
problems that debt will be incurred only for legitimate purposes and that no type of currency 
inflation will take place. We must continue so to regulate our taxation and expenditure as to 
maintain the confidence of onlookers in the stability of the State and in the probity of its 
Parliament and Government, for on that confidence our credit depends, and on our credit 
depends whether schemes of development can or cannot be economically carried out. Moreover, 
maintenance of the credit of the State is necessary for the security and expansion of private 
enterprise.
17
 
 
This indicated that Cumann na nGaedheal‟s economic and fiscal policies would continue in 
the same cautious vein that saw the government reap the praise of conservative 
publications such as The Economist in previous years. In order to meet an estimated deficit 
of £1,148,803 in 1929, Blythe proposed to collect the remaining arrears in income tax, to 
gather the property tax in one instalment instead of two, to extend the McKenna duties (see 
previous chapter) to commercial vehicles and tyres, and to introduce slight increases in the 
sugar tax and the cost of telegrams. Collectively, these budget measures amounted to 
£1,166,000, covering the deficit and resulting in a surplus of £17,197, which was used to 
abolish the entertainment tax for race meetings and remove the duties on imported 
medicine bottles. A year in advance of the Wall Street crash, there was little evidence to 
suggest that Cumann na nGaedheal would be capable of imaginatively dealing with a new 
economic crisis as budget preparation continued to resemble an exercise in good 
bookkeeping. While events did force some changes in Cosgrave‟s policy, and it has been 
argued that de Valera‟s party „should get neither all the blame nor all the credit‟18 for the 
lurch towards economic nationalism in the 1930s (discussed below), Fianna Fáil‟s long 
ideological commitment to an alternative economic policy ensured that the piecemeal 
changes forced on Cumann na nGaedheal by world conditions became part of a more 
substantial Free State policy agenda after the change of government in 1932.  
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Economic activity in the Free State peaked in 1929 on the eve of the Wall Street 
crash,
19
 an event which compounded existing structural weaknesses in the world system.
20
 
In 1929, Irish exports were valued at £47m, a figure not reached again until 1948. The 
actual volume of exports that year was not again matched until 1960.
21
 Various sources of 
instability began to act together as investment, particularly in Germany, peaked and then 
declined from 1928. A reduction in American interest rates in 1927 reinforced a 
speculative tendency in the stock market on that side of the Atlantic. Between 1925 and 
1929 the value of stocks and shares had grown by 250%.
22
 Meanwhile, in Europe, interest 
rates rose in some countries, serving to restrict credit, further curtailing investment there. 
Patricia Clavin argues that America‟s dominant role in the world economy after the Great 
War required that it play a leading role, but that it failed to do so, putting its own interests 
first. In order to be successful, the „business as usual‟ approach needed a greater degree of 
international cooperation and uniformity in approach than was present in the late 1920s. 
When the Federal Reserve tried to reduce the amount of money in circulation and cool the 
speculative boom, the effects were not just felt in the United States. Panic selling in 
October reduced by almost half the index of share prices on the New York stock exchange. 
More damaging than a comparatively small loss of wealth, was the effect on confidence. 
Shown on newsreels around the world, the crash shattered American confidence. The 
decline in the United States had a severe impact everywhere else.
23
 The problem was made 
worse in Europe as fear of inflation and continued adherence to the gold standard added 
further deflationary pressure at a time of economic slump.
24
 Tight monetary policies were 
not the answer to the crisis but that was not yet realised by stunned policy makers. 
 Alternatives were in gestation in 1929-30 and they would be ready for application 
within a year or two. In Britain, The Observer complained that the country had become 
decadent with her „long economic supremacy‟ blinding her „to the fact that times had 
changed‟.25 The paper acknowledged that unemployment was a world problem but did not 
propose global solutions. Instead, „foresighted national strategies‟ were advocated as 
remedies to unemployment given that each country‟s economic woes had a unity of their 
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own. Britain in 1930 was „out of date‟ and public works schemes represented a better 
investment than the dole payment given that there was ample work for the idle hands to do. 
Moreover, the author of the article believed that „tariffs need to be taken up in a more 
serious and modern attitude than at present‟ (The Conservatives supported tariffs) and 
blamed the understanding reached between Labour and the Liberals for the failure to make 
adequate progress towards all out protectionism. The article encapsulates the economic 
changes that would characterise the 1930s as European governments increasingly began to 
intervene in their economies, along national lines, through a mixture of public works, 
rearmament and protectionism.  
As a primarily agricultural producer, committed to economic liberalism,
26
 the Free 
State under Cumann na nGaedheal was particularly vulnerable to any potential collapse in 
world trade. Throughout the 1920s, the Free State ranked alongside Holland and Britain as 
a low tariff economy. Ireland relied heavily on agriculture, and particularly on finding and 
developing export markets for its surplus produce. Britain remained the country‟s most 
important trade partner and the Free State‟s agriculture competed with Denmark, and 
Dominions such as New Zealand for the lion‟s share of British agricultural imports. 
Understandably, the country‟s economic problems from 1929 prompted increased 
clamours for government intervention and protection. Irish agricultural exports suffered 
from about 1930 as rivals lowered prices.
27
 Like most governments at the time, Cumann na 
nGaedheal remained reluctant to change course, simply believing things would improve. 
Moreover, Cumann na nGaedheal seemed to believe that the rapport it had built up with 
Britain would safeguard the country‟s trade relationship with its nearest neighbour. 
Addressing the Dáil on 19 November 1930, Cosgrave offered a stout defence of his party‟s 
agricultural policies by stating: 
 
We can only speculate, but in our speculation we must take cognisance of the ominous fact that, 
with the exception of butter, the fall in prices of live stock and other products is far less than the 
fall in the prices of cereals. Our economy consists, in the main, in the production of live stock 
and live stock products; the economy of countries like Canada and Australia consists in the main 
in the production of cereals for sale. I am not at present concerned with politics or politicians but 
with farmers, end every farmer in the country knows that the price of cattle, sheep, beef, mutton, 
bacon and eggs, has fallen far less than the price of feeding - barley, oats, maize and particularly 
wheat. We are all discontented with the price of our live stock products, but what is the position 
of the farmer who is growing wheat or oats for sale as such? There is at least one claim which 
we are entitled to make in this year, 1930, and that is that the policy which we have consistently 
urged on farmers, viz., to produce live stock and live stock products, and to use grain as their 
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raw materials, has saved this country from the deplorable conditions existing in agricultural 
countries which, either from necessity or choice, have concentrated on the production of cereals, 
and especially wheat.
28
 
 
In the same speech, Cosgrave gave a critique of the policies being put forward by the 
opposition. He stated that Fianna Fáil‟s demands for increased wheat production (see 
below) were „not worth considering‟ given the „unbelievably low level‟ of world prices 
and reminded the other parties that international conferences at Geneva had warned against 
the erection of trade barriers between countries. Furthermore, Cosgrave described self-
sufficiency as short-sighted and warned that the „doctrine may indeed amount to 
recklessness if based on neglect to study world conditions‟.29 While using the speech to 
announce the allocation of £300,000 for the provision of employment in rural areas 
adversely affected by bad weather conditions, it is clear Cosgrave wanted to highlight what 
his party saw as the shortcomings in Fianna Fáil‟s economic policies. In his response, de 
Valera linked the traditional British policy of economic liberalism with the disasters of 
Irish history, including the Great Famine, and charged that Cumann na nGaedheal was 
merely continuing the tradition. This emphasised the opposition‟s attempt to portray the 
government as pro-British. Moreover, de Valera lamented the reduction in tillage and 
reiterated his belief than an acre of wheat would generate more wealth than an acre under 
grass.
30
 Once again, The Economist took Cosgrave‟s side. In its review of 1930, the 
magazine pointed out the low costs of production for the Free State farmer given the 
falling price of grain and feeding. Furthermore, the magazine commented that „the 
difference between the movements of beef and butter prices shows the wisdom of a 
diversified farming system, and justifies the insistence by the Department of Agriculture 
on the breeding of dual-purpose cattle‟.31 Also praised was Cumann na nGaedheal‟s mixed 
approach to protection. Progress had been made in the few protected industries while the 
continued import of the protected articles contributed to government revenue. It agreed that 
„the best line of development of Free State industries lies in the direction of manufacturing 
specialised high-grade articles for export rather than in attempting to encourage a variety 
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of small industries behind a tariff wall‟.32 Orthodox observers considered the Fianna Fáil 
alternative economically unviable and tended to support the government‟s policies. 
While their opponents saw them as bootstrap liberals, Cumann na nGaedheal 
ministers such as Paddy Hogan considered themselves pragmatists rather than free traders. 
Ministers argued that they had experimented with tariffs since 1924 and had set up a Tariff 
Commission in 1926 to investigate each appeal on its merits on a case-by-case basis. As 
stated, its cautious approach was determined by the results of the Fiscal Inquiry 
Commission of 1923. As Ó Gráda argues (but probably overstates), from 1930-31, the 
party increasingly gave way to protectionist pressure and in keeping with world trends 
probably would have become still more protectionist had it won the 1932 election, such 
was the climate of the time.
33
 Moreover, Ó Gráda suggests that the 1931 general election in 
Britain, which produced a national government committed to increased protection for 
British agriculture, particularly in those areas in which the Irish farmer specialised, made a 
continuance of the Cumann na nGaedheal policy impractical. This, he argues, further 
reduced the importance and appeal of Cosgrave‟s policies and made a Free State policy 
volte face more likely. This would appear to also suggest that a changed trading 
relationship between Britain and the Free State would have been the natural outcome in 
1932 regardless of whether Cosgrave or de Valera had been in power.  
Britain changed course from its time honoured practice of free trade in early 1932 to 
restrict imports.
34
 She had already abandoned the gold standard in September 1931 
facilitating and end to deflationary „gold standard orthodoxy‟ policies. Now, the British 
economy need not sink with countries that remained tied to gold.
35
 However, British 
economic nationalism did not automatically sound the death knell for Irish agricultural 
exports to Britain. Initially, newspapers such as The Times believed the depressed state of 
world trade would make Britain and the Free State more dependent on each other as 
friendly neighbours. As stated, the friendly relationship between the two since 1922 would 
have counted in Ireland‟s favour and as a Dominion, she could have expected a measure of 
preferential treatment against non-Dominion competitors (as initially happened). Britain 
imported eggs, butter and bacon in large quantities and in 1931/32 the Irish farmer could 
have expected to benefit from its longstanding relationship with Britain. With Britain 
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coming off the gold standard in September 1931, The Times seemed to think that the two 
countries would become more dependent upon each other and welcomed a speech by 
Cosgrave asking Free State citizens to buy Irish-produced goods in preference to imports 
and, crucially for The Times’ readership, asking Irish people to buy British goods where 
that proved impractical.
36
 In addition, figures in the McGilligan papers, and cited by Ó 
Gráda, show that the Free State agricultural exports to Britain remained competitive with 
those of Denmark until 1931
37
 and that the Free State accounted for a higher proportion of 
overall British agricultural imports in 1930 (5.2%) than it did in 1928 (4.2%).
38
 However, 
the Free State‟s proportion of agricultural exports to Britain declined substantially in 
1933.
39
 Her competitors, Denmark, New Zealand and the Netherlands more or less 
maintained the level of their exports to Britain, with New Zealand seeming to benefit most 
from the decline in Ireland‟s share of British agricultural imports from 1932 (British 
agricultural imports were down overall but this does not account for the collapse in Free 
State exports, expressed as a percentage of the total, which more than halved in 1933 and 
stayed at low levels throughout the 1930s).  
Did the collapse in agricultural exports to Britain in 1932 have its root in the policy 
of Britain‟s new government or the actions of the new Fianna Fail administration in Ireland? 
The evidence suggests that the change in government in Ireland and the political choices 
made by Fianna Fáil in 1932 accounted for a large measure of the changed trade 
relationship between the Free State and Britain. As such, it cannot be asserted that policy 
changes in Britain would inevitably have forced a downturn in the percentage of Irish 
agricultural exports to Britain, given that she continued to import similar products from 
Denmark, Holland and New Zealand for the duration of the 1930s. By 1932 Cumann na 
nGaedheal would have been forced to adapt its traditional policy (as it had been doing), 
and de Valera‟s party was more in tune with world trends, but by that time Cosgrave‟s 
administration had enough goodwill points earned with the British to expect at least a 
measure of preferential treatment that could have maintained the value of her exports to 
Britain into the 1930s. When Britain turned to protectionism, she initially exempted the 
Dominions until November 1932 before deferring a final decision on preference to the 
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Imperial Conference. The Times was confident that cooperation would pull Britain and the 
Dominions through the Depression.
40
 As we shall see below, the radical departure 
embarked on by de Valera in March 1932 had seismic consequences, particularly in that 
goodwill between the two countries vanished, leaving the Free State isolated. As Clavin 
states, economic nationalism and a collapse in international economic cooperation 
inevitably led to more tense relations between countries. 
 
Department of Finance  
 
As seen in previous chapters, the department of Finance was all-powerful within the 
Free State administrative structure. Its writ ran through all departments and its supremacy 
had both native and British antecedents, in the Dáil department of Michael Collins and the 
Treasury of the British administration in Ireland. Leading officials such as McElligott were 
committed free-traders and schooled in financial orthodoxy.
41
 As noted, the department 
had wanted a greater reduction in the old-age pension than that conceded by Blythe in 
1924 and as is evident in this thesis, its officials were quick to propose economies 
whenever the budget seemed unlikely to balance. Under Cumann na nGaedheal, like so 
many other governments, the Free State was slow to be „cured‟42 of its attachment to 
orthodox policies even though deflation was worsening the economic collapse. Given that 
Fianna Fáil worked with the same department from 1932, and policy changed considerably 
under the new government, it must be the case that the political affiliation of ministers 
remained the most important consideration that affected Free State policy, and that 
ultimately officials were the servants of their political masters. Cumann na nGaedheal too 
did not always toe Finance‟s line. Not all retrenchment options suggested by officials were 
implemented (see below), while Ó Gráda points out that the party ignored some of the 
department‟s deflationary proposals in 1931 as did Fianna Fáil in 1932. 43  Moreover, 
officials in the department probably found their Cumann na nGaedheal political masters 
easier to work with given that they shared the same broad ideological persuasions.  
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Finance opposed tariffs and monopolies in regard to wheat on the grounds that they 
often led to inefficiency, higher prices and consumer discontent.
44
 Furthermore, due to 
administrative costs, producers would end up charging a higher price for bread which 
would lead to public discontent while the elimination of the „competition element‟ would 
remove any incentive to greater efficiency in economical management. Given that the 
proposal came from Fianna Fáil, it was clear that it would take a change of government to 
effect real change in Free State economic policy. It was also clear that if a change of 
government occurred a more uneasy relationship would emerge between Fianna Fáil 
ministers and Finance officials who were diametrically opposed to their policies. However, 
by 1932 and in particular 1933 the world trend was turning away from deflationary policies 
towards more aggressive state intervention and reflationary pressures. Fianna Fáil‟s 
coming to power in February 1932 coincided with changing economic attitudes as 
spiralling protectionism replaced the creeping tariffs of the 1920s. 
 
Economic Committee 
 
Responding to pressure from de Valera during the summer of 1928, the government 
established a wide-ranging, all-party economic committee in November  and charged it 
with examining the economic position of the Free State, how best to improve it and create 
more employment. In establishing the committee, Cosgrave was responding to the repeated 
demands and taunts of Fianna Fáil from the opposition benches. For its part, the Irish 
Times was pleased that the opposition party, which it criticised for its tendency to blame 
the government for all the country‟s woes, was being asked, finally, to shoulder a portion 
of political responsibility.
45
 On 21 November 1928, Cosgrave announced the personnel and 
terms of reference of a committee that would bring government ministers, opposition 
leaders, industrialists and academics together to discuss solutions to the Free State‟s 
economic problems.
46
 It was the first time since the Civil War that Treatyites and anti-
Treatyites sat side by side around the same table to work on solutions to problems affecting 
the country,
47
 a point picked up on by the Irish Times.
48
 In the event, the division between 
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the two parties ultimately proved unbridgeable, but records of the committee‟s proceedings 
in the Ernest Blythe papers shed some interesting light on the motivations behind the 
policies of both government and alternative government and are particularly useful here in 
that they are indicative of the influences on Cumann na nGaedheal‟s economic policies. 
Professor George O‟Brien of UCD was a member of the committee as were the Governor 
of the Bank of Ireland (Captain A. Nutting), the vice president of the Irish Transport and 
General Worker‟s Union (Thomas Kennedy) and ministers Blythe, McGilligan and Hogan. 
For Fianna Fáil, de Valera, Lemass and James Ryan accepted invitations to sit on the 
committee as did Labour deputy Richard Anthony and independent T.D. Michael Brennan. 
Ernest Blythe chaired the committee‟s meetings while John Leydon of the department of 
Industry and Commerce acted as its secretary.  
The committee spent most of its time discussing tariffs on imported flour and 
subsidies for wheat (with a view to helping the Irish flour-milling industry) and heard 
evidence from Irish producers of bread, biscuits and confectionary. The committee also 
discussed various proposals from Fianna Fáil, notably its suggestion for a control board for 
wheat as discussed above.
49
 The 1926 census of production showed that the vast majority 
of wheat milled in the Free State had been imported, as had overall ingredients used in the 
biscuit, bread and confectionary industries.
50
 Fianna Fáil had long advocated a shift 
towards tariffs, self-sufficiency and wheat production, and so favoured wheat subsidies and 
import duties on flour. Another motivating factor in the opposition party‟s position was the 
State‟s adverse balance of trade, which stood at just under £7,000,000 in 1928.51  
An Economic Committee meeting on 12 March 1929 was attended by two 
representatives of Jacobs.
52
 The problem before this meeting was the importation of high-
grade flour from Britain which damaged the Irish mills. Unlike their British counterparts, 
Irish mills had no outlet for low-grade flour. Bread made from it could not be sold in 
competition with bread made from imported flour. As such, bakers had an incentive to 
import flour. Fianna Fáil members of the committee were always keen to press for 
protection particularly to encourage Irish wheat production, the Cumann na nGaedheal 
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element usually opposed them or sought a compromise. For instance, Blythe proposed an 
arrangement whereby firms such as Jacobs engaged in the manufacture of biscuits for 
export would be allowed to import, free of a duty, any flour they required on promising not 
to use the imported flour for any other purpose especially sale.
53
 However, tariffs were not 
always favoured by Irish manufacturers. For firms like Jacobs, protectionist measures 
could increase their costs while also reducing the quality of their produce. An experienced 
flour miller claimed that Irish wheat was difficult to work with given its high water content 
and that a tariff would do little to address the Irish millers‟ competitive disadvantage with 
British firms.
54
 This point was emphasised by O‟Brien who remained unenthusiastic about 
protection. 
 At another meeting McGilligan seemed to encapsulate the Cumann na nGaedheal 
position. While there was common ground with de Valera and Lemass in their willingness 
to consider proposals that would help native millers and producers, McGilligan wanted to 
know if the benefits brought about by the introduction of a tariff would be worth the 
various disadvantages that had been set out by O‟Brien, Bridges and representatives of 
Jacobs. Bridges had warned that the introduction of a tariff would force the smaller Irish 
mills out of business and McGilligan feared that there would be no great increase in 
employment or working conditions (given that jobs would be lost in the closed mills) to 
justify driving the small mills out of business. McGilligan wanted to know if the country‟s 
demands could be supplied as cheaply under protection. He was told prices would increase 
with the introduction of a tariff. McGilligan also feared that large English firms would 
come into Ireland if a tariff was introduced.
55
 In response he was told it would be 
impossible to keep English firms „from looking at Ireland‟. These exchanges reflect the 
cautious approach of Cumann na nGaedheal to protectionist policies and illustrate that they 
were grounded somewhat in genuine concerns that tariffs could create new problems, or at 
the very least fail to address the issue which they were intended to solve. Cumann na 
nGaedheal analysed each case on its merits and continued its cautious policy on tariffs. In 
this instance McGilligan seems to have judged that it was economically unviable for the 
Irish mills to reach 100% capacity and that the negative consequences might undermine the 
gains from such a policy. 
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The Committee produced a majority report in May stating that „from the point of 
view either of the farmer or of the nation there is no justification for any subsidy for wheat‟. 
The report also went on to state that the rejection by the Tariff Commission of an 
application for a tariff on imported flour was the correct decision.
56
 However, Fianna Fáil 
remained committed to the introduction of an import duty on flour. In a minority report 
compiled by Seán Lemass, and signed by the committee‟s Labour member, the party‟s 
position was set out clearly. Lemass claimed that the Tariff Commission‟s judgement had 
been called into question as a result of the Economic Committee‟s work and that the case 
for a tariff on flour had been strengthened.
57
 Lemass‟s minority report set out an alternative 
policy that would prohibit the milling or importation of flour other than straight-run. 
Lemass further recommended that an import duty be placed on all flour imported into the 
Free State with the exception of that imported under licence, to be issued by the 
department of Industry and Commerce, and for exclusive use in the manufacture of biscuits. 
Lemass also listed countries that had introduced high protective tariffs to conserve their 
flour milling industries: Finland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, USA, Poland, France, Germany, 
Japan, Norway and Sweden.  
The document also admitted that Britain had over-milled since the war, making 
cheap British imports attractive to Irish firms, while acknowledging that the numbers of 
new jobs through the scheme would be negligible. Why introduce the tariff so? Lemass 
reasoned that the tariff would force Irish mills to work at full capacity, thereby providing 
more work days and better wages for existing workers. The work of the committee shows 
that there were pragmatists in both parties and the thinking that underpinned the policies 
adopted. They show too that where Cumann na nGaedheal policy might be motivated by 
the dictate of the market and economic logic, Fianna Fáil‟s seems to have had at the heart 
of its economic nationalism a progressive commitment to better conditions for workers. 
While the committee received correspondence from firms seeking state help in creating 
employment through various business ventures, it was wound down in July 1929. Leydon 
wrote to Cosgrave stating that the committee‟s members had unanimously agreed that 
further meetings could not be justified given the disparity between the Fianna Fáil and 
Cumann na nGaedheal positions. The Irish Times, noting that the Labour representative, 
who sided with Fianna Fáil‟s minority report, had „made reservations on particular points‟ 
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added that it was clear that the policies of the two main parties were „diametrically 
opposed and few people believed that they could be reconciled at round-table 
conferences‟.58 The committee proved a failure but is of interest here in that it sheds light 
on the respective positions of the two main parties. 
 
Eve of election Retrenchment 1931 
 
Ireland was slow to feel the effects of the Depression as the price of those goods the 
Free State imported fell more rapidly than those it exported. However, by 1931 its affects 
were clearly felt and it had created a considerable gap in the country‟s budgetary position. 
While Income Tax and Corporation Profit taxes remained stable, decreased trade, 
particularly from 1930 onwards, affected customs and excise duties. As noted, reductions 
in alcohol consumption had already affected revenue in previous years and the depressed 
state of world trade worsened the position of the Free State‟s finances. In the autumn and 
winter of 1929, the government demonstrated its continued adherence to economic 
liberalism and the eradication of trade barriers by entering into commercial treaties first 
with Portugal,
59
 and then with Norway.
60
 In signing the treaty with Portugal, the 
government asserted its autonomy by insisting that the Great Seal of the Free State be used. 
The British consented and it was the first time the state‟s seal was used in an international 
document. However, trade continued to slide, and had an adverse effect on revenue. By 
September 1931, receipts were £721,500 less than the budget estimate, with the fall in 
customs and excise responsible for the greater part of the loss.
61
 The extent to which the 
country‟s trade was devastated by the world depression, is illustrated by the fact that, in the 
period July 1930 to June 1931, Free State imports and exports fell by some £8,000,000 
each resulting in an overall reduction of trade valuing £16,300,000.
62
 Trade had also fallen 
in the previous year, though not to the same extent. In preparatory work for the budget for 
the financial year 1932/33, the trade depression was taken into account with the result that 
revenue estimates were down by over one million pounds on the previous year. For the 
conservative officials of the department of Finance, government was still costing too much, 
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with McElligott castigating the failure to effect sufficient administrative economies, such 
as reductions in the Governor General‟s establishment, as had been suggested in previous 
years.
63
 A budget deficit of £2,460,500 was anticipated for the financial year 1932/33.  
Of course Ireland was not unique. The world trade depression affected most 
countries and made the task of balancing the budget that bit more difficult. In fact, the Free 
State was one of very few countries that managed to balance its budget in 1930/31. That 
financial year had produced a very small surplus in Ireland while there were budget deficits 
of 2% in Czechoslovakia, 3% in France and Britain, 6 % in Germany and 22 % in the 
United States.
64
 However, given the squeeze on the country‟s trade and the changed world 
conditions, balancing the following year‟s budget would prove even more difficult. 
Something would have to give. Taxation would have to increase or spending would need to 
be cut if Cumann na nGaedheal was to avoid having to implement policies that it had long 
opposed. 
The problem of unemployment is synonymous with the history of inter-war Europe. 
However, in the predominantly agricultural Irish Free State, unemployment was not the 
problem that it was in more industrial nations such as Britain or Germany. Having failed to 
industrialise during the 1920s, Irish cities were not crowded with disenchanted 
unemployed as characteristic of more highly industrialised centres in this period. 
Unemployment in the Free State is notoriously difficult to determine given the short-term 
nature of assistance,
65
 and the fact that there had long been nationalist hostility to welfare 
provisions introduced by the British. The closure of the emigration outlet to North America 
meant that the country, as in 1918 (see previous chapters), contained more discontented 
people than usual by the time the election of February 1932 came along. Both employers 
and employees paid into to the unemployment fund but less people claimed benefit than 
were registered as unemployed, perhaps as a consequence of the agricultural nature of the 
economy farming was able to absorb some of the unemployed workers.
66
 In 1922 over 
40,000 Irish people were out of work. The numbers unemployed remained high until the 
mid 1920s before falling dramatically to 21,019 in 1926. In September 1930 there were 
20,652 on the live register. Emigration was an option available to Irish people who could 
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not find work in the mid 1920s. By the early 1930s, emigration to North America 
practically ceased as the United States, feeling the effects of the crash, restricted 
immigration resulting in a slight population increase in the Free State.  As Britain 
recovered in the mid-1930s, Irish emigrants found a new destination. Cumann na 
nGaedheal adopted a conservative approach to unemployment believing it was not the 
business of government to create jobs and remained focussed on private enterprise.
67
 
Ireland‟s public finances continued to deteriorate given the world slump and a tax on petrol 
was introduced to finance a new agricultural grant. The party stood by its dictum that the 
farming sector was the state‟s primary economic interest. 
In the autumn of 1931 it was clear that a supplementary budget was necessary to help 
bridge the gap between receipts and expenditure. The government needed to find £900,000 
and decided to recover half that amount by increasing taxation by six pence in the pound 
and doubling the petrol duty. The remainder would come from retrenchment.
68
 Tough 
austerity had been introduced in Germany the previous year,
69
while in September 1931, 
public sector pay cuts in Britain represented a last ditch attempt to stay on the gold 
standard.
70
 Britain changed course eventually under a new government. In Ireland, 
Cumann na nGaedheal, nearing the end of its term, was unlikely to radically change its 
approach and so prepared to trim the state‟s wage bill. Numerous ways of saving money 
were proposed by the department of Finance. Among those options for consideration were 
reductions in garda pay, teacher‟s salaries and once again, old-age pensions.71 On the eve 
of a general election, the discussion of such reductions, let alone their implementation, 
would do nothing to enhance the party‟s popularity with the electorate. Remaining 
committed to its orthodox policy, the government faced a difficult political choice.  
With memories of the political backlash it faced in 1924 over the pension reduction, 
the government decided to target public salaries rather than cut the old age pension again. 
However, cutting teacher‟s salaries and garda pay provoked fierce resistance and proved 
politically damaging. Rumours of retrenchment and salary cuts for gardaí and teachers 
were widespread in the autumn of 1931. It was well known that people would be asked to 
make sacrifices given the difficulty of balancing the budget and many saw it as their 
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patriotic duty providing the cuts were fair. The government‟s economy committee had 
„reported on the teachers‟ salaries as a likely source of Exchequer saving, even before the 
present stringent financial situation arose‟ reported the Irish Times, which predicted 
resistance unless teachers would be shown that other public servants would similarly be 
„obliged to suffer in the national interest‟.72 Finance‟s memo argued that the savings from 
salaries were justified given that the cost of living had fallen since the scales were 
introduced in 1920.
73
 Furthermore, the document pointed out that the passage of the School 
Attendance Act would result in the appointment of 500 additional teachers thus placing a 
considerable drain on public finances. The government, keen to ensure that the political 
path to cuts would be as smooth as possible, arranged for a deputation of the Irish National 
Teachers‟ Organisation to meet with Blythe and John Marcus O‟Sullivan, the Education 
minister. Teachers were asked to accept a 10% cut to their existing salaries (6% wage cut 
combined with new pension arrangements amounting to 4%).The Teacher‟s organisation 
accepted the cut before Christmas, saving the Exchequer some £300,000.
74
 
 Reducing police pay was to prove more problematic. By 12 January 1932 it was 
clear that Blythe‟s plan to cut government costs was to be extended to the gardaí, with all 
ranks subject to a 5% reduction.
75
 In 1929 Blythe had told the Dáil that police pay was at 
rock bottom and that members of the force need not fear the economic axe. This made the 
announcement of January 1932 a particularly bitter bill for gardaí to swallow. Government 
platitudes about depressed world conditions and the need to balance the national budget 
did little to ease the pain. O‟Duffy was incensed by the government‟s decision to reduce 
the pay of his force and made his views clear to his political masters in „a memo, which 
verged on political blackmail‟. 76  Showing his unsuitability for the role of police 
commissioner, O‟Duffy claimed that the garda „individually and collectively‟ had been a 
loyal and faithful servant of the government and had helped party organisers „carry out 
their organising work‟.77 So much for Kevin O‟Higgins‟ speech to the Dáil in 1924 when 
he said „those who take the pay and wear the uniform of the State, be they soldiers or 
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police, must be non-political servants of the State‟.78 In the memo, O‟Duffy demonstrated 
his over-eagerness to involve himself in political matters and portrayed the force as the 
servants of the government party. He claimed, gardaí had helped Cumann na nGaedheal 
win votes and had dealt with interrupters at party meetings. The police commissioner 
further alleged that the government would cynically pay no heed to garda protests because 
they knew a Fianna Fáil government would be even more unsympathetic to their interests. 
Cumann na nGaedheal by then was growing ever more impatient with O‟Duffy and would 
likely have dismissed him had they won the 1932 election.
79
 
Also problematic for Cumann na nGaedheal as it campaigned for re-election in 1932, 
was a sense that it had been wrong not to introduce more tariffs. Cosgrave‟s introduction of 
new protectionist measures in 1931 seemed to indicate the party knew it had been wrong 
and was about to mimic the Fianna Fáil policy.
80
 As stated numerous times, Cumann na 
nGaedheal adopted a cautious approach to protection given that such policies had been 
synonymous with Irish nationalist politics for decades and in particular with the Sinn Féin 
party of Arthur Griffith, from which it claimed a direct lineage. Yet the Free State under 
Cumann na nGaedheal was generally committed to liberal economics and by the time of 
the 1932 election, the state was an exception in that „it was ruled by Europe‟s longest-
serving democratic government, and it could claim (with some exaggeration) to be one of 
the world‟s last free-trading nations.81 Cosgrave‟s government continued to experiment 
with tariffs until 1932, slowly introducing new duties as had been the trend of 1920s 
Europe. Cosgrave, in the early 1930s, was slow to join the new tendency towards spiralling 
tariffs and was regarded by Keynes as a „nineteenth century liberal‟.82 As the Depression 
worsened, tariffs were extended and in January 1931, Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna 
Fáil joined forces to vote through the imposition of a new duty on imported butter.
83
 In 
response, the November 1931 Customs Duties (Provisional Imposition) Act empowered 
the government to pass emergency charges to prevent the dumping of goods on the Irish 
market. As the Depression worsened, Fianna Fáil‟s economic policies seemed to be 
vindicated, putting Cumann na nGaedheal increasingly on the back foot. On the 
international arena, Cumann na nGaedheal representatives had always espoused a more 
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avowedly protectionist position than that they pursued domestically, but that was probably 
more in keeping with a desire to assert Ireland‟s authority internationally as a small nation 
and not to allow the country be steamrolled by the agenda set by the bigger powers.
84
 
Duties introduced in 1929 on quilts and woollen goods had boosted revenue (helping to 
make up for that lost elsewhere) and resulted in modest employment increases as had 
previous duties on soaps, jams, confectionary, blankets and shirts. However, the same 
document exercised caution when it claimed that British exporters were forced to quote a 
lower price when home competition was effective and that certain imports could not be 
stamped out because people  had a preference for a certain „taste‟ or brand.85 
 
The 1932 election: political, economic and social change? 
 
Retrenchment and the appearance of mimicking its opponent‟s policies was not a 
successful blueprint for electoral victory in any era. Yet, this is precisely how Cumann na 
nGaedheal entered the campaign in February 1932, although the latter point has probably 
been overstated by previous writers, as we shall see later. Of course, Cosgrave need not 
have called the election when he did; it may well have been beneficial to wait until the 
summer when the public pay cuts controversy had settled down. Anxious to avoid 
politicising July‟s Eucharistic Congress, Cosgrave decided to have the question of who 
should govern decided in advance.
86
 Whoever won the election would face steep economic 
problems, but still each party fought intensely for the poisoned chalice.  
One consequence of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s financial orthodoxy was that social 
services suffered. In an era before the welfare state, public services in the 1920s and 30s 
were still evolving and throughout this thesis it has been shown that the economic reality 
of independence, and the agricultural nature of Irish economic activity, meant that state 
resources of independent Ireland would be sparse limiting the scope for expansion in terms 
of the services provided by the state. A quite developed welfare system was inherited on 
independence. Irish nationalists and Catholics alike had never been enthusiastic about the 
welfare provisions introduced by the British government and it was likely these would not 
                                                          
84
 As expressed by Blythe and O‟Sullivan at the 1928 League of Nations Economic Conference, Irish 
Independent, 14 Sept.1928. 
85
 Effect of tariffs on prices in the Saorstát, 14 Apr. 1931 (UCDA, Ernest Blythe papers P24/321/2).  
86
 Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland, p. 51. 
279 
 
be extended after independence.
87
 Cumann na nGaedheal chose to cut taxation and reduce 
spending which further limited the services provided under the Free State government. 
This was a policy choice made by the government and another consequence of its rigid 
adherence to economic liberalism. Blythe and his colleagues believed that sacrifices made 
during their time in government would be to the long term benefit of the country. 
Addressing a Cumann na nGaedheal meeting in Nenagh in April 1930 Blythe said his 
priority was not reckless social policy in the present but „the giving of an opportunity to the 
country to develop, so that in times to come, perhaps, much greater social benefits could be 
given without imposing such a burden as would be necessary now‟.88 
Having matured in opposition for five years, Fianna Fáil entered the 1932 contest 
looking more like a government in waiting than ever before. Fianna Fáil‟s Dáil speeches, 
the proceedings of the Economic Committee and its by-election campaigns and 
propaganda hinted at the type of change that it would implement if elected to government. 
Fianna Fáil was likely to put more acres under tillage to the detriment of the commercial 
farmers who favoured Cumann na nGaedheal; divert more resources to native industry; and 
substantially expand Free State tariffs as it embarked on a policy of self-sufficiency. Irish 
agriculture‟s focus would change from trade to subsistence. As noted by Terence Dooley, 
Fianna Fáil intimated it „would tackle the land question much more forcibly and radically 
than Cumann na nGaedheal‟ and de Valera‟s rhetoric promised to divide the grazing 
ranches among the labourers and young farmers.
89
 The Depression made it difficult for 
many farmers to pay their land annuities and the main opposition party promised to 
withhold these in the Free State.
90
 In this way Fianna Fáil was able to appeal to those 
discontented with the pace of change, pushing Cumann na nGaedheal further to a 
reactionary position.  
As seen in earlier chapters, outrages were still a feature of Irish life and the IRA and 
Saor Éire were two increasingly left-wing and militant organisations that the government 
was acutely aware of. Given the opposition of these groups to Cumann na nGaedheal and 
the Free State, the fact that the government party‟s policy position of economic liberalism 
was in retreat globally, and that Fianna Fáil was proposing radical changes, it was but a 
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short leap for the party‟s propagandists to dream up the „gunmen versus statesmen‟91 or 
„Red scare‟ campaign that characterised the 1932 general election. Regan has shown how 
Treatyite intellectuals such as Tierney, Professor James Hogan and Desmond FitzGerald 
feared Fianna Fáil‟s social and economic programme and how their own response was 
intertwined with contemporary trends in Catholic social teaching, although he probably 
goes a little far in attributing it to paranoia within the party leadership.
92
  It should not be 
forgotten that the opposition party threatened the core support of the urban middle class 
and commercial farmers who had subscribed to Cumann na nGaedheal‟s economic 
policies.
93
 Through a combination of its tariff policy, its emphasis on putting more acres 
under tillage and its promotion of land division policies that Garvin describes as a „wager 
on the weak‟ ,94 the main opposition party, consciously or not posed as a party of political, 
social and economic change. Taken with intelligence reports in the late 1920s and early 
1930s,
95
 and attempts to depict the IRA as a front for Communist infiltration,
96
  the „Red 
scare‟ was a small leap of imagination in this deeply conservative society. Clearly, the 
momentum was with Fianna Fáil given the type of policies it was proposing as the 
economy contracted and the manner in which the government had antagonised various 
sections of the electorate in the lead-up to the campaign. On the defensive, Cumann na 
nGaedheal responded with its negative campaign in the hope of rallying its core support 
while once again posing as the party of stability. Cumann na nGaedheal promised to 
protect a state and a society that would be jeopardised should Fianna Fáil implement its 
policies. This negative campaign revealed the reality that the policies previously pursued 
by the government had been largely discredited. 
Cumann na nGaedheal stood on its record in 1932, as the party that had upheld the 
Treaty and had ensured the Free State‟s credit was high internationally. The party also 
sought to highlight the successes of its External Affairs policy as ministers emphasised that 
Britain could not interfere in the Free State without incurring the wrath of the other 
Dominions (the Statute of Westminster 1931). However, as Ciara Meehan points out, there 
was little domestic political capital to be gained from much of the party‟s diplomatic 
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achievements and the Statute of Westminster had come too late for its impact to be of 
electoral benefit to Cumann na nGaedheal.
97
 Cumann na nGaedheal simply argued that the 
Free State was independent in an attempt to counter the Republican and irredentist card 
played by Fianna Fáil.
98
 Essentially it stood for the status quo at a time when emigration 
outlets were closed off, people failed to see any material benefits for the sacrifices they had 
made, and the arguments for an alternative agenda seemed insurmountable given what has 
been described as the „beggar-my-neighbour character of international politics and trade in 
the 1930s‟.99 Fianna Fáil was the party of radical change, proposing a new departure in 
economic and social policy. Addressing an election meeting at Dunlavin, Lemass appealed 
to former supporters of other parties to join with Fianna Fáil in having „the spirit of Irish 
nationalism invoked in a sustained effort to solve their social and economic problems‟.100 
A new epoch was ushered in as Fianna Fáil won the election inaugurating an immediate 
transformation, with far-reaching consequences.  
 
Fianna Fáil in government 
 
Fianna Fáil governed with the support of the Labour party until January 1933. At its 
first cabinet meeting on 10 March 1932, the new government decided to release a great 
number of Republican prisoners and to immediately set about changing the State‟s tariff 
policy.
101
 If the implementation of tariffs under Cumann na nGaedheal had been piecemeal, 
those decided on at the first cabinet meeting by Fianna Fáil were revolutionary. The new 
government‟s tariff policy was quite a contrast to the approach of the Cosgrave 
government as something in the region of 200 new tariffs were initiated, amounting to an 
immediate adoption of wholesale protectionism. Moreover, Fianna Fáil, as promised, 
withheld the land annuities, provoking a furious response from Britain. Whatever goodwill 
had existed between the state and Britain evaporated as the outbreak of a damaging 
Economic War between the two marked de Valera‟s first year in power. Described by 
Keogh as a „costly diplomatic gaffe‟,102 and as a „silly political wrangle‟ by Ó Gráda, the 
Economic War coming as it did at a time of worldwide depression, compounded the 
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country‟s difficulties. As stated above, the initial round of tariffs introduced by Britain had 
no appreciable effect on trade in the Free State and the dominions were exempt. However, 
in its review of 1932,  The Economist was clear that the retention of the land annuities by 
de Valera and Britain‟s subsequent retaliatory tariff  were the causes of  a trade war that 
„obscured tendencies which otherwise would have been observed‟. 103  In addition, the 
magazine correctly surmised that the trade war worked to Fianna Fáil‟s advantage in that it 
facilitated the new government‟s domestic policy agenda of self-sufficiency. Fianna Fáil 
would pursue considerable state intervention in the form of compulsion, subsidies and 
tariffs to bring about the self-sufficient national economy. However, the effect on southern 
agriculture was disastrous as traditional economic activity was doubly affected. Not only 
was the Free State excluded from Imperial preference, it was subjected to penal duties.
104
 
At a time when competition for the British market was more intense than ever, the Free 
State lost its traditional position. Johnson argues that Irish livestock exports to Britain 
„would almost certainly have been given favourable treatment‟ were it not for the 
Economic war and British suspicion of de Valera‟s political motives.105  
From the opposition benches, former Cumann na nGaedheal ministers speculated as 
to how the new government could square the circles of collapsed revenue, a likely deficit 
and ambitious programmes of social and economic reform that would cost a great deal of 
money at a time of economic contraction. This reflected the extent to which the party 
remained caught up in the orthodoxies that had characterised its decade in power. For 
Blythe, it was a „strange and moving spectacle‟ that the Civil War vanquished should be 
„handed over the control of the army, police force and Treasury of the Irish Free State‟. It 
was a bitter pill for Blythe that the „party now called Cumann na nGaedheal, led on the 
first occasion by the late Arthur Griffith and the late Michael Collins, and in the three 
subsequent elections by Mr. Cosgrave...[should now find itself] in a minority‟.106 Blythe 
pondered how a government committed to extending social services could do so given the 
perilous position of the Exchequer: „Fianna Fail [sic], therefore, is faced with the problem 
of providing increased social services out of a revenue that will certainly be smaller than it 
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has been heretofore‟. 107  Cumann na nGaedheal was sure that de Valera would come 
unstuck and that Cosgrave would soon be called on to form a government once more. In 
the meantime Blythe promised constructive opposition and that his party would „cooperate 
in every step in which they can see a prospect of promoting the welfare of the nation‟. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s first annual convention as an opposition party took place in April 
1932. Delegates warned of the danger of the Free State pursuing an isolationist policy and 
called on the new government to continue the work of Cumann na nGaedheal. Fianna Fáil 
was warned against policies that would endanger the „economic advantages of 
Commonwealth membership‟. Delegates to the Cumann na nGaedheal convention passed 
resolutions stating that the party had restored order to a country it found in chaos during 
the Civil War and had handed over a balanced budget to its successors. Moreover, party 
members argued that the Free State inherited by the Fianna Fáil government was „suffering 
less from the effect of economic depression than any other country in the world‟.108 
Tax increases were anticipated in Fianna Fáil‟s first budget to meet its „ambitious 
schemes of social reform‟.109 In the event, taxation did increase, to the consternation of 
business interests and the Cumann na nGaedheal opposition. The party claimed that Fianna 
Fail was imposing taxes that the community could not bear. Fianna Fáil brought taxation 
back to five shillings in the pound (it had been six shillings in 1922). The new government 
also introduced the Control of Manufacturers Act. This act aimed to limit the scope of 
foreign firms to establish plants in the Free State, therefore countering those who had 
argued against protected industries on the grounds that foreign competitors might seek 
shelter behind the tariff wall. Under the act, in a throwback to Lemass‟s work on the 
Economic Committee, such firms had to seek a special licence from the minister for 
Industry. Fianna Fáil believed the act would eliminate foreign competition thereby 
encouraging Irish capital to invest in native industry. Again Cumann na nGaedheal and 
business interests opposed the new measure with McGilligan arguing the act infringed on 
certain commercial treaties, entered into by the Cosgrave government. 
110
 Commercial 
farmers saw their wealth dwindle during 1933 and 1934 as cattle exports from the Free 
State collapsed in value. Johnson describes Fianna Fáil‟s agricultural policies as a failure 
with overall output falling and the increased tillage acreage failing to provide more 
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employment on the land.
111
 Moreover, protectionism pushed Irish prices above world 
levels. 
Such is the background to the political instability in the Free State in 1932-33.
112
 The 
new government embarked on a radical overhaul of Free State policy. This challenged 
what Mike Cronin has called those voters who had prospered under the „sturdy, upright, 
Conservative government of Cosgrave‟.113 Those voters subsequently felt threatened by the 
political changes that were taking place and flocked to the ranks of the Blueshirts after 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s second defeat in January 1933. Perhaps de Valera had moved too 
swiftly to effect change? Political instability, ultimately the fruits of his crusade, proved 
devastating for the reputation of a country that was experiencing economic hardship. The 
Wall Street Journal was scathing in its criticism of Ireland‟s new government. Lamenting 
the way Fianna Fáil had handled the state‟s main economic activity, the journal claimed 
that Ireland had once been a leading cattle exporter.
114
 De Valera was an abstract idealist 
whose supporters focussed on the intangible realities of Irish nationalism and envisaged an 
Ireland „absolutely independent of all ties whatsoever to any other nation‟. Cosgrave‟s 
supporters on the other hand focussed on the tangible realities proposing „to make the best 
of these, looking to the future for an “all Ireland” in fact [original emphasis] in full control 
of her national life, but meanwhile not caring much about those things which lie in the 
region of form and symbol‟. The result of political change had been bitter divisions in Irish 
society and the mobilising of the IRA and the „white army‟ (Blueshirts).115 Similarly, the 
Manchester Guardian commented that Cosgrave had promoted friendly relations with 
Britain out of „economic necessity‟.116 The New York Times believed that the mainstay of 
the Irish economy under Cosgrave, the cattle market, was on the brink of collapse due to 
the trade war.
117
 The price of dairy cows had fallen sharply leaving farmers reluctant to sell 
even if they would soon have no choice due to the cost of feeding the animals. On the same 
day, the Herald Tribune reported on the burning of Union Jacks in Dublin after an anti-
imperialist meeting which had resulted in rioting in the city. The paper also reported that 
poppies had been snatched from their wearers as emboldened Republicans protested 
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against the legacy of armistice day in the Free State.
118
 Ireland, like numerous countries 
ravaged by the Depression seemed engulfed by economic and political chaos. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s second electoral defeat within a year showed that it had not 
yet grappled with how to survive politically in the rapidly changing world of the early 
1930s. As noted, the party had struck a more positive tone for the 1933 election by offering 
a programme of policies that would mark its return to government, and by introducing a 
„talkie film‟ of Cosgrave.119 Moreover the party attempted to reconnect with its nationalist 
background by using the tricolour on advertisements and trumpeting Cosgrave‟s national 
record. However, the election had come too soon for the party. Those who had benefitted 
under Fianna Fáil, the small farmers, new industrialists etc were unlikely to be won over 
and in fact constituted a broad coalition that would help keep de Valera in power for 
sixteen, continuous years. Meanwhile those who had suffered disproportionately from the 
effects of the Economic War, tended to gravitate towards the new National Centre Party as 
well as Cumann na nGaedheal.
120
  The country seemed to be tearing itself apart again as it 
had done in 1922-23. The fourth National Loan launched in 1933 was affected as the 
political turmoil worried potential investors. 
By September 1933 Cumann na nGaedheal had given way to a new, united 
opposition party, United Ireland Party-Fine Gael. The new party reflected the extent to 
which Cumann na nGaedheal had been weakened and discredited by the economic 
convulsions of the early 1930s. Its second electoral defeat left Cumann na nGaedheal 
„demoralised and confused‟.121 It was compelled to accept merger on weaker terms than 
would have been likely the previous January had Alfie Byrne‟s „Mansion House call‟ for 
merger come to fruition. This may not have been problematic for Cosgrave and his 
colleagues given that „ideologically and culturally, Cumann na nGaedheal and the Centre 
party were by 1933 practically indistinguishable‟.122 United Ireland reflected some degree 
of continuity with Cumann na nGaedheal, but initially seemed to reject its parent party‟s 
brand of non interventionist economic policy. A manifesto was launched days after the 
merger on 8 September and a more detailed policy document was unveiled in November. 
Treatyite intellectuals such as James Hogan and Michael Tierney moved into the policy 
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vacuum caused by the discrediting of Cosgrave and his colleagues to shape the agenda of 
the new party.
123
 Cumann na nGaedheal‟s scepticism about the self-sufficiency drive was 
reiterated, Fine Gael believing the Free State could not operate as a self contained 
economic unit. Agriculture was again viewed as the main source of future prosperity while 
„old-time virtues of thrift, industry, enterprise and fair dealing‟ would be promoted. These 
were the „backbone of success‟ and, where they were not honoured, „capital will not come 
and durable prosperity will not be achieved‟.124 There was change too. While some of the 
old economic principles would be retained, Fine Gael half heartedly supported a 
corporatist agenda, as its solution to liberalism‟s failures. 125  However, the lukewarm 
support given by some party leaders, and the fact that it was quietly dropped in the mid 
1930s suggests that Cumann na nGaedheal lived on in Fine Gael and experimental policies 
continued to be greeted with a degree of scepticism. The party‟s embracing of 
interventionist economic policies should be understood in the context of the global 
economic collapse and the discrediting of laissez-faire. Indeed, the uneasy alliance 
between Fine Gael and its shirted movement was only maintained initially by de Valera‟s 
attempts to coerce the Blueshirts.
126
 After O‟Duffy‟s resignation in September 1934, and 
his failure to retain the loyalty of a vast majority of the grass-roots,
127
 the moderates began 
to take control of the party again. By the mid 1930s, the corporate idealists were lamenting 
that the new party had become Cumann na nGaedheal all over again. As expressed by 
Mike Cronin, „the rejection of direct action and the dismissal of O‟Duffy produced a 
reassertion of Cumann na nGaedheal traditionalism within the Party‟.128 
There was little doubt by 1933 that the pre-1914 order was a bygone era. The attempt 
to turn the clock back had not worked and the world had changed. German inflation and 
hyperinflation in the early 1920s had caused alarm and further contributed to the 
sponsorship of deflationary policies for the remainder of the decade. Moreover, budget 
deficits were initially frowned upon as any sense that a country‟s debt was more than it 
could hope to pay worried investors and experts alike. All that changed around the time of 
the 1932 election in Ireland. Britain left the gold standard in September 1931 and gradually 
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it came to be seen that deflation was actually a further negative force on the economy. 
Countries rowed back on economic integration in the early 1930s and focussed instead on 
domestic production and the home market. More and more governments introduced tariffs 
as a new era approached. Ireland too sought national solutions to its economic problems 
under de Valera though the upheaval this caused threatened political stability. Like much 
of inter-war Europe in 1932-33 these tensions in the Irish Free State increasingly spilled 
over into street politics as an unsettling and bleak future seemed to beckon.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The politics of the Irish Free State was transformed in 1932-33 as Fianna Fáil 
replaced Cumann na nGaedheal as the largest party in the Dáil to begin a sixteen-year 
period of unbroken de Valera-led government. Fianna Fáil would emerge with a plurality 
of seats at every general election until it was consigned to third place behind Fine Gael and 
the Labour Party in the extraordinary electoral contest of February 2011. For Cumann na 
nGaedheal, and the subsequent political development of the Irish state, the general 
elections of 1932 and 1933 had far-reaching consequences. Cumann na nGaedheal 
jettisoned its own unique identity, in the process leaving what proved a largely fruitless 
inheritance to its successor party, Fine Gael. For much of the twentieth century and for the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, Fine Gael languished on the opposition benches 
and at times struggled to define itself against its major rival. This thesis attempted to 
understand the complex reasons that caused this dramatic realignment of Irish politics in 
the early 1930s. 
 
Party organisation 
 
Working on the assertion of others that Cumann na nGaedheal was badly organised, 
and displayed many of the characteristics of a classic „cadre style party‟, the first part of 
this thesis examined this proposition by conducting a study of the party‟s structures in 
three representative constituencies. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s organisational machine 
operated with varying degrees of success in the constituencies of Clare, 
Longford/Westmeath and Dublin North. In Clare the party struggled electorally and was 
dogged by internal organisational problems for much of the period. Clare, the bailiwick of 
the party‟s arch rival Eamon de Valera, was something of an anomaly as Cumann na 
nGaedheal generally fared well in the western constituencies during its period of office 
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(although it ceded serious ground in the west to Fianna Fáil in 1932-33). In 
Longford/Westmeath the party‟s electoral fortunes improved from September 1927 and its 
organisational efforts there generally proved more successful than those in the barren 
territory of Clare. Dublin North was consistently one of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s electoral 
strongholds throughout the decade in question and was regarded as such by the other 
parties and even by local and national newspapers. Moreover, the party machine in Dublin 
North showed innovation in the party‟s formative days, in the setting up of a constituency 
social club in November 1927 and in its efforts to expand the cultural and sporting 
activities of Cumann na nGaedheal. Across all three constituencies efforts were made to 
expand local branches and to increase party membership between elections. Moreover, 
organisers such as R.J. Purcell frequently toured the country to build up new cumainn. 
Purcell was well respected by government party supporters across the Free State. After the 
March 1925 by-elections, various branches in Sligo/Leitrim voted thanks to Purcell on his 
„herculean effort‟ in the campaign and he was presented with a „wallet of notes‟ in a 
Cumann na nGaedheal victory celebration in Sligo on 23 March 1925.
1
 On his death in 
January 1930, the tributes came in from grateful activists across the country as well as 
figures such as W.T. Cosgrave and Seán Milroy.
2
  
Susan Scarrow, building on the work of Maurice Duverger, distinguishes mass 
parties from cadre parties, not by their success in enrolling a grass-root membership, but by 
the presence of an „aspiration‟ to enlist supporters in a widespread branch organisation.3 
Mass parties were a response to the emergence of newly enfranchised electorates in the 
early part of the twentieth century, had permanent local structures and reinforced political 
identity through recreational clubs and party newspapers.
4
 In essence, the mass parties of 
the early twentieth-century created political communities and aimed at the harnessing of 
their strong support through the organisational structures of the party. Cadre parties, on the 
other hand, were associated with the era of the more limited franchise. They were 
decentralised, loosely knit and usually organised around groups of local notables who 
understood the politics of their party. While largely obsolete by the end of the Great War, 
many features of the old cadre parties lived on in traditional liberal and conservative 
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parties. This was due to what Duverger calls a certain „repugnance of the middle class for 
political regimentation‟.5 While Cumann na nGaedheal displayed some of the 
characteristics of a cadre type party, particularly with regard to clerical leadership of 
numerous rural branches in Clare and Longford/Westmeath, it must nevertheless be 
regarded as a mass organised party of its time, albeit a less successful version than that 
later mastered by Fianna Fáil. Cumann na nGaedheal was often forced to throw money at 
organisational problems and on many occasions dispatched paid organisers to badly 
organised constituencies in advance of general elections to ensure selection conventions 
were thoroughly representative of party support. However, this practice also occurred in 
Fianna Fáil. In March 1927, Fianna Fáil delayed its selection convention in Monaghan so 
as to „enable the organisation to be established in certain centres where it did not yet 
exist‟.6 Reorganisation of the pro-Treaty party‟s structures often took place between 
elections too. In 1925 Cumann na nGaedheal made a determined effort to build permanent 
structures in Counties such as Clare and Westmeath where previous efforts had proven 
unsuccessful. 
For four years Cumann na nGaedheal operated without a party newspaper due to 
widespread support for the pro-Treaty position in the national, regional and local press. 
From 1927 onwards, The Freeman, The Star and the revived United Irishman served as 
Cumann na nGaedheal sheets while the North Dublin Election News carried its election 
time message to voters in Dublin North. In addition, advisory booklets were produced for 
rank-and-file members. In advance of the June 1927 poll Cumann na nGaedheal produced 
an election handbook and in 1932 published Fighting points for Cumann na nGaedheal 
speakers and workers, general election 1932. These publications directed grass-root 
activists in their electoral role and provided useful information to help with canvassing, 
rallies and polling day duties. Party publications and official newspapers, such as those 
produced by Cumann na nGaedheal, are yet another characteristic of mass membership 
parties in this period. As shown in chapter five, the innovative Dublin North constituency 
organisation also arranged recreational and cultural events. Such activities were also 
prevalent in Cumann na nGaedheal circles elsewhere and in 1933 the secretary of the 
Roscommon constituency urged members to arrange social functions suggesting concerts, 
dances, dramatic entertainments and card tournaments as examples of events that could 
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prove successful.
7
 Like mass parties of the time, Cumann na nGaedheal aimed to enrol its 
supporters in a nationwide branch network and Dublin North‟s recreational activities were 
intended to strengthen supporters‟ identification with the party. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
clear desire to build a mass party also explains the recruitment of paid organisers to stir and 
expand its existing structures.  
On leaving government in 1932 concerted efforts were made to improve the Cumann 
na nGaedheal grass-root organisation. Blythe wrote of the need to attract more young 
people into Cumann na nGaedheal and suggested the party make use of the Army 
Comrades Association in much the same way as Fianna Fáil had depended on the anti-
Treaty IRA for much of its vitality in the mid to late 1920s.
8
 A year later after its second 
electoral defeat in less than twelve months Cumann na nGaedheal front benchers 
established a reorganisation committee under the guidance of Richard Mulcahy. In the 
spring of 1933 Mulcahy produced numerous documents geared towards the breathing of 
new life into Cumann na nGaedheal‟s constituency structures. The former minister 
formulated a new scheme of organisation that would target the working classes, the 
labourers, the young and women voters.
9
 Before the merger to form Fine Gael, Cumann na 
nGaedheal was already looking at ways to emulate Fianna Fáil‟s success at developing as a 
mass movement. In opposition, the party‟s leaders could devote more time to the 
development of its grass-root structures, Cosgrave took on the lead role in the organisation 
for the first time, and branch members themselves recognised their important new role. It is 
worth quoting the County Roscommon secretary again: 
 
I do not propose in this letter to deal with the political situation beyond saying that I believe this 
Organisation will again be the one which will have to supply the next Government for this State 
and this being my opinion I would impress on you and your Members the need for keeping your 
Cumann in a good working condition, by having regular Meetings, by enrolling new[,] and if 
possible[,] young members and by being always prepared for any eventualities that may arise.
10
 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal activists had less scope to influence policy than their anti-
Treatyite counterparts. In Fianna Fáil each cumann was entitled to two delegates at the Ard 
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Fheis, in Cumann na nGaedheal, from 1926 onwards, each branch could send one delegate 
to the party‟s annual convention. Given that it spent most of its life in government, 
Cumann na nGaedheal was unlikely to yield too much power to its grass-roots to the 
detriment of administrative probity in the early years of Irish statehood. Bad experiences 
during the Treaty debates ensured Treatyite leaders would not be tied to the resolutions 
passed by party militants in „packed convention halls and rigged ballots‟.11 Power would 
rest with the parliamentary party and ultimately with the government. As noted by David 
Farrell, this was a characteristic of Irish parties generally. The „predominant party model in 
Ireland‟ was one where the parliamentary party was independent of party structures 
(though they could sit on the organisation‟s committees) and headquarters‟ staffs, such as 
the general secretary, were answerable to the party leader. In post-independence Irish 
politics elected politicians were not subservient to their party machine and the grass-roots 
would generally have a limited role in the formation of policy.
12
 Duverger argues that this 
is inevitable. Parliamentary parties are representative of the wider electorate and the voters 
who identify with the party‟s policies. National Committees and party conferences on the 
other hand are representative of paid up members, the party‟s militants. Parliamentary 
parties and governments know they cannot formulate policy on such a basis. 
Having established Cumann na nGaedheal‟s status as a mass party, let us qualify this 
by stating that it was not as successful as Fianna Fáil in building up an extensive party 
machine. Cumann na nGaedheal possessed at most some 800 branches across the Free 
State (and this might even be an exaggeration), while Fianna Fáil‟s totals ranged from 435 
to 1,307 between 1926 and 1932.
13
 Fianna Fáil‟s first Ard Fheis was attended by 467 
delegates and its conferences thereafter were more than double the attendance at Cumann 
na nGaedheal‟s annual convention reflecting greater emphasis on branch representation 
within de Valera‟s party. Fianna Fáil‟s second Ard Fheis was attended by 1,000 delegates 
representing 500 branches. Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 1927 party conference was attended 
by 325 delegates, each representing one cumann. While Sinn Féin had remained 
Cosgrave‟s main political opposition the organisational strength of the two parties was 
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quite evenly matched. In March 1925, there were 375 Sinn Féin branches, eighteen of 
which were in Britain.
14
 When Fianna Fáil was founded, anti-Treatyite organisational 
prowess stepped up a couple of gears. 
 A common feature of both the Free State‟s main parties from 1927 was the tendency 
of total affiliated cumainn to drop between elections. While there are no surviving Cumann 
na nGaedheal membership books to quote from, it is clear from the party‟s archive, private 
papers and contemporary newspaper reports that cumainn were prone to lapse or were slow 
to affiliate between elections and this often necessitated the efforts of a paid organiser. 
However, this was also the case in Fianna Fáil. According to Reynolds, there were just 550 
affiliated Fianna Fáil branches in 1930 (some of which were in England and Scotland).
15
  
This indicates that the number of Fianna Fáil cumainn had halved between 1927 and 1930 
before increasing again as the 1932 election approached. As such, a noted lapse in Cumann 
na nGaedheal‟s organisation between general elections,16 was not a uniquely Treatyite 
phenomenon. 
From 1927, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s organisation lagged behind that of the newly 
formed Fianna Fáil party which brought a new vigour to party mobilisation in Ireland. 
Cumann na nGaedheal‟s organisation had been able to match that of Sinn Féin in the early 
to mid 1920s but was  quite clearly overshadowed by Fianna Fáil‟s deliberate strategy in 
the latter part of the decade and into the early 1930s. Fianna Fáil by 1932 was the most 
successful mass organised party to emerge in Ireland. Cumann na nGaedheal was less 
successful in part due to the predominantly conservative nature of its support base 
(inherited through its advocacy of the Treaty), the increasing unpopularity of its policies 
and because of the party leadership‟s preoccupation with the day-to-day business of 
government. Fianna Fáil‟s superior organisation was undoubtedly a feature in the demise 
of Cumann na nGaedheal, but caution should be exercised in over-emphasising it as a 
deciding factor. The policy choices made by Cosgrave‟s government and an appetite 
among sections of the electorate for a more strident version of Irish nationalism that 
dovetailed with wider world economic and political trends were the main factors in 
Ireland‟s political realignment of 1932/33. On formulating a new approach to party 
organisation in the spring of 1933, Mulcahy acknowledged the whirlwind in which the 
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world was then caught. In a „quickly changing world‟, his party needed to „increase its vote 
by 75%‟ if it was to regain power.17 Within months, his own party had been swept away in 
the tide. 
 
Wider trends 
 
Cumann na nGaedheal was a moderate, conservative party typical of those 
predominant in western Europe in the 1920s. As already stated by Alvin Jackson, it would 
be a mistake to equate Cumann na nGaedheal with some of the more callous right-wing 
regimes in Europe at the time.
18
 Men and women over 21 were entitled to vote under the 
Free State constitution, the army mutiny was faced down by the civilian ministers, on 
balance the party‟s political opponents were integrated into the parliamentary apparatus of 
the state and power was peacefully transferred to Fianna Fáil after the people had spoken 
through the ballot box in February 1932. By the time of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
foundation in 1923 Europe was stabilising under the new post-war order. However, within 
a few years of the war it was clear that liberalism had been weakened in some countries as 
figures like Mussolini and de Rivera came to power around the time of the establishment 
of the Irish Free State. Left-wing urges unleashed during the war had been largely 
becalmed as the victors pressed ahead with fashioning the new European order in their own 
economic and political image. Germany and her allies had been defeated, while Britain, 
France and the United States aimed to perpetuate their own values in the aftermath of the 
war. As a result they set about recreating the „golden‟ world of the Belle Époque: 
unfettered free trade, balanced budgets and the fixed exchange mechanism of the gold 
standard. Liberal democracy too was promoted by the victors of the war. In Britain and the 
United States the war was heralded as a victory for democracy and national self-
determination.  
However, there were serious obstacles in the way of a return to the pre-1914 order. 
The war itself had challenged the principles of economic liberalism as belligerents were 
forced to abandon the gold standard, accrued large debts and allowed public spending 
spiral to unprecedented levels. In addition, the pre-1914 order had operated largely in the 
era of empire. By 1918, Imperial Germany, Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary and the 
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Ottoman Empire had all been swept away to be replaced by a patchwork of nation states 
and the first experiment in state Socialism. Some of the new nation states of Eastern 
Europe were determined to protect their national economies ensuring that tariffs and 
charges reigned where there had previously been Imperial free trade. Initially, it seemed 
left-wing parties and trade unions would benefit from the extension of the franchise and the 
radical impulses unleashed by the war. However, centrist and centre-right parties largely 
countered this by appealing to national sentiment, warning against class warfare and 
pressing ahead with a democratic experiment that seemed inherently unstable to extremists. 
Moreover, the left was divided in many countries between Social Democrats, keen to work 
within the new democratic parameters, and those who looked to Bolshevik Russia for 
inspiration. In Britain and France, demobilised war veterans remembered their fallen 
comrades and were determined that such a conflict would never happen again. In 
Germany, Italy and Austria, such pacifism did not reign. These countries were ultimately 
left disappointed with their lot in the post-war order and „stab in the back‟ myths lingered 
on with a desire to avenge the national wrong as militarism and politics converged.
19
 
Europe seemed caught in the middle between the emerging consumer society of the United 
States and the planned economy of Soviet Russia. Philosophers, politicians and 
demagogues clamoured to point the way forward as the continent came to terms with its 
greatest catastrophe to date. The redrawing of the map had social as well as economic 
consequences. Considerable dislocation was caused as various minority groups now found 
themselves on the wrong side of new national boundaries.
20
 Moreover, war had speeded up 
the process of urbanisation and it was the major cities where underlying social and ethnic 
tensions were most noticeable as were cultural changes which made traditionalists wary. 
Broadly speaking, by the mid 1920s, there seemed to be a consensus in favour of a 
return to prosperity generating free trade and reduced spending even though the world had 
been radically altered and what seemed like workable alternatives were in operation in 
countries such as Italy and Russia. To that end severe deflationary policies were pursued, 
particularly in the United States and Britain. Germany, Austria and Hungary initially 
preferred inflation but brought its own problems. Brief left-wing governments in Britain, 
Denmark and France failed to establish themselves in 1924 as gold standard orthodoxy 
once more became the measure by which a country‟s financial standing came to be 
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measured. It seemed to many observers in the mid 1920s that Europe would turn the corner 
economically.
21
 Kevin O‟Higgins once boasted that his party was the „most conservative 
minded group to put through a successful revolution‟,22 while many officials had been 
schooled in the conventions of the British Treasury before independence. Unsurprisingly 
then, Cumann na nGaedheal governments did not deviate from the status quo pursued by 
the United States and Birtain. Sound financial principles were rigidly adhered to regardless 
of the electoral consequences. Spending was reduced, taxes were cut and a determined 
effort was made to balance the Free State‟s national budget. Moreover, free trade was 
maintained with Britain as the government focussed on the production of a high-quality 
agricultural produce for the British market. Cumann na nGaedheal was lauded in 
conservative publications such as The Economist for its efforts to adhere to sound financial 
policies. Blythe and his colleagues were determined to show their resolve to take difficult 
decisions. However, even Cumann na nGaedheal‟s infamously parsimonious nature was 
not enough to gain it the seal of approval in the state‟s early years. In 1924 Raligh S. Rife 
was concerned that the government‟s Land Purchase Scheme would place too great a 
burden on the country‟s resources (chapter seven). 
Cumann na nGaedheal might have been influenced by Arthur Griffith in its 
nationalism, but was divided on where it stood with regard to the lost leader‟s economic 
teachings. A substantial group in the party favoured tariffs and an end to free trade but 
government policy sought a middle road that leaned towards free trade. The anti-Treatyites 
picked up the protectionist baton. From its foundation in 1926, Fianna Fáil preached an 
economic nationalist line that was committed to Irish self-sufficiency. Propitiously for it, 
the Wall Street crash of October 1929 shattered faith in laissez-faire. World trade 
collapsed, unemployment rose and government services had to be curtailed. 
Internationally, the argument for protection had been strengthened. In the Free State, 
Fianna Fáil was well placed to capitalise even though Ireland was spared the worst effects 
of the Depression. The country had not industrialised so Irish cities were not crowded with 
masses of laid-off workers in the early 1930s as were German and British urban centres. 
Nonetheless, from 1930 onwards, the effects of the Depression were felt in Ireland. 
Emigration outlets to North America were closed as the United States in particular reeled 
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from the effects of the crash. Prices fell and farmers found it increasingly difficult to pay 
the land annuities.  
Countries struggled with the collapse in revenue and governments became 
increasingly unpopular as they reduced spending. Being tied to the gold standard entailed 
pursuing deflationary policies which made people‟s lives particularly difficult at a time of 
economic slump. Political change was the result of economic convulsions as parties of the 
left and right increased support. Moderate politicians - liberals, conservatives and reformist 
socialists - failed to stem the economic crisis of the early 1930s.
23
 Liberalism was 
discredited as socialists, communists, and fascists pointed to its failings. Numerous 
countries lurched to the political extremes as the protection of national interests became the 
priority as resources dwindled. In 1931 Spain emerged from dictatorship to elect a left-
wing, republican government. In Britain that same year a national coalition was formed to 
meet the crisis. The coalition took Britain off the gold standard freeing her to devalue and 
pursue a protectionist economic policy thus signalling that the era of gold standard 
orthodoxy was definitely over. At this time liberal democracy‟s most deadly enemy was 
emerging as a major political player in Germany. Street politics and clashes of rival gangs 
became a characteristic of European cities during this difficult time. International tension 
mounted as economic rivalry caused countries to implement protective tariffs. By 
November 1932 every European country had either enhanced existing protective measures 
or introduced new tariffs to safeguard the national economy.
24
 Efforts to deal effectively 
with the Depression were hampered by a profound fear of inflation and budget deficits. 
Such paralysis initially worsened the Depression and enabled the less scrupulous 
proponents of change come to power in countries such as Germany. Weimar Germany was 
doomed to failure. Unemployment had destroyed self-respect in a country where a man‟s 
prestige derived from his job. In such a situation action seemed preferable to inaction,
25
 
and Hitler was able to extend his support by appealing to the newly discontented classes. It 
was the Depression that brought the Nazis to power. 
In the year before the Depression hit Ireland, Irish agricultural exports were valued at 
£47m. They would not reach that value again until 1948 as global economic integration 
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retreated.
26
 After the crash, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s approach was no longer sustainable 
and the protectionist lobby grew ever louder. Yet the party continued to regard tariffs 
essentially as a revenue-raising device and the modest introduction of new duties was seen 
as a way of making good trade losses. Moreover, the party responded to the economic 
crisis by prescribing retrenchment for the gardaí and teachers. The 1932 election amounted 
to a rebuttal of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s policy as Ireland turned inwards and against 
economic liberalism. Cumann na nGaedheal, like other parties that were slow to realise 
that financial orthodoxy was sensible in a time of plenty but disastrous in a time of 
scarcity, was swept from office. 
 
Political realignment in Ireland: domestic or international causes? 
 
Ireland did not exist in isolation from the extraordinary convulsions that swept the 
world in the early 1930s. In 1931 and 1932 the Depression had brought a national coalition 
to power in Britain, a republican government to Spain, political instability to many 
countries and would soon sweep the Nazis to power in Germany. The Irish electorate was 
also radicalised by the Depression. Cumann na nGaedheal had spent ten years building a 
state which would play its part in the world order which the Great War had seemingly 
brought into being. Instead, that order was crumbling by the time Irish voters went to the 
polls in February 1932. Internationally, policy makers and politicians were in the process 
of dismantling the economic system that had flourished in the first decade of peace. In 
some cases, the democratic political system that underpinned the post-war order was also 
being deconstructed.
27
 
Irish voters had backed the Treatyite leadership in the debates of 1922. They had 
endorsed Cumann na nGaedheal‟s appeal to stability and progress in 1923 and showed 
little appetite for renewed national struggle with England in the elections of June and 
September 1927. In the aftermath of the assassination of O‟Higgins, the Irish electorate 
had again solidly supported a continuation of President Cosgrave‟s policy while Fianna 
Fáil had increased anti-Treaty support essentially by moving closer to the Cumann na 
nGaedheal position on the Treaty and through the development of more innovative social 
and economic policies. Cumann na nGaedheal had won the debate on the Free State‟s 
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legitimacy, but as the economy slumped, Fianna Fáil was able to trump it on economic and 
social policy which it cleverly linked with its more aggressive nationalism.
28
 This is what 
had changed by 1932. On balance, Irish voters had not discovered a sudden aversion to a 
Treaty they had decidedly endorsed a decade earlier. Neither had Fianna Fáil‟s superior 
organisational prowess, or more aggressive nationalism, alone been the deciding factors in 
the 1932 election. What had  
Without dismissing outright all of the above contributory factors, they were but 
secondary to the worldwide economic Depression. There was little domestic capital to be 
won from Cumann na nGaedheal‟s solid achievements in statecraft and foreign policy. 
Most importantly, its economic policy was discredited by the slump in world trade. As the 
economic slump worsened, Cumann na nGaedheal failed to articulate a comprehensive 
response beyond the need to trim budgets. In response to the economic crisis, there was a 
minor extension of tariffs while further retrenchment was heaped upon a people already 
reeling from the effects of depressed trade, falling prices, closed emigration outlets and job 
losses. Fianna on the other hand offered radical change. It promised enhanced land 
distribution, protection of native industry, extended social services and a policy of 
economic self-sufficiency. Fianna Fáil appealed successfully to the national bourgeoisie, 
defined by Orridge as the class least dependent on the Commonwealth connection, and in 
the process hurt Cumann na nGaedheal‟s support in western constituencies.29 
Political realignment in early 1930s Ireland, as elsewhere, formed part of a global 
trend. However, the world being ushered into existence in the early 1930s was a sinister 
one that led inevitably to a Second World War. International cooperation retreated, selfish 
national interests became paramount and liberals played an increasingly marginal role. In 
Ireland, the effects of the political realignment endured. On its foundation, Fine Gael 
abandoned Cumann na nGaedheal policy and instead clumsily endorsed the corporate state 
in a way that never sat easy on Cosgrave‟s shoulders. In power de Valera was able to 
exploit the collapse in world trade in pursuit of self-sufficiency and a changed political and 
constitutional relationship with Britain. Fianna Fáil‟s subsequent hegemony in Irish 
politics resulted in a largely peripheral role for the other parties. Fine Gael struggled to 
shake off its mishandling of its initial spell in opposition and in particular its flirtation with 
the Blueshirt movement. By 1935, with Cosgrave at the head of affairs once more, the 
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party began to take on the appearance of a rebranded Cumann na nGaedheal. Fine Gael 
would have to wait almost eighty years before a second „Depression‟ would knock Fianna 
Fáil from the perch it had occupied since 1932. 
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